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Page 3
Page 2

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 36

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

Printed for the use of the
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561
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UNITED STATES
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Mrs. R. E. Wells . A5

Jan. 16, 1953 1946

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois	BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
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HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina	

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1911, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1915, to May 31, 1946
	Pages 203-209	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Allen, Brooke E., Maj.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Allen, Riley H.	---	---	3105-3120	---	---	---	---	---
Anderson, Edward B., Maj.	---	---	---	---	---	64	---	---
Anderson, Ray	---	---	2479-2491	---	---	---	---	---
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm.	---	391-398	---	---	---	---	---	---
Anstey, Alice	---	---	4022-4027	---	---	---	---	---
Arnold, H. H., Gen.	---	---	148-186	---	---	---	---	---
Asher, N. F., Ens.	1127-1138	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Ball, N. F., Ens.	1033-1038	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Ballard, Emma Jane	---	---	2567-2580	---	---	---	---	---
Barber, Bruce G.	---	---	3972-3988	---	---	---	---	---
Bartlett, George Francis	---	---	2492-2515	---	---	---	---	---
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr.	1719-1721	---	---	---	---	---	---	5269-5291
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens.	1219-1224	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm.	886-951	115-134	1575-1643	660-688	---	---	471-510	3814-3826 3450-3519
Benny, Chris J.	1382-1399	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Benson, Henry P.	---	---	3720-3749	---	---	---	---	---
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col.	377-389	---	1186-1220	---	---	---	---	---
Berry, Frank M., S i/c	1224-1229	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Betis, Thomas J., Brig. Gen.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Bicknell, George W., Col.	314-320	---	1413-1442	---	---	194	---	5089-5122
Bissell, John T., Col.	---	---	---	---	1, 2	59-63	---	---

Bloch, Claude C., Adm.	733-812	2-29, 86-96	1469-1537	385A-417			
Boone, Gilbert E., Lt. Comdr.						554-557, 607-608	
Bothne, A. M., Btswn.							
Bragdon, John S., Brig. Gen.	1181-1185		2894-2922, 3831-3884				
Brainard, Roland M., Vice Adm.		399-403	T. S. 54-96, 227-244, 278-308	1	206-208		4508-4628
Bratton, Rufus, Col.							
Brenchman, Albert L.	520-527						
Briant, Granville C., Comdr.		229-233					
Brooks, H. E., Lt. Col.			974-994				
Brotherhood, F. M., Lt. Comdr.				919A-930		143-147	
Brown, Wilson, Rear Adm.	1241-1259	135-146					
Brunner, Gertrude C.			2216-2221				
Bryden, William, Maj. Gen.			898-909				
Bunkley, Joel W., Rear Adm.		413-415					
Burgin, Henry T., Maj. Gen.	268-283		2598-2664				
Burr, Harold S., Comdr.			3067-3073			376-386	
Burton, H. Ralph.			848-896				
Butler, Bernard.	1753-1765						
Butterfield, James W.			4103-4121				
Calhoun, W. L., Vice Adm.	951-960	225-228		931-943			
Capron, W. A., Col.			2015-2030				
Carmichael, W. A., Lt. Col.			4015-4021				
Caulfield, Frances M.			143-144				
Chun, Philip Chew.			3258-3265				
Clarke, Chester R.			3623-3636				
Claverbos, Louis J., Col.			4095-4103				
Clausen, Henry C., Lt. Col.							
Coll, Raymond S.			3166-3184				4300-4508
Colton, Roger B., Maj. Gen.			670-696				
Combs, R. E.			2427-2455				
Conant, Joseph M., Lt. (jg)						158-162	
Connolly, Thomas E.			2158-2198				
Cooper, Howard F., Maj.	473-478		2130-2133				

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 30, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col.	478-483, 301-310							5080-5089
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)								
Crosley, Paul C., Comdr.		179-184						
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)	1171-1178							
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN		105-114						
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN	1178-1180							
Davidson, Howard C., Maj. Gen.	1659-1663, 170-198		4125-4151					
Davis, Arthur C., Rear Adm.		96-105						
Dawson, Harry L.						87-B		
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen.						205		
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm.	812-843, 1538-1571						163-181	
Dickens, June D., Sgt.	504-509	74-85	1695-1732	495-510				
Dillingham, Walter F.								
Dillon, James P.		2745-2785						
Dillon, John H., Maj.		4186-4196						
Dingeman, Ray E., Col.		3190-3201						
Donegan, William Col.		1928-1965						3826-3838
Doud, Harold, Col.	2-32							
Dunlop, Robert H., Col.						B223-224		
Dunning, Mary J.	365-368					B65-66		
Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col.						B229-231		
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN						49-51		
Earle, Frederick M., W/O			3642-3643				418-423	
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN	1747-1753	368-378					451-464	

Eboey, Frank W., Capt., USA	437-442					511-514	
Edgers, Dorothy	1286-1295						5027-5075
Eichelberger, Leslie E.							
Elliott, George F., Sgt.				991-1014	644-659	183-184	
Emanuel, Theodore, Ch/S. C.						83	
Evans, Joseph K., Col.							68-79
Fabian, Rudolph J., Comdr.							
Farthing, W. E., Brig. Gen.				832-848			
Ferguson, Homer, Hon.				4385-4408			
Felder, Kendall J., Col.	287-301, 311-313, 1670-1682						
Finnegan, Joseph, Capt., USN				2943-3010		B41-42, 190-193	
Fitch, Aubrey W., Vice Adm.		288-290					424-427
Flannery, Harry W.				2516-2522			
Fleming, Robert J., Jr., Col.				1254-1343			
Flood, William F., Brig. Gen.				2848-2865			149-150
Freeman, Frederick L., Lt., USN						B81-82	
French, Edward F., Col.	1842-1847			186-206		1, 2	
Friedman, William F.							515-528
Fuqua, Samuel G., Lt. Comdr.	1025-1033						
Furbush, Edward A.				4338-4345			
Furlong, William R., Rear Adm.	960-975						
Gabrielson, William A.	1296-1310					B80	
Gailey, Charles K., Jr., Gen.				145-147			983-1048, 1592-1673
Gerow, Leonard T., Maj. Gen.	1848-1860			4224-4338		B198-200	
Gesler, Earl E., Col.				932-964			
Gibson, Ernest W., Lt. Col.				T. S. 271- 277		1	
Glover, Robert O., Capt., USN		170-178					
Grafe, Paul				2288-2320			
Graves, Sidney C.				4346-4355			560-603, 615-773
Grew, Joseph C.				4197-4223	1062-1069		
Griffith, Edwin St. J.	517-520						
Hain, Robert W., Lt. Col.				3304-3355, 3650-3661			
Hall, Mobley, Sgt.	428-437						
Halsey, William F., Vice Adm.	978-1025	293-307					

[illegible]

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Phelan, John, Ens.	212-247,	---	1107-1160,	477-495	---	---	---	5210
Phillips, Walter C., Col.	284-287	---	1240-1252	---	---	---	---	4933-5009
Pickett, Harry K., Col.	1584-1594	---	3636-3640	---	---	---	---	---
Pierson, Millard, Col.	---	---	2375-2398,	---	---	---	---	---
Pine, Willard B.	---	---	3990-3996	---	---	---	---	---
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov.	1340-1356	---	3153-3165	---	---	---	---	---
Powell, Bolling R., Jr., Maj.	---	---	2923-2933	---	---	---	---	---
Powell, C. A., Col.	352-365, 395-415, 428	---	3885-3915	---	---	179-181	387-388	---
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr.	---	---	---	9-11, 271-272, 572-573, 1081-1082, 1136-1137, 1151-1152	---	---	---	---
Prather, Louise	---	---	1963-1988	---	---	232	---	---
Pratt, John S., Col.	---	---	1035-1070	417-446	---	---	---	---
Pye, William S., Vice Adm.	1766-1783, 855-884	147-169	---	---	---	---	---	---
Rafter, Case B.	---	---	778-789	---	---	---	---	---
Raley, Edward W., Col.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Ramsey, Logan C., Capt., USN	---	---	---	578-608	---	76-77	---	---
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm.	---	---	---	1091-1108	---	---	---	---

Reierstad, Leo, Lt. Comdr.						158-162	
Renchard, George W.						202	
Reybold, Eugene, Maj. Gen.			568-634				
Richards, Robert B., Col.			730-745				
Richardson, J. O., Adm.					1052-1061		253-340
Roberts, Owen J., Mr. Justice.			697-728				3259-3303
Robins, Thomas K., Maj. Gen.			3588-3623,				
Robinson, Bernard L., Col.			3803-3827				
Rochefort, Joseph John, Capt., USN.	1096-1123	207-213	1644-1672		470-476	43-44, 52-53	4672-4710
Rohl, Hans William			2222-2287			70-71	
Ross, Mary L.							
Row, Lathé B., Col.			2092-2129			67,	
Rowlett, Frank B., Lt. Col.						225-226	
Rudolph, Jacob H., Brig. Gen.	198-202		1221-1240				
Russell, Henry D., Maj. Gen.			4362-4366			85-86, 87-13	
Russell, John E.						209-211	
Sadtler, Otis K., Col.			T. S. 246- 259	1, 2			4628-4659
Safford, L. F., Capt., USN.		355-362	T. S. 109- 191		744-761		97-127, 529-540, 609-612
Saltzman, Stephen G., Lt., USA.	455-463		4164-4186				3555-3813, 3842-3893
Scanlon, Martin F., Brig. Gen.			3287-3304				
Schlesinger, Helen			635-669				
Schley, Julian L., Maj. Gen.					194-218, 311-318, 692-732		
Schuirmann, R. E., Rear Adm.		404-412					
Schukraft, Robert E., Col.						201	4910-4933
Schulz, Lester Robert, Comdr.							4659-4672
Settle, F. A.	1579-1583						
Shaw, C. H., CH/T	1138-1146						
Shirley, J. P.			2354-2360				
Shivers, Robert L.	1401-1447		3201-3225			88-96	
Shoemaker, James M., Capt., USN.	1191-1205		4366-4383				
Shoemaker, Thomas B.							

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 28, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Short, Arthur T.....	37-169,		3644-3650	220-270				2921-3231
Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen.....	1617-1647 452-455		276-541, 4411-4445					
Shortt, Creed, Pvt.....			3265-3286					
Sisson, George A.....							4-9	
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.....					2	69		
Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen.....				528-572		195-197	335-375	3354-3378, 3521-3555
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen.....		32-65						
Smith, William W., Rear Adm.....				1077-1081				
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN.....	1738-1742							5009-5027
Smoot, Perry M., Col.....								
Sonnnett, John F., Lt. Comdr.....					2			
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen.....	1186-1190			2-194, 320-324, 774-810				2096-2223, 2244-2477, 5153-5175, 5202-5269, 5543-5555
Stark, Harold R., Adm.....	1805-1808							
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR.....		323-334						
Stipphen, Benjamin L.....			1539-1575					5416-5440 ²
Stimson, Henry L.....			4037-4094 C					5441-5463 ¹
Stone, John F.....						203-204	411-413	
Street, George.....								
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen.....						185		

Sweeney, J. J., Rev.	1368-1372								
Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Capt., USA	1447-1469			3250-3257					
Taylor, Kenneth, Lt., USA	415-422								
Taylor, William E. G., Comdr	1229-1240			338-354		609-627			
Thielen, Bernard, Col									26-27, 34-36, 38-41, 49-55, 57-61, 64-65, 70-73, 79-80, 92-101, 103-111, 130, 138, 139-154, 165-172, 188
Thomas, James K., Lt., USA	484-486								
Thompson, O. N., Col							99		
Throckmorton, Russell C., Col				1387-1412					
Tillman, Thomas E.				2134-2157					
Tindal, Lorry N., Col	390-393			4487-4500					
Tinker, Clarence, Brig. Gen.	1706-1718								
Truman, Louis W., Col				1444-1453					1911-2063
Turner, Richmond K., Rear Adm	1809-1829, 1861-1862		250-272			988 1024			
Tyler, Kermit A., Lt. Col	368-376			1095-1105		446-460			
Ulrich, Ralph T., Sgt.	486-489							465-470	
Underkofler, Oliver H., Lt., USNR									
Ufterback, Charles J.	509-517								
Van Deurs, George, Capt., USN			290-292						
Walker, Eugene B., Col				965-972					
Walsh, Roland, Brig. Gen				1381-1387					
Waterhouse, George S.	1262-1272								
Waterhouse, Paul B.	1373-1381								
Weddington, Leonard D., Col	1213-1219			3012-3027					
Welch, George S., Maj	422-428			2008-2014					
Wellborn, Charles, Jr., Capt., USN			383-390						458-473, 477-549
Welles, Sumner									

¹ Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.

² Sworn statement presented to committee.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK--Continued

	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Pages	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Pages	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Pages	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Vol.	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Pages	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Pages	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
Witness														
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen.	1311-1329			2722-2744										
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col.	496-499			3120-3124										
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col.	1830-1842			1989-2007										
White, William R., Brig. Gen.				2456-2478										
Wichiser, Rea B.														
Wilke, Weslie T.	1334-1340													
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm.			279-288											
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen.				1345-1381										
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen.	247-259			910-931										
Wilson, Erle M., Col.				3663-3665										
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col.														
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm.														
Wong, Ahoon H.				3677-3683										
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR														
Woodward, Farnley C., Lt. (jg), USN														
Woolley, Ralph E.														
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr.			379-382											
Wymann, Theodore, Jr., Col.				3357-3586										
York, Yee Kan	1525-1538													
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN	1683-1705													
Zucca, Emil Lawrence				2580a-2596										3233-3259, 3303-3354

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 149

[TOP SECRET]

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

A FURTHER INQUIRY INTO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

Conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, in accordance
with a precept, dated 2 May 1945, from the Secretary of the Navy

INDEX OF WITNESSES

<i>Name and rank</i>	<i>Page¹</i>
SMEDBERG, William R., II, Capt.....	4
McCOLLUM, Arthur H., Capt.....	10
ROCHEFORT, Joseph H., Capt.....	43, 541
MASON, Redfield, Capt.....	63
FABIAN, Rudolph J., Comdr.....	68
KARIG, Walter, Comdr.....	80
KELLEY, Welbourn, Lieut.....	80
OUTERBRIDGE, William W., Capt.....	87
SAFFORD, Laurance F., Capt.....	97, 529, 609
KRAMER, Alwin D., Capt.....	128, 576
LINN, George W., Lieut. Comdr.....	140
BROTHERHOOD, Francis M., Lieut. Comdr.....	143
PERING, Alfred V., Lieut. Comdr.....	148
FREEMAN, Frederick L., Lieut.....	149
NOYES, Leigh, Rear Admiral (extracts of testimony).....	153
REIERSTAD, Leo, Lieut. Comdr.....	158
CONANT, Joseph M., Lieut. (jg).....	158
DELANY, Walter S., Rear Admiral.....	163
LAYTON, Edwin T., Capt.....	182
McMORRIS, Charles H., Vice Admiral.....	293
SMITH, William W., Vice Admiral.....	335
BURR, Harold S., Comdr.....	376
WOODRUM, Donald, Lieut.....	376
POWELL, Carroll A., Brig. Gen., USA.....	387
WILKINSON, Theodore S., Vice Admiral.....	389
STREET, George, Civilian.....	411
HUMPHREY, Richard W., RM3c.....	414
DYER, Thomas H., Capt.....	418
FINNEGAN, Joseph, Capt.....	424
HUBBELL, Monroe H., Lieut. Comdr.....	428
MURRAY, Allan A., Lieut. Comdr.....	433
WRIGHT, Wesley A., Comdr.....	442
EARLE, John B., Capt.....	451
UNDERKOFER, Oliver H., Lieut.....	465
BELLINGER, Patrick N. L., Vice Admiral.....	471
EDGERS, Mrs. Dorothy, Civilian.....	511
FRIEDMAN, William F., Civilian.....	515
LASWELL, Alva B., Colonel, USMC.....	541
WOODWARD, Farnsley C., Lieut. (jg).....	541, 597
BOONE, Gilbert E., Lieut. Comdr.....	554, 607
MAYFIELD, Irving H., Rear Admiral.....	558

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Description	Page ¹ of original exhibit where introduced	Page
1	Precept convening investigation-----	1	359
1A	Modification of precept, directing report of findings and conclusions-----	602	360
2	Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy investigations-----	2	361
3	CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 8 Dec. 1944, relating to the attacking force-----	5	588
4	A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor-----	8	614
5	CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 Oct. 1944, containing description of Japanese midget submarines-----	9	515
6	ONI document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines"-----	9	648
7	Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941 (Ex. 60 of Naval Court)-----	9	648
8	Photostatic copies of Com14 and Com16 dispatch estimates of Japanese fleet location and movements, 26 Nov. 1941-----	12	648
9	ONI Bulletin of 1 Dec. 1941, Japanese fleet locations-----	17	650
10	McCullum memorandum estimating situation as of 1 Dec. 1941-----	21	659
11	"Battle Report"-----	22	661
12	FCC radio intercepts regarding "winds" code (Ex. 65 of Naval Court)-----	31	661
13	Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches-----	56	662
14A	14B, 14C, 14D: Photostatic copies of captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor-----	60	676
15	Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63 of Naval Court)-----	66	676
16	Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor, regarding Japanese fleet movements-----	75	702
17	Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plate V of "Battle Report"-----	83	703
18	Log of conversation between WARD and CONDOR on the morning of 7 Dec. 1941-----	91	703
19	Tentative copies of Communication Intelligence Summaries, for 1 Nov. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, at Pearl Harbor-----	103	705
20	Message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code-----	135	729
21	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 Nov. 1941 concerning composition of Japanese Navy-----	185	730
22	Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 Oct. 1941 to 5 Dec. 1941, prepared by Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel-----	194	739
23	Memorandum of 1 Dec. 1941 from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel, estimating Japanese ship locations-----	211	779
24	Nov. 24th dispatch from CNO to CinCpac (Ex. 15 of Naval Court)-----	238	781
25	"War Warning" (Ex. 17 of Naval Court)-----	247	782
26	Layton Intelligence Reports from 6 Oct. 1941 to 2 Dec. 1941-----	259	783
27	Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelligence agencies delivered to CinCpac-----	264	789

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS—Continued

Exhibit No.	Description	Page ¹ of original exhibit where introduced	Page
28	Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel regarding proposed Army aerial reconnaissance of Mandated Islands.....	266	801
29	Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to Fleet Intelligence Officer about December 10th.....	272	802
30	Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japanese log on reverse side, recovered from submarine (returned to Captain Layton).....	279	804
30A	Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30.....	279	804
30B	Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A.....	280	804
31	Panomara sketch of Pearl Harbor position five miles south of Pearl Harbor, recovered from submarine (returned to Captain Layton).....	280	805
31A	Photostats of exhibit 31.....	280	805
32	Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese midget submarine (returned to Captain Layton).....	281	805
32A	Photostat of exhibit 32.....	281	805
33	Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese submarine, showing defensive installations (returned to Captain Layton).....	290	805
33A	Photostatic copy of exhibit 33.....	291	805
34	Staff Instructions, CinCpac, 1941.....	293	806
35	U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46).....	295	837
36	Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CinCpac, approving Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.....	297	869
36A	Letter of 25 July 1941 from CinCpac to CNO, submitting Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.....	297	871
37	Photostatic copy of schedules setting forth utilization of patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from 17 Nov. to 31 Dec. and approved 22 Nov. 1941.....	368	872
38	Transcripts of intercepted telephone calls of Japanese Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu from October to 2 Dec. 1941 (Consul's marked 38A; Vice Consul's marked 38B).....	379	872
39	Copy of intercepted "Mori conversation".....	382	908
40	ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul in Honolulu from 1 Dec. to 6 Dec. 1941.....	385	911
41	File of work sheets on Jap diplomatic traffic (incorporated in other exhibit).....	420	933
42	Paper showing part of decryption process of Japanese "PA" code.....	421	935
43	Duty Officer, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, information sheets.....	420	935
44	Extract from signal log of gate vessel of 7 Dec. 1941.....	430	937
45	Extract from quartermaster's log of gate vessel of 7 Dec. 1941.....	431	938
46	Extract from log of Signal Tower, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, of 7 Dec. 1941.....	432	938
47	Collection of documents, containing Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.....	457	938
48	Collection of dispatches regarding submarine contacts at Pearl Harbor in November and Dec. 1941.....	461	942
49	Bellinger "Estimate of Situation".....	474	946
50	Letter from ComTaskFor 9 to CinC, 20 Dec. 1941, on reconnaissance prior to attack.....	481	953
50A	Dispatches cited in exhibit 50.....	482	955

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS—Continued

Exhibit No.	Description	Page ¹ of original exhibit where introduced	Page
51	ComTaskFor 9 letter of 22 Oct. 1941, file 0026-----	483	959
52	ComTaskFor 9 letter of 16 Jan. 1941-----	484	961
53	ComPatWing 2 letter to CNO, of 11 Dec. 1940-----	488	965
54	Watch and duty schedules of Patrol Wings One and Two prior to attack-----	496	973
55	RCA Communications, Inc., statement, listing certain Japanese cable messages from Honolulu in Nov. and Dec. 1941-----	542	932
56	Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55, received by Navy 5 Dec. 1941-----	544	982
56A	Pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56, containing messages not decrypted until after the attack-----	600	986
57	Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55, received by Navy after the attack-----	550	996
57A	Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, received by Navy on night of 7 Dec. and subsequently translated-----	601	1004
58	Collection of dispatches from Naval Communication files relating to Japanese fleet movements and locations during the period 27 Nov. to 7 Dec. 1941-----	555	1058
59	Collection of Japanese plain language news broadcasts-----	555	1068
60	Collection of memoranda relating to messages received at Naval Communications in various Japanese code systems-----	556	1081
61	Memorandum of Naval Communications, surveying work sheets processed by Navy of Japanese purple system-----	557	1084
62	Report from DIO, 14th N. D., to Director of Naval Intelligence, of 19 Apr. 1942, relating to coded dispatch traffic of Japanese Consul General, Honolulu-----	569	1088
63	Certified collection of documents relating to anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks-----	602	1126
64	Copy of ltr. from Secretary of War to Secretary of Navy, dated 7 Feb. 1941, relating to air defenses at Pearl Harbor-----	603	1129
65	CincPac secret letter of 7 Aug. 1941 relating to the organization of the Orange fleet-----	603	1130
66	Map showing the location of ships present at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec. 1941-----	603	1144
67	Telephone log of radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing calls made and received on 7 Dec. 1941 as to Jap fleet locations-----	603	1145
68	Photostatic copies of memoranda relating to questioning of captain of Japanese captured submarine-----	604	1147
69	Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June 1945, containing description of midget submarines and method of transport to Pearl Harbor-----	604	1151
70	Selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches, miscellaneous subjects, taken from CincPac Headquarters-----	604	1176
71	Collection of dispatches relating to proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941-----	604	1205
72	Collection of dispatches of Dec. 7 and 8, 1941, from CincPac-----	605	1206

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS—Continued

Exhibit No.	Description	Page ¹ of original exhibit where introduced	Page
73	CincPac secret letter of 12 Dec. 1941 reporting damage to ships at Pearl Harbor as result of attack and other details	605	1213
74	Photostatic copy of War Diary of Com 14 from 7 Dec. 1941 to 1 Jan. 1942	605	1266
75	War Diary of USS WARD; War Diary of O-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D.; War Diary of USS CONDOR; excerpts from diary of O-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D., WARD, and CONDOR	605	1281
76	Photostatic copy of 1st and 2nd endorsements on Com 14 letter of 30 Dec. 1941 relating to early morning submarine contact on 7 Dec. 1941	606	1298
77	Collection of correspondence relating to combined operating center for Army and Navy	606	1299
78	Typewritten translation and copy of intercepted Japanese communication contained in exhibit 20, and notes relating thereto	611	1305
79	Photostatic copy of page 44 of volume containing translations of files of operations orders, orders, memos, and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap CA NACHI	613	1306
80	Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre	613	1306
81	Collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with organization and locations of Jap fleet as estimated during November and up to Dec. 1, 1941	613	1314

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

FIRST DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Monday, 14 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, Investigating Officer; Mr. John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Counsel; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, U. S. Naval Reserve, Aide to Admiral Hewitt; Lieutenant John Ford Baeher, U. S. Naval Reserve, Assistant to Mr. Sonnett; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, U. S. Naval Reserve, Official Reporter.

The precept, convening the investigation, was read and is appended hereto as "Exhibit 1."

Admiral Hewitt made the following opening statement:

The precept of the Secretary of the Navy appointing Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, to conduct further investigation into the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, will be marked "Exhibit 1" in the record of this investigation.

The Secretary's precept forwarded:

(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.

(B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy, 12 February 1944.

(C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.

The Secretary's precept provides, in part:

7. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional [2] persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, as may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are authorized to obtain such documents relating to said attack as may be required for inclusion in the record.

A study has been made of the enclosures. In this connection, a narrative statement of the previous Navy investigations has been prepared by counsel and is designated "Exhibit 2" in these proceedings.

I find that further investigation is necessary in order:

(A) to obtain the information now available concerning the composition and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941;

(B) to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor, at Cavite, and at Washington, during the period 14 October 1941 to 7 December 1941, concerning the location, composition and movements of Japanese naval forces, including: (1) examination as to the activities of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor and the information obtained by it, with particular reference to the location

of the major portion of the Japanese carriers, to the loss of radio contact with units of the Japanese Fleet on or about 1 December 1941, and to the apparently erroneous belief that on 7 December 1941 the attacking force was located south of Hawaii; (2) examination as to the preparation of ONI bulletins, such as the bulletin of 1 December 1941; (3) examination as to the information furnished by the Navy to the Army, at Washington and at Pearl Harbor, concerning Japanese naval movements and loss of radio contact with Japanese units; (4) examination as to information of Japanese naval units obtained by Army reconnaissance, with particular reference to the War Department's directions to General Short, about 26 November 1941, to conduct reconnaissance to Jaluit, to the action taken, and to the question whether Admiral Kimmel was advised of this;

(C) to determine whether or not Japanese submarines operated in and around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941, including: (1) whether a captured Japanese map, as indicated in the Army Pearl Harbor report, establishes that such submarines were in Pearl Harbor before that date, or, as indicated in the book entitled "Battle Report," that the map was [3] made on that date and erroneously fixed the positions of United States ships in the harbor; (2) what submarine contacts were made in or around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941; (3) according to "Battle Report," at about 0500 on 7 December 1941, a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting of a submarine at approximately 0350. It should be determined what was done about this and why were the net gates allowed to remain open from 0445 until 0800;

(D) to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the office of Naval Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval Intelligence at Hawaii;

(E) to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, which are set forth in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's Record, and how, when, and where they were obtained and decoded;

(F) to determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo."

(G) to determine whether or not there was a "winds code" message relating to the United States. In connection with the "winds code" message, it should be noted that according to Captain Safford the last time he saw the message was when it was sent to the Roberts Commission. It should be determined whether or not the message was there or is there now;

(H) to interview Admiral Wilkinson generally and with particular reference to combat intelligence and to the "winds code";

(I) to interview Captain McCollum generally and with particular reference to the "winds code";

(J) to determine what the original records show concerning: (1) Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal Defense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate; (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation [4] of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941, and the Secretary of War's reply; (3) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack; (4) the date when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941;

(K) to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance which Admiral Kimmel directed on or about July, 1941, toward the Jaluits.

In accordance with the Secretary's precept, having found that such further investigation is necessary, the purpose of this proceeding will be to examine persons having knowledge of the facts in question and to obtain such documents as may be relevant thereto.

Counsel in this investigation will be John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting in the investigation are Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporter at this meeting is Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, was read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give your name and rank?

Captain SMEDBERG. William R. Smedberg, III, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What is your present duty?

Captain SMEDBERG. I am the Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give me the information that you now have available and can testify to concerning the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Captain SMEDBERG. A Japanese prisoner who was captured on Saipan [5] during the Marianas Campaign has given a very complete account of the preparations and movements of the Jap Fleet in the Fall of 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941. This prisoner was a chief yeoman in the Japanese Navy, attached to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto. He has reconstructed the events preceding and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Much of the information given by this chief yeoman has been substantiated and verified by other information which we have received, and we believe the reliability which can be placed on this information to be very high.

The best reconstruction can be found in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, a confidential bulletin dated 8 December 1944, volume 1, number 22. This gives a very complete story of the preparations for the attack and also gives a reconstruction of the Operation Order, as I remember it, on which the attack was based.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you submit a copy of this as an exhibit?

Captain SMEDBERG. Yes, sir.

(The Weekly Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 3.")

This secret Operation Order is dated 1 November 1941 and starts off with the statement that "The Japanese Empire will declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands," that "War will be declared on X-day," and that "This order will become effective on Y-Day."

It gives the composition of the striking force, which sortied from Etorofu To in the Kuriles on or about 27 November (all times used here are East Longitude times and dates) and headed eastward under heavy front before turning south to the attack.

[6] The late Vice Admiral Nagumo, who was then CinC 1st Air Fleet, was in command and his force consisted of the six carriers KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU, and ZUIKAKU; two battleships, the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA; three cruisers, the TONE, CHIKUMA, and ABUKUMA; elements of Destroyer Squadron One, and about twenty submarines.

This document tells of the plan to coordinate midget submarine unit attacks with the Main Fleet attack and states that the Sixth Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within Pearl Harbor. The Sixth Fleet was the Japanese submarine fleet. The submarine fleet, according to the chief yeoman prisoner of war, had almost its entire strength off the mouth of Pearl Harbor, with the object of attacking those ships which attempted to escape from the plane attacks of carrier divisions one, two, and five.

One of the documents which the prisoner previously referred to has reconstructed from memory was a Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order Number 2, dated 5 November, which stated that Y-Day will be 23 November. He also reconstructed Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order Number 3, dated 10 November, which stated, "X-Day will be 8 December." (It should be noted that 8 December is 7 December Pearl Harbor date.)

From the prisoner's reconstruction of the original Secret Operation Order Number 1, it was his belief, and he so stated, that the striking force (carrier task force) would depart its naval bases or operating areas about X minus 16 days and will proceed by way of Takan Bay, Etorofu Island in the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would deliver a surprise attack.

It further stated that the commander of the surprise attack force (submarine force), having the Sixth Fleet (submarine fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the [7] Inland Sea on X minus 20 day to attack Pearl Harbor.

It is interesting to note here that the commander of this surprise attack force was charged with carrying out reconnaissance before the attack and also carrying out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The prisoner states that the time for such attacks was to be after the flights of planes have attacked Oahu.

There is on page 16 of the Intelligence Bulletin which we have been discussing a copy of a captured track chart of the Japanese carriers, covering the period, showing, among other things, the departure of the carriers from their home bases, departure from Etorofu Island on November 27th, arrival to the northwest of Oahu on December 8th (East Longitude time), and a retirement initially to the northwest and then to the southwest. This indicates that the Jap aircraft

took off from their carriers about 200 miles due north of Oahu, and this information checks with the document recovered from a crashed enemy plane shortly after the raid.

Admiral HEWITT. There is reference in the exhibit just introduced, and in other publications concerning the Pearl Harbor attack, to a map which was recovered from a Japanese midget submarine, showing courses and the location of ships inside Pearl Harbor. Can you produce the original or a copy of this map and discuss it?

Captain SMEDBERG. I cannot produce the original, Admiral. My division had not been formed up to the time of Pearl Harbor, and I have asked that the records of the Japanese Section of the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence be checked to see if it can be located—without result. I have here, however, a copy, which, I am assured by Captain E. S. Pearce, present head of the Japanese Section of the Far [8] Eastern Division of ONI, was made from the English translation of the Japanese chart taken from the captured midget submarine. This chart indicates to me the courses and times which the submarine captain laid down beforehand and hoped to follow. He hadn't gotten into Pearl Harbor, as he later testified after his capture, so that the chart could not have been prepared by him either while in Pearl Harbor or after his emergence from Pearl Harbor.

I leave you a copy of this chart as exhibit 4.

(The chart referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 4.")

Admiral HEWITT. What information can you give as to the characteristics of the midget submarine?

Captain SMEDBERG. There are several descriptions of Jap midget subs which have been developed from captured documents and prisoner of war interrogations, one of the best being found in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, volume 1, number 15, a copy of which I will bring to you for use as an exhibit.

(The Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and will be marked "Exhibit 5.")

The sum of the information on the midget sub used at Pearl Harbor is that it was carried by and launched from a mother submarine. The sub at Pearl Harbor was 41 feet in length and had a reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles maximum at its most economical speed of 4 to 6 knots. The full details are available in an Office of Naval Intelligence publication known as "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines." I will obtain this document and bring it to you for use as an exhibit.

[9] (The publication referred to was received and will be marked "Exhibit 6.")

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know any information about whether these two-man midget submarines were equipped with radio?

Captain SMEDBERG. The best information that I can recall on this submarine which was used at Pearl Harbor is that it had no radio. A much larger type midget submarine which Japan used one year later had a high frequency radio with a range of about fifty miles, but this sub was twice as long as the type used at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Exhibit 60 from the Naval Court of Inquiry record will be marked as an exhibit in this investigation.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 7.")
Admiral HEWITT. Have you anything further, Captain?

Captain SMEDBERG. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Then, that will be all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

Admiral HEWITT. That is all for today.

(The investigation was then, at 3:15 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

[10] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SECOND DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Tuesday, 15 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain McCOLLUM. Arthur H. McCollum, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you state the duties to which you were assigned in December, 1941, and the period preceding that?

Captain McCOLLUM. I was Officer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you please give us the details of your duties in that connection?

Captain McCOLLUM. My duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy and other countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation for war.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relationship of your unit with Op-20-G, Captain Safford's unit?

Captain McCOLLUM. Captain Safford's unit produced a source of intelligence. Intelligence from that source was shown to me and was one of our most valued sources of intelligence concerning the Far East. Briefly, the intelligence [11] received from that source consisted of decryptions of secret Japanese code despatches, inferences drawn from the analyses of Japanese radio traffic, and inferences drawn from changes in procedure of Japanese radio traffic. There was from time to time intelligence of this same general nature received from non-Japanese sources, but the bulk of it was from Japanese sources.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the location, composition, and movements of the Japanese forces in general, what information or estimate was received from and sent to the Pearl Harbor unit and to Cavite?

Captain McCOLLUM. By the end of November we were almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Japanese naval forces, except those that were sighted by our observation posts along the China coast.

The system for serving radio intelligence consisted of a three-point system, one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; one serving the Chief

of Naval Operations at the Navy Department in Washington. All intelligence derived from radio intelligence means in either one of these three centers was passed through and back to these three centers. In order words, information from radio intelligence sources available in Manila were also available at Pearl and also available at Washington, and vice versa. That was passed as a matter of routine back and forth among the three radio intelligence centers serving between the three major command centers, Asiatic, Pacific, and Washington.

Admiral HEWITT. That applies not only to the information but also to the inferences that they drew from them?

Captain McCOLLUM. Definitely. I am not so denite about decodes of diplomatic traffic. I am not certain whether items concerning the Japanese [12] diplomatic traffic, that is, traffic in diplomatic cyphers, was invariably available to all three or not. The volume of that was very great, and, if I remember correctly, the principal headquarters for that type of traffic was here in Washington and, to my mind, it is doubtful that all decodes of Japanese diplomatic traffic were ever sent back out again. I don't think it was. I don't think it could have been with the existing radio facilities.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here a series of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, which I submit to you for your identification.

Captain McCOLLUM. I identify these. I have seen them.

(The photostats referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 8.")

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give us your comment on the salient points of this exhibit?

Captain McCOLLUM. As I have indicated before, in general radio intelligence consists of three distinct procedures. One is an actual translation of the enemy's code despatch; another is inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic and its divergence from a norm.

Admiral HEWITT. What you call traffic analysis?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is traffic analysis. Another is from a study of call signs, the ships' radio call, and so on.

Before Pearl Harbor we never had very good intelligence on Japanese naval type messages from decryption. With the disappearance of means which we had devised for keeping Japanese naval vessels and naval movements under observation, such as reports by merchant ships, reports by agents located in various ports in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our consular authorities, which all had been set up and was functioning—these sources [13] whereby our radio intelligence could be confirmed from time to time by actual visual sighting had disappeared by early November due to a number of natural causes. One was the enforcement of our embargoes against Japan, which in a very short period of time swept normal merchant traffic out of the North Pacific so that by mid-November it is hardly too much to say that there were no ship movements of any nature to and from Japan in the North Pacific. One other point that we watched and carefully checked, had a world-wide system for observing, was the world-wide movement of Japanese merchant shipping in all the ports of the world. Due again to the operation of our embargoes, the Japanese merchant shipping in the Americas was gone. Due to the war in Europe, the Japanese merchant shipping lines had been disrupted; so that source of intelligence had disap-

peared. One other point, the Japanese progressive closing in of security measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get information out of Japan that would be timely in a tactical situation. So that by the middle of November it was apparent that so far as observing and locating the Japanese fleet were concerned, our major dependence was perforce based on radio intelligence without the benefit of check by visual observations from time to time.

As a result of this situation, this dispatch of the 24th of November was sent out. It was intended to point out to our major commanders that our information was unsatisfactory and that every effort had to be made by using the one remaining instrument we had to determine the location and direction of movement of Japanese naval forces.

As a result of this dispatch, we got the benefit of estimates of the situation as it applied to the location and possible movements of the Japanese fleet from both ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN. These two addresses and the code system which was sent indicates that this estimate was made [14] by the radio intelligence organizations which went under that cover call in both of these places. The estimates are virtually the same. They differ only in minor degree. You will find that you had two task forces being organized under the over-all command of Commander Second Fleet. One was thought to be fairly well located in the general Formosa-Southern Japan area; another was possibly in the Mandated Islands. There was some discussion as to whether carriers were present with this latter force or not. That was one of the points of disagreement between these two here.

Greater reliance was placed on ComSIXTEEN's dispatch because physically he was in a much better position to intercept a larger volume of Japanese radio traffic than ComFOURTEEN was and his radio intelligence organization was stronger in numbers and in continuity of operation than that of ComFOURTEEN.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, then, will you read the part of the ComFOURTEEN message which relates to the possible task force in the Mandates and then give me SIXTEEN's comments on that?

Captain McCOLLUM. This is ComFOURTEEN's:

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise AIRON TWENTY FOUR at least one carrier division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

Now, ComSIXTEEN in referring to that states as follows:

Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force and are in Mandates X our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area.

[15] Admiral HEWITT. What were the dates of those?

Captain McCOLLUM. The 26th, sir; the 24th, which was our outgoing, and ComFOURTEEN's is 260110, November, sir, and ComSIXTEEN's is 261331.

Admiral HEWITT. Which would be 27 our time?

Captain McCOLLUM. Which would be about 27 our time. These are all GCT, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Those are all GCT?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. ComSIXTEEN added to his general evaluation of the situation that he considered the evaluation reliable.

Admiral HEWITT. What further information on this subject was received in Washington during the period from November 27th to December 7th?

Captain McCOLLUM. Pursuing the directive issued, there ComSIXTEEN from day to day issued fragmentary reports concerning the movement of such Japanese naval units as became apparent to him. There was never received in Washington, to my knowledge, anything that changed the general view of fleet organization and concentration areas as set forth in those dispatches of the 26th.

Admiral HEWITT. It appears from prior investigations that on or about December 1st radio contact with the Japanese forces was either greatly diminished or was lost. Can you tell us anything about that?

Captain McCOLLUM. If I might presume, sir, I don't think it is exactly accurate to say that radio contact was lost. What occurred was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the fleet. In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time must elapse before we could build up identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on. In other words, the actual radios were still going out, but we [16] couldn't get anything out of them very much.

Admiral HEWITT. Then there was no perceptible diminution of traffic?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not that I know of. There are other people possibly better qualified to advise you on that score than I am, but my impression of what had occurred was what is generally known as a general call sign change. In other words, the old call book went out and a new one was effective that date. There may have been some differences in frequencies; there probably were some two or three new allocations. But some time would have to elapse before a radio intelligence organization would be able to draw inferences from messages intercepted.

Admiral HEWITT. That was a situation which had occurred previously, was it not?

Captain McCOLLUM. It had occurred from time to time previously.

Admiral HEWITT. You remember the approximate date of the previous change?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I do not. Normally in peacetime those things do not change often, possibly every six months or every year or so, but we had had partial changes from time to time as new task organizations developed presumably in Jap forces, sir. It was a shorter period of time since the last change to this change than had occurred normally before.

Admiral HEWITT. As far as you know, had a change of that sort ever previously accompanied a major movement by the Japanese such as a movement to French Indo-China?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. There had been minor changes in that, but a wholesale change hadn't occurred for some time previously to that that I remember now.

[17] Admiral HEWITT. As far as you know, there was no discussion or concern about apparent radio silence of any major part?

Captain McCOLLUM. There was concern not of the radio silence but the fact that we had lost at this particular time an exceedingly valuable source of intelligence which for the time being was going to be much less valuable than it had been before. It wasn't possible to connect at the time that particular change with that specific movement, except that which had been outlined. We were certain at that time there were reorganizations and regroupings of forces going on. We knew that the Japanese fleet was ready for action. We knew that it had been called home, docked and extensively repaired and was looking for action. Therefore, it was interpreted, along with this other stuff, as a possible indication of action to come.

Admiral HEWITT. Am I correct in stating, then, that as the intelligence unit in Hawaii would have this same information as ComFOURTEEN, therefore CincPac would be as well informed as to these changes of radio calls and frequencies, and so forth, as you were in the Navy Department?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated as to Japanese naval forces: "Major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greater proportion of carriers."

(The ONI Bulletin referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 9.")

Was that statement correct?

Captain McCOLLUM. This statement is correct, based on the best intelligence available at the time. It was based on the intelligence then available. At this late date I can't make a specific statement as to the [18] exact time lag, but as I remember it, this statement was based on intelligence that would be at least three to four days prior to the date of the document itself.

Admiral HEWITT. What was understood by the term "home waters" as used in that bulletin?

Captain McCOLLUM. This paper developed out of a scheme for keeping track of the Japanese fleet which had been followed for a number of years in the Far East Section of ONI, and the term "home waters" was generally understood to mean the normal cruising grounds of the Japanese fleet. That would roughly be west of the 180th meridian of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa and included the Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians.

Admiral HEWITT. In your opinion, would the recipients of this bulletin, such as the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, interpret the term "home waters" in the same way? In other words, was that definition of "home waters" generally known?

Captain McCOLLUM. Admiral, this paper was originally designed for circulation within the Department alone. At various times from 1939 on Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had visited the Department and on two occasions had expressed a desire for this document. The general basis on which the document was prepared, and the charts showing the delimitation of areas, was discussed with these officers at that time, including both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel. Whether the term was ever formally defined and a defini-

tion issued to the fleet, I doubt. If the term was ever formally defined and issued to the fleet, I doubt. However, it was well understood here in the Department and in discussions with officers from the fleet at various times, the term was understood to mean the normal cruising grounds of the Jap fleet. That is, north of southern Formosa, [19] west of the 180th meridian, and including the Kurile Islands,

Admiral HEWITT. In this particular case, the information on which the estimate was apparently based, Exhibit number 8, was that the forces under discussion were generally in the Sasebo-Kure area.

Captain McCOLLUM. The major battleship and carrier strength was in the Kure-Sasebo area.

Admiral HEWITT. So that, really in this case the term apparently meant home waters in the home islands?

Captin McCOLLUM. That is right, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What information, if any, was sent out to the fleet after December 1st concerning the location and movements of Japanese fleet units?

Captain McCOLLUM. The fleet, as I explained to you, had information from radio intelligence as to fleet locations, had the same information available to them as we had here in the Department. So far as I am aware, no dispatch was sent from the Department specifically to the fleet, calling attention to the location and movements of the Japanese fleet. Such messages as they would have received would have been common not only to the Pacific Fleet but to the Asiatic Fleet and to the Department, and they consisted, after the 1st of December, of reports of our observers on the China coast and of our naval forces which had contacted a Jap task force moving south of Formosa in the direction of Hainan and from there on farther south towards the Kra Peninsula.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what was the system or whether any one was specifically charged with the duty of dissemination of information which was necessary to the major fleet commanders?

Captain McCOLLUM. I can't answer that question specifically, sir. [20] The radio intelligence organization, as I have pointed out, certain of their information was passed automatically to the three centers. The system in the Department at the time was that the Intelligence Division, with the information it had available to it, prepared statements of intelligence which were presumed to be factual, without making an estimate of enemy intention. This statement of fact, or presumed fact, was submitted then by the Intelligence Division to the Plans Division and to the Chief of Naval Operations, who made the decision as to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet.

Admiral HEWITT. What would be your own action in the case of receipt of information which you considered to be of serious import? Would you attempt to call special attention to it?

Captain McCOLLUM. I would. My responsibility was definitely to bring that to the attention of my Director of Intelligence immediately and to recommend most strongly to him that he take such action as I deemed necessary further up, and in almost every case we had direct access to both Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division, and to the Chief of Naval Operations himself.

I might remark in that connection that on the 1st or December I prepared an analysis of the situation as it looked to me at that time which I submitted to Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval In-

telligence, on the morning of December 1st. I had actually prepared this the day before and had slept over it overnight. He took this up and made an appointment for us to see Admiral Stark, and about noon on the 1st Admiral Wilkinson took me into Admiral Stark's office and I read this statement and made verbal comments on my views on it, and both Admiral Wilkinson and I urged that a dispatch of warning be sent to the fleet at [21] that time. We were assured at that time that such a dispatch had been sent on the 27th of November which definitely included the term, "This is a war warning".

Subsequent to this, the situation further deteriorated and I recommend to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send dispatches out to our naval attachés and various naval agencies throughout the Far East, directing that they destroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on and so forth, and to affirmatively report when these had been destroyed. That dispatch was sent so that the fleet commanders on the chain going out and coming back would have the information that that order had been issued. Some time after the 1st, possibly around the 4th, I prepared this—

Admiral HEWITT. That is a copy of the memorandum to which you refer?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 10.")

Captain McCOLLUM. I took that, coupled with additional information, and drafted the general situation up in dispatch form, which I presented to Admiral Wilkinson with the recommendation that it be sent. Whether that was sent or not, I do not know.

Admiral HEWITT. What information regarding the Japanese naval forces was furnished to the Army during the period from October to 7 December?

Captain McCOLLUM. The Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division had full information on the situation. We were in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships, and they had full [22] access to all of the radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department. That was given by me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to day with officers of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division in the War Department, and that had been true for some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as withdrawing our naval language officers from Japan or sending a dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers, and so forth, as we did to the naval attaches and other places, without notifying my opposite number in the War Department what we intended to do.

Admiral HEWITT. That was Colonel Bratton?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was Colonel Bratton, or his assistant, who, I believe, at the time was Colonel Pettigrew. The people who had access to that stuff in detail were Colonel Bratton, Colonel Pettigrew, and Colonel Dusenberry, I believe.

Admiral HEWITT. Would the like apply to the information which the Army received from their sources? Was that made available to you?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, so far as I know, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What, in general, sources of information did the Army have?

Captain McCOLLUM. The Army had information from their usual attaches and observation posts such as they had in the Far East, and the Army also had a radio intelligence organization which produced certain information along this same line.

Admiral HEWITT. Which confirmed, in this case, your own information?

Captain McCOLLUM. The Army had nothing to do with the Navy systems. They didn't touch the Jap Navy systems. They were doing work on Japanese diplomatic ciphers at that time and some minor Japanese Army system. They [23] weren't so well developed or anywhere near as good as our naval radio intelligence service at the time. But any information that they got through their services, as far as I am aware, was made available to me through Colonel Bratton's office in the War Department.

Admiral HEWITT. As I understand it, there was no particular organization or system for effecting cooperation between your organization and the Army organization other than the mutual unofficial relations you established?

Captain McCOLLUM. Those relations were unofficial, but they had the official sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intelligence and of the Director of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, I think he is called, who were both not only glad of that mutual confidence and trust and exchange of information, but thoroughly encouraged it.

Admiral HEWITT. What information have you concerning the movements of Japanese submarines? What information can you give me concerning the movements of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to December 7th?

Captain McCOLLUM. I remember nothing specific, except we had suspected for some time that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. At various times through the preceding six months there had been reports of contact by our destroyers on Japanese submarines. At one time, I think it was in July or August, we actually suggested a search of a certain spot in the ocean to the north of Midway where we believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with Jap submarines who were observing our fleet movements. It was felt here, and I feel that it was felt in the fleet, that our movements were [24] under Japanese submarine observation.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the nature of these contacts? Underwater sound by destroyers?

Captain McCOLLUM. They would be underwater sound by destroyer and sighting of a periscope and that sort of thing.

Admiral HEWITT. Sighting of a periscope?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. Whether it was actually a periscope or not, I don't know.

Admiral HEWITT. Were any of them well authenticated?

Captain McCOLLUM. One or two seemed to us at the time to be fairly well authenticated.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember the general location of those contacts?

Captain McCOLLUM. Most of them weren't close in to Honolulu, but one contact, if I remember correctly, was made in Molokai Channel somewhere off Lahuna Roads—most of this is memory—in the approaches to and from the drill grounds of the fleet from Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here two charts which have been submitted as exhibits which purport to be reproductions in translated form of a chart which was taken from a Japanese midget submarine which was stranded on the north side of Pearl Harbor. One is in a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin and the other one came from another source. They appear to be generally the same, except that as to the captions in English, if you will notice, off Ford Island to the eastward, one of them says, "Attack and sink enemy ship"; in the other one it says, "Enemy ship sunk," and there are similar differences.

I would like to have you examine those and from your knowledge of the Japanese language give us your ideas on that. What I have in mind [25] generally is whether this is a record of an actual trip by a submarine or whether it might have been an attack plan with points marked at which certain actions should be taken. The original is not available to me.

Captain McCOLLUM. This, in the Pacific Fleet Bulletin dated 8 December 1944, I don't remember having seen before. This other chart, marked "secret" here, is a translation of a photostat, later backed up by the original, of a Japanese chart which, to the best of my belief, was recovered from a Japanese midget submarine that was sunk in the East Loch. I remember the original quite well and went over it personally, together with the best translators in the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, and it was my opinion at the time, and it is my opinion now, that this was an attack plan. In other words, this thing here was the planned scheme that the submarine commander was going to utilize in making his entry to Pearl Harbor.

(A copy of the book "Battle Report" was received and marked "Exhibit 11.")

Captain McCOLLUM. Take, for instance, the four Japanese ideographs appearing in the photostat in the book "Battle Report." I point out these four ideographs here. In the Japanese language the tense of verbs is shown in general—there are exceptions—by appending the *kana* symbols which indicate the tense. Where the ideograph alone is used it is not possible to determine the tense of the verb. Here you have only four ideographs, which might be translated present, past, future, or imperfect as the situation might warrant, because there are no *kana* symbols here showing the tense of the verb. It is not possible to infer from this as to whether this is past tense or future tense. The words "attack and sink enemy ship" [26] in Exhibit 4 are a literal translation. It is impossible to make a literal translation in English without an English indication of tense. The best you can do is to take each word for its value and put it down. In this particular instance (referring to Exhibit 4), the word "and" is interpolated.

Admiral HEWITT. You stated that to the best of your knowledge this came from a submarine which was sunk inside the Loch. The other exhibit, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, makes the statement that this was taken from a midget submarine which was stranded on the north coast of Oahu. Could there have been two charts?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. One from one submarine and the other from another?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, I think so, but it would have been most unusual had they been exactly the same.

Admiral HEWITT. Unless they were attack plans.

Captain McCOLLUM. That is true.

The stuff that is run in circles is stuff that was pencilled notations, if I remember correctly. In other words, there was a distinction made here (referring to Exhibit 4). In other words, what I am calling to your attention here is you will notice certain of these things are circled, like this (indicating). It is circled on this other chart (referring to Exhibit 11). I think that those circles represent pencilled notations by the submarine commander. In other words, he had his plan and these notations were aid memoirs in assisting him in carrying out this plan.

Admiral HEWITT. I notice here (referring to Exhibit 11) several characters appearing in heavy black—

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, that may be the way they are reproduced. These are hand-written characters here (indicating), written in by hand and [27] not by printing. They are both printing and typewritten stuff. Now this stuff here (indicating) is hand-written by the man himself.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what this (indicating) is about?

Captain McCOLLUM. I am not much good at this translation any more, sir. I wouldn't venture a translation of that for you, sir. I can get it done for you and check it, but I am not very good at this any more. This first two is Hawaii. It is something about ships anchoring off at certain times in Hawaii, I think, sir. In other words, ships are sometimes anchored off in this general area or general direction (indicating). That is not shown on this (referring to Exhibit 4).

Admiral HEWITT. One more question on this exhibit (referring to Exhibit 4). With respect to the times which are noted, the turning point and arrival and so forth, there is a question in my mind whether it relates to some zone time or whether it may be based on an H-Hour for an attack, if it is an attack plan. Can you give me any comment on that? If it were a dawn attack, it wouldn't be Honolulu time.

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir. If it were any one of the standard times at all, it would be Item time. All the Japanese Navy runs on Item time, which is Tokyo time. That is standard or has been standard in the past. The impression that I have from this is that it is time based on a zero hour.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any information as to the probable source of the other map, in the Intelligence summary, which differs?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I haven't.

Admiral HEWITT. Now we go back to the communication questions. We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court record, which contains certain decrypted communications. Can you tell us how they were obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed?

[28] Captain McCOLLUM. These that I see here are decrypted copies of Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches. These dispatches were received in the Navy Department from the intercepting stations in a variety of ways, some by direct transmission in the origi-

nal by radio, others telegraph, and others by mail. When they arrived in the communication intelligence center, Navy Department, they were decoded and translated. A number of copies of the translations were made, and books containing these translated dispatches were made up. Those books were distributed by officer messenger to the Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, Director of War Plans, Director of Intelligence, Chief of Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, within the Navy Department, and the Naval Aide to the President. A complete book was also taken by officer messenger to the Secretary of State. Another complete books was taken over and shown to the Far East Section of the Military Intelligence Division of the Army and by them was distributed to the Secretary of War, Under Secretary, and Chief of Staff, War Plans Division of the General Staff, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and, I think, to the head of what they called the Intelligence Branch of G-2, which was the Foreign Intelligence Section. The book, in whole or in part, went to the President, depending on what the Aide to the President thought about it.

Admiral HEWITT. Now will you discuss the question of the "winds" code and the messages using that code, the dispatch which previous testimony indicates you prepared and which was allegedly not sent?

Captain McCOLLUM. I don't quite understand your question.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to have you discuss the subject of the "winds" code, what it was, the messages that were received using the code.

[29] Captain McCOLLUM. All right, sir. If we may lead up a little bit, by the latter part of November it was apparent that the Japanese were doing a great many things, that they expected that war with the United States, Great Britain, or both might possibly break out at any time, and that they were taking every possible step to make sure that their intelligence organization and their diplomatic representatives would be well advised. One of the schemes for this was to use a Tokyo weather broadcast, which was normally with the ordinary voice news broadcasts that came out from the commercial or so-called commercial radio stations at Tokyo from time to time. There was a message setting forth that by arrangements of using this weather code and for having the thing repeated in certain sequence in a broadcast, that in one instance it meant war with Russia; in the next instance it meant war with England, and another one was that it meant war with the United States. Those were the three possibilities.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that war or a break in diplomatic relations?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, a break in diplomatic relations. Instead of war, the term used was, "In case relations are in danger," "danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations." There is the verbatim translation; in Japanese this says, "In case there is danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations." The system followed that they used, a term which was a smooth translation and in important cases the exact rendition followed that in parenthesis. That was the Navy's system. The Navy translators did that, in general.

Admiral HEWITT. Read that here (indicating), for instance.

Captain McCOLLUM. (Referring to Document 15 of the Exhibit) "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following

warning will be [30] added in the middle of the Japanese language daily short-wave news broadcast."

There is another dispatch (referring to Document 13 of the Exhibit). This (indicating) is circular 2353; this (indicating) is circular 2354. It was another code. He coded it differently. It is a different message. This says, "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts."

Admiral HEWITT. In your opinion, that is merely a different translation of the same phraseology?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I think it is different phraseology in the Japanese. In other words, I think that two different messages were sent out, and possibly more, by the Japanese Foreign Office, which may have been and probably were phrased differently in the original, which gave differing translations on this answer.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether the actual message containing the phrase which indicated the emergency with any particular country was actually transmitted?

Captain McCOLLUM. About the middle of the week 1-7 December, the Federal Communications Commission reported the occurrence of one of the words in a Japanese news broadcast from Tokyo which indicated war with Russia. In studying the message at the time, it did not appear that this was a bona fide warning in the terms as set forth. It did not appear in the proper sequence and proper number of times in the broadcast, as I remember it, and it was thought at the time that this was a bona fide weather report which happened to use the code word for Russia. I know of no message received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December which indicated [31] that diplomatic relations with the United States would be ruptured. After the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made, either late afternoon of the 7th, Washington time, or some time on the 8th, a dispatch was translated which indicated war with England. I think you have got some exhibits on that point there.

(Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and marked "Exhibit 12.")

This is the Federal Communications Commission dispatch which I referred to. It is Document number 2 Exhibit number 65.

Admiral HEWITT. That, in your opinion, is a bona fide weather report?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir, I think so. We don't have the verbatim Japanese of this thing about Russia here, but the translation would indicate that it was other than as given here. For instance, all this in here [indicating] is exact. Now, this translation indicates that "Tokyo today, north wind slightly stronger, may become cloudy." You see, there is too much in there. This is an abbreviated sort of an imperative form used here. And besides, the announcer in this thing starts out by saying, "This is in the middle of the news, but today especially I will give a weather broadcast at this point." I mean this is what he says in this [indicating].

The Document number 2 is from the Federal Communications Commission, which came verbally to me and later on the thing written out, which was from a plain language broadcast and it was our opinion at the time, considering all of the facts, that this was probably a

bona fide weather broadcast and not the warning signal. If it were the warning signal, it [32] would have applied to Russia.

The Document number 4 of Exhibit 65, which was transmitted between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, was the "winds" code message announcing dangerous diplomatic relations with England. The wording used in there meant Japan-British relations.

That is what is shown on Exhibit 12.

Admiral HEWITT. You have no knowledge of any message transmitted which indicated the breaking of diplomatic relations with the United States?

Captain McCOLLUM. Not in the "winds" code, no, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have it in any code?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. By afternoon of Saturday, December 6th, a very long diplomatic dispatch was coming in to the Japanese ambassador at Washington. On the morning of—that is Washington time—December 7th, I was on duty in my office in the Navy Department when the last parts of this very long diplomatic note were translated. Following this, a dispatch was translated, instructing the Japanese ambassadors to present this note to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, Washington time, December 7, 1941. The context of the diplomatic note as contained in the dispatch which the Japanese ambassador was directed to present to the Secretary of State indicated a discontinuance of the negotiations between Japan and the United States, with the strong inference that diplomatic relations would be ruptured.

(Referring to Documents 38 and 39 of Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record). This first one doesn't make any particular impression. There had been so many of these things along this line, including telephone conversations backward and forward, that we knew something was coming. And on the fourteen-part message, all hands were up all night, working on it to [33] get it through.

Admiral HEWITT. That was the night of the 6th-7th?

Captain McCOLLUM. That was the night of the 6th-7th, yes, sir. By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, thirteen of the parts. They were transmitted, almost as soon as received, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to people over here in the War Department.

Early Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my office, where we had a special watch set since early November, the fourteenth part was coming in; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I were discussing the situation about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30, with Admiral Stark, the instruction which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State was brought in, shown to Admiral Stark, who immediately called the White House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to the Secretary of State and to the White House. At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands.

Admiral HEWITT. You are referring to the 1 p. m. delivery time?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. In other words, it was pointed out that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about 8 o'clock in the morning Honolulu time.

Admiral HEWITT. 7:30.

Captain McCOLLUM. 7:30, yes, sir, and very early in the morning out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places; and that we didn't know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had [34] been stressed to the ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State.

I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it was taken over, with instructions to point that out, to the Secretary of State. I was not present at that. I do not know. I would add, however, that the Secretary of State was not available at the time that the Japanese ambassador desired to deliver their note, and it is my recollection in the discussion at the time with the Chief of Naval Operations and his admirals in there that that was a deliberate move on our part.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember who it was delivered the message to the Secretary of State and the White House?

Captain McCOLLUM. No, sir, I do not, but it was probably Lieutenant Commander, now Captain, Kramer. I can't say that for sure because some of these things Admiral Turner himself would run over to see the Secretary, or Captain Schuirman would run over. The normal routine would have been for Kramer to have delivered it.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall who was present when—

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes. May I elaborate a little bit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Captain McCOLLUM. By mid-November the situation in the Far East had appeared so acute that in addition to the usual duty watches in the Division of Naval Intelligence, one of the three regular officers assigned to the Far East Section—that is, Commander Watts, Colonel Boone and myself—was constantly on duty in our offices, with adequate office help, on a twenty-four hour basis.

I arrived at the Navy Department about 7:30 or a quarter of eight [35] Sunday morning, December 7th, to take over the watch from Commander Watts. Shortly after my arrival in the Navy Department, Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Intelligence, arrived and sent for me and we had a discussion concerning the situation in the Far East. After fifteen or twenty minutes of the discussion, we received word that Admiral Stark had arrived in the Navy Department and both Admiral Wilkinson and myself went down to talk to Admiral Stark. At that time he was alone. While we were in there discussing the situation with Admiral Stark, various officers of the Division of Operations came into the office. I believe Admiral Ingersoll was present, Admiral Brainard, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, and possibly Captain Schuirman. There may have been others; I don't know. Certainly, Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll were present. Whether they were present all the time, I do not know. There was considerable going in and out at that time.

About 9 o'clock or a little earlier, I received word from the outside room that one of my officers wished to see me urgently and I stepped outside and received the last part of the message, concerning the final note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassadors.

Admiral HEWITT. The last part of the long message?

Captain McCOLLUM. The long message. And the dispatch directing its presentation on the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock Washington time. I held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance at the time, and he it was who pointed out the times at Honolulu as 7:30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on.

Admiral HEWITT. Before dawn. Wouldn't that be before dawn?

Captain McCOLLUM. Before dawn, yes, sir. That would be about 2 o'clock in the morning out there.

[36] I took that in to Admiral Stark and pointed out the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note, and it was also pointed out to other officers of the Division of Operations who were present at the time. Admiral Stark talked over the telephone, I think, with the Chief of Staff of the Army, who presently came over with Colonel Bratton. I was not there the whole time, and later on I came back in and by 10 o'clock that morning we were given to understand that a warning message had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, via Army channels. In other words, the warning was to go to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, with instructions to transmit it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, to go back to the "winds" code message, there has been other testimony in prior investigations that you, about the 4th of December, prepared a long warning message to CincPac and CincAsiatic, summarizing the significant events up to that date and quoting the "winds" message. Can you tell us anything about that?

Captain McCOLLUM. I did draft in dispatch form a general summary of the Far Eastern situation, indicating the probability that diplomatic relations might be ruptured at almost any time. I do not remember specifically quoting any "winds" message or referring specifically to a "winds" message in that dispatch. Normally I should not have done it as that would have been passed over all radio intelligence channels rather than the type of dispatch I had formulated, which was in effect a cummation of the situation, the moves made by the Japanese and an estimate of the probable enemy reaction or probable Japanese reaction to the situation.

Admiral HEWITT. It embodied—

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes. In effect it embodied the contents of my [37] memorandum of the 1st of December, plus such additional factors, such as the sighting of the Jap task force, and so on, which we had at the time.

Admiral HEWITT. You say you submitted that draft. What happened to that? Was the message sent?

Captain McCOLLUM. Well, sir, that draft, I don't know. That draft was submitted to Admiral Wilkinson and before a thing of that sort left the Navy Department, it had to be passed on by higher authority. I do not believe that it was sent, but time passed and I am not certain as to what became of it.

Admiral HEWITT. You say you submitted that to Admiral Wilkinson?

Captain McCOLLUM. That is correct, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember what his comment or reaction to it was?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think he tried to get it out. As a matter of fact, hindsight now, or recollection, I am quite sure that he tried to get it out.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have any particular conversation with Captain Safford with respect to that?

Captain McCOLLUM. I don't remember having a conversation wholly on the subject of the "winds" code. Safford and I discussed certain aspects of radio intelligence from time to time because when I was unclear on the possible meaning or interpretation to be placed on something from the radio intelligence viewpoint, I made it a custom to go down and see Safford and talk to him about it.

And as I say again, this "winds" message was a definite message, but it was only one of various other communications we had. For instance, we had a message directing the Japanese intelligence chief for the Americas [38] to clear out of the country. We had another message directing the consuls to burn all their papers. We had constant messages regarding the presence of our ships in West Coast ports. All of those we had. The Japanese had for some years, until the Division of Naval Intelligence had been successful in breaking it up, a system of reporting United States naval movements out of the West Coast ports. That was done through the consuls, and starting in November the number of messages coming in showed in effect, "For goodness sakes, get these reports in promptly," and caused some note to be taken of them.

(Referring to Document 40) This was a sample of a routine report made by Japanese consuls throughout the Americas on the location and movement of United States warships.

(Referring to Document 46) This document wasn't available before December 7th, nor, to my memory, was one couched in quite such urgent terms transmitted to any other consulate in the United States.

However, it was evident from a study of general messages sent to Japanese consuls, particularly in our West Coast ports, that the Japanese were particularly anxious to learn the location and movements of our naval forces on the West Coast.

Admiral HEWITT. How about Hawaii?

Captain McCOLLUM. Hawaii we didn't have in that detail yet. We had some, but the general instruction covering Hawaii would cover all the rest of it. The general instruction went out in a general circular and Hawaii would be included.

These dispatches were to come—the one referring to ship movements and location is under date of 18 November 1941. It is a routine warship report from the Consul General at Honolulu to Tokyo, presumably intercepted [39] by the radio intelligence organization which translated it. It was translated on the 6th of December 1941. This message must have been transmitted by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu and therefore originated at that station. It is not possible to tell from the exhibit whether this dispatch was physically acquired in Honolulu or at one of the various intercept stations located in other parts of the world.

Admiral HEWITT. What information can you give me on the interception in Hawaii of Japanese telephone and cable messages by ONI and the FBI or otherwise?

Captain McCOLLUM. I know very little about that subject, sir. The ONI had been making an effort to get a workable arrangement with

the telephone and cable companies, which, as I remember it, was only partially successful. Both the Federal Communications Commission, so far as I am aware, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation came much later into this field than we were, and, so far as I am aware, made no serious effort to obtain this type of intelligence until a very brief time before the outbreak of war with Japan.

Admiral HEWITT. Isn't it a fact that there was a law which forbade the commercial companies from furnishing that information?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Are there any other facts bearing on this question that have not been previously mentioned, that you think would be of assistance to me?

Captain McCOLLUM. I think, Admiral, that you have all the facts. I would like to venture some observation of the general organization of intelligence as it operated in the Navy before the war with Japan and substantially as it is operated today that I am not certain in my own mind [40] are quite clear to people that might read the records.

The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center for the fleet as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence center for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department; equipped to supply combat type of intelligence, which prior to outbreak of war is nearly always closely related with diplomatic negotiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was equipped with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which served him directly. With the exception of more static types of intelligence, such as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on, your combat intelligence was designed to function in the Navy Department to advise the Chief of Naval Operations, at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through his fleet intelligence officer, and out in the Philippines—

Admiral HEWITT. May I interrupt you for a moment? You say at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. I think you have mentioned before it was attached to the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District.

Captain McCOLLUM. It was attached to him, sir, but actually the function was to advise CinCpac. Similarly, such personnel were administratively attached to ComSIXTEEN, but they worked operationally directly under CinCAsiatic.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Go ahead.

Captain McCOLLUM. And in the Asiatic Fleet, which in some respects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organization, to keep the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, advised.

The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to set up certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which would [41] produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic Theatre those intelligence agencies operating out there were made known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and their reports in every case funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Our naval attaches, for instances, were under orders to submit copies of every report that they made both to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well as to the Department. So, you had in effect a three point system

in which combat intelligence common to any one of them was common to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief supreme in his own area. And that is essentially the way it was functioned throughout the war.

Admiral HEWITT. What would be the responsibility of the Asiatic unit, for instance, to insure that intelligence which they received was disseminated to the other commands?

Captain McCOLLUM. They would be guided in that by the policies of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, as in turn they would be guided by the over-all policy of the Chief of Naval Operations. In general, that was for the Asiatic Fleet to keep CincPac and the Department informed. In other words, they went right up the chain of every one in the Pacific into the Department and it worked back the other way.

Admiral HEWITT. The Office of Naval Intelligence was well organized apparently for the collection and evaluation of intelligence. What means were used to disseminate the intelligence?

Captain McCOLLUM. Reports were disseminated by letter, in book form, and by dispatch. In February, I think it was, of 1941 the Division of Naval Intelligence, if it had ever had the authority, didn't have it after that date of issuing estimates to the fleet of probable enemy intentions. [42] That was considered to be a function of the higher echelon of command within the Department, and the Division of Naval Intelligence was restricted to presenting what appeared to be the facts of a situation for determination of what a prospective enemy might do by higher authority within the Navy Department.

I might add, sir, some time prior to that, to be perfectly frank with you, we had here from time to time issued a memorandum of just what we thought about the situation. About February, 1941, that was done away with and that stuff had to be cleared through Plans and, I think, through Admiral Ingersoll.

Admiral HEWITT. 1941?

Captain McCOLLUM. Yes, sir. Now, we continued from time to time to prepare stuff, but a lot of things there, who prepared it and who put out estimates of probable enemy intentions weren't clear to the Division of Intelligence.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:20 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

[43] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

THIRD DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 16 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Joseph J. Rochefort, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. From about 15 May 1941 to about the end of 1941 you were in charge of communication intelligence, assigned to the FOURTEENTH Naval District?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. As we understand it, there were two other communication intelligence units, one in the Far East at Cavite and the other in Washington, D. C.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, insofar as the Navy is concerned.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes, I am speaking of the naval communication intelligence units.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Who was in charge of the other units?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The unit in Washington was in charge of Captain E. F. Safford, and the unit in Cavite was in charge of R. J. Fabian.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what in general was the mission and scope of each?

[44] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The mission of all three stations was in general to exploit all cryptographic systems employed by foreign powers and to develop what was then known as radio intelligence but is now known as traffic intelligence organizations, and to develop radio direction finder nets.

Admiral HEWITT. That was the general mission?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the scope of each of those units? What was each one supposed to cover in area or in type of traffic or what?

Captain ROCHEFORT. During the latter part of 1941, the station at Pearl Harbor was assigned the specific tasks of attacking personnel code, administrative code, the code in use in the Marshalls Islands area, and to exploit those systems. They were also directed to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems except the five-numbered system.

Cavite was charged with the exploitation of information contained in diplomatic systems and in five-numbered system.

The station in Washington was charged with the general control of all three plus Japanese diplomatic systems and such other systems as might have been directed by higher authority.

Admiral HEWITT. As head of this unit, to whom were you responsible for your work, the Navy Department, the FOURTEENTH Naval District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

Captain ROCHEFORT. My orders to that duty read to report to the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. I assumed that he was my immediate superior and I made all reports, other than purely technical reports, to the Commandant.

Admiral HEWITT. What in general was the relation of your unit to [45] the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The relationship with the District Intelligence Officer was on the basis of a frank and over-all exchange of information and views on a personal basis other than any information obtained from ultra sources. The relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to exchange all information available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by him.

Admiral HEWITT. You have stated in your previous testimony that your unit consisted of an interception unit, direction finder unit, and a cryptographic research group. You will explain what each of these are and how it functioned and who was in charge of each.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The station at Pearl Harbor consisted in the main of an interception unit which was stationed at Aiea radio station in charge of Chief Radioman Langford; a mid-Pacific direction finder net with stations at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, and Midway. These were controlled in Pearl Harbor under the supervision of the then Lieutenant Commander Huckins. The decryption unit was responsible for the attack, exploitation, translation, and dissemination of all intercepted traffic. I was in direct charge of that section as well as directly in charge of all sections.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, you stated in your previous testimony that your sources of information, in addition to the work of your own unit, were the other two combat intelligence units and other government agencies, such as the FBI, the Army, and the FCC at Honolulu. You also stated that the information furnished by these latter agencies was of no value prior to December 7th, and stated before the Court of Inquiry that the collaboration of these agencies was on a personal basis. Will you explain what the [46] relationships were with the FBI, the Army, the FCC, and the other intelligence agencies with whom you dealt?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. With regard to the FBI, I met with Mr. Shivers, the agent in charge, on frequent occasions and discussed the general situation, particularly pertaining to Japanese in Hawaii, but did not discuss any ultra matters. Mr. Shivers on his part kept me informed as to what he was doing, possibly with some limitations.

The relationship with the Army dealt primarily with the G-2, Colonel Fielder, and was similar in nature to that carried out with the FBI.

The relationship with the FCC was limited to technical matters, particularly those pertaining to direction finding, location of unauthorized stations, and other similar matters.

Admiral HEWITT. Your relationship with the Federal Communications Commission, did that include matters concerning getting information from commercial transmissions, telephone and cable?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir. The reason for that was, sir, that the FCC was not authorized to handle any ultra and I knew from personal experience that all matters pertaining to the acquisition of traffic were handled by the Washington unit.

Admiral HEWITT. You stated before Admiral Hart that any message originating in one of the communication intelligence centers was automatically sent to the other two, and before the Naval Court that at Pearl Harbor they received all information of a technical nature from Washington. I would like to ask you what information was so received during October, November, and December, that is, from the other combat units and from Washington.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I could not state in detail, sir, every message because I do not have the files, but a typical message would be the receipt [47] of the so-called "winds" message from Cavite on or about November 27th and the receipt from Washington of the frequencies then employed by the Japanese in making voice broadcasts. By "winds" message, I mean the message which established the procedure for indicating war.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know of any intercept of any message using that so-called "winds" code?

Captain ROCHEFORT. What we referred to as the execute or the message indicating war based on the code established in the "winds" message has not been seen by me and I have made an exhaustive search into all available records and can find no trace of any execute of the "winds" message prior to the evening of 7 December Washington time.

Admiral HEWITT. That message related to war with England, did it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Was Pearl Harbor monitoring for that execute?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Shortly after the receipt of the message from Cavite previously referred to, we received a dispatch from Washington directing us to establish a listening watch on the most likely frequencies. I thereupon sent four language officers to the intercept station at Aiea, where they covered on a twenty-four hour basis one or more frequencies in addition to all the known broadcasts from Tokyo. Results were nil.

Admiral HEWITT. With respect to your estimate of the location of the Japanese fleet on November 26th, you stated before Admiral Hart that it was your opinion that at least two Japanese carriers were at that time in the Marshalls area. What was the basis of that estimate?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The estimate was arrived at after mature consideration by the three or four officers best qualified in the Pearl Harbor unit and embraced their considered opinion, considering all the traffic which they had studied and including the results of their past experiences with the Japanese in such operations as the Hainan occupation the previous year. It was based entirely on radio intelligence.

Admiral HEWITT. I hand you Exhibit 8. Will you identify those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes. I don't recall this one (referring to the first dispatch). I do not recall the receipt of this message from OpNav to CinCAF, ComSIXTEEN, Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo,

and CincPac, 242239. I might have seen it, but I can't recall it. This (referring to the second dispatch) I identify as the so-called estimate by ComFOURTEEN, 260110, and I recognize the dispatch from ComSIXTEEN, 261331.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, with respect to ComFOURTEEN's dispatch of the 26th, which was based on your estimate, you testified before Admiral Hart that the Commander-in-Chief and Commander FOURTEENTH Naval District came to your office and discussed the matter at great length, at least for an hour and a half, and in answer to a question from Admiral Hart as to whether you recalled the disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the east and was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, you stated that you were almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief. What was said during the discussion between the Commander-in-Chief, ComFOURTEEN, and you at that time in discussing that situation?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In general terms, the Commander-in-Chief wished to know the basis for the estimate, why we placed certain units in certain areas, wished to know the distinction or difference between the estimates of ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN, and what our opinion was regarding the [49] location and direction of movement of the various Japanese forces. ComFOURTEEN also inquired about the same information. Each point, as I recall, was discussed in some detail by both admirals in my office. To the best of my belief, that would be the 27th of November.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that before or after the war warning?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I am quite sure it was after the receipt of the war warning. My reason for saying that was, as I recall, the Commander-in-Chief wanted to know what Washington's reaction was and my reply was apparently the war warning or something of that nature, but that was their reply.

Admiral HEWITT. I assume, then, you saw the war warning.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, I did see the war warning. That is, the war warning of the 27th, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. How many carriers did the Japanese have at that time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. They were generally considered as having seven, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your estimate as to the location of the other Japanese carriers, that is, after you placed two in the Mandates?

Captain ROCHEFORT. We did not know, sir, where they were.

Admiral HEWITT. And that lack of knowledge was communicated to Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What conferences, Captain, did you have with Admiral Kimmel after November 27th and prior to December 7th and who else was present and what was said at those conferences?

Captain ROCHEFORT. There were several conferences in my office [50] at which the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant were present to discuss what information our unit had available and to elaborate upon our daily summaries of location and disposition of Japanese forces.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you summarize in general terms the information and deductions that were made as to the movements of the Japanese fleet during the period 27 November to 6 December?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The communication intelligence summaries as prepared by the ComFOURTEEN unit during the period 27 November to 6 December, inclusive, contained the following information:

(A) The fact that a large task force commanded by the CinC Second Fleet and whose composition was fairly definitely established and whose destination was likewise fairly well established.

(B) Several other items, including on 27 November the fact that there was no further information regarding the presence of CarDiv Five in the Mandates and that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU.

It was further stated on November 27th that carriers are still located in home waters.

On 28 November it was stated that there was no indication of movements of any combined fleet units and that CinC Second Fleet was particularly attentive in his dispatches to CarDiv Five and Seven.

On 30 November it was stated that the only tactical circuit heard was one that the AKAGI and several Marus, and that CinC Second Fleet sent a dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee, which indicated that that vessel was a member of the Second Fleet task force.

It was also stated on 30 November that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers in the Marshalls indicated at least one carrier in [57] the Marshalls, although this was not confirmed.

On 1 December all service radio calls were changed, and that this indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

On 1 December, referring to carriers, a notation was made "no change."

On 2 December from inconclusive evidence it appeared as if there might have been a split or division in the normal or combined fleet staff and that these might be two supreme commanders with staffs; also a complete lack of information in regard to carriers, and that despite the partial identification of 200 service calls, not one carrier call had been located, which was a new low ebb.

On 3 December there was no information on submarines or carriers.

Also, on 5 December it was stated that there was no traffic from the commander carriers or commander submarine force.

On 6 December it was noted that CinC combined fleet sent several messages to the carriers, to the Fourth Fleet, and other major commanders. Commander submarines originated two messages, which were his first since 1 December. He was believed to be definitely in the Marshalls.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain, referring to Exhibit 3, which is a U. S. Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, at page 13 you will find a statement of the composition of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor. Is that description of those forces accurate, to the best of your knowledge?

Captain ROCHEFORT. It is accurate, to the best of my knowledge.

Admiral HEWITT. It was a fact, Captain, that the AKAGI was one of the carriers in the force which attacked on December 7th, was it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

[52] Admiral HEWITT. And also the SHOKAKU?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. And the battleship HIYEI was also in that force, was it not?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to the daily summaries of intelligence information in your unit at Pearl Harbor during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, Captain, what references do you find to those three ships?

Captain ROCHEFORT. On 27 November the communication intelligence summary stated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters.

On 30 November the statement was made in the above-mentioned summary that the only tactical circuit heard was one that the AKAGI and several Marus.

On 30 November it was stated that the CinC Second Fleet sent a dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee and which placed the HIYEI as a member of his task force.

Admiral HEWITT. In the light of later information, to what extent are the statements made in that intelligence bulletin correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. In the light of later information, it appears that the statements made in the answer above were correct or could have been correct, except the one in regard to the HIYEI.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain, what is the significance to be given to the tactical dispatch which was, according to your information, sent to the AKAGI on the 30th of November 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Normally whenever tactical circuits were established within units of the fleet, it signified that an operation, such as [53] a fleet problem or a maneuver, was about to begin or had already commenced.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your procedure, Captain, for disseminating this type of information between 27 November and 7 December and who received the information?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Copies were airmailed to the other communication intelligence units. Information considered to be of great importance was sent by radio to the other communication intelligence units. A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer daily during the early afternoon, accompanied by a trained RI officer for any discussions which the Fleet Intelligence Officer had wish to conduct.

Admiral HEWITT. You stated before Admiral Hart that between November 26 and December 7 very little radio information was obtained by means of radio intelligence due to the lack of traffic. That lack of traffic, as I understand it, was not over-all, but was lack of traffic from ships at sea. Is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, except as noted in the communication intelligence summary, the volume of total traffic remained about the same or increased, but the traffic which contained as an addressee or as an originator one of the major units or major vessels was almost non-existent.

Admiral HEWITT. And some of the actual traffic, as I understand it, consisted of repetitions of old messages which might, in the light of later information, have been padding, is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. There was perhaps a certain amount of padding or repeating of messages, but in our opinion at the time, and our opinion today, of all of the trained RI personnel, there was no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms.

Admiral HEWITT. You also stated in your previous testimony that [54] your unit did not assume that because you did not hear from the large Japanese ships or units that they were all in port and that it occurred to your unit that this silence definitely presaged another offensive movement and that this was called to the attention of the Commandant and the Fleet Intelligence Officer. That is correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What information was received concerning this lack of traffic and its significance from the Far Eastern unit?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall any specific message or messages from the Far Eastern unit and therefore believe that any messages they may have sent us in all probability added nothing to the picture.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the reaction of the Commandant and the Fleet Intelligence Officer to this question of lack of traffic?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Both officers were concerned and enjoined us to make every effort to at least estimate or ascertain the location of the missing units.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall on what date this was brought to their attention?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I would say, sir, it was brought to their attention almost daily. It was brought to their attention daily by means of the communication intelligence summary and in addition to that by telephonic conversations.

Admiral HEWITT. Did Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel or Captain Leighton know that on a prior occasion when similar traffic conditions existed it preceded the advance and occupation of Hainan?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did they make any comment to the effect that this [55] might indicate another offensive movement?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, I think it was generally agreed that there was a definite offensive movement by every one connected with the fleet or with my organization. The only error made was in the direction.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, they probably connected that with the other indications of a large movement to the south?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. There was an air reconnaissance toward Jaluit which was ordered by Admiral Kimmel in July, 1941. Have you any information about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I have no information about any air reconnaissance on Jaluit.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relative period of silence prior to the Hainan operation as compared with the period of silence which occurred prior to December 7th and how was the first period of silence evaluated by the intelligence unit?

Captain ROCHEFORT. About the same, and the evaluation at the time of the Hainan occupation included the statement of occupation of Hainan.

Admiral HEWITT. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated that the major portion of the Japanese carriers was in home waters. Did you see this between December 1st and December 7th?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I did not see any ONI estimate dated 1 December prior to 7 December.

Admiral HEWITT. Apart from the information of the movement of Japanese naval forces and apart from the information from Japanese telephone or cable messages, what other intelligence did you receive during the period 1 December to 7 December 1941?

[56] Captain ROCHEFORT. Apart from telephonic, sir?

Admiral HEWITT. Excepting the Japanese telephone or cable messages.

Captain ROCHEFORT. We received several messages from the Washington and Cavite units pertaining to the destruction of Japanese cryptographic systems. We also received a report through the District Intelligence Officer that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers and presumably cipher systems. This information was passed on to all concerned.

Admiral HEWITT. The book "Battle Report" states that the United States shortly before 7 December 1941 had two task forces at sea and that Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo. What do you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my knowledge, Tokyo was not informed of the presence at sea of the two task forces?

Admiral HEWITT. Now, with relation to the communications with which the Japanese consul general at Honolulu was concerned that you previously testified you had received about 1 December and of which some, which you were able to decode prior to the attack, were unimportant, and others were decoded after—how did you receive those communications?

Captain ROCHEFORT. They were received from an officer messenger from the District Intelligence Officer's office. I did not know, nor did I inquire, as to how he had obtained them.

Admiral HEWITT. What communications were they? Do we have copies of those?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not have copies and do not know what happened to the copies received from the DIO, FOURTEENTH Naval District, but believe that duplicates will be in the Washington file but unable to identify the same.

(A certified collection of dispatches supplied by Naval Communications, Navy Department, Washington, was received and marked "Exhibit 13.")

Admiral HEWITT. There are three dispatches to which I direct your attention, Captain, in that exhibit and request that you examine them and explain whether or not you have ever seen them, and give us your comments concerning them.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December, number 253. I do not recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo, December 6, number 254. I do recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245. This last message was

one of the group of messages received by the Pearl Harbor unit from the District Intelligence Officer and due to the difficulties inherent in the system, involving research, it was not deciphered until the night of 10 December by the Pearl Harbor unit. It was shown to the Commandant, who gave it to the Secretary of the Navy, who had just arrived. At the Secretary's direction, it was shown to no one except the Commander-in-Chief and the District Intelligence Officer, who was directed verbally to take whatever action was necessary with the local officials, including the FBI.

This message referred to above prescribed a set of signals to be made, indicating the types of ships in the Hawaiian area, the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area, and their activities, and included arrangements for various lights in houses, on beaches, signals on boats, want ads in Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the source of that message?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The source, sir?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes, of that message you just discussed.

Captain ROCHEFORT. From Honolulu to Tokyo.

Admiral HEWITT. The source from which you received it.

[58] Captain ROCHEFORT. The District Intelligence Officer, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain, that was one of the group of messages which, I believe, you said you received on or about December 2nd or 3rd, is that correct?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is correct.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall the substance of any of the other ones of that group of messages?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I do not.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you at any time before December 7th receive copies of any Japanese reports concerning American ships in Pearl Harbor or American preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not to the best of my knowledge. I have here all the messages we could dig up on the subject and it is not there.

Admiral HEWITT. In addition, Captain, to the message concerning the signals which you have just discussed, you examined, did you not, a message of December 6th from Honolulu to Tokyo, number 253, and a message from Honolulu to Tokyo of December 6 bearing the number 254? Would you read the two messages into the record and call attention to the date of translation?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The message number 253, dated 6 December 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo in system PA-K2, reads as follows:

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, [59] nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

A notation on the bottom of this dispatch indicates that it was translated on the 8th of December 1941 by the Army.

The message number 254, from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, 1941, also in system PA-K2, states as follows:

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

This message was translated on the 8th of December 1941 by the Army.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know how the Army secured those messages?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not know how they secured them or [60] when. Safford can answer that question, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. There has been testimony to the effect that both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation tapped telephone wires of the Japanese Consul General at Hawaii. What do you know about this?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I know nothing about it, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, concerning the movement of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to 7 December, what do you know of the captured Japanese map which apparently shows either the actual or proposed movement of a Japanese submarine?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I have a copy of a chart in four sections.

Admiral HEWITT. Photographic copy?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, photographic copy of a chart in four sections, which is a copy of the chart removed from the Japanese submarine which went aground off Bellows Field, Oahu, shortly after 7 December. This chart indicates courses and distances into Pearl Harbor and around Ford Island counterclockwise and also contains several notations written in pencil.

It is my considered opinion that the submarine from which this chart was obtained did not transit Pearl Harbor on 7 December and that the marks in pencil, which had been erroneously translated as "begin firing" and "attack and sink enemy ship" or "enemy ship sunk", were actually notations made by the submarine commander prior to his arrival in the Hawaiian area and were merely his plan of approach and entry into Pearl Harbor (referring to Exhibits 3 and 4).

(The four photostatic sections referred to were received and marked respectively "Exhibit 14A," "Exhibit 14B," "Exhibit 14C," and "Exhibit 14D.")

[61] I had received a copy of the original chart from which this photographic copy has been made shortly after its being obtained from the submarine in question and did study the chart in its original form on or about 8 December. It is impossible to state with regard to the Japanese characters referring to "begin firing" and "attack and sink enemy ship" whether they are in the past, present, or future tense.

However, in view of the fact that the submarine when obtained did have its two torpedoes aboard, it would appear that the vessel did not at that occasion sink or fire any torpedo at American vessels in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. What is your deduction as to the meaning of the times indicated at the different points that the courses have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. My deductions as to the times at the various turning points are that they were the submarine commander's proposed times for arriving at such points, all times being minus 9 or Tokyo time.

Admiral HEWITT. Which is how many hours different from Honolulu time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Which is four and one-half hours ahead of Honolulu local time, which is plus 10½.

He would have been off the entrance to Pearl Harbor at 0510 Sunday morning Honolulu time and he would have arrived at the gate on or about 0530 Honolulu time.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall at about what time the actual midget submarine was sunk in Pearl Harbor and at about what part of the harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. A midget submarine was sunk in the vicinity of East Loch during the forenoon of 7 December. The exact time I do not recall.

Admiral HEWITT. Was there a similar map recovered from the submarine that was sunk inside Pearl Harbor?

Captain ROCHEFORT. If so, I have never seen it, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. On the original map (Exhibit 14A) were the locations of ships plotted in pencil or in ink?

Captain ROCHEFORT. They were plotted in ink.

Admiral HEWITT. And what were the notations as to the——

Captain ROCHEFORT. The notations adjacent to each ship marker were the names of the ships.

Admiral HEWITT. Were those in pencil or in ink?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I don't remember that. There they looked to be in ink.

Admiral HEWITT. And the times of the turning point are in ink?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The times of the turning point are in ink.

Admiral HEWITT. And the remarks "prepare to fire" and "attack and sink" are in pencil?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Pencil, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That is not the photograph of the original chart, but it is a photograph of a copy of it (referring to Exhibit 14A)?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, this is a photograph of the original, I am pretty sure about that.

In connection with the track of the submarine on course 295 between times 0500 and 0510, both Tokyo time, it would appear impossible for the submarine to have steered such a course due to the fact that at that time United States vessels were anchored or moored in the area traversed by that course.

Admiral HEWITT. What do you know about submarine contacts that were made prior to December 7th?

[63] Captain ROCHEFORT. During my service in the fleet immediately preceding my detail to the FOURTEENTH Naval District, we

had at least several submarine contact reports in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to Pearl Harbor. None of these contacts developed into actual submarines.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you mean by that that they were never actually determined to be submarines?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. I was trying to avoid the use of the word "negative" there because we didn't know.

Admiral HEWITT. They weren't positively determined to be submarines?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Is that what you mean?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. None of these contacts were positively determined to be submarines.

Admiral HEWITT. According to this book "Battle Report," about 0500 on 7 December a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting of a submarine some time earlier. What do you know about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. I haven't heard of such a conversation prior to this, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, it appears from previous testimony that it was believed on 7 December after the initial air attack that the attacking force was located to the south of Pearl Harbor and that certain orders were sent out to search for and intercept Japanese forces in that direction. What information do you have on that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. When the attack commenced, the unit at Pearl Harbor lost all communication with the direction finder stations, one of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea; consequently, no [64] bearings were received from the direction finders at these two locations by the communication intelligence unit. The direction finder at Lualualei, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally broadcast by radio a bearing obtained of one of the attacking units. This bearing was allegedly received by the Commander-in-Chief as being an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true. The direction finder station stated later to me that they had transmitted the bearing as 357. If a reciprocal bearing was given to the Commander-in-Chief by radio, it was the first instance, to my knowledge, that that particular type of direction finder, namely, a CXK, gave a reciprocal bearing.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, that type was capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That was the number one direction finder that we had at that time in the Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. And that is all the information on that particular occurrence that you have?

Captain ROCHEFORT. That is all that I have on that, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your system of communication with Lualualei?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The system of communication with Lualualei was by telephone which utilized short stretches of wire between Pearl Harbor and Lualualei, partly Army cable and partly commercial telephone lines. It was claimed at the time that the communication systems failed because of sabotage, but after considerable study and research on our part, we believed it was due to actions of our own per-

sonnel, that is, United States personnel, whereby in setting up new circuits, telephone and otherwise, our circuits were discontinued.

Admiral HEWITT. That action, then, would have been by the Army?

[65] Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, concerning relationship with the Army in Oahu, what information, to your knowledge, was furnished to the Army, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December?

Captain ROCHEFORT. The war warning was given to the Army, as was stated in the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief. In my several talks with Colonel Fielder subsequent to the 27th, in which we exchanged opinions, I gathered the impression that he was as well informed on current affairs as we were in Pearl Harbor. I did not give the Army G-2 any ultra information, first because the only ultra that was available pertained to destruction of cryptographic material and had no bearing on the local G-2 situation; secondly, because the Army G-2 in Honolulu was being furnished such ultras as was considered necessary by the War Department. It is my recollection that the Army received the information regarding burning of papers in the Japanese consulate in Honolulu at the same time that we received it.

Admiral HEWITT. Did they receive any information as to your estimates of the location and movements of the Japanese fleet?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Not from me, they did not, sir. If they received such information, they would have received it from the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral HEWITT. May I ask who Colonel Fielder was?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Colonel Fielder was G-2, sir, to General Short, the opposite number to Layton.

Admiral HEWITT. The relationship with the Army, as I understand, was entirely on a personal basis? There was no official system set up for joint operations?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, there was not.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether any reconnaissance was conducted [66] by Army planes at any time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not know of any air reconnaissance conducted by the Army, except that which was being conducted during 1941 at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, which was an inshore patrol.

(Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and marked "Exhibit 15.")

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to ask you what information you had on the messages in that exhibit prior to 7 December.

Captain ROCHEFORT. The only ones that I have seen, sir, are these here because these are the only ones transmitted by Washington to CincPac and ComFOURTEEN (indicating those of 1 and 3 December). It tells London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy the purple machine, and one on 1 December about giving plans to entice the British to invade Thailand; one on 26 November covering the Tokyo voice; and one on 13 November which went to ComSIXTEEN, but it doesn't say whether it went to CincPac or not, giving the U. S. military situation in the Philippines. That is all we got.

The messages referred to above were received by the Pearl Harbor unit from the Navy Department.

In addition, I have seen the gist of the message of November 19th (contained in Exhibit 15).

Other than the above, I haven't seen any, to the best of my knowledge, of the messages contained in this exhibit.

Admiral HEWITT. There has been previous testimony relating to a commercial telephone conversation between Tokyo and a Japanese resident at Hawaii some time during this critical period between the 1st and 6th of [67] December. It has been termed the "Mori conversation" and it was more or less unintelligible. Do you know anything about that?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I do not.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, as you know, the purpose of this investigation is to supplement previous investigations in order to obtain all the facts. Is there any fact bearing on this matter, of which you have knowledge, which hasn't been mentioned?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:40 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

[68] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

FOURTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Thursday, 17 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will each of you state his name and rank.

Captain MASON. Redfield Mason, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Commander FABIAN. Rudolph J. Fabian, Commander, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain Mason, for the benefit of the record, will you state what your duties were during 1941?

Captain MASON. I was Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you do the same, Commander?

Commander FABIAN. I had been the Officer-in-Charge of the radio unit on Corregidor and had been relieved in September, but my orders were, by the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to remain there and to assist as much as I could.

Admiral HEWITT. That was in view of the situation existing at the time?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Commander Fabian, what was the mission of the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor?

Commander FABIAN. Our mission, Admiral, was to maintain a unit for [69] study of enemy fleets and communications in order, first, to keep track of their peacetime intentions; second, to prevent against a surprise attack, insofar as possible, or an attack without a declaration of war; and, third, to keep as well up as possible on the organization, methods, and so forth, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Of the Japanese fleet?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What equipment did you have there?

Commander FABIAN. I had twenty-six radio receivers, ranging from low frequency to high frequency, had a set of business machinery and the appurtenances necessary for the interception of both high speed and low speed enemy transmissions.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have a direction finder?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir. In addition to that, we had a direction finder.

Admiral HEWITT. And what about decrypting?

Commander FABIAN. For the decryption of naval traffic, we had seven officers and nineteen men, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What, in general, were the arrangements for dissemination of radio intelligence information to the Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Army out there?

Commander FABIAN. The American Navy radio intelligence organization had a private cryptographic system which was held by ComSIXTEEN, which was our unit, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and OpNav, sir. Now, as for dissemination to the Army, locally all of our information was handed to the Fleet Intelligence Officer in Manila, who provided for liaison with the Army. Insofar as the Army in Washington, [70] it was all carried on by OpNav, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have any specific tasks which were assigned by the Navy Department, any particular types of traffic to watch, and so forth?

Commander FABIAN. No, sir. In general, we were assigned the mission that I indicated previously, and in carrying out that mission, we covered certain circuits from which we could get most of the information we desired, sir, and the greatest volume of material. In addition to that, we provided for intercept of diplomatic traffic. In connection with the diplomatic traffic, sir, certain types were immediately enciphered and sent back to Washington as soon as it was intercepted.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that go to Pearl Harbor also, the Pearl Harbor unit?

Commander FABIAN. No, sir. To the best of my knowledge, they weren't performing any cryptanalysis or reading of diplomatic system.

Admiral HEWITT. Captain Mason, have you got anything to add to that?

Captain MASON. I can add a little bit about the dissemination to the Army locally. The Army was furnished daily a copy of all diplomatic translations that had been made by the unit at Corregidor. The purely naval matters, when our intelligence came from purely naval traffic, inasmuch as there wasn't any translating going on as a matter of fact, they weren't furnished any copies of either dispatches that we sent to CincPac or Washington or received from them, but I conferred quite frequently with the head of the intelligence department in the Philippine Army Department and always provided at least—I can't be too specific on the point of how frequently, but quite frequently—our estimate of the locations of the Japanese fleet. As I recall now, I didn't give him the source of this [71] information but graded it as "doubtful" or "possible" or whatever we thought of it.

Admiral HEWITT. Did the Army out there have any similar sources of information?

Captain MASON. No, sir. That is correct, isn't it?

Commander FABIAN. They had an intercept unit, but they made no local attack, I believe, sir.

Captain MASON. It was copying Army and diplomatic traffic.

Commander FABIAN. That is right.

Admiral HEWITT. Was the exchange of information between you and the Army complete? I mean did you receive all the information they had as well as giving them all the information you had?

Captain MASON. So far as I know, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. You were in close contact most of the time?

Captain MASON. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What diplomatic codes were assigned to the unit in the Philippines for reading?

Captain MASON. There were assigned the machine cipher known as purple, machine cipher known as red, and the diplomatic code known as J with the current one being 19.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relative order of importance of those codes?

Captain MASON. You mean as we deemed it?

Admiral HEWITT. As you deemed it.

Captain MASON. Well, we considered that the information of the greatest value would more likely be obtained from the purple. It should be made clear, I think, in the record that the exploitation of this traffic [72] was for the purpose of local information chiefly, seeing that we might be the first to intercept the message and that the unit was not responsible for the recovery of the keys necessary to read it. That was done in Washington and forwarded back to it. And all purple traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in the red and J-19 codes were immediately enciphered and sent to Washington. That is whether we read it later or not.

Admiral HEWITT. What, in general, was the information obtained from the Japanese diplomatic codes during the period 27 November to 7 December?

Captain MASON. Well, we knew from purple dispatches that negotiations then being carried on in Washington between the Japanese and ourselves were not progressing satisfactorily and would probably be broken off. I think that is as general as I can make a statement.

Admiral HEWITT. You saw the war warning dispatch from OpNav on November 27th?

Captain MASON. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that contain any information which was new to you or surprising?

Captain MASON. Not of a surprising nature, no, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here a file of dispatches which has been previously submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 15." I would like to have both of you look them over and let me know which, if any, you saw. They are a file of diplomatic and consular dispatches.

Captain MASON. I have seen this file, Admiral, both Commander Fabian and I. The only message which we specifically remember having received or seen was number 15 of Exhibit 15, which we received from the British unit at Singapore and sent to OpNav, information to ComSIXTEEN, CinPac, and [73] ComFOURTEEN, in CinCAF dispatch 281430 of November, 1941.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the gist of that?

Captain MASON. That was the setting up of the "winds" code.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here a file of Japanese dispatches which have been marked "Exhibit 13" which I would like to have you examine and state what messages, if any, you had seen.

Captain MASON. I do not recall having seen any messages in this exhibit.

Admiral HEWITT. Commander Fabian?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir. I can't specifically remember any of these, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall having seen any messages referring to the ships or locations of ships at Pearl Harbor?

Captain MASON. I do not.

Commander FABIAN. Nor I, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What Japanese naval codes had been broken at Corregidor?

Commander FABIAN. The Corregidor unit, Admiral, was working on the naval system known as JN-25, which was the system containing the greatest volume of Japanese dispatches.

Admiral HEWITT. To what extent were you successful in breaking the code?

Commander FABIAN. We were in the initial stages, sir. We had an established liaison with the British unit at Singapore. We were exchanging values, both code and cipher recoveries, but we had not developed either to the point where we could read enemy intercepts.

Admiral HEWITT. Is it a fact, then, that most of your information [74] as to the location and movements of the Japanese fleet were obtained entirely from traffic analysis rather than decryption?

Commander FABIAN. That is true, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning your estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces from 26 November to 7 December 1941, are you familiar with the dispatches contained in exhibit number 8, which I submit to you?

Commander FABIAN. Yes, sir.

Captain MASON. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What difference, if any, existed between the estimate of the ComFOURTEEN unit and the ComSIXTEEN unit?

Commander FABIAN. The ComFOURTEEN unit indicated a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls and also indicated that one CarDiv unit was present in the Marshalls. In the same dispatch in which they gave their estimate, they requested our comment, to which we replied that we could not confirm their thought that there were carriers and submarines in force in the Mandates. We believed that all the First and Second Fleet carriers were in the Sasebo-Kure area.

Admiral HEWITT. Then your dispatch was rather a statement that you were unable to confirm the FOURTEENTH District estimate rather than a positive disagreement?

Commander FABIAN. That is correct, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What dispatches relating to Japanese movements were sent by ComSIXTEEN or Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to OpNav or CincPac after the 26th of November dispatch?

Commander FABIAN. From the standpoint of the RI unit on Corregidor, sir, we initiated a dispatch around the 1st of December containing the [75] movement report of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, on his departure from the Empire area and his prospective movements through the various communication zones down to the Indo-China area, sir.

In addition to the dispatch just mentioned, ComSIXTEEN transmitted to CincPac, OpNav, and ComFOURTEEN, comment on AS-TALUSNA Shanghai 270830, regarding locations of enemy ships and added information indicative of a shift of 4,000 men to the Mandates.

On 30 November we originated a dispatch indicating a change of "orange" call signs, and on 1 December a message indicating enemy fleet movements or enemy ship movements, plus indication of the CinC Second's movement from the Kure-Sasebo communication zone probably en route to South China waters.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you identify these (handing dispatches to the witness) as the dispatches which you sent?

Commander FABIAN. Yes.

(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 16.")

Admiral HEWITT. What other information did you have concerning the Japanese fleet movements from 26 November to 7 December 1941?

Captain MASON. Is that other than RI?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Captain MASON. Information concerning Japanese fleet movements, other than that obtained from traffic analysis, consisted of one or two reports, the exact nature of which I am not certain, from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, and in addition a number of sighting reports obtained from our reconnaissance planes. There was one on 2 December from CincAF to OpNav, information CincPac, dispatch 020345, reporting the sighting of nine [76] submarines. I don't remember just where they were now, but it will be contained in that dispatch. Another on 2 December at 0730, the same originator and the same addressees, reporting the sighting of three submarines and twenty-one transports and the presence of enemy patrol planes over Camranh Bay. One on 6 December, same originator, same addressees, at 1255, reporting a convoy in Camranh Bay. Those are all the messages that have been found and to which I can positively testify.

I have a fairly clear recollection of another one or two, and one made by the British which included the sighting of the heavy fleet units, the battleships and the cruisers, after they had turned westward around Poulo Condore, French Indo-China, which was probably about twenty-four to forty-eight hours prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I can't recall positively, but I feel certain that our own reconnaissance planes had sighted at least the cruisers of that task force about twelve hours or more previously, which we reported also. I don't recall any other information that we had on movements during that period, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. During the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, did you have any information, by deduction or otherwise, as to the location and movements of any Japanese carriers?

Commander FABIAN. Our estimate summarized in ComSIXTEEN's 261331 indicated that we believed all carriers, all known carriers, were in the Kure-Sasebo area.

Admiral HEWITT. You mentioned the aerial reconnaissance, your own aerial reconnaissance. Can you give me an idea of the extent of that and approximate dates?

Captain MASON. I can't give the exact dates, Admiral, except that I know some of it was going on before we received the war warning and that [77] it was intensified thereafter. We flew such aerial reconnaissance so as to insure that no surface force could approach Luzon from any of what might be termed the expected directions and escape detection. Chiefly, as I recall it now, we put most stress on the lines from slightly eastward of the east coast of Formosa down through Bako, where they had a naval base, and Hainan, where they also had a naval base, and also towards Comranh Bay in the later days after the sighting of these various units moving south. We also had in the late days some sort of an agreement with the Dutch about reconnaissance toward Palau, thinking that perhaps an attack on the Mindanao and Davao area would come from that direction. I am not prepared to try to give exact details of that because I can't recall that, sir. The Dutch were flying, I am certain, something up from the general Halmahera area towards Palau and, I think, we were flying something along the general Davao-Palau line. And the British, too, in the final days were flying reconnaissance out of Singapore towards

Camranh Bay and over the Gulf of Siam. I think that is about all I can really recall about the reconnaissance.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall receiving any information from the British and Dutch sources?

Captain MASON. From the British, yes, sir. I have mentioned it previously. They sighted the task force that was to eventually invade Malaya somewhere in the general Poulo Condore area.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here an exhibit which is a Pacific Area Intelligence Bulletin. It gives information obtained from a Japanese prisoner of war as to the composition of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor. Will you look at that and see if you had any radio intelligence concerning any of those ships in the period 26 November to 7 December?

Commander FABIAN. No, sir. I feel sure our last definite information [78] about carriers was summarized in the dispatch I referred to which was originated on the 26th.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the "winds" code in the dispatch of 28 November which you recalled having seen, what steps were taken to monitor for the use of this code and what were the results?

Commander FABIAN. We assigned one receiver to cover the Tokyo voice broadcasts and each broadcast was listened to by a linguist. In addition to that, we assigned one receiver on a twenty-four hour basis to the Navy Morse press broadcast. The materials therefrom were copied constantly and delivered to the linguists and no indication of any of the phrases set up in the "winds" message appeared.

Captain MASON. The British unit at Singapore was also monitoring the same circuits and it was agreed that anything received by either unit would immediately be exchanged.

Admiral HEWITT. Nothing was received?

Captain MASON. Nothing was received from that.

Admiral HEWITT. This book called "Battle Report," which I show you, contains a statement that the United States had two task forces at sea shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack and that the Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo. Have you any information as to the basis for that statement?

Captain MASON. I have none, sir.

Commander FABIAN. Nor I, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you receive any information by means of interception of Japanese cable or telephone messages?

Captain MASON. None, sir.

Commander FABIAN. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any information concerning the operation [79] of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor?

Commander FABIAN. None, sir.

Captain MASON. None, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. As you know, the purpose of this investigation is to supplement the previous investigations in order to obtain all the facts. Are there any facts bearing on this matter of which you have knowledge which have not previously been mentioned?

Commander FABIAN. None that I recall, sir.

Captain MASON. No, sir.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:50 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

[80] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

FIFTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Friday, 18 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will each of you state his name and rank.

Commander KARIG. Walter Karig, Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Welbourn Kelley, Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. You gentlemen were the authors of "Battle Report," a book published in 1944?

Commander KARIG. Yes, sir.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Turning to page 6 of that book, what was the basis of the statement that, "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion fleet to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders," and, "The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo"?

Commander KARIG. That question, Admiral, was in several parts. Can we work at it backwards? Can we take the last part of that question first?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Commander KARIG. "That Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo"?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[81] Commander KARIG. That was made in the form of a declarative sentence, and is not the most cautious kind of writing. It was based on the Robert's Report, and I would like to read two paragraphs of that report into the record, if I may.

Admiral HEWITT. Go ahead.

Commander KARIG. (reading):

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan, and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons acting for him.

It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United

States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu. They knew, from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital air fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. Their flyers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field. Each seems to have been given a specified mission.

Lieutenant KELLEY. May I say something also, sir? In conversation [82] with Secretary Knox he gave us the background of the Japanese attack as he knew it—how he knew it, we don't know—and he said that his belief was there were two Japanese task forces, as we have it here.

Admiral HEWITT. That was the basis for your statement, then?

Commander KARIG. Our conclusions were drawn as a deduction from the Robert's Report although there was no specific proof that the Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo.

Admiral HEWITT. Relative to the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR on pages 13-14 relative to a submarine contact, will you tell me where you obtained that information?

Commander KARIG. I will let Lieutenant Kelly answer that, Admiral, please sir.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Sir, from the skipper of the WARD, then Lieutenant W. W. Outerbridge, USN, who went to the station on Bishop's Point and got a transcript of that conversation as intercepted by the naval radio station on Bishop's Point, the conversation between the CONDOR and WARD. At approximately 0500, the following conversation between the USS CONDOR and the USS WARD was intercepted by the naval radio station on Bishop's Point:

WARD. What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine you sighted?

CONDOR. The course was about what we were steering at the time, 020 magnetic and about 1,000 yards from the entrance.

WARD. Do you have any additional information on the sub?

CONDOR. No additional information.

WARD. When was the last time approximately that you saw the submarine?

CONDOR. Approximately 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance.

[83] Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the Japanese map, Plate V, and this diagram, Figure 3, you take the position, I believe, that the Japanese submarine from which this map was obtained was in Pearl Harbor on December 7 and inaccurately charted the position of our ships in the Harbor that day. Will you tell me on what you base that belief?

Commander KARIG. Again I'll ask Mr. Kelley to answer that because he interviewed Admiral Furlong here in Washington.

Lieutenant KELLEY. Admiral, that map as contained in Plate V was quite widely published and was released officially by the Navy Department some time after Pearl Harbor. I don't remember the exact date. A news story widely printed at that time was to the effect that this chart was made by a submarine in the harbor. I discussed this chart with Admiral Furlong on a visit to Washington. I discussed the whole Pearl Harbor attack with Admiral Furlong at great length. I don't remember specifically saying to Admiral Furlong, "Do you think this was made by the submarine?" I couldn't say that

he said that to me. He did describe how the chart was brought into the submarine base and spread out on the deck. They all looked at it. I am sure he told me that it was from a submarine. That is, I think, pretty well known and my memory is that it came from the submarine which was sunk by the MONAGHAN and the CURTISS inside the harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. But you wouldn't be positive?

Lieutenant KELLEY. We cannot prove that.

(A photograph of a captured Japanese chart, showing courses and location of United States ships in Pearl Harbor, from which Plate V in "Battle Report" was taken, was received and marked "Exhibit 17.")

Commander KARIG. Shall we read into the record the official title of the picture?

[84] Admiral HEWITT. Will you please?

Commander KARIG. "CHART OF PEARL HARBOR FOUND IN CAPTURED JAP SUBMARINE.—This Japanese map is an excellent example of subversive Japanese activities mentioned by Secretary Knox upon his return from Hawaii. Japanese symbols drawn on the chart indicate the anchorage of ships and details of military establishments around the inner harbor of Pearl Harbor, U. S. Naval Base in Hawaii. Note misspelling of 'Southeast Loch' (lower right)."

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Admiral HEWITT. Did you see the translation with notations on that chart?

Lieutenant KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I have here two Exhibits, 3 and 4, of reproductions of the chart with the English translations. If you will note, the notations are different. You will notice off the position of the TENNESSEE one says, "Attack and sink enemy ship," and the other one says, "Sunk enemy ship." For your information, that confusion may be because they are translations of the Japanese ideographs, which have no tense and could mean either past or future.

Commander KARIG. They don't even have a number. It could be "enemy ships."

Lieutenant KELLEY. We haven't seen this translation.

Admiral HEWITT. You haven't seen either?

[85] Lieutenant KELLEY. Not this one, no, sir.

Commander KARIG. No, sir. The translations we supplied in the book were made by a civilian. The only translations that were made for us anyhow were made in the so-called syllabic, and not ideograph.

Admiral HEWITT. On page 26 of "Battle Report" there is the following: "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the evidence

of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw it with my own eyes.' " You don't know what part of the chart that was?

Lieutenant KELLEY. It was the southeast, as I remember it, along here (indicating) about the cruisers.

Commander KARIG. That is just trusting to memory—where that was penciled into the chart from which the cut was made.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the times noted on the chart, what was your opinion as to the zone time that they were in?

Commander KARIG. Honolulu time was our assumption, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you read the statement on page 23 as to the source of the submarine map?

Commander KARIG. On page 23, Chapter Two, part two:

At 0430 on the morning of December 7th a Japanese two-man submarine was inside Pearl Harbor just off Hospital Point.

From the log of this submarine, subsequently beached outside Pearl Harbor and recovered intact, it is not difficult to reconstruct its survey of the harbor, leg by leg.

Admiral HEWITT. By the "log" of this submarine, do you mean the chart which has been under discussion?

Commander KARIG. Yes, sir. The only copy of the Japanese chart from which we worked in preparing the text of chapter two was Exhibit 17, supplied [86] by the Pictorial Section, Office of Public Relations.

Lieutenant KELLEY. That is not a complete chart as taken from the submarine.

Commander KARIG. Nor did it show that part of the channel below—

Lieutenant KELLEY. Below the Hospital Point entrance.

Admiral HEWITT. The Army Pearl Harbor report, apparently based on testimony of an FBI agent, states that the difference between the charted positions of the United States ships and the actual positions on December 7th shows conclusively that a submarine had been in the Harbor prior to December 7th. Did you investigate the location of ships in the Harbor prior to December 7th?

Commander KARIG. No, sir.

Lieutenant KELLEY. No, sir, we did not. The information was not available to us.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know the location of the original map?

Commander KARIG. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. If you have anything else or any other information or any leads that you can give that would permit me to obtain additional information about this affair, I would be very glad to have it.

Commander KARIG. We have nothing further. That is, first-hand information.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:40 p. m., adjourned until 10:30 a. m., Monday, 21 May 1945.)

[87] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SIXTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 10:30 a. m., Monday, 21 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. William W. Outerbridge, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. You were the Commanding Officer of the WARD on the morning of 7 December 1941?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And during the early hours of that morning, you had several actual contacts with submarines? Is that so?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Several actual contacts?

Admiral HEWITT. Well, reported contacts.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. We had one alert and one actual contact and then later, after the attack, we had several outside.

Admiral HEWITT. There has been reported and logged the conversation which you had with the CONDOR along about 0520 Honolulu time and later there is in evidence the report of your actual attack on the submarine. Will you give me your story of the events of the morning, beginning with the report from the CONDOR about 0400?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. That doesn't appear on this record, but she signalled us by flashing light that she believed she had seen an object that looked like a submarine proceeding to the westward, and I believe she [88] had just come out and was sweeping, magnetic sweep out in the channel, but she said, "The submarine is standing to the westward."

Admiral HEWITT. What was her location?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. She was in the channel, sweeping with her magnetic sweeps.

Admiral HEWITT. The approach channel to Pearl Harbor?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Outside of the actual channel, between the reefs, but on the approach channel to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Swept channel?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Swept channel, yes, and we went to General Quarters and proceeded to her position, as close as we could get to her without fouling her sweeping gear, and then we stood to the westward, slowed to ten knots, and searched. It was a sonar search. We couldn't see anything.

Admiral HEWITT. About what time did you get that signal?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. We got that signal about 0358, visual signal about 0358, and we searched for about an hour and didn't find anything; so I got in contact with her again and asked her for a verification. Then she said—this is in the record here. We asked her first, "What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you sighted?" and she said, "the course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance." Well, I knew then that we had been searching in the wrong direction. We went to westward, and, of course, there was still doubt as to whether she had actually seen a submarine because there hadn't been any other conversation, except by flashing light with us, and I wondered whether they were sure or not; so I did ask them, "Do you have any additional information on the sub?" and they said, "No additional information," and I then asked them, "When was [89] the last time approximately that you saw the submarine?" and they said, "Approximate time 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance." Then we thanked them for their information and asked them to notify us if they had any more information and then we just kept on searching in our area, in the restricted area outside of the buoys. That was the end of this incident for the first search.

Admiral HEWITT. You made no report of that to higher authority?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. No, sir, I didn't make any report of it.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your evaluation of that?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Well, at the time I thought perhaps it wasn't a submarine, because they didn't report it. This conversation was taken over another circuit entirely. This is not in either his log or mine. They didn't report it and I thought if he didn't report it, he must not think it is a submarine. It was his initial report and I thought it may not be. It may have been anything; it may have been a buoy. Since then, I don't believe it was a buoy. I believe the Commanding Officer of the CONDOR saw a submarine. I don't know where he is. I think he was killed, killed in action. But at that time I didn't know whether or not it was a submarine.

Admiral HEWITT. You say you think the Commanding Officer of the CONDOR was killed?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I believe he was killed.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember his name?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. No, sir, I don't know, but I met some people who told me about him.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, now about the later contact. -

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. The later contact—I turned in again and was sleeping in the emergency cabin, as usual, and Lieutenant Goepner [90] had the deck. He was a j. g. He called me and said, "Captain, come on the bridge." The helmsman was the first one to sight this object and he saw this thing moving. It looked like a buoy to him, but they watched it and after they had watched it for a while, they decided probably it was a conning tower of a submarine, although we didn't have anything that looked like it in our Navy, and they had never seen anything like it. I came on the bridge as fast as I could and took a look at it. I don't know where it appeared to them at first, but at that time it appeared to me to be following the ANTARES in. The ANTARES had been reported to me and at that time I thought

the ANTARES had been heading into the harbor. She also had a tow, towing a lighter, and it appeared to me the submarine was following astern of the tow.

Admiral HEWITT. Astern of the tow?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. It may or may not have been. I think other people can testify it was standing in to Honolulu. To me it appeared to be following the ANTARES in and I thought, "She is going to follow the ANTARES in, whatever it is." It was going fairly fast. I thought she was making about twelve knots. It seemed to be a little fast to me. I was convinced it was a submarine. I was convinced it couldn't be anything else. It must be a submarine and it wasn't anything that we had and we also had a message that any submarine operating in the restricted area—not operating in the submarine areas and not escorted—should be attacked. We had that message; so there was no doubt at all in my mind what to do. So, we went to General Quarters again and attacked. That was 0740-0640.

Admiral HEWITT. And you attacked and you reported, I believe that—

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we reported.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you identify those exchanges of messages? Will [91] you identify the messages on the radio log?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. The Executive Officer was on the bridge at the time. We made the attack and we dropped depth charges in front of the submarine. The first report was, "We have dropped depth charges upon sub operating in defensive sea area." I thought, "Well, now, maybe I had better be more definite," because we did fire and if we said we fired, people would know it was on the surface, because saying it was a sub and dropping depth charges, they may have said it might have been a blackfish or a whale. So I said, "We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area," so they would feel, well, he shot at something. We sent the message at 0653, the second one.

(The radio log of the Naval Radio Station, Bishop's Point, Oahu, containing the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR and the WARD's report of attack upon a submarine, was received and marked "Exhibit 18.")

Admiral HEWITT. What do you feel was the effect of your attack?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I think we sank the submarine.

Admiral HEWITT. What do you base that on?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. On the gun hit, only on the gun hit.

Admiral HEWITT. There was a gun hit on it?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. There was a gun hit on it, and I looked these submarines over and there is no hatch between the conning tower and the tube of the submarine, where I believe it was hit, right at the waterline, the base of the conning tower.

Admiral HEWITT. And the submarine disappeared after that?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, it disappeared.

Admiral HEWITT. That was before you made the depth charge attack?

[92] Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we fired at the submarine before we made the depth charge attack, and as she was going under the stern, we dropped over the depth charges.

Admiral HEWITT. Your depth charges were close to her?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Definitely?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Definitely, they were there. I didn't claim a kill——

Admiral HEWITT. Whom were those reports addressed to?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I believe it was Commander Inshore Patrol. We were working for inshore patrol, but the interpretation is here——

Admiral HEWITT. You got the calls?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we got the calls.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you remember what they mean?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Those were the only reports of that attack you made?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, two messages on that.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your action after the completion of that attack?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Well, I saw one of these large white sampans lying to out there in the defensive area.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that against regulations?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. That was against standing rules. They weren't supposed to be in the defensive area, but he was in there. So, I turned around and went after him and we chased him out towards Barber's Point. He was going pretty fast.

Admiral HEWITT. He tried to get away from you?

[93] Captain OUTERBRIDGE. It appeared that way to me. He could have stopped much sooner, but he appeared to be going around Barber's Point. When we did catch up to him, he came up waving a white flag. I thought that was funny. I thought, "We will just send for the Coast Guard." That was what we always did when we caught a sampan in the defensive area. We sent for the Coast Guard and they were very prompt. They sent a cutter out to take him in.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you identify for the record those two messages you sent about the sampan, which are on the Bishop's Point record?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. "We have intercepted a sampan into Honolulu. Please have Coast Guard send cutter to relieve us of sampan." And, "We have intercepted sampan and escorting sampan into Honolulu. Please have cutter relieve us of sampan." We sent that. That is a little garbled, but that looks like it.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the time of it?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. That was 0833 and 0835.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, then, I understand that several days later you saw a midget submarine which was recovered off Bellow's Field. Is that correct?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Admiral HEWITT. Was the appearance of the conning tower similar to the one that you saw?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the condition of that submarine off Bellow's Field? Did it have its torpedoes?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, it was in good condition and I went inside and there was a torpedoman—I believe he was a chief torpedoman— [94] working on the torpedoes, trying to get them out without exploding them, and I saw the torpedoes inside.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, I think, that is all I had planned to ask you. I am naturally interested in any information you can provide on this Pearl Harbor attack. Is there anything that you might think would be pertinent to this investigation that you can volunteer?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Well, I suppose it would be a matter of opinion, which probably wouldn't do you much good, but I was even a little surprised at the attack which followed. I mean I had no idea that the air attack was going to follow. We brought the sampan in and we got another submarine attack. We dropped four depth charges on another submarine in the area. We got depth charges that morning and at 11 o'clock we ran out. When the attack started, we were still at General Quarters. We hadn't secured from the attack. We were still at General Quarters and we saw the planes coming in, but not until after the bombs began to fall, because the bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor, and the Exec and I were standing on the bridge. Lieutenant Commander Dowdy was the Exec and he said, "They are making a lot of noise over there this morning, Captain." I said, "Yes, I guess they are blasting the new road from Pearl to Honolulu." He said, "Look at those planes. They are coming straight down." I looked at them, and he said, "Gosh, they are having an attack over there." I said, "They certainly are," and that was the time the attack actually began.

Admiral HEWITT. That was about 0750?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. 0750, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That must have been about the time, judging from this report here, that you were engaged in bringing the sampan in.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we were still standing in with the sampan.

[95] Admiral HEWITT. You mentioned just then several other submarine attacks that you had the same morning.

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That was after the ones you have already discussed. What were they?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. They were good metallic contacts, although I was a little surprised at them at first, before things began to pop. I didn't think we would get so many, but we did get a lot of them. We got good metallic contacts and the only thing to do was to bomb them. They gave us a good sharp echo. We bombed them until we ran out of depth charges and went in and got some more.

Admiral HEWITT. That was in the same general area?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Right in that defensive area.

Admiral HEWITT. Off the entrance to the swept channel?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. Yes, sir. There was another thing we saw. That was a lot of explosions along the reefs. I thought that they were explosions of torpedoes fired into the reefs. I didn't see any other submarines the whole morning. We didn't actually see any, but we did see a lot of explosions that looked like shallow water explosions of torpedoes.

Admiral HEWITT. What would make you think they were torpedoes rather than bombs?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. They were right along the coast, along the reef, and I didn't see any planes overhead. They were inside the coast

in Pearl Harbor, bombing Pearl Harbor, and I didn't think they would all miss that far. I thought they would do better than that. They did do better than that in general.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall approximately how many different [96] contacts you bombed?

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. I think we had three or four that morning, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. After the one——

Captain OUTERBRIDGE. In the first ten days we had eighteen contacts, day and night, but we didn't actually see any more submarines. I heard that they were there, but we didn't actually see any more. We don't know what the effect of the attacks were on the submarines. There was one other one, on the 2nd of January. We were with our division, making the attack, and the ship astern of us, after I got in port, told us that she saw a submarine come up under our starboard depth charge. I hadn't, up until then, claimed any hit for it. We had a pretty good contact. It was our turn to make the run. We made the run and kept on going, and that is what the Commanding Officer of the ALLEN said. That was the 2nd of January. But we didn't actually see that from the ship.

Admiral HEWITT. That is of general interest to show the probable submarine activity out there on the first day.

I think that is about all I have, then. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[97] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain SAFFORD. Laurance F. Safford, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you state your duties during 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. 1941, I was the Chief of the Communications Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the mission of that activity?

Captain SAFFORD. Our mission was twofold: Intelligence, intelligence on foreign nations, particularly Japan—in fact, almost exclusively Japan; and security, to furnish our own codes and ciphers and to supervise the security of our own communications of the U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the relation between that activity and Commander, now Captain, McCollum's unit, which, I believe, was known as Op-16-FE?

Captain SAFFORD. We were furnishing intelligence or information to Op-16-F2, who evaluated the information and combined it with other intelligence and were responsible for its dissemination. My section had no authority or responsibility for the dissemination of anything except what we called technical information; that is, the codes and ciphers, Japanese frequencies, and so forth, which would aid us in our work, which would aid the organization in its work, rather.

Admiral HEWITT. It appears from your testimony before Admiral Hart that there were three main radio intelligence units, one in the Navy Department, which was concerned with intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments; the second at Pearl Harbor, with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor, which dealt with the dispositions and plans of naval forces [98] in the Pacific and surveilland of naval Japanese communications, exclu-

sive of diplomatic communications; and the third at Corregidor, which early in 1941 had been concerned primarily with diplomatic communications, but which, in the fall of 1941, shifted its main attention to Japanese naval communications.

The so-called Japanese "purple" code was a diplomatic code, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It was a machine, sir, a very complicated electrical machine.

Admiral HEWITT. But it was used for——

Captain SAFFORD. It was used for diplomatic purposes to the higher embassies, or more important ones, such as Washington, London, and they also held it at Singapore and Batavia, Tsinking, and a few other places which I would hesitate to say from memory; also Berlin and Tokyo.

Admiral HEWITT. The unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the problem of intercepting Japanese communications using the "purple" code?

Captain SAFFORD. It never was, sir. They hadn't been assigned any diplomatic circuits since about 1932.

Admiral HEWITT. Was the unit at Corregidor ever assigned the problem of intercepting communications in the "purple" code?

Captain SAFFORD. The unit at Corregidor had been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems for several years and continued to do that up to and including December 7, 1941. Their main attention was on the local Asiatic circuits for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but very late in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering the Berlin-Tokyo circuit because we couldn't get adequate coverage from all other stations combined. [99] These were forwarded to Washington and weren't touched locally.

Admiral HEWITT. What in general were the arrangements for the exchange of information among the three units, that is, Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and Washington?

Captain SAFFORD. If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the intercept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for the "purple" machine and keys for another system which we called Jig-19, and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of duty.

With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few. Pearl Harbor's main mission was in attack on the Japanese flag officers system. This particular code and cipher had been in effect since about 1 December 1940 and remained in effect for some time after Pearl Harbor. We were also attacking this code with another group in the Navy Department and, I believe, the British were working on

it. We never succeeded in a solution. From about 1926 to December, 1940, most of our knowledge about the Japanese Navy came from this code. We thought it the most important system the Japanese Navy was using and we had our most skilled and most experienced officers and men working on it. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, about December 10th, the Hawaiian unit [100] discontinued their attack on this code and put all their attention on to a lesser system which used numerals and was held by all ships, or practically all ships, of the Japanese Navy. We continued attack on the flag officer cipher back in the Navy Department until the system went out of use.

Will you repeat the question so I know what I am answering?

Admiral HEWITT. I can ask another amplifying question here. Was there free exchange of intelligence information between the Corregidor unit and the Pearl Harbor unit?

Captain SAFFORD. There was in so far as it pertained to the projects they were assigned. Corregidor and the Navy Department exchanged by radio information on the "purple" machine and on what we called the Jig-19 system and other diplomatic systems, but Pearl Harbor was not addressed in these messages.

Admiral HEWITT. What about the information gained from breaking the code, information as to enemy movements and locations?

Captain SAFFORD. The information gained from breaking enemy messages, dissemination was a function and responsibility of Naval Intelligence. We were bending over backwards not to try to take over the functions of Naval Intelligence in this respect, and at the same time we were insisting that Naval Intelligence keep out of the communications field of activity and disband the amateur intercept stations which various ambitious District Intelligence Officers had set up without authority from the Navy Department. We insisted that both parties adhere strictly to approved war plans.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, then, am I correct in stating that any enemy intelligence, intelligence as to movements or locations of enemy ships which was gained by the Corregidor unit would not necessarily be passed by them to the Pearl Harbor unit?

[101] Captain SAFFORD. It would normally be passed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, or to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, and they would make further dissemination.

Admiral HEWITT. Before Admiral Hart, you testified that on November 26th estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and disposition of the Japanese fleet. Can you identify this exhibit number 8 as—

Captain SAFFORD. These are the messages referred to.

Admiral HEWITT. Is it correct, as Captain Layton testified, that the principal difference between the estimate was that ComSIXTEEN's unit couldn't confirm the supposition by ComFOURTEEN's unit that Japanese carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates?

Captain SAFFORD. To my mind, the chief difference between the two reports was that ComSIXTEEN gave a great deal of supplementary information which was not available to ComFOURTEEN. The only respect in which ComSIXTEEN disagreed with ComFOURTEEN was in his statement, "Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications are that

all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."

Admiral HEWITT. Is it correct that both units believed that the major portion of Japanese carriers was in home waters?

Captain SAFFORD. It is correct for that particular date.

Admiral HEWITT. Is it also correct that, as you previously testified, ONI sent a dispatch on November 24th to CinCAF, indicating that the SIXTEENTH District intercepts were considered most reliable, and requesting that future reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

[102] Admiral HEWITT. Is it also correct that ONI did not advise the FOURTEENTH Naval District that they, ONI, considered ComSIXTEEN's report to be more accurate because of the geographical location of the ComSIXTEEN unit?

Captain SAFFORD. That was not stated in the dispatch.

Admiral HEWITT. It has been testified previously that on or about December 1, 1941, radio contact with the Japanese forces was either lost or greatly diminished. Did you know about this at the time and, if so, when did you learn it?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not believe that statement is correct. We received an immediate report from one of the two stations that the Japanese had changed their call sign system for forces afloat at midnight on December 1, 1941, and until they made a reasonable number of identifications, any information on the "Orange" fleet through radio alone would be rather limited. The Daily Communication Intelligence Summary which was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, by our unit in Pearl Harbor contained detailed information as to not hearing messages from various ships and particularly the Commanders-in-Chief, Second and Third Fleet, but that an unusual number of messages were being broadcast or otherwise addressed to these forces, and that they believed that these fleets had already commenced or were about to commence their southward movement. This information was not forwarded to the Navy Department at that time, so far as I know, and we did not get the details until copies of these summaries were received by air mail some time after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you introduce such information as you have on those communication summaries that you mentioned?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. This exhibit, we have copies of Communication Intelligence Summary at Pearl Harbor for the period 1 November 1941 [103] to 6 December 1941, inclusive. The Navy Department copy could not be located in 1944. When Commander Rochefort reported for duty in 20-G shortly before the Navy Department Court of Inquiry under Admiral Murfin, he made a thorough search personally throughout the records of 20-G and could find no trace or record of this paper; so he sent a dispatch out to Pearl Harbor and had them prepare copies out there, which they forwarded to him for use with that investigation. I signed for one of those copies and prepared additional copies for the use of this investigation. It is obvious that there are two or three clerical errors or typographical errors in copying because some of the sentences seem to be incomplete or else somebody used a very queer style of English. I

think they tell the story, with one or two exceptions where we have to guess.

Admiral HEWITT. We will receive that copy and mark it as an exhibit, subject to correction when the originals are obtained.

(The document referred to was received and marked, "Exhibit 19.")

Admiral HEWITT. We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's record, which concerns a series of decoded Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches. Will you look at those and tell me, if you can, how they were obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed?

Captain SAFFORD. They were initially obtained from intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and foreign points; mostly radio intercepts and occasionally land wire or cable. Some were photographs of station copies as they passed through the various commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-five per cent were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed Japanese systems. The principal was the "purple," [104] which is a complicated electrical machine solved by the Army and machines made both by the Army and the Navy and two machines, in fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig-19 at this period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep abreast of the Jig-19 than it did the "purple" once we had the machine reconstructed. In all these systems, "purple," Jig-19, and the minor systems, we had an exchange between Washington, Singapore, Corregidor, and London. We pooled our efforts on that.

Admiral HEWITT. How were these messages evaluated as to their importance and what distribution was made?

Captain SAFFORD. They were translated in the translation sections of the Navy Department unit and the War Department unit and the senior translator decided which were of relative unimportance, not worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with financial matters and visas and things like that; and the others were all typed smooth and turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, respectively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared briefs or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the messages and they were distributed to the higher officials in the War and Navy Departments and to the Secretary of State and [105] to the President.

In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usually saw them; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the War Plans Division. The Secretary of the Navy also saw them and usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide to the President saw them and took them in to the President.

In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief Signal Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of Staff, War Department, aid also to the Secretary of War.

Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request of the President and after conference agreement between Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs was dropped and the original messages were prepared in folders and each day the folder was taken through. By agreement, all dissemination to the White House was handled through the Navy Department, and in return all dissemination to the State Department was handled through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything the Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy; and they put on a serial number. Ours were JD-1 and the Army's were SI-X, with a serial; so they were substantially duplicates unless something went wrong.

In addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to references, and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything that was referenced to anything bearing on this subject was put on the off side of the page, so that you had the message on one side and the references on the other side, the left hand side, of the folder. Then, anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And Kramer went with them and stood in the [106] doorway or outside and if there was any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody who was interested in the subject. Kramer also went to the White House, I believe twice. Normally he would explain things to the Naval Aide to the President and the aide would depend on his memory to answer any questions the President might want to ask. The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning.

Admiral HEWITT. If the information contained in these messages was disseminated to naval agencies outside the Navy Department, that was the responsibility of the Director of Naval Intelligence or the Chief of Naval Operations himself, is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. Well, Kramer was serving under me and had space in my section. He was officially attached to the rolls of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence and our foreign translators were paid from ONI funds. I think Naval Communications furnished one officer and two or three yeomen because Intelligence couldn't furnish enough people to help them out. We did that as a favor in cooperation. Kramer had to do a job. But when any information was passed over to Kramer or Op-20-GZ, Naval Communications' responsibility was finished. From that time on it was the clear responsibility of Naval Intelligence and we were very careful not to cross the line.

One thing I would like to add. There was only one copy of it sent around. It made the rounds and everybody took a look at it. The one exception was on the night of December 6th, when the mes-

sage was so important and time so short that Kramer made individual copies for each person who was to see it.

Admiral HEWITT. Here are some additional messages, which have been introduced as Exhibit 13, also relating to Japanese movements and the [107] "winds" code.

Captain SAFFORD. These are the same as the others, except they are mostly, I notice, in the minor systems.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you examine the messages which are marked, relating to ship movements, and give me your comment as to how they were translated, how they would have been translated, apparent reason for the delays in effecting translation?

Captain SAFFORD. The JD serial 7029 was an Army translation. I believe the long delay is due to the fact that the Army forwarded it from Honolulu by air mail, but only the Army can give the positive answer to that. Number 7029, dated November 20, 1941, was translated on December 4, 1941, by the Army.

The next is JD serial 7179, dated 6 December 1941, translated December 8, 1941, by the Army. That message was in one of the minor systems, which is known as PA-K2. The notation shows it intercepted at Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by teletype. The War Department unit at that time was observing normal office hours and secured from work at noon on Saturday, December 6, 1941, with intention of doing no work until 8 'clock on Monday, December 8, 1941. The Army unit received an urgent call from the Navy about 3 p. m., Saturday afternoon, December 6, 1941, and there were certain officers over there, working overtime to get back work caught up. They telephoned and got some of the Army people back and they assisted the Navy throughout the night of December 6th in translating the very long and very important fourteen-part message which has been referred to in earlier investigations. I believe that this message, JD 7179, simply laid in the basket until they got all these urgent messages over and then it was decrypted and translated as a matter of routine. We had a rigid system of [108] priorities, first by systems and second by the priorities the Japanese assigned their own messages, and a message like this in the normal course of events would only be looked at after the most urgent messages had been caught up to date.

The JD serial 8007, dated December 2, 1941, and translated by the Army on December 30, 1941, was intercepted at Station 5, which is Honolulu. This is an Army translation and I believe the Army are investigating this themselves to see if they can determine what was the trouble. Superficially, it was intercepted at Station 5, which is Fort Shafter, and I think it was forwarded by air mail and just got delayed in the excitement. The Army gave instructions to encipher and forward by radio Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted at Fort Shafter, beginning December 3rd or December 4th, as I remember. This order was faithfully complied with, but the messages of earlier date went by air mail as in the past. That is how I account for this delay, though it is only my supposition. May I add, there was a notation on the message which said, "This message was received here on December 23."

Referring to Exhibit 63, JD serial 7086, message was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on 29 November 1941 and translated by the Navy

Department on December 5, 1941. This message was intercepted at Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by air mail or ordinary mail, because it doesn't have the "TT" which means teletype. Station 2 is an Army unit at the Presidio. Seven days is about the average time of solution or translation of Jig-19 messages. They normally weren't forwarded by teletype and also got second priority in translation. This delay is average and not unusual.

The next is JD serial 7063, dated November 18, 1941, translated December 5th by the Army. Again, I can't account or give the exact reason for the delay. It was intercepted at the Navy station at Bainbridge Island, [109] Station S, was not forwarded by teletype. Part of the delay was caused in transmission; part possibly by delay in solving the message or solving the Jig-19 key. This was one of the longest delays we had in the Jig-19 system, but it was by no means unique.

The next is JD 7111, dated November 19, 1941, translated December 6, 1941, by the Army. This message was intercepted by the Army station at San Francisco and was not forwarded by teletype. It is my estimate that the long delay in this message was waiting for enough messages or a long enough message in this particular system to be received so that we could solve the cipher. Sometimes we would get Jig-19 key in a day and sometimes we would have to wait a week or ten days until we were able to break it.

We have one more, JD 7381, dated December 6, 1941, and translated December 12, 1941. This was also an Army translation; so I can only guess at the reason for the delay. It was intercepted at Station 5, Army station, Fort Shafter. It is in the PA-K2 system, which probably had the last or next to the lowest priority in decipherment and translation. The system had been in effect for several years and there was no difficulty at all in reading messages in it. But with one or two exceptions, the message was so unimportant they were never typed smooth for distribution.

Incidentally, if I may look through, there was one other message about the same time which I would like to look for, because there were two messages—the only two messages to or from Honolulu at that time went on the air twelve hours and eighteen hours respectively before the attack on Pearl Harbor and there simply wasn't time enough to get those messages into the War and Navy Departments and have them translated and get any information out. So, though they may have been several days late, we couldn't have possibly made the grade on it. This (indicating) may be one [110] of the messages I am thinking about. I am not certain of it. I looked that up way way back. It is possible that the other message I referred to hasn't been submitted in evidence.

An additional fact was this: As I said before, the Army were covering the even days and the Navy the odd dates; that is, the filing date. And if the Army had been standing continuous watches, the way the Navy had been since the 1st of February 1941, they might have picked up these messages in time to have done something with them, but when they came back on the Navy's call, they only handled the messages the Navy was looking at and the other messages didn't get looked at until Monday at best. However, I do not believe we

could have handled these messages in the minor systems within eighteen hours of the time they were on the air.

Admiral HEWITT. Were any of the codes used by the Japanese for reports on United States ships being read at Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. They weren't, sir, and if they were, it was not known to us.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether or not Pearl Harbor knew of these Japanese reports?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know at the time and I only have at second-hand now and would prefer not to attempt to answer that question. If I might add for my own answer, we had at Pearl Harbor a copy of the old keys in what we called our radio intelligence publication on Japanese diplomatic systems. We had two or three spares there and we sent them all out the printed changes, but we didn't keep them up to the minute and they did not get the day to day changes by radio which went out to ComSIXTEEN and also went out to London, and therefore, if they got into those and were able to read anything, it was only one some of the minor systems, such as the [111] LA system which had been in effect since 1925, and the PA-K2.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether or not any of these dispatches which indicated interest in locations of ships in Pearl Harbor and which were translated before December 7th were ever sent to CinCPac?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my knowledge, none of them ever were. That would have been Naval Intelligence's province and they would know better than I would, but I have no personal knowledge of ever sending them, and I did look through the outgoing message files once and do not recall seeing anything like that.

Admiral HEWITT. Concerning the so-called "winds" message, it appears from your previous testimony that in all the Navy received four reports of the establishment of that code and that two reports said that the use of the code would signify a break in diplomatic relations and the other two said that it would signify war; that efforts were immediately made to monitor for a message using that code; that the FCC intercepted some messages, set forth in Exhibit 65, which did not use the words relating to the United States; that you said that at 0800 on December 4th, Lieutenant Murray or Lieutenant Commander Kramer came in with a pencilled message which used the words relating to the United States; that you said that you had not seen a copy of this message since December 15, 1941; that at that time you checked the various papers which were being assembled by Kramer, which included the "winds" message relating to the United States, and then turned the messages over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Robert's Commission; that you were certain that the "winds" message had been distributed both in the Navy and to the Army; that no copy could be found in the Navy's files and that the Army had been unable to furnish a copy; that on the afternoon of December 4th, Commander McCollum prepared a dispatch [112] summarizing the situation to date with direct reference to that "winds" message, and which said that it was considered to be the signal to execute Japanese war plans; that you said that you were present when Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Noyes

discussed the advisability of sending McCollum's dispatch; that Admiral Wilkinson wanted to send it but Admiral Noyes did not want to send it; that you understood that Admiral Wilkinson was going to try to get the dispatch cleared; and that you believed, until you read the Robert's Report, that the dispatch had been sent. You further indicated that you had conducted some investigation into this matter; that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood told you that he knew the disposition of the copies of the message but did not care to tell you; and that you, through very second-hand and devious sources, learned what happened to the Army copies.

What investigation into this matter did you conduct?

Captain SAFFORD. The statements there are substantially correct. In the fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses, that my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could follow as testimony. That was the time when I studied the Robert's Report carefully for the first time and noted no reference to the "winds" message or to the message which McCollum had written and which I had seen and I thought had been sent. And then I began talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who I knew had been mixed up in it to see what they could remember to straighten me out on the thing and give me leads to follow down to where I could put my hands on official messages and things so that it would be a matter of fact [113] and not a matter of memory. I also talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around at the time and had anything in this thing, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come together. The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral HEWITT. When and where did you have the conversation with Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood as to the disposition of copies of that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That was not a conversation. I wrote him a letter about the thing because that was looked for throughout a period of six months repeatedly. Various people looked for it in the Army and finally couldn't find it, and I asked him if he knew anything about it. He said yes, but he didn't care to tell me about it then; but when he came back to the States, I asked him about it and found out he hadn't understood. We were working at cross purposes. I found out he was referring to the false "winds" message which we had thrown in the wastebasket. This is document number 2 of Exhibit 65, which was telephoned from the FCC to Lieutenant Brotherhood, who was on watch. Kramer identified that as being not what we were looking for and threw it in the wastebasket.

Admiral HEWITT. Is that the message, then, which Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood referred to when he said that he did not care to tell you what the disposition of it was?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the one.

Admiral HEWITT. It was the result of a misunderstanding?

Captain SAFFORD. That was the result of a misunderstanding. We were talking about different things. He didn't want to get—particularly [114] unofficially, he didn't want to get Kramer into any trouble on the thing. He didn't mind telling me first-hand when he got back here.

Admiral HEWITT. Then you have no information that the Army ever got copies of the "winds" message relating to the United States to which you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no information which would be acceptable as evidence before this Court. I heard the story and I believe it true, but it is very third-hand.

Admiral HEWITT. The information that you have, even though second- or third-hand, may be of assistance in furnishing a lead. Will you tell us your information?

Captain SAFFORD. The information that I got was that written copies of the "winds" message had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall.

Admiral HEWITT. You don't recall the direct source of that information?

Captain SAFFORD. I would prefer not to give the direct source, but I think it may be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation.

The investigation then, at 12:27 p. m., recessed for lunch until 1.30 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: The same parties as during the morning session.

Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, resumed his seat as witness.

Admiral HEWITT. Before proceeding any further, I would like to make sure that the message now under discussion was actually the message relating to the breaking of diplomatic relations or war with the United [115] States rather than the false message which indicated war with Russia.

Captain SAFFORD. I am certain that Colonel Sadler did not have them confused.

Admiral HEWITT. In order to clear this matter up and to permit further investigation of the allusions to high officers in the Army, I feel that you should give me the complete story of the source of this information.

Captain SAFFORD. That story came through Mr. W. F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst in the War Department, the man who was responsible for the solution and reconstruction of the "purple" machine, although at the time of Pearl Harbor he was working on German systems rather than Japanese and was not directly concerned with anything that took place at that time, but he did have a fatherly interest in the Japanese section.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you give me his name?

Captain SAFFORD. William F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst, War Department. I have only answered half that question, incidentally. The other is more direct.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes. Will you go ahead?

Captain SAFFORD. There is another angle, which is very much older than this destruction. When Colonel Bratton first learned of the "winds" execute message, he was not entirely satisfied in his mind and telephoned to Admiral Noyes, requesting to be furnished the

original intercept so that he could verify the translation. This was customary in highly important messages because the Japanese language was very tricky and sometimes the translations varied, in which case both translations were sent to higher authority and they could have their choice. Admiral Noyes refused to comply with this request, told Colonel Bratton that the Navy translation was correct and the Army would not be given a copy of the original message. For this reason, [116] Bratton did not take very much stock in the "winds" execute message; at least, he did not take it as seriously as Colonel Sadler and the officers in SI-X.

Admiral HEWITT. You are speaking again of this execute "winds"—

Captain SAFFORD. I am talking of the "winds" execute.

Admiral HEWITT. For the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. For the United States. And that story should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation. I might add, furthermore, Captain Schukraft knew that the "winds" execute had been received and that it meant the United States, although he may never have seen the original message or known the exact wording.

Admiral HEWITT. Who was that?

Captain SAFFORD. Captain Robert F. Schukraft. He is now a Colonel, U. S. Army.

Admiral HEWITT. What were the names of the four watch officers in your section through one of whom this or any similar message must have passed?

Captain SAFFORD. They were Lieutenant—do you want their then ranks or present ranks?

Admiral HEWITT. It is immaterial as long as we can identify them.

Captain SAFFORD. Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn, U. S. Navy; Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood; Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering; and Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, U. S. Naval Reserve. The first three are in Washington. Murray is with the Allied Military Government somewhere in the Pacific.

(The witness desired to augment his testimony relating to the question beginning on page 111 and continuing on page 112.)

[117] Captain SAFFORD. To supplement the very long summary in the previous question, Lieutenant Commander Kramer of Murray or both came in with a teletype message on which was noted in pencil the translation and meaning of the Japanese words which constituted the war warning. Kramer has informed me within the past month that a copy of the "winds" message and other papers relative to the break in diplomatic relations with Japan were not turned over to the Robert's Commission but were given to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal about 9 December 1941 while he was Acting Secretary in the absence of Mr. Knox, who had flown to Hawaii. So far as Kramer knows, this folder was never turned over to the Robert's Commission. I had stated it was my impression—not that it was a fact, but it was my impression. Kramer said that he went over this folder with Mr. Forrestal and spent about two hours explaining the significance of the various messages. Kramer did not recall the "winds" execute specifically.

Admiral HEWITT. What did Kramer tell you about his recollection of the "winds" message?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer's recollection of the "winds" message now is that it came in, that he and the watch officer, whom he is not certain of, came up to my office and showed it to me, and then the watch officer took it upstairs to deliver it to Admiral Noyes, in accordance with instructions that the Admiral had given Kramer and were posted in writing at the watch officer's desk at that time, though I had forgotten that point. Kramer says that we walked down the corridor together to his office, discussing the message. It was my custom to talk over ultra secret matters with Kramer, walking up and down the corridor. We were so horribly overcrowded. My office had about five people in it and his had an equal number. We had to go out in the corridor to get any privacy. I recall that the message was [118] fouled up somehow and did not come in the exact form which we expected and Kramer remarked, "You can always count on those monkeys to do something that you don't expect." That is a little off from what he told me. That is my recollection getting mixed up in that. And Kramer now is not certain whether the United States was specifically mentioned or not, but he is certain there was a "winds" execute message which we were expecting and that it came in the middle of the week before Pearl Harbor. I wouldn't say exactly what date. In fact, I had to check up some outgoing messages to make sure whether it was Thursday or Friday and Kramer couldn't remember whether it was Wednesday or Thursday.

Kramer informed me that no written copy was furnished the Army and no written copy was distributed in the Navy Department in the customary manner because Admiral Noyes had given specific orders not to do so and that he would handle dissemination of this message himself.

I would like to add, McCollum's message of warning was very long. The part referring to the "winds" message was very short, but was the last item in the message.

That covers all the discrepancies on that I had any reason to want to correct.

Admiral HEWITT. You testified before Admiral Hart that:

The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the "winds" message when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the [119] continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The "winds" message was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the "winds" message was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it.

Now the question is: What was the frequency and time of day and condition of radio propagation which resulted in the message being received only by one or two of the Navy stations on the East Coast of the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. That is a question I cannot refer to, having no station log available. It now appears more likely that it was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than late the night before, because the watch officers who were on at that time only recollect the false "winds" message and not the true "winds" message. There is a possibility that it was heard by the Dutch at Java, although such information as I had available indicated the Dutch did not get it, and it also could have been heard by the Australians and may have been the basis of the story that was told to Senator Ferguson by the Australian Minister to this country, who was, I believe, Minister of National Defense in Australia at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

I can illustrate some of the vagaries of high frequency radio by two or three actual examples of about that time, if I may refresh my memory here.

Before giving these examples, I would like to state that radio communications over long distances in a north-south direction is much easier and more reliable than in an east-west direction, and our reception of the [120] Tokyo radio was always in an east-west direction.

The long fourteen-part Tokyo serial number 902 or JD serial 7143 was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. This message, incidentally, was received by Radio San Francisco. Part 2 of this message and the message immediately before, which was Tokyo serial number 904 or JD serial 7144, were also copied at Cheltenham, Maryland, were forwarded to the Navy Department by telegraph, and were used for the actual description of those messages. This is verified in the GY log for 6 December 1941. The other thirteen parts of Tokyo serial number 902 were uncopiable at Cheltenham, that is, they were either not heard or were failing so hard they couldn't make an intelligible message. Part 2 of the very important part 3 Tokyo to Berlin, number 985, JD serial 6943, that was dated around the 1st of December, were missed, but the first and third parts were copied solid. Incidentally, this came from England and not from this country.

As I have stated earlier in my testimony, we had to call on Corregidor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits as the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii, and England could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage.

I would like to add that all hands had been very nervous about our ability to receive this "winds" execute when it should come in, because we were not certain of the power or the frequency, of the time or anything, and every day I would come in and I would ask Welker, in charge of GX, or the watch officer, if we had it and we would call the Army or they would call us to see if we had it, and I think on one occasion Kramer came down and said that Admiral Wilkinson wanted to know if there was any chance of our missing it and I told him then I didn't see how we could because there were so many stations, so widely scattered, listening for it. When the message first came [121] in to me, my heart sank like an elevator to think that the Japs really had the nerve to attack the United States, because as soon as I saw it, to me it was war and nothing else. And then later, particularly when I talked with Welker, we had a great sense of relief because the

thing had come in and we hadn't missed it. We had done our part properly. We had gotten the warning to higher authority and we felt very thankful that we had put these East Coast stations on it, though it seemed like a wild goose chase. It was like the center fielder backing up the second baseman. It was a wild chance, but it paid us dividends. That was our feeling on the thing.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any record at all of what East Coast stations the message could have come in from or did come in?

Captain SAFFORD. We were intercepting foreign transmissions at Winter Harbor, Maine, which was a main intercept station and was always attempting to copy Tokyo; Cheltenham, Maryland, which is also a main intercept station and guarding it regularly at that time; Jupiter, Florida, which is primarily a direction finder station but had an intercept unit attached; and Amagansett, Long Island, also a direction finder, but with an intercept unit attached.

Admiral HEWITT. You have no knowledge, then, of what station this message came in from?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no knowledge which station it came in from, though I would give first guess to Cheltenham and second guess to Winter Harbor, because they had much better facilities than the others.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether the logs of these stations have been searched for any record of this message?

Captain SAFFORD. We searched for the logs of those stations and in the Navy Department they had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves [122] and no record kept of them. They simply couldn't be found.

Admiral HEWITT. When was that search made?

Captain SAFFORD. This search was made in November or December, 1943, and again in the spring of 1944—I wouldn't place that any closer—after we got notice that Admiral Hart would conduct his investigation. The logs of Winter Harbor, Maine, were destroyed in the spring of 1943 simply to make room; they destroyed everything for about six months back. Cheltenham's logs were destroyed when the intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved up to Chatham, Massachusetts, which was some time earlier than that. I cannot say offhand what happened to the logs of the other two stations, but they could produce nothing.

Admiral HEWITT. We have here in exhibit 65 four documents which are copies of weather messages which were intercepted by the FCC. They indicate war with Russia rather than war with the United States. What is your explanation of that?

Captain SAFFORD. I never saw these documents until the day or the day before I went on the stand before the Navy Court of Inquiry under Admiral Murfin. The document number 1 was the information which Major Guest gave the FCC in requesting their cooperation. I did not know about this request or else had forgotten it completely. Welker might know something about it. Document number 2 is obviously a part of a true weather forecast and bears no relation to the "winds" execute we were expecting. However, it was telephoned in to Brotherhood and this is what he was referring to by the "winds" message. Not having a copy of the message before our eyes, we were working at cross purposes there.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, one of you was referring to one message and the other to the other message, the one about Russia?

[123] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, to this one here.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Brotherhood said he called Admiral Noyes and Admiral Noyes said, "That is a funny direction for the wind to blow from, isn't it?" and Brotherhood said, "Yes," and the Admiral said, "I don't think there is anything in it. Don't take any further action until tomorrow morning," and then Kramer took one look at it and said, "That is not what we want," and threw it in the wastebasket.

For the sake of the record, this was received—it was intercepted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, and was telephoned to Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, from the Washington office of the Federal Communications Commission. This message came in twelve hours or more after what I referred to as the true "winds" execute had been intercepted and received.

Now, document number 3 was intercepted by the FCC and telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, December 5, 1941. That also is apparently a part of a true weather forecast because it mentioned south and south did not come in as part of the "winds" code. We only had the three directions: north, east, and west. If it had been a "winds" code message, it would have referred to Russia because it does specifically mention north.

Admiral HEWITT. But does it follow the form which was specified for the "winds" code message in the dispatch which established that code as to the location of the reference in the broadcast, and so forth?

Captain SAFFORD. In document number 3 the reference to north wind does not follow the form or location specified in their set up, but, for that matter, neither did the true "winds" message. The Japanese followed that [124] one up, though I can't remember just how it was. I know in discussing it afterwards, Welker and I congratulated ourselves that we had required all plain language to be forwarded to Washington to be looked over here instead of telling the stations what to look for and relying on them to segregate true from false.

Admiral HEWITT. What is your recollection of the wording of the true message?

Captain SAFFORD. May I get into number 4 before I get into that?

Admiral HEWITT. Oh, yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Document number 4 is a true "winds" execute message, the way we expected to see it, but mentions England only. It was sent about twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, what is your recollection of the wording of the so-called true "winds" message?

Captain SAFFORD. My recollection was that they sent the voice form by Morse code and made some other departure from what was expected. Murray says that in addition they sent the negative form of "north wind cloudy."

Admiral HEWITT. That isn't quite clear to me. What do you mean there? You say they sent the negative form of the north wind. If that was south wind—

Captain SAFFORD. No, it wasn't south. The three winds were specifically named; that is, *Kita*, north, or Russia; *Nishi*, west, or England;

that included the Netherlands East Indies; and *Higashi*, east, or the United States. They had the other expressions in Japanese which accompanied these words in the voice form of the message.

The "winds" execute message as translated gave east wind, war with the United States; west wind, war with England, including N. E. I.; and the [125] negative form of north wind, meaning no war with Russia, or which could have been interpreted as no war with Russia.

Admiral HEWITT. Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court record indicates that a "winds" code execute message relating to England was received and transmitted to Lieutenant Commander C. C. Dusenberry, U. S. Army Service Corps, at approximately 8 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, December 7, 1941. If a "winds" code execute relating to the United States and England had been sent on December 4th, as you previously testified, why was a "winds" code message relating to England alone sent on December 7th?

Captain SAFFORD. This message was broadcast about twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which had been announced on all the radios of the world. It may have been to remind the Japanese consulates, and so forth, that Japan was still going to attack England or British possessions and it may have been to amplify the hidden word message received in Washington a little before 11 o'clock, Eastern Standard Time, December 7, 1941, which was translated differently by the Army and Navy but seemed to stop short of war. I am referring to Tokyo circular number 2494 or JD serial 7148.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you describe to me what is meant by the hidden word code?

Captain SAFFORD. The hidden word code was set up by Tokyo circular number 2409, dated 27 November 1941, JD serial 6985, and was subsequently added to by three or four other messages. It provided a means of sending out secret information in ostensibly plain language, certain words being given as a secondary or hidden meaning, constituting the true message. This system was designated or indicated by adding the word "stop" in English as the last word of the message, whereas the rest of the message was in Japanese. The hidden word message of December 7th referred to had thirteen [126] words of text, exclusive of the indicator "stop" and the signature "Togo." Three of these words constituted the true message, namely, *Koyanagi*, *Hattori*, *Minami*. This message was translated in such a hurry Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, that the third word, *Minami*, was overlooked and the message delivered to the Chief of Naval Operations and the President merely said, "Relations between Japan and England aren't in accordance with expectations." The Army translation was considerably stronger and added "America." We did not get this information until 1944. I do not know when the Army discovered that *Minami* had been omitted.

Admiral HEWITT. And the significance of *Minami* was United States?

Captain SAFFORD. United States. In fact, we didn't know it until the Army pointed it out to us. I would like to add one thing more. While the Japanese set up a very elaborate system for reporting military movements, declarations of war, smuggling of critical materials,

and so forth, this one message is the only time that I recall that they ever used the hidden word code.

Admiral HEWITT. It was not used, then, so far as you know——

Captain SAFFORD. So far as I can recall offhand, it was never used again. If it were, it was nothing important and it was just lost in the maze.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, thank you very much, Captain.

Captain SAFFORD. May I add one more thing to this hidden word?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes. Add anything that you think would be pertinent and of value.

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to add this: The hidden word set up was translated by the Navy on December 2, 1941, and from that time on we could not be certain whether the Japanese decision as to peace or war would come in the hidden word code or in the "winds" message, and apparently [127] they used them both. As a matter of fact, they did use them both.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much, Captain.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:30 p. m., adjourned until 12:30 p. m. the next day.)

[128] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SEVENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 12:30 p. m., Tuesday, 22 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Captain KRAMER. Alwin D. Kramer, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What was your duty or assignment in 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I was attached to Op-16, Far Eastern Section, but working in Op-20-G.

Admiral HEWITT. Under Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And you were the head of the Translation Section?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, Op-20-GZ.

Admiral HEWITT. And on some occasion you evaluated messages as well as translated them, evaluated them as to their possible importance?

Captain KRAMER. For information I expressed my opinion on them, yes, sir, which can be construed as an evaluation. The evaluation was normally done by Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my opinion about it, too.

Admiral HEWITT. You were in this section that was headed by Captain Safford, but you were also responsible, I believe, to Captain McCollum of ONI?

[129] Captain KRAMER. I was primarily responsible to Captain McCollum of ONI, yes, sir. That arrangement may seem a little unusual, but it was one that had been in effect since the early 20's for several reasons. One was since all the language talent available in the Navy at that time were language officers who had been to Tokyo in that three year language course and as a result were well known to the Japanese and were normally in social contact with the Japanese in town here, naval attaches and assistants and the embassy people, it was felt preferable to have them attached to the office of Naval Intelligence than to a section of Naval Communications. That was one reason. There were a number of others.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes. Well, that is very logical. Exhibit 63, 64, and 65 of the Naval Court's record and exhibit 13 of this record—have you had an opportunity to examine those?

Captain KRAMER. I looked at them briefly yesterday afternoon, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to ask you if you can identify the messages in exhibit 63 and exhibit 64 which establish or give the so-called "winds" code.

Captain KRAMER. There are two messages in 63, numbers 13 and 15. Both concern the setting up of that plain language so-called "winds" code, one applicable to Morse code transmission, the other to voice broadcast. In exhibit 64 there is also one that I saw in 1941, namely, number 2. The dispatch marked number 3 from ALUSNA, Batavia, I do not recall having seen.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you tell me what steps were taken to listen for and monitor any message using the "winds" code?

Captain KRAMER. I was familiar only in a general way with the [130] allocations of circuits to be monitored by our intercept system and the Army intercept system. I do know that because of the considerable interest in this particular "winds" code message, an unusually wide coverage was directed; but regarding the details of which stations were so ordered to watch for it, I cannot give any testimony from first-hand knowledge.

Admiral HEWITT. Are you familiar with the messages in exhibit 13 setting up the so-called hidden word code? If so, will you explain what this code was?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I am familiar with these messages marked number 6 in exhibit 13. As the messages themselves indicate, it was a system set up by the Japanese Foreign Office whereby in the case of disruption of encoded traffic, they could make use of plain language words to get across hidden meanings as set forth in the code. We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic after the thing was set up, which was about the end of November, but traffic did not appear in this system until the 7th of December and the latter part of December, '41.

Admiral HEWITT. How was the use of the hidden word code indicated in a message?

Captain KRAMER. That we did not know until the first traffic appeared. Based on experience, we assumed that it would be an innocuous sounding Japanese Romaji message.

Admiral HEWITT. I think in one of those messages, at least, if my recollection is correct, it says look for the hidden meaning if the English word "stop" is used at the end of the message instead of the Japanese word.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct. That refreshes my memory now. I remember, now that you remind me of it, that these reams of plain language traffic that we were getting in several weeks before Pearl Harbor were searched [131] for that indicator. That, however, I didn't recall specifically because I didn't do the searching. It was done by the GY watch officers.

Admiral HEWITT. I believe that about the middle of the first week of December there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that, to the best of your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of thinking it over since that time. I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of '44. However, after being given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 7 December '41, I believe about the middle of the week 1-7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the *qui vive* about for a week or ten days. That is the last I saw of such a message.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Captain KRAMER. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message. The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, "*Higashi no kaze ame*," specifically referring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now than I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on that is the fact that [132] in thinking it over, I have a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches from the fleet commanders or going out to them from Operations.

Admiral HEWITT. Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view of that, there was no indication—

Captain KRAMER. I would like to continue that statement, Admiral, by saying: For that reason, I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

Admiral HEWITT. Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?

Captain KRAMER. I just don't recall.

Admiral HEWITT. Reference to one or more of the messages supplied by the FCC is in exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of those may have been seen by you?

Captain KRAMER. This document 1 is not a message and document 4 is the one of the 8th of December about midnight GMT. I may have seen these specific messages. I cannot be certain, however, because we saw a great many messages of this kind in looking for this particular type of "winds" code message. When we started monitoring all Japanese plain language some weeks before Pearl Harbor, the volume of material coming in was simply tremendous, swamping. We had only three linguists at the time for translation purposes, with a pretty heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the negotiations. Consequently, we felt the extra burden or having to scan all this Japanese plain language stuff and there were many instances of [133] weather occurring in that, but because of the fact that the particular code thing we were looking for, we felt it was incumbent on us to ex-

amine it all. The reason I cannot state specifically that these particular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the same nature as many I did see.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall any message which arrived in the forenoon of 7 December using the hidden word code?

Captain KRAMER. I didn't recall it until I looked over these exhibits yesterday afternoon. I had been under the impression since the hearing of last summer that it was a "winds" message.

Admiral HEWITT. The one you saw, this hidden word, you decided that was the message—

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir. Now that I have reexamined the exhibits, I recognize that as being a hidden word message.

Admiral HEWITT. My understanding is that when that was first decoded, the word *minami*, which related to the United States, was overlooked, so that the translation merely referred to England. Is that your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. Last summer when that question of the late morning of 7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my recollection had been that it was a "winds" message. It wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection was refreshed to the extent that I thought it was one of these hidden word messages rather than the "winds." I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the fourteen-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my [134] mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message, which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the United States.

Admiral HEWITT. I show you a copy of a Tokyo dispatch dated 7 December and ask if you can identify it.

Captain KRAMER. I believe this is the one I saw that morning, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you read it for the benefit of the record?

Captain KRAMER. It is a message from Tokyo to the legation in Panama, classified urgent, serially numbered as a circular number 2494, the initial 9 in that figure group indicating circular, and reading:

Koyanagi rijiyori seirinotugoo arunituki hattori minami kinebunko seturitu kikino kyokaingaku sikyuu denpoo aritasi stop—Togo.

It is to be noted that this is a "stop" message; therefore of the hidden word code. My recollection of the handling of this particular message that morning was as I have earlier indicated and on seeing this message now, my recollection tends to [135] be confirmed in that the initial word of the message referred to England. The fifth word of the message referred to estranged relations. May I have my previous answer read.

(The former answer referring to this message was read.)

Now on seeing the message, I can see that the initial word refers to England and the seventh word of the message, at the beginning of the second line, refers to the estranged relations. It was on the basis of those two words that I hastily dictated something to go along with the folder I was already on my way out with and did not note the omission in translation of an additional code word appearing in this message until return to the office and reexamination of the morning's traffic an hour or more later. My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring back to document 11 of exhibit 13 there, can you identify that as the original translation which you made that you dictated hurriedly?

[136] Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I do. In this connection, however, I might add that I do have a recollection of making an insertion in, I believe, the file copy of this message of the words "United States," with a view to making a distribution of a corrected copy, but that no actual corrected copy was distributed because of the attack taking place about 1:30.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall, during the latter part of December, '41, during the absence of Secretary Knox, assembling a collection of intercepted traffic bearing on Pearl Harbor and discussing this with Mr. Forrestal?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I do.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall whether or not this message of 7 December, this hidden word message of 7 December, was among that group of messages?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot specifically recall, Admiral, but I am almost certain that it was. We broke out a sizeable folder of that

traffic for Mr. Forrestal, and I recall going through it rather hastily in the course of three-quarters of an hour or so, giving him the general tenor of the way the things shaped up from this traffic because of the fact that Mr. Forrestal hadn't normally seen this material before that time.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to the so-called one p. m. message, document 41 of exhibit 63, which you have previously mentioned, will you tell me what you remember about delivery of that message?

Captain KRAMER. I have already touched on what took place in my office as regards the haste of getting this out to recipients on my return from the State Department about 10:30. While the folders for recipients were being made up, I recall drawing a navigator's time circle to see if this one p. m. Washington time tied up at all with the developments in the [137] Malay area, which we had been following in considerable detail the previous week. I recall being impressed with the fact that one p. m. here was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where we knew the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Bharu with the connivance of the Thaiian Chief of Staff. That further tied up with the movement of a large Japanese convoy down the coast of China the previous three or four days. For that reason, I felt that on the way over to the State Department it might be well to point that out for Mr. Knox' benefit, and when the folder for Mr. Knox was turned over to Mr. Hull's private secretary, I did point that out and repeated that matter to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office with a similar folder for Mr. Stimson as well as Mr. Hull.

Admiral HEWITT. Then you knew the fact that this particular time was before daylight in the Far East but shortly after daylight in the Hawaiian area was significant?

Captain KRAMER. My mention of the time 7:30 at Pearl Harbor was incidental in passing this explanation on for Mr. Knox' benefit. I mentioned that point too because of the fact that I had just completed two years sea duty operating out of Pearl Harbor, was thoroughly familiar with the 10½ time zone, and more or less automatically inserted Hawaiian time into that time circle.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you call the attention of any one else to the significance of this time?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir, I think that I repeated that item perhaps to eight or ten different people, including people in my office, I believe Commander McCollum, and I am not certain but possibly to Admiral Wilkinson; several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton, and, I think, Captain Safford. But I don't believe that I mentioned it specifically, [138] although again I may have, on delivery to the CNO's office.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to refer you now to the intercepted Japanese messages which referred to ships and the location of ships in Pearl Harbor, in particular documents 14, 15, 22, and 24 of exhibit 13. The notations on those messages indicate whether they were intercepted by the Army or the Navy and give the times of translation.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you explain or discuss the time lag between the dates of the interception and the dates of translation of those messages?

Captain KRAMER. Numbers 14, 15, and 24 are Army translations. Number 22 was a Navy translation which, however, was intercepted by an Army intercept station, station number 7. Date of origin was 3 December; date of translation 11 December. I recall seeing this message for the first time Monday morning, the 8th of December. In view of what had happened the previous day and further in view of the rather badly garbled and partly unrecovered form of the message we had, it took about two days before this translation was completed. At that time, namely, when the translation was completed, a message giving the essential points in it was sent to Pearl Harbor or was sent to CinCPac, suggesting that it be passed on to the District Intelligence Officer. Even in this form here, there are several gaps and undecipherable spots, after having worked on it for a couple of days and comparing additional copies of this message with the one we were working on.

Admiral HEWITT. Would some of the time lag possibly have been due to the volume of traffic which was being intercepted and decoded?

Captain KRAMER. I will refer specifically to number 22 again, but I think it applies to all four of those. The time lag in the case of message number 22, the so-called "lights" message, between the date of origin [139] and the date we got it I cannot account for specifically, but can give this background on this type of code. The machine systems, when the key had been recovered and was being used again, were usually very promptly decoded, a case in point being the previous afternoon, when between 3 o'clock in the afternoon and about 8:30 in the evening thirteen parts of that fourteen-part note were coming in at intervals and the whole job was completed, as regards decrypting, translation, and typing, by 9 o'clock, when I commenced delivery after calling Admiral Wilkinson. In the case of the codes, however, as compared with these machine ciphers, it depended on the volume of traffic whether or not a key for that day's traffic was broken. Sometimes, with luck, a day with a small amount of traffic could be broken. Many days, however, never were broken. This particular exhibit 22, I can't state from first-hand knowledge whether such factors entered into the delay or whether the delay was due to lag between time of origin and transmission by the Japanese consulate or lag between time of intercept and delivery here.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you any other information which has not been brought out before which you think would be interesting or pertinent to this investigation.

Captain KRAMER. I think that I have covered my part of this thing fairly completely, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[140] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. George W. Linn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. What duty were you assigned during 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. I was in OP-20GY, which was a decrypting section of the Communications Intelligence Section, and I was assigned, I think it was probably about February or March—a watch was started, a twenty-four hour watch started, and I was assigned to

that watch and later became the senior officer of that watch. Some time, maybe a month or so, before December 7th, I was taken off the watch list and put on days, principally for decrypting reasons. I had more experience than most of the others and Captain Safford wanted to be sure we would get the keys in this machine cipher as soon as possible during the night so that we would have them the next morning. So that took me off the watch list. Then—I am not sure about this date—a couple of days before the 7th of December we started our Christmas leaves and one of our watch officers started his leave and I went on the watch list in his place, and that put me on watch from 1600 to 2400 on the 6th.

Admiral HEWITT. How many watch officers were there standing that watch during the first week in December?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Well, at the early part of the first week there were the four watch officers, including the one that I replaced. From about the 4th or 5th on—I am not sure about this date—there were three others besides myself.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you give me their names?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, [141] Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, all Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you know of the existence of the "winds" code at the time?

Lieutenant Commander ETA shrdl

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Well, I saw the translations of the documents that set up the "winds" code and I knew that steps were taken to get the raw material in and the watch was assigned the task of looking over that raw material outside of normal working hours. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who was in Op-20GZ at that time, handled that himself during the day, anything that came in during normal working hours. At night the watch looked over this raw material. It came in mainly from the West Coast, plain language Japanese; came in by teletype.

Admiral HEWITT. Then if anything came in on that subject, it would have been seen by you or one of the officers that you have mentioned?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Yes. If it had come in outside of normal working hours, some one of the officers should have seen it. I myself have no knowledge of it. I will say this, that we wouldn't of necessity know about it—

Admiral HEWITT. But one of you—

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. If it did come in. But the man who received it would.

Admiral HEWITT. What I am trying to bring out is it must have gone through one of the officers that you mentioned, one of those four watch officers, outside of working hours; is that right?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. That is right.

Admiral HEWITT. And Commander Kramer during the day time?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Yes. Well, he was in during the evenings a lot. [142] It is pretty hard to draw the line. Commander Kramer worked sometimes as late as 9 o'clock. It is pretty hard to draw the line at 1630.

Admiral HEWITT. What I am trying to bring out is if an execute or any message having to do with that "winds" code had come in, it would have been seen by at least one of those officers?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Yes, if Commander Kramer wasn't there at the time. We were the GY watch and we had the responsibility for anything that came in if it came in through Naval Communications or anything else. The only way in which they might not would be if something came in at 8 o'clock and he just took the raw material and handed it to Commander Kramer without looking it over.

Admiral HEWITT. Then Commander Kramer would have seen it?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. He would have had it himself. That is right.

Admiral HEWITT. Are you able to state positively that you never saw any intercept which used the code words indicating the breaking of relations with the United States or war with the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. LINN. Prior to December 7th, yes. I have seen the one from the FCC, but that was afterward. That was a part of the previous investigation. I didn't see anything before that I remember. My memory in some phases of this is good and others not too good at all. I knew nothing about the FCC being mixed up in this until at the time of the inquiry, when I saw that copy.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[143] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Francis M. Brotherhood, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.

Admiral HEWITT. It appears from previous testimony that during 1941 you were connected with the security section of Naval Communications in Washington and that you have some knowledge of the so-called "winds" code. What were your duties in 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Admiral, I was one of the watch officers in charge of the decryption and preparation of diplomatic dispatches, especially the Japanese.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you tell us what you know about the "winds" code and the efforts to monitor for the "winds" code? State what your understanding of the "winds" code is and what steps were taken to listen for a message using that code.

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Some time in the month of November, Admiral, we got a dispatch which we succeeded in breaking out, that told us that the Japanese were planning to inform their consular officials around the world by voice radio from Tokyo to the effect that they intended to break relations with certain countries, among them the United States, Russia, and Great Britain. I don't remember whether any one else was included. It would be in the way of a weather broadcast. A certain weather expression was to indicate that Japan planned to break diplomatic relations with the United States, and another expression meant that they planned to break with Great Britain, and still another that they planned to break with Russia. As one of the watch officers through whom they hoped to have the message transmitted to the authorities at the Navy Department, I had been [144] drilled as to what to watch for and had very specific instructions as to how to handle any such dispatch that was intercepted.

In connection with the intercept facilities, I wasn't a part of the people that set up the intercept organization, but it was my understanding at the time that whatever facilities the Navy had that could be diverted to the reception of voice signals as against conventional

radio telegraphic signals had been diverted and had been set up for the purpose. We regarded the possible intercept of such an execute order as being of great importance. We had been instructed further that the FCC had been informed of what we were looking for and that under certain circumstances we might hear from them, and the Army, who was working this diplomatic project with us jointly, and my understanding at the time was that they were also diverting certain facilities in an effort to get this broadcast. That is the background, as I understand it.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall what, if any, messages were received using this "winds" code?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. I was on duty there the evening of, I believe it was, the 4th of December—I rightly don't remember at this moment whether it was the 4th or the 5th—when the FCC called and asked for some one to whom they could deliver a certain dispatch and the officer of the FCC at the other end indicated to me some way that I understood what he was driving at, and I said, "I am authorized to take it," and I did so and it was an expression that just didn't quite fit the code. In other words, it was not what we were looking for. I would say not what we were looking for. In other words, it did not indicate that we might expect a break in relations on the part of Japan with the United States, but it was suggestive of a break in relations with Russia. However, as I remember the [145] dispatch in question, without refreshing my memory here, it was not accurate in its fitting the formula insofar as Russia was concerned. At the time, I myself was not in position to evaluate the value of that dispatch. I had only my orders to pass it on, which I did. However, I did so with a reservation in my own mind that it was not fitting the formula setting up this dispatch.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you examine this exhibit number 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and see if any of those fits the message which you just described?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. This one (indicating) is somewhat like the message that I have just described, although this is in English, a translation of what I actually received.

Admiral HEWITT. That is document number 1?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. This is document number 1.

Admiral HEWITT. Look at the others also. What about document number 2? Could that have been the message to which you referred?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. That doesn't strike me, Admiral Hewitt, as being the one.

Admiral HEWITT. Number 1 to which you refer is not a message, but it might be the code?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir, but that was the point I made, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I will rephrase the question. Document number 2, then, as I understand it, refers to the north wind, but in referring to the north wind, it did not follow the form which had been more or less specified in the message that set up the "winds" code, is that correct?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir. That was the impression I had at the time.

[146] Admiral HEWITT. Will you discuss to whom this message was delivered?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Admiral Hewitt, my instructions were to first get in touch with the communication watch officers upstairs and pronounce the words that I had heard from whoever sent them to me, in this case the FCC, and I would receive further instructions. The communication watch officer instructed me in these words: "You want to see the Admiral." I called the Admiral on the telephone directly and without delay got him on the other end of the wire and told him verbally what I had received. The reaction on the part of Admiral Noyes, who was then the Director of Naval Communications, was that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction, and he used words to that effect. As I said, when I telephoned this thing through, I didn't think personally, although I was not supposed to think in the matter—I didn't think it was in the nature of an execute. Admiral Noyes further gave me to believe from what I heard him say over the telephone—I can't quote his words, but the impression I got was, however he would pass the information on for what it was worth.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall what conversation you had with Captain Safford concerning this?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Admiral Hewitt, I haven't had my memory refreshed on that conversation, although Captain Safford says that I called him that morning and told him such a dispatch had arrived. That was in accordance with my instructions, too.

Admiral HEWITT. But you can't remember now actually whether you did it or what was said?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. No, sir. If I hadn't seen Captain Safford here a half hour ago, I wouldn't be able to say that I had called him, but Captain Safford said I did and I believe I had called him.

[147] Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall ever seeing any message which referred to the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. No, Admiral, I do not.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you give me the names of the other officers who stood the same watch that you did?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir. I relieved Lieutenant Commander Linn, Lieutenant Commander George Linn, at midnight—well, 1201, December 7th—and I was relieved in turn by Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering some time after 7 the same morning, and the other officer, whom I did not see that day, was Lieutenant Commander Murray. I don't remember his initials.

Admiral HEWITT. Were there any officers who stood watch earlier?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Well, sir, we had another member of the group. There were five of us. The other member of the group managed to get in his Christmas vacation that week—I mean his annual leave—so he was not present, and that was Lieutenant Commander Brown.

Admiral HEWITT. The only other officer besides those you have mentioned who would have direct knowledge of such messages or through whom such messages would pass would be Commander Kramer, is that right?

Lieut. Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Well, Commander Kramer should certainly be considered, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. As I understand it, he would have the messages that came in during the day and one of these watch officers, one of you watch officers, would be sure to see any messages that came in during the night outside of working hours. Is that correct?

Lieut Comdr. BROTHERHOOD. Yes, sir. That would also be true of the day time. We had a teletype set up there in which all this stuff, if it was intercepted by any of the outside stations, was being transmitted to us.

[148] Admiral HEWITT. I think that is all then. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Alfred V. Pering, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

Admiral HEWITT. What were your duties during 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. I was the watch officer in Op-20G.

Admiral HEWITT. And you were carrying out that duty during the first week in December, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Who were the other watch officers?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, Lieutenant Commander Murray, Lieutenant Commander Linn. At the time there was a four section watch.

Admiral HEWITT. You knew of the existence of the "winds" code?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. Yes, sir. We had instructions to look for a certain set of conditions in plain language Japanese which was being intercepted.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you ever see any intercept using that code which referred to the breaking of relations with the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. I did not, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you see any referring to breaking relations with any other nation?

Lieut. Comdr. PERING. No, I saw none.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[149] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Frederick L. Freeman, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. What were your duties during 1941, Mr. Freeman?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. I was in the section that was identified as section GI of Intelligence, which was a correlating section and disseminating section. We disseminated intelligence received by us from the field radio intelligence units to ONI. We wrote up our own reports on the basis of information sent to us and delivered them to ONI.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you stand a watch in connection with those duties?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. We had been on a watch basis, sir, for about a month, I would say—I don't recall exactly how long, but it was about that long—before Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. What other officers shared that watch with you the first week of December, 1941?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Lieutenant M. W. Lyon, Chief Yeoman—he is Ensign now—Nine, and Chief Yeoman Stalter.

Admiral HEWITT. You were acquainted with the so-called “winds” code then?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Yes, sir, I was.

Admiral HEWITT. What do you know about the efforts made to monitor, intercept, a message referring to that code or in that code?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. Well, I am aware that we made every effort. We were expecting the signal to execute and I know that every effort was made, all stations were alerted to listen for it; but from personal knowledge I don't know that we ever actually got the signal.

[150] Admiral HEWITT. You never knew personally of any intercept?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall what discussions you may have had with Captain Safford concerning this?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. I had a discussion with Captain Safford some time last year about it and he was requesting me as to my memory of the circumstances, as to whether or not we had gotten such a message. I was standing duties adjacent to the section that was responsible for decrypting, and so forth, at that time and we worked fairly closely with them and he thought that I might personally recall having seen the message executing.

Admiral HEWITT. But you never did?

Lieutenant FREEMAN. I never did, no, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. the next day.)

[151] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

EIGHTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 23 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Admiral HEWITT. Careful consideration has been given to the evidence concerning the so-called "winds" message with a view to determining whether or not Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN, formerly Director of Naval Communications, should be called as a witness. It appears from the testimony of Captain Safford that he *thought* that a "winds" message relating to the United States was received about 4 December 1941 and was shown to him by Captain Kramer and a watch officer and then delivered to Admiral Noyes. It appears from the testimony of Captain Kramer that he believes that there was some such message at about that time, but that he cannot recall whether or not it referred to the United States, and he is under the impression that it referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it *may* have referred to the United States also. Captain Kramer believed that the message in question was delivered to Admiral Noyes. There is yet no other evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the United States was received.

Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such message and that he did not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although he had some recollection of a "false alarm." Accordingly, I find that no useful purpose would be served [152] by calling Admiral Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in this record. This decision will be reconsidered should further evidence be developed indicating that a useful purpose would be served by reexamining Admiral Noyes.

(The extracts of testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, follow.)

[153] EXTRACTS OF TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LEIGH NOYES BEFORE NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY

37. Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which has been familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to examine it and state whether you had seen this document on or after the date of its translation, which is noted in the right-hand corner as being 28 November 1941?

A. Yes.

38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document when it was brought to your attention?

A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations to cover this point.

39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these steps to get intercepts from your stations, will you state whether any of the code words as set out in document 15 were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or in plain English?

A. They were not.

40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2 and Document No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications Commission. I ask you whether you were ever acquainted with the information contained in these documents prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941.

A. I have no recollection of ever having seen this document.

41. Q. Either 2 or 3—either document?

A. No, sir.

42. Q. Had you ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3 prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge.

43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an officer in your Division made any telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter contained in the winds code, of document 15, that you have previously been shown?

A. No.

44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, having been informed by some officer in the Navy Department that there had been received in the Navy Department certain information about winds, and that your reply was, "The wind seems to be blowing in a strange direction," or words to that effect? Do you have any recollection of such a conversation?

A. I do not."

78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was there brought to your attention a dispatch that had been prepared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Far Eastern Division in which there was a summary or resume of intelligence information to be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

[154] A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communication intelligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence. I told him that in my opinion estimates of the situation should come from the Chief of Naval Operations.

79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message was ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not.

80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department with regard to releasing this dispatch?

A. I cannot. I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except to see that they were properly released.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was prepared and being considered for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, do you remember whether any reference was made to the winds code system?

A. I do not.

82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execution signal was received?

A. We had a special 24-hour watch for all communication intelligence matters.

83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal?

A. I couldn't say.

84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and these had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the

earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was established?

A. No, I couldn't say.

85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that the execution of the winds code system was received and that a thorough search in the Navy Department files had failed to receive a copy of the execution signal. Would the Director of Naval Communications files be the normal place in which the record would be kept?

A. If it was received by naval means, yes; if not, no.

86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of the Director of Naval Communications the normal repository of such messages?

[155] A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the Office of Naval Intelligence.

87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been received by naval intercepting means and therefore the record of this message would naturally be kept in the files of the Director of Naval Communications, would it not?

A. Yes.

88. Q. Can you explain why this document is missing from the files of the Director of Naval Communications?

A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think that any such message was received by naval means.

89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form of the winds message? Is that the way you want to leave your testimony on that subject?

A. That is right; yes.

136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of the "Winds Message": Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant Commander Kramer came in with the execute of the "Winds Message" and said, "Here it is"?

A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which afterwards turned out not to be correct. That information was taken to mean that an execute of this "Winds Message" had been received. It turned out not to be correct.

141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form." I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just testified that you received some information. From where did this information come?

A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, that there was a false alarm about it.

142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that particular subject, did it?

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.

143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution of the "Winds Message"; is that right?

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so-called "Winds Message" was finally received.

Reexamined by the court:

144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

[156] 145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

146. Q. Yes.

A. No.

147. Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message from Alusna Batavia to OpNav, No. 031030, and ask you whether or not you have seen that dispatch, or whether you recognize it, and if so, at what time did you see it?

A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it.

149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court, please?

A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department."

150. Q. And continue for the first three lines.

A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end."

151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations?

A. It was his interpretation apparently of the same message that had already been received.

152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the War Department of the Japanese code would have reached about the same conclusion, in that they had the same words to work from?

A. This was not necessarily—

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the following statement: I call the court's attention to the fact that this was not a translation made in the War Department. This came from Batavia that way.

The witness made the following statement: Somebody in Batavia had gained that information.

153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same code system which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the "Winds Code" system?

A. Probably. We discussed it with the War Department. They did not have much confidence, as I remember it, in the information from there as against the rechecking that was done in Washington.

154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds Message" was received; that is, who gave it to you?

A. No.

155. Q. But you do recollect that you did hear about the execution of this before 7 December 1941?

A. It has been stated and it has been testified to that there were six [157] copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my recollection for three years back as against my assistants. These people who handled the details were my subordinates, and their recollection of details is probably better than mine.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it, what this false report of the execute of the "Winds Message" was?

A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe there must have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that it was not finally found to be correct.

157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Admiral, is the wording of the report which you received and which later you determined to be false?

A. I don't know.

158. Q. Do you know from whom it was received?

A. I don't.

[158] Two witnesses entered and each was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Leo Reierstad, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Joseph M. Conant, Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

Admiral HEWITT. Lieutenant Commander Reierstad, what are your duties?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. I am in charge of the translating unit in Op-16FE.

Admiral HEWITT. That involves translating Japanese?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What are your qualifications in Japanese?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Well, I am a graduate of the Navy's School of Oriental Languages and Japanese language and then I had nine years of residence in China, during which time I studied Chinese, which, of course, has some relation to the Japanese language as far as the written form is concerned.

Admiral HEWITT. Lieutenant Conant, will you answer the same questions with regard to your duties and qualifications?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. I am a translation sub-section head under Lieutenant Commander Reierstad and my qualifications are solely that I graduated from the Boulder Language school.

Admiral HEWITT. Have you examined this exhibit number 14, which I present to you?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. This looks like the one that we had and actually examined.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you examine it closely enough to tell whether this is the same one or a copy of it? This is a photographic copy.

[159] Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you state whether this is the one that you looked over to translate?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, that is the one.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. I present you with exhibit number 4 and ask you to testify if the printed part of the exhibit, with the additional pencil notations, is your translation of the exhibit number 14?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. It is.

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. How does your translation compare in general with this exhibit number 3?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. This (referring to exhibit number 3) we haven't examined prior to this time, sir. Admiral, I point out here, sir, that this translation, which is a possibly correct one, also might be translated "establish position." I should like to make clear that the time element, whether it is past, present, or future, is not definitely ascertainable from the characters as appearing here.

Admiral HEWITT. That would also be true where this caption is "enemy ship sunk" in exhibit 3 and in exhibit 14 it is "attack and sink"?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. That is also true. Simply on the basis of the original Japanese it is not possible to say definitely whether it is past or future action. "Attack and sink enemy battleship" could be correct, or "enemy ship attacked and sunk" would also be correct, in our opinion.

Admiral HEWITT. I call your attention to the fact that the entrance channel is marked here by rings through a lighthouse here and through the Sugar Mill stack at Waihapu, that a vessel entering the channel at these [160] outer buoys should be on this range (indicating). Will you confirm my idea that possibly this notation "position established" could be a note to get on that range at that point?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. I would say definitely. Wouldn't you, Conant?

Lieutenant (jg) CONANT. Yes, I would say that.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you state the date on which you last looked over exhibit 4 and added the pencil notations?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. 22 May was the last time we handled this chart and put our final remarks on.

Admiral HEWITT. Are you willing to certify as to the accuracy of this translation within the limitations of tense which you have already expressed?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. And we would like to add within the limitations of this being a photostatic copy and certain parts of it being impossible for us to accurately discern.

Admiral HEWITT. But to the extent that there is a translation here on exhibit 4 it is accurate?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes sir.

Admiral HEWITT. In other words, your translation is not complete, but what you have translated is correct?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. Yes, sir, with the further qualification, of course, that the Admiral just made, that we cannot undertake to state whether this is past or future tense.

Admiral HEWITT. In the book "Battle Report" on page 26 there is a statement, referring to this chart or another photographic copy of the same chart: "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the evidence [161] of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw it with my own eyes!'" Could you find anything on this chart which might be the basis for that statement, any notation on this chart?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. In this connection, sir, all we can say is on the basis of the photo copy made available to us for examination, there is no evidence we have been able to locate of any Japanese writing that could be so translated.

Admiral HEWITT. Calling your attention to the notations which are in ink near the times 0115 and 0410, one is translated as "fight." Could that possibly refer to the initiation of a general attack or a zero hour for an attack?

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. In my opinion, it definitely could.

Lieutenant (j. g.) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. It is very possible, but again there is no way of saying whether that is a future action or a past action.

Admiral, there is just one idea that occurred to me, whether it might not be worthwhile in connection with this project to get the original and to also make from the original a study of the calligraphy which appears here in different places to establish first of all whether it was all written by the same man, if possible, whether some of it might not have been written in considerably greater haste. A good deal of information could be obtained from a study of that kind. Don't you think so, Joe?

Lieutenant (j. g.) CONANT. Yes, sir.

Lieut. Comdr. REIERSTAD. The interesting thing here is, Admiral, that all of these signals appear to have been written in pencil. If anything had been fixed up in advance, I think that that happening would have been written on in ink, if we assume that these other things were also written [162] on in ink, well in advance. Also the question of the effect of what damage on some parts of the document as against the others which would make some of these stand out more clearly.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witnesses were excused.)

The investigation was then, at 2:30 p. m., adjourned until 11 a. m. Friday, 25 May 1945.

[163] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

NINTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 11 a. m., Friday, 25 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Admiral HEWITT. State your name and rank.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U. S. Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. You were Assistant Chief of Staff in the Operations Office of CinCPac?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Prior to 7 December 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. You are, of course, familiar with exhibit number 8 of the Naval Court's record, Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 on the security of Pearl Harbor. One of the assumptions is—

That a declaration of war may be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

And also at the end of the letter a statement was made that—

It must be remembered, too, that a single submarine's attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

Is that correct?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Exhibit 52 of the Court of Inquiry's record, which [164] is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, established the task groups then in effect?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Task forces, yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. You can identify that?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Also we have exhibit 69A and B of the Court of Inquiry, which purport to be memoranda gotten up for the Commander-in-Chief by Captain, now Admiral, McMorris. Can you identify those from your recollection?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, that exhibit, those two memoranda, as I understand it, were somewhat in the nature of a check-off list of steps to be taken—

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir. They were given to the Duty Officer.

Admiral HEWITT. —a running check-off list of steps to be taken in case war was declared?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, before the Roberts Commission you stated that as far as you recalled, the question of an air raid on Pearl Harbor was not discussed between 27 November and 7 December. Is that still in accordance with your memory?

Rear Admiral DELANY. You mean a surprise attack—

Admiral HEWITT. It says:

The possibility of an air raid on Pearl Harbor was not discussed between 27 November and 7 December.

Rear Admiral DELANY. I take it that you mean a joint discussion or as a matter within the Staff or personal discussion. "Never from the point of view of what happened"; yes, sir, I confirm that statement.

[165] Admiral HEWITT. The question was:

Had you any discussions between November 27 and December 7 as to the probability of Japanese naval action or air action?

Never from the point of view of what happened.

Then the next question was:

The possibility was not discussed, the possibility of an air raid?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, that is still my—

Admiral HEWITT. But it was not specifically discussed after the arrival of the war warning on November 27th?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, sir. The same answer there; not in the light of what happened, an attack of that nature.

Admiral HEWITT. What I was trying to bring out was whether the possibility of what actually did happen was discussed during that critical period from November 27th to December 7th in the Staff or with Admiral Kimmel.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, within the Staff, even before this time, and when this order was formulated, it was stated in there that the possibility of an air raid existed; but with the information that we had, it wasn't discussed as a matter that was actually going to happen. There always was a possibility of it.

Admiral HEWITT. About that time was an estimate of the Pacific situation made?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. In which various enemy courses of action were considered?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Was that in written form or was it just a mental estimate made by the Commander-in-Chief or some of the members of the Staff?

[166] Rear Admiral DELANY. Well, Admiral, I think that the war plans that came out of the Pacific Fleet, and I think must be on file here, gave consideration to that.

Admiral HEWITT. The Pacific Fleet war plans.

Rear Admiral DELANY. There was a Rainbow plan and shipping raid plans.

Admiral HEWITT. Let's refer to that.

Rear Admiral DELANY. I can't give you the contents of those war plans after all this time, but I know there was a running estimate of the situation and plans based on those estimates.

Admiral HEWITT. You expect it to appear in the assumptions to the war plan, do you not?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Looking at this Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1), they are general assumptions:

That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account—

and other general assumptions of that nature, and one special assumption—

That the [167] Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

Now, I might read the following into the record, I think. In Chapter III, paragraph 1331, of this reference, the Estimate of Enemy Action includes the following:

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

[168] b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reinforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reinforcement of the Mandates.

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probably main base in Halmahera).

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

[169] e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

Those are the essential ones. Take this sub-paragraph "f" here:

Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area.

That would seem to indicate that a raid on the Hawaiian area by forces other than submarines was not seriously contemplated then?

Rear Admiral DELANY. That is right; to the extent that it actually happened, that is correct, and I think it might be pertinent to say that I believe that that plan was submitted to the Navy Department and approved by the Navy Department. I don't know the date because I am not familiar enough with the thing three years from then to say what the thing is, but I know that those things were submitted to the Navy Department.

Admiral HEWITT. I read from the letter of distribution of this book:

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

You don't remember whether that—

Rear Admiral DELANY. I don't know that the thing was actually approved, but the concept of the whole thing was that it was to be approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, because it is intimated in that letter that approval hadn't yet been received and if the occasion arose before the approval was forthcoming, it would be placed in effect anyhow.

[170] Admiral HEWITT. So as to have something ready?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, I gather a picture of this, from reading the testimony and so forth, that you had a great many warnings of different sorts. You knew about that time that the relations were strained—there was a good deal in the papers about it, as I recall—and you had the messages of November 24th, particularly, and November 27th. The message of November 24th, with which you are undoubtedly familiar, was from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Naval Districts concerned. The one of the 24th was: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." This says any direction but puts emphasis on the attack on the Philippines or Guam.

Do you recall what discussion was held of that and what other directions besides those indicated, the Philippines or Guam, were considered?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir. I think that the fact that air-craft carriers were sent out to place planes on both Midway and Wake

and that patrol strength at Midway was increased is indicative of the fact that we thought that the attack would not probably be limited to the Philippines and Guam but it would extend farther to the eastward as far as Midway and Wake.

Admiral HEWITT. What made you feel that it might not be extended farther east or probably wouldn't be?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Well, Admiral, I think Intelligence indicated that there weren't any forces in that area.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you glance over these intelligence summaries [171] (exhibit 19) and see if you can recall whether those or something like that were the ones that were available to you?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, these are summarized in the daily conferences in which the Intelligence Officer of the fleet presented the——

Admiral HEWITT. The general tenor of those was that there was considerable movement of forces in the direction of Indo-China and the Kra Peninsula and to the south and southeastward generally but there might be some forces in the Mandates, particularly submarines.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. There was a question whether or not there might be a carrier unit there, is that correct?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And that the main body of the carriers was in home waters?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. What did you generally understand out there by "home waters"?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Generally to the westward and southern of the Philippines and in the homeland itself.

Admiral HEWITT. Close to the homeland?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, then, you got this war warning dispatch on November 27th which contained the words, "This dispatch is considered a war warning," and went on, "The negotiations have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected in the next few days," and went on to mention these forces to the southeast. What was the general feeling out there as to what that dispatch meant? That was considered a war warning. Was that [172] taken particularly seriously?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Very definitely so, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I mean it meant more than the other warning dispatches that they had had before?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, and the operating forces at sea were all put on condition watches, darken ship, required to steam continuously in anti-submarine defense dispositions.

Admiral HEWITT. As a matter of fact, that had been the case for almost——

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, but it had been tightened up after this thing here.

Admiral HEWITT. Now as to the message addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, "Execute defense deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL 46." You had at that time two carrier task forces out there delivering planes?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. So that you did have some forces to the westward?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. But, as I understand it, there was nothing else done in the matter of defensive deployment which was considered possible or necessary. Am I correct in that?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Well, so far as the relations between the Army and Navy were concerned, there were conferences and I believe that the same concept existed then as existed previously, that the greatest danger in the Hawaiian area lay from submarine attacks and sabotage in view of the intelligence information that we had.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether an attack of the nature which [173] actually was carried out was ever investigated carefully as a possible course of action? Was there an investigation in which you figured out the distances and times necessary to cover the distance of a carrier running from the home waters—

Rear Admiral DeLANY. As I recall, it wasn't possible, between the time of the attack and the receipt of the war warning, in the event that the intelligence was correct about the fleet being in home waters.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, the home waters would have been anywhere in the home islands?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, the evidence indicates that that force actually left the harbor up there at Etorofu Island on the 27th, which was the date of the war warning. I haven't laid this thing out myself yet to figure out the speeds and so forth, but apparently it demonstrated that it could be done. I just wondered if they had been laid down and thought of—

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir, I am sure—well, I know that in the Operations Section and with the plans that had been put on a piece of paper.

Admiral HEWITT. That would have been McMorris's job, wouldn't it? He would have known the details of that and what study was made of it?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Speaking of the conferences and so forth between the Army Staff and the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, also with COMFOURTEEN's I suppose, as to courses of action and defensive measures, did you have a staff command post or communications center or an operations room which was to be put into effect in case of war or strained relations, or was there ever an exercise, joint exercise, carried out?

[174] Rear Admiral DeLANY. In all the exercises that were conducted prior to this, there was a joint setup as much as was possible with the facilities and communications and other requirements in effect, because as required by the Commander-in-Chief out there, there had been numerous air raid exercises and the Army's installation was fairly well complete, as I recall it, for their own particular control of planes, but the hookup into a central joint operational room never had been made.

Admiral HEWITT. Was it planned?

Rear Admiral DeLANY. Yes, there were complete plans for the installation of a complete warning net on the island and the joint ar-

rangement up there in the caves in the hill was all down on paper and the thing was definitely an accomplished plan.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that include a command post, or whatever you want to call it, for ComFOURTEEN?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. And CinCPac, too, if he was there?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, because the whole joint defense of the island was planned in those arrangements.

Admiral HEWITT. But it had never actually been tried out in an exercise?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Not with that installation as existed subsequent to the 7th of December, because there just weren't any materials available to establish this radar warning set hookup or anything like that. I think all the material was ordered according to plans, but it never had been delivered, never had been set up, by the 7th of December.

Admiral HEWITT. There is a lot of testimony through here in various places of efforts which were made to get the various things which were needed to improve the defenses. We have the letters which were written about the [175] deficiencies in defenses in the first part of 1941, the requests for planes; of course, the supply of additional planes, except in the operations, would not have been your function, but do you happen to know whether that was kept after, the importance of that was realized?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, I am positive of it. The Commander-in-Chief made a trip back here in the summer of '41. The thing was completely outlined in that, and I believe the records show the efforts that were made by everybody to get more planes, more anti-aircraft batteries, more communication facilities. We took pains to get officers who had been familiar with the defense of Great Britain out into the Islands to instruct and lecture and guide everybody in their island defense installations. That had been going on for months.

Admiral HEWITT. I recall a reply to the request for additional planes, made by the Navy Department, which stated in effect that the planes weren't available. Was any reason ever given for the non-availability of these planes, why they weren't available? Was it because they did not exist or because they were distributed elsewhere?

Rear Admiral DELANY. As I recall it, it is the latter case; they were being distributed elsewhere.

Admiral HEWITT. And shortly after the attack took place, additional planes were sent very promptly, is that correct?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes. There was no question of their ability to deliver planes to us after the 7th of December.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall where those came from?

Rear Admiral DELANY. They came from continental United States. I don't know where they started out from initially, sir. That same thing is true of [176] a lot of material that wasn't available before the 7th of December, that flowed out to us out here.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to Exhibit 8 of the Naval Court's record, Assumption B, that indicates that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor is possible, does it not?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. And that letter was issued on October 14, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I believe that the letter was originally issued in March or April, 1941, because reference (a) is PacFleet letter 2CL-41. "Reference (a) is revised herewith." This is a revision. The original order, which was almost identical with this, was issued, I believe, in March, 1941.

Admiral HEWITT. And this revision was issued on October 14, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. That is what the date says; yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. So that from the date of the first letter up to and including October 14, 1941, I take it it was an assumption that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, I think it is correct to say that.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you know whether there was any written estimate or assumption made after October 14, 1941, which changed or modified that assumption in any way?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, because I think it was as correct in March, 1941, or October, 1941, as it is on the 25th of May, 1945.

Admiral HEWITT. Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains communication intelligence summaries, and particularly to the summaries for the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall that on or [177] about December 1, 1941, there was a change in the radio call signs of the Japanese?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, I can't answer that.

Admiral HEWITT. Would it refresh your recollection if you examined the communication intelligence summary for December 1, 1941, contained in that exhibit?

Rear Admiral DELANY. The question now was what?

(The question asked was read back as follows:)

Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains communication intelligence summaries, and particularly to the summaries for the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall that on or about December 1, 1941, there was a change in the radio call signs of the Japanese?

Rear Admiral DELANY. My answer is still that I do not remember now whether I knew it then or not. I mean this doesn't refresh my memory. I do not recall whether I knew that or not.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall that there was any noticeable diminution in radio traffic from Japanese fleet units after December 1, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I believe that the subject was mentioned at the morning conference by the intelligence officer in the fleet out there.

Admiral HEWITT. Can you recall the substance of that discussion at that time?

Rear Admiral DELANY. No, I can't. I don't recall it at all.

Admiral HEWITT. But you do recall that there was some discussion of the change?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, I recall there was a discussion, because, as I say, this information here, particularly this one here about the carriers [178] are still located in the home waters, was well covered by the intelligence officer out there on all the discussions around that time. Whether it was the 27th of December or the 27th of November, or the 1st of December, or anything like that, I am not prepared to say now.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall whether or not Admiral Kimmel was present during the conference concerning the change in Japanese radio traffic which you have just mentioned?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, because the conferences that I mentioned were held in his office and included the Admiral, the Chief of Staff, Plans, Operations, and Intelligence Officers.

Admiral HEWITT. I take it, then, that both you and Admiral McMorris as well as Admiral Kimmel were present at each of those conferences?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I would say, generally, yes. I can't answer that I was there every morning.

Admiral HEWITT. There were daily conferences, Admiral?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes.

Admiral HEWITT. And were such conferences held daily, to the best of your recollection, during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I think so, yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Now, referring, Admiral, to Exhibits 69A and B of the Naval Court record, would you examine those and give us the dates and tell us what they are?

Rear Admiral DELANY. As I recall these—this is dated the 30th of November 1941, and they are the check-off lists that were prepared to be in the possession of the duty officer out there in the event that war would occur in the next twenty-four hours.

Admiral HEWITT. And the second one, 69B, is dated what date, Admiral?

[179] Rear Admiral DELANY. 5th of December.

Admiral HEWITT. Admiral, will you point out where in those exhibits 69A or B any provision is made in light of Assumption B of the October 14th letter, namely, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Well, If I may be frank again, you read this the same as I can; I don't think you will find it in that. This daily reconnaissance of Task Force Two and Three all provides for reconnaissance, but it is not stated any place in here that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral HEWITT. What reconnaissance is provided for in those exhibits, Admiral?

Rear Admiral DELANY. There is no reconnaissance provided in here until——

Admiral HEWITT. Until war has broken out?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Probably so, yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Was there any discussion of reconnaissance during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral DELANY. The usual reconnaissance was conducted, yes.

Admiral HEWITT. Was there any discussion of increasing the reconnaissance.

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, the planes on Midway were increased. The planes were put on Wake.

Admiral HEWITT. What reconnaissance was being conducted during that period, sir?

Rear Admiral DELANY. The usual reconnaissance within the area.

Admiral HEWITT. That is, I take it, a reconnaissance of the fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu and reconnaissance from Midway and Wake?

[180] Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir, and partially to the northward. There was always an anti-submarine reconnaissance around the island.

Admiral HEWITT. How far out was that?

Rear Admiral DELANY. It depended on the number of planes available and the condition of the planes. The reconnaissance to the northward was usually conducted as part of the training and testing of planes that were on the roll call.

Admiral HEWITT. That was done by the PBY's?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Admiral, would you say that the information, particularly from radio intelligence, which was available from November 27th to December 6, 1941, at Pearl Harbor indicated that Japanese naval forces were on the move and that the direction of some of those forces could not be known or was not known?

Rear Admiral DELANY. It is perfectly possible for them to be on the move without our knowing anything about it.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall whether or not the radio intelligence indicated that they were on the move?

Rear Admiral DELANY. I think the intelligence indicated there was a move to the southward.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you recall what the intelligence indicated in the week preceding December 7, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of the major portion of the Japanese carrier fleet?

Rear Admiral DELANY. As I recall it, the information was that the carriers were in the home waters and the report, that was not well founded, that there was a possibility of some of the smaller carriers being around [181] Truk or some place like that.

Admiral HEWITT. Was there any discussion during the period November 27th to December 7th concerning the desirability of reconnaissance from Oahu in the direction of Truk?

Rear Admiral DELANY. There was a lot of discussion about the desirability of the reconnaissance and the reconnaissance would have been conducted had there been planes available to do it and at the same time maintain their material condition, which was considered of vital importance.

Admiral HEWITT. In your opinion, as far as the plane reconnaissance was concerned, if you had employed all the planes for reconnaissance, that could not have been maintained very long, and if you were to use sufficient planes, the maximum number of planes, for daily reconnaissance, the sectors to be covered would have been entirely limited and just a choice?

Rear Admiral DELANY. Yes, sir. There weren't enough planes for a complete 360° search around the island, and even in the limited sectors in any direction that you would have chosen, the number of planes and replacement pilots available was such that the search could not have been kept up for a very long time because of the material condition of the planes, the scarcity of relief crews, and the fact that everybody there was convinced that you had to give continued thought

to maintaining the number of planes that you had in the best material condition so that if something did break, you would have them available, and by saying "break," I mean some information coming to us that would require the use of these planes.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The meeting was then, at 12:10 p. m., adjourned until a time and place to be set.)

[182] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 2 p. m., Tuesday, 29 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you please state your name and rank.

Captain LAYTON. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Staff, CincPac.

Mr. SONNETT. And what is the nature of your present duties?

Captain LAYTON. I am assigned as Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, 1941, what was your assignment?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet Intelligence Officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. And for how long prior to December 7, 1941, were you in that assignment?

Captain LAYTON. One year to a day.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Captain, the nature of your duties as Fleet Intelligence Officer for the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. With your permission, I will refresh my memory [183] when appropriate.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes, do.

Captain LAYTON. I will read from the Staff Instructions, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, dated 1941:

214. *Intelligence Officer*—25.

(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).

(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.

(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).

(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.

(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.

(h) In charge of censorship.

(i) Internal Security of ships.

(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. *Assistant Intelligence Officer*—26.

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.

(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.

(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.

(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

[184] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, in the discharge of the Staff Instructions which you have just quoted, what sources of information did you have?

Captain LAYTON. Principally from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Operations, Navy Department; also from communication intelligence sources, from American Naval Attaches and observers, and information obtained by them through foreign observers and ship masters, plus information passed to me from British intelligence sources in the Far East, and in some instances information from consuls or State Department representatives in the Far East.

Mr. SONNETT. Of those sources of information, Captain, which would you characterize as your principal source of intelligence or information during the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Principally dispatch reports from Naval Attaches and observers in the Far East, and daily communication intelligence analyses of traffic flow and delivery, and reports from ONI on Japanese naval organizations, activity, movements, and intentions.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 27, 1941, and enclosed intelligence bulletin number 45-41, and ask you if you can identify that.

Captain LAYTON. I can. I wrote it; I prepared it; I proof-read it, and had it released by the Admiral.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what that document is, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. That document shows a summation of the effort made in the CincPac Intelligence Section to assemble all pertinent and timely information on the Japanese naval organization and the Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands.

[185] Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 21.")

Captain LAYTON. That is as of 27 November 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 21, which is the document you have just identified, Captain, will you state the highlights of the information therein contained concerning the Japanese carrier forces?

Captain LAYTON. Previous bulletins from OpNav and previous intelligence bulletins on the Japanese fleet organization disseminated by CincPac had carried the Japanese carrier division attached to the First and Second Fleets, two divisions to each fleet respectively, plus their plane guard destroyers. Some time between April and July, 1941, as I recall it, a reorganization within the Japanese Fleet took place in which a Commander of Number One Air Fleet was detected. He acted as a type commander such as our ComCarrier Divisions, Pacific, in those days.

From all sources available, it was believed that the Japanese Carrier Fleet, as we called it then, was organized as follows: KAGA, Flagship; Cardiv 1; AKAGI and KAGA plus Desdiv 7, plane guards of four destroyers; Cardiv 2, consisting of the SORYU and the HIRYU with Desdiv 23; (4 destroyers) as plane guards; Cardiv 3: RYUJO and HOSHO with Desdiv 17 of 3 destroyers as plane guard; Cardiv 4: ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU with Desdiv 3 of 4 destroyers as plane guard; Cardiv —, consisting of the carriers KORYU and KASUGA (MARU)—totaling ten carriers and sixteen destroyers.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you Exhibit 3 of this investigation and ask you if you can identify the document.

[186] Captain LAYTON. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state what it is, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It is CinPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, the successor to the previous Fleet Intelligence Bulletins I previously identified. It serves the same purpose of keeping the Fleet informed of all matters of general interest regarding the enemy, his techniques, practices, and in some cases historical examples.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of that bulletin, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. 8 December 1944. It is Volume 1, Number 22.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the contents of Exhibit 3 describing the composition and movements of the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, will you state whether or not you are familiar with the information therein contained?

Captain LAYTON. I am.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have a hand in the preparation of that bulletin, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. I did, with one exception. There is an error. It is not "Cardiv 5 less HOSHO." The HOSHO did not belong in Cardiv 5.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Captain, referring to page 13 of Exhibit 3, will you state exactly what the error is to which you have just referred?

Captain LAYTON. That states, "SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Cardiv 5 less HOSHO)." That is an error in that the words "less HOSHO" should be omitted.

Mr. SONNETT. With that exception, Captain, I take it that the information contained in the exhibit concerning the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor is corrected?

[187] Captain LAYTON. Again may I suggest that the last line, stating, "elements of Desron 1; and about twenty subs" is incorrect, inasmuch as I do not believe that twenty subs ever sortied from Etorofu as was stated. I believe that a minimum of three and a maximum of six accompanied the task force in their trip from Etorofu to a position north of Oahu, arriving there the morning of December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. The information contained in Exhibit 3, Captain, was obtained from what source?

Captain LAYTON. This came principally from the interrogation of a prisoner of war who had the position of secret yeoman to the Operations Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet; also from interrogation of other prisoners of war who were a part of the task force, and from captured documents, diaries, maps, and other information.

Mr. SONNETT. Are you able to state, Captain, on the basis of all of the information which you have received since the attack, whether, with the exceptions you have just noted, the information contained in Exhibit 3 is or is not correct?

Captain LAYTON. With the exceptions I have mentioned above, the information in Exhibit 3 referred to previously is correct. I have since seen in the original Japanese a photostatic copy of Combined Fleet Operation Order Number 1 from the NACHI sunk in Manila Bay, and while it does not lay down specifically each ship by name, it lays down the forces in such terms that, putting it with other task unit designations and compositions, I am positive that this force sortied from Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, on or about 27 November and is composed of the ships listed herein, with the exceptions I have named.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Captain, would you restate [188] the information on page 13 of Exhibit 3 concerning the composition of the attacking Japanese forces correctly so that we have in the record a correct statement of the available information that you now have?

Captain LAYTON. Task title, Striking Force; Commander, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo; Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; Cardiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; Cardiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; Batdiv 3, first section, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; Crudiv 8, TONE and CHIKUMA; elements of Desron 1 headed by Desron 1 flagship, the light cruiser ABUKUMA, some submarines, five or six tankers.

Mr. SONNETT. On the basis, Captain, of the information which was available when Exhibit 3 was prepared and on the basis of other information which you have subsequently received, can you state the movements of the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. To my best recollection, about 20 or 22 November the forces of the striking force departed Saeki Anchorage near the Bungo Channel and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, and there assembled and fueled, departed on or about 27 November 1941, East Longitude date. According to the diagram on page 16 of Exhibit 3, they proceeded on an easterly course to a little east of the 180th meridian, whence they struck southeast to a point to the north of Oahu, arriving December 8, 1941, East Longitude date. A subsequently captured map, which was on exhibit in San Francisco, incidentally, showed an easterly course to a position almost north of Oahu, with a subsequently southerly course to a position just north of Oahu.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you recall on or about November 27, 1941, that a dispatch was received which has been referred to as a war warning?

Captain LAYTON. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state when and how you learned of that [189] dispatch and what action was taken concerning it that day?

Captain LAYTON. In mid-afternoon I learned that such a dispatch had been received and was shown the tape copy in the communication office. Subsequently, Admiral Kimmel sent for me and told me he wanted me to take this dispatch to General Short. I asked him if he wanted me to take this dispatch, as I had done on previous occasions, and show it to him or should I give him a paraphrased copy thereof.

He directed me to make a paraphrased copy and return that paraphrased copy with the dispatch to him for his perusal, which I did. This paraphrased dispatch was prepared and shown to the communication officer to obtain his concurrence that the phraseology did not destroy the import of the original dispatch nor change in any way its import.

When this was completed, I went outside the Admiral's office and awaited an opportunity to enter as there was a large conference with closed door, which meant no admittance. At the first opportunity, I entered and asked if the Admiral desired to see the paraphrase. He examined the paraphrase and about that time, as I recall it, the Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, Captain Earle, arrived in civilian clothes and requested the Admiral's pardon for being in civilian clothes, but stated in substance that he had a very urgent message which General Short had delivered to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to be further delivered for the perusal of the Commander-in-Chief. He presented the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, who showed it to the Chief of Staff and others. Their remarks were in the general tenor that, "This is the same dispatch in substance that we have just received." I should add that the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District, stated that General Short had requested that no copies be made of their dispatch. There was some discussion then concerning this [190] dispatch and the Army dispatch, their similarity, when Admiral Kimmel turned to me, handed me the paraphrase, and said, "Get this to General Short right away." At the same time, he delivered the dispatch from General Short to the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District, and we left the Admiral's cabin.

Outside was the officer who had brought General Short's dispatch, Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, the Naval Liaison Officer with Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. The Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District, urged me to give Burr the dispatch Admiral Kimmel had given me for delivery to General Short so that they could be delivered simultaneously and by the officially accredited liaison officer, to which I assented. I did not immediately check on his delivery, but I subsequently checked and was told by Lieutenant Commander Burr that it had been delivered.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you Exhibit 8 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of various dispatches, and ask you if you can identify those as copies of dispatches which you saw.

Captain LAYTON. I don't have a good recollection of this, but I think we received it.

Mr. SONNETT. That is referring to the dispatch on November 24, 1941, from OpNav to CincAF?

Captain LAYTON. Info COMSIXTEEN; ALUSNA, Chungking; ASTALUSA, Shanghai; ALUSNA, Tokyo; CincPac.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the other two dispatches in that exhibit, Captain, will you simply state as to those whether you can identify them?

Captain LAYTON. The dispatch from COMFOURTEEN dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, was sent by the communication intelligence unit, 14th Naval District, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, transmitted through [191] me to Commander Rochefort, as a result of the daily traffic analyses, intelligence reports which

the Admiral had seen, and of the discussions we had had concerning the formation of these forces and their movement to the south, with amphibious warfare being noted as paramount.

Mr. SONNETT. How about the third one, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. ComSIXTEEN's dispatch of 26 November 1941, time date group 261331, I recognize as the dispatch reply by ComSIXTEEN to the dispatch sent by ComFOURTEEN on 260110 in which they gave their estimate of the Japanese naval organization and movements as pertaining to the time in question. We specifically noted at that time that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition by ComFOURTEEN that submarine and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and noted their best indications were that all First and Second Fleet carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area.

Mr. SONNETT. Would it be correct to state, Captain, that the dispatches to which you have just referred summarized the intelligence available to ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN concerning the Japanese naval movements during the preceding month or so?

Captain LAYTON. I would say that. Additionally, I would say that summarized the information also made available to CincPac and CincAF as of those times because those units each served the Fleet Commander of that area and all of that information was made available to the Fleet Commanders.

Admiral HEWITT. What was understood by the term "First and Second Fleet carriers" contained in the ComSIXTEEN dispatch?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that ComSIXTEEN was referring to the naval organization as promulgated by ONI on 29 July 1941, in which, as I have previously stated, there were two carrier divisions attached to each of [192] the First and Second Fleets. ONI listed Cardiv 3, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, with Desdiv 34 plane guards (four destroyers), and Cardiv 5, RYUJO and HOSHO with a four destroyer plane guard, division number unknown, as attached to the First Fleet. ONI listed Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA, and Desdiv 3 of four destroyers as plane guards, plus Cardiv 2, SORYU, HIRYU, with Desdiv 23 of four destroyers as plane guards, attached to the Second Fleet. This would be a total of eight carriers assigned to the First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers being listed as assigned to any other fleets.

Mr. SONNETT. So that in substance, Captain, the ComSIXTEEN dispatch of November 26th, in stating that all known First and Second Fleet carriers were believed to be in the Kure-Sasebo area, was understood by you to mean that they estimated that all known Japanese carriers were in that area?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, all known operating carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. And that estimate differed with the ComFOURTEEN estimate in that ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that at least one Japanese carrier was in the Marshalls at that time?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Subsequent to those dispatches of November 26th, Captain, it was the fact, was it not, that daily communication intelligence summaries were delivered by the radio intelligence unit to you and to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. They were delivered to me for my presentation to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have copies of the daily summaries which were so presented through you to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I have.

[193] Mr. SONNETT. I note, Captain, on the photostatic documents which you have presented, commencing with October 14, 1941, and ending with December 1941, initials in the lower right hand corner. Can you identify those initials?

Captain LAYTON. Those are Admiral Kimmel's initials.

Mr. SONNETT. And do they appear on the original?

Captain LAYTON. They do.

Mr. SONNETT. I also note that certain of these daily communication intelligence summaries have portions underscored. Can you state who underscored those portions?

Captain LAYTON. Certain of the underscoring was performed by Admiral Kimmel as he read them. Certain other marks, including marks by direction finder bearings and positions of ships, were made by myself in plotting them.

Mr. SONNETT. To the best of your knowledge, Captain, are the photostatic copies which you have presented true copies of the original daily communication intelligence summaries presented to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. This is the original copy. They only presented one copy and this is the original. They kept a copy in combat intelligence, 14th Naval District, but this is the original copy as prepared.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the document you have before you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the document or collection of documents which I show you and which you have supplied are photostatic copies of the original?

Captain LAYTON. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark them as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[194] (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 22.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, and to the daily communication intelligence summaries from November 27 to December 5, inclusive, 1941, will you give us in general the substance of the movements of Japanese forces therein noted?

Captain LAYTON. On 27 November 1941, there was some tactical traffic intercepted from the carriers. There was other traffic addressed to the commanders to play the leading roles in the days that followed on the Southern Expedition; that is, Chiefs of Staff, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force were addressed by Southern Theater Commands. It is to be noted that the Commander Combined Air Force commands all naval shore-based air and all naval tender-based planes. He does not have any connection whatsoever with the carriers except in inter-joint force maneuvers.

(The following was read:)

That is, Chiefs of Staff, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force were addressed by Southern Theater Commands.

(Continuing)—Bako, Pescadores, Hainan Island, and Saigon. Destroyer Squadrons 4 and 5, who were earmarked for the southern move-

ment, were also addressed, with information to Chief of Staff, Second Fleet.

Direction finder net was active and it was noted that the Marshall Island stations were also sending bearings in after having been silenced for several days.

It was noted that Destroyer Squadron 3, earmarked for the southern move, could not be positively identified in the Hainan area but was believed to be in company with Cruiser Division 3 there.

[195] It was noted that there was no further detected movement from the Kure-Sasebo area.

There were four enciphered addresses noted. An enciphered address always indicates a new command who has no position in the call sign book, so that these then were placed in a fairly simple cipher. From these forces one was aware of newly formed units becoming active and generally in an operational or maneuver stage and not as administrative or routine appearance. These were the number 82 unit at Taihoku, Formosa; in care of the Yamashita unit addressed for delivery via the RYUJO; Koroku (Naha, Okinawa) air base commander; the military stores depot chief at Keijo, Korea.

It was also noted that there was nothing to indicate the movements yet of the CinC, Third Fleet (corresponding to our Commander Amphibious Force).

It was noted that the commander of the Mandates was addressing dispatches to his defense forces there; that Jaluit was sending messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units; that there was communication between Jaluit, the Saipan Air Command, and the Commander of the Mandates Field; that work was still in progress there was inferred by communications seen from the civil engineering units at Imieji, Jaluit and Eniwetok.

Traffic analysis located the Chitosa Naval Air "Corps" in Saipan and Naval Air Squadron number 24 in the Marshalls. It was noted that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division 5 in the Mandates. It was, however, noted that an air unit in the Formosa area (Takao) addressed the carriers SHOKAKU and KORYU. It was stated that [196] "Carriers are still located in home waters." No information of further movement of the shore-based air forces to Hainan.

Of significance was the location of the Commander of the submarine forces in the Chichijima area.

The unit at Cavite informed us that they had noted Army type ciphers being handled on Navy circuits for the past couple of days, during which an Army officer named Oka was in communication on these naval circuits with the Combined Army Forces, Imperial Headquarters.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that by dispatch, Captain Layton?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you identify the dispatch?

Captain LAYTON. I don't have the time-date requirement.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you supply us with a copy of each of the dispatches to which you make reference in your testimony?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. Also that this officer, Oka, was associated with the Combined Army, Taiwan, and the Combined Army Forces, Sama (Hainan).

On the 27th of November the Naval Attache at Shanghai in his dispatch 270855 reported the sightings by master of a foreign vessel which left Hong Kong en route Shanghai of many transports proceeding south singly or in small groups—they averaged three or four ships on each watch Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday—and that the military wharves at Shanghai were abnormally empty of stores.

Dispatch from OpNav, addressed to CincPac and CincAF, information Cinclant, dispatch 272337, which was a war warning and stated that OpNav had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that negotiations between Japan and America regarding the stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had ended and an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected within the [197] next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Navy task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. It directed appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 and said to inform only the district and Army authorities. It stated the War Department was sending a similar warning, and directed continental naval districts, plus Guam and Samoa, to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, if I may interrupt you for just a moment, the daily communication summary to which you have just referred, that was for 27 November 1941, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. That was.

Mr. SONNETT. When was that delivered to you, Captain, and by you to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, it was delivered to me in the morning of the 28th of November, 1941, and, as was my custom, I presented it to Admiral Kimmel at about 8:15.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that presentation to Admiral Kimmel of available intelligence information done daily during this period?

Captain LAYTON. This was done daily throughout the period of my association with Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. And in addition to the communication intelligence summary of 27 November, to which you have referred, and to other daily communication intelligence summaries, I take it you also would present whatever other intelligence information you then had available?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary [198] of 27 November and to the statement that "carriers are still located in home waters," will you state what was comprehended by the term "home waters"?

Captain LAYTON. "Home waters" was the term used to consist of Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay Area; in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu.

Admiral HEWITT. Did that include Etorofu?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. Locations in northern Japan, including northern Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the high north area.

Mr. SONNETT. To what point east of Japan would the scope of "home waters" extend?

Captain LAYTON. Forty, fifty, sixty miles perhaps; maybe more; about the same distance that our fleet operations would take us west of San Clemente or San Pedro or San Diego.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that definition of "home waters" which you have given, Captain, the accepted definition in the radio intelligence unit and in CincPac headquarters?

Captain LAYTON. It was. It was also understood by Admiral Kimmel, who had queried me on these standard phraseology terms used in writing those traffic intelligence summaries.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summaries for 28 November and there on up to December 5th, Captain, will you give us the highlights of those?

Captain LAYTON. The highlight on 28 November was the activity shown by what was believed to be the Tokyo intelligence broadcast net, plus the direction finder net, and it was stated and underscored that the Japanese radio intelligence net "is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval [199] Communications and *IS GETTING RESULTS*."

It was noted that Tokyo originators were sending high precedence traffic to the Commander-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force, the three commands for the south movement. Previous indications that Palao was concerned with this southern movement were shown by a typical dispatch where the Chief of the Naval General Staff addressed the Chiefs of Staff (normally Chiefs of Staffs are addressed in operational matters) of the Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet (Mandates Fleet), Third Fleet (Amphibious Force), French Indo-China force, Second Fleet, and Resident Naval Officer, Palao.

It was noted that no Combined Fleet units movements were detected; that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was sending his usual dispatches to the Third Fleet and the Combined Air Force; and that he, Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was paying particular attention in his communications to Crudivs 5 and 7, Desrons 2 and 4, and Cardiv 5. It is to be noted in the original it stated "attention to Cardiv 5 and 7." This was corrected in pencil to read "Crudivs 5 and 7."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know when that correction was made, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall, but it was either prior to showing to Admiral Kimmel or upon his noting that there was no Cardiv 7 and therefore there was something wrong. I think it was before.

The impression was gained this date that the First Base Force, that is, the first section of the Amphibious Force, consisting of about a minelayer division, two minesweeper divisions, one gunboat division, one subchaser squadron of four subchaser divisions, and twenty-seven transports, was not present at that time with the bulk of the Third Fleet in Sasebo but could not be exactly located elsewhere.

[200] It was noted that the Army commander on Formosa was holding communications with the Commander-in-Chief of the Amphibious Force, generally a sure sign of amphibious operations.

It was noted that two Third Fleet units had arrived in the Pescadores but were apparently to return to Kure from Bako.

Nothing significant was noted in the Mandates on the 28th of November summary.

It was observed that Sama, Hainan, addressed the Omura Naval Air Corps in several messages which were for information to Saigon and Tokyo. This would indicate the future location of the Omura Air Corps to be Saigon in the near future.

Takao, Formosa, was addressing French Indo-China forces, the Combined Air Force, and the Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and Second Fleet.

It was noted that the Takao Naval Air Corps was addressing the Sukugawa Air Corps and the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps.

It was noted that a representative of the Hainan office, which had moved to Saigon, was sending messages to the naval bases at Sasebo and Kure.

Additionally, the Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet was addressing the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet, the two prime movers in the southern movement, indicating his assistance in some degree.

No submarine traffic of note was observed.

On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, and stated:

Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source X Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one [201] December without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at Songkhola X (Singora).

This dispatch from CincAF, addressed to OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN for action, established the "winds" code in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net and the other from Japanese language foreign broadcasts for more generalized receipt.

ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area.

OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPas, ComSIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that the total troops in South Indo-China totalled 70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently augmented and are

being trans-shipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast of Tongking [202] Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500. These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum, Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landings and movements were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500 would go south by special train; that in Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Jap troops and at Gillam there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to all warehouses by noon November 25th.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to November 29, 1941, Captain, will you point out the highlights of the communication intelligence summary of that day, together with any dispatches of interest received that day, November 29, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Communication intelligence summary noted again Tokyo intelligence sending eleven messages during the day to major commanders, both afloat and ashore, and that the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to major commanders. It noted that the direction finder net controlled by Tokyo was active during the night, with much activity, and that the Jaluit radio direction finder station included Commander Submarines as an information addressee in a dispatch, indicating, as has previously been shown, that Commander Submarines was somewhere in the approaches to or about to enter the Mandated Islands and likely the [203] Marshalls. A new air group, the 103rd Naval Air Group, was noted as originating a dispatch whose address was composed completely of enciphered calls, confirming that he was new as he had no call sign book. One of the addresses was a new organization, the 11th Air Fleet. It was noted that this address had appeared before and therefore was not a mistake, that the use of the word "fleet" was not a mistake. And it was added that its composition was unknown.

The highlight from an operational point of view was the confirmation of the arrival of Air Squadron Seven in the Takao area. This unit consisted normally of three CHITOSE class seaplane tenders.

It was noted that the presence of Cruiser Division 4 in the Takao area could not be confirmed nor denied, but dispatches and their handling indicated the following units under the immediate command of CinC Second Fleet, who, it had been shown previously, was in command of the Southern Invasion Force. The commands under this Commander were CarDiv 3, SubRon 5, SubRon 6, CruDiv 5, CruDiv 7, Des Ron 2, DesRon 4, Third Fleet (Amphibious Force), and French Indo China Force.

It was further noted that associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships. It was further noted that the Commander-in-Chief,

Third Fleet, sent a message to ComDesRon 5, Number Two Base Force (consisting of one minelayer division, with at least five other men-of-war, and seventeen merchant ships suspected of being transports and cargo carriers), Number One Base Force, Defense Division One, and ComDesRons 2 and 4.

It was noted also that CinC Third Fleet held extensive communication with CinC Second Fleet and Bako.

Fourth Fleet was noted as relatively inactive, and that the Commander of the Submarine Force had his traffic routed through Saipan, noting that the previous day's traffic had been routed through Chichijima, indicating [204] a southerly or southeasterly movement.

It was noted that ComCruDiv 7 made a movement report type of dispatch from the Sama, Hainan, area and the direction of this movement was not indicated.

The communication intelligence unit at Cavite sent a dispatch on the 29th of November which noted recent developments from radio intelligence: encrypted addresses noted in traffic the last two days, "Commander First Patrol Force"; headquarters this unit apparently at either Yokosuka or Palao; "Fifth Air Battalion" at Takoa; "Commander Airborne Troops," location undetermined; "French Indo-China Billeting Detachment" in Saigon area; "Third Fleet Headquarters" probably at Yokosuka. The CinC Third Fleet shifted his flag from the ASHIGARA to the NAGARA. The CinC Southern Expeditionary Fleet shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI (tentative identification).

New arrivals in the Takao area that may be placed in the first section of the task force he referred to in his 261331: DesRon 4, Air Squadron 7, and one command that appears to be a submarine squadron. It appears that the HIYEI and KONGO are definitely associated with these units in the first section, but no movement has been noted on these.

CinC Second Fleet told the key radio stations today and also CinC Combined Fleet that he would leave the Kure zone 0400 hours today, that he would leave Sasebo zone midnight the 1st and enter Bako zone midnight the 2nd.

On the 29th we received OpNav's 290110, addressed to Commander North Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Frontier, information CincPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, which stated that the Army had sent to the Western Defense Command:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility [205] that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X this policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X prior or hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X report measures taken * * * should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan X limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers' X WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier X undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

He referred in this dispatch to OpNav's 272337, but in error sent it as referring to his 272338, which was the war warning.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for 29 November 1941 and to the dispatches just mentioned by you, Captain, is it correct that the only reference to carriers was the reference in the communication intelligence summary to the effect that CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the composition of CarDiv 3 at that time?

Captain LAYTON. At that time we believed CarDiv 3 to be composed of the RYUJO and HOSHO plus three plane guard destroyers.

[206] Mr. SONNETT. So that, aside from that information, there was, on 29 November, no other information relating to Japanese carriers?

Captain LAYTON. There was no other information relating to Japanese carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to 30 November 1941, will you give us the highlights of the communication intelligence summaries and of any dispatches received that day?

Captain LAYTON. In general the traffic volume was less, indicating less circuit activity and that back-dated traffic, some as far back as 26 November, was being transmitted. This sort of practice generally indicated a reduction in the urgency of the general over-all picture plus the possibility of the importance of the re-transmitted dispatches. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUS.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the significance of the use of the term "tactical" in that connection, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. The term "tactical" implies the use of radio by the vessel itself, calling up directly other vessels and working them directly rather than working vessels through shore stations via the broadcast method, which is the common practice by the Japanese communications.

Mr. SONNETT. Did it connote any operation of the carrier AKAGI?

Captain LAYTON. No. If the AKAGI had been working with other carriers, it would indicate that they were exercising or operating, but working with MARUS would indicate more that she was making arrangements for fuel or some such administrative function. A carrier would rarely address a MARU except an oiler or repair vessel or aircraft tender in matters of administration and function rather than in the tactical concept of operations.

[207] It was noted that one urgent dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Chiefs of Staff of the following fleets: Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, Combined Air Force, Submarine Force, China Fleet, and Fifth Fleet. The last fleet, the Fifth, was a new fleet of which little or nothing was known, but it was inferred from long practice that it most likely was a minor force concerned with the northern area.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the northern area to which you referred, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. North Japan, from Ominato on Honshu north.

Mr. SONNETT. And therefore including the Kuriles?

Captain LAYTON. Including the Kuriles. The traffic on the 30th located the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet at Kure. By that same message the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet was not shown in any location, but other indications suggested he was at sea.

It was noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, sent a dispatch to his "usual addressees" of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but he also included therein the battleships KONGO and HIYEI, which placed them as members of the CinC Second's task force.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, if I may interrupt you for a moment at that point, the HIYEI was one of the battleships which was part of the force which later attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And on 30 November 1941 that battleship was at sea, having left Etorofu Island?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. I believe——

Mr. SONNETT. Therefore, is the statement contained in the communication intelligence summary correct or incorrect?

[208] Captain LAYTON. I believe the statement in the communication intelligence summary is correct in this regard. It is very likely that the HIYEI is a bad identification for the HARUNA, which, with the KONGO, took part in the southern expedition. It is believed that this mis-identification, which frequently occurs with ships of one type and within one organization, is an error in fact but not an error in substance.

It is noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was no longer adding the activities at Palao in his addresses and had not done so for the past two days.

It was noted that the Resident Naval Officer at Palao was holding traffic with Taiwan Army Headquarters.

Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, was seen addressing two messages to ComDesRon 2, ComDesRon 4, ComDesRon 5, ComCruDiv 5, First and Second Base Forces, and Defense Division One, being sent for information to CinC Second Fleet. The location of the CinC Third Fleet was not indicated, but there was a strong impression that he was underway.

It was noted that the Jaluit radio addressed the Commander Submarine Force and Naval Air Squadron 24 in one dispatch. The continued association of Jaluit and the Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from Japan through the Chichijima area to the Saipan zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units had arrived in the Marshalls some time previously, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that this bore out ComFOURTEEN's unit's previous contention that there was a submarine concentration in the Marshalls, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force.

It was stated that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama Naval Air [209] Corps, being in the Marshalls, pointed toward air-submarine operations from the Marshalls.

It was also noted that the presence in the Marshalls of a unit of plane guard destroyers would indicate the presence of at least one

carrier in the Mandates, although the presence of that carrier was not confirmed.

Continued activity was observed with dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets from the Pescadores, activities including also the Combined Air Force and Hainan as addressees; also that the Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet was becoming more and more an originator of dispatches to the task force, which was then believed to be southbound. The CinC China Fleet made a movement report, with the South China Fleet as an information addressee, indicating his intention to proceed south.

Mr. SONNETT. I note, Captain, that on the original of the communication intelligence summary of November 30, 1941, which you have before you, that various portions are underlined in red and in blue pencil. Can you state who made the underlining?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that I did. I am not positive.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that made before or after the submission of the summary to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I believe it was made after the submission, although it may have been before.

Mr. SONNETT. I note also on the November 30th communication intelligence summary that in the left-hand lower corner of the page there are other initials. Would you state whose initials they are?

Captain LAYTON. They are Admiral McMorris' initials. He was at that time head of the War Plans Section.

[210] We received a dispatch late the 30th from ComSIXTEEN, addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, CincPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same garble table pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' call signs hadn't changed.

We received a dispatch, time 301709, from OpNav, addressed to CincAF, information CincPac, referring to his dispatch 300419, in which he had directed CincAF to cover by air search the line Manila-Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of said dispatch in order to ascertain the destination of the overseas expeditions, based on the information that Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus. He was told in this dispatch that if the expedition was approaching Thailand, he was to inform MacArthur.

In this dispatch, 301709, he referred to the above dispatch and requested priority dispatch of any contacts, and in case of no contacts being made, to report once a day if the information was all negative.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you an original memorandum, dated December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral and ask you if you can identify it.

Captain LAYTON. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what that document is?

Captain LAYTON. This document was prepared by me late the afternoon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel. As my yeoman was absent, the write-up of this memorandum was delayed until December 1st. Admiral Kimmel's directions, as I recall them, were that he wanted the following day, Monday, 1 December, a list of Japanese fleet [211] locations, and every Monday thereafter. After this was written up, certain substantiating

and additional information was obtained from the officer who wrote the daily communication intelligence summary as to any future indicated movements and these changed movements were made in red pencil prior to being submitted to Admiral Kimmel. There was, however, one typographical error that was not found until Admiral Kimmel read the paper, in which a typographical error meaning "2 OCL" became "20 CL," which Admiral Kimmel pointed out to me and in his handwriting wrote, "2-OCL" at the side on page 4.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark this document as an exhibit? Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 23.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring to Exhibit 23, which is the memorandum you have just identified, do I understand your testimony to be that it was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have a discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning this memorandum after he had read it?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I note on page 1 of the exhibit the word "Japan" written in pencil opposite certain ships listed under Yokasuka area and similarly the word "Japan" written in pencil opposite certain ships listed under the Kure-Sasebo area. In whose handwriting are those words?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel's.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, will you state the information therein contained concerning the location of Japanese carriers?

Captain LAYTON. On page 3, under the Bako-Takao area, was carried [212] Cadiv 4: 2 CV plus 4 DD; and Cardiv 3: 2 CV and 3 DD. On the last page the supposed carrier KORYU(?) plus plane guards, 1 CV, 4 DD, was carried under the Marshalls area. On page 2 under the Bako-Takao area was carried the KASUGA MARU, 1 XCV.

Mr. SONNETT. Summarizing the information, then, Captain, in this exhibit concerning the whereabouts of Japanese carriers, it appeared that there were Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4 plus the KASUGA MARU thought to be in the Bako-Takao area and the KORYU thought to be in the Marshalls area, is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. There is no reference in this memorandum, Captain, to Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Was there any discussion between you and Admiral Kimmel concerning the whereabouts of those carrier divisions?

Captain LAYTON. There was. Admiral Kimmel noted almost immediately that neither Carrier Division 1 nor Carrier Division 2 was listed in this memorandum, and asked me where they were. I said that I had no recent good indications of their locations, but that if I had to guess, I would estimate them in the general Kure zone.

Mr. SONNETT. Did he inquire whether it was possible that those carriers weren't in that zone but were in the Hawaiian area?

Captain LAYTON. Not in those words.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of [213] their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or words to that effect.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, it appears that on each of the pages, at the bottom, there is an X mark. Can you explain that?

Captain LAYTON. That X mark was not on this memorandum this morning prior to its being photostated. I presume that it was placed on there by the photostat personnel, as it appeared when brought back from them.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 1, 1941, Captain, was that received after the delivery of your memorandum of December 1, Exhibit 23, and your discussion with Admiral Kimmel, to which you have just testified?

Captain LAYTON. It is my recollection that the 1 December 1941 summary was delivered prior to the submission of my location sheet, Exhibit 23.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you examine the communication intelligence summary for 1 December 1941 and give us the highlights of that document?

Captain LAYTON. The summary, dated 1 December 1941, confirmed previous information from ComSIXTEEN that all service radio calls of forces afloat of the Japanese Navy had changed promptly at 0000, 1 December, minus 9 time. Previously service calls had changed after a period of six months or more. Calls having last changed on 1 November 1941, it was noted that service calls lasting only one month indicated progressive steps in preparing for active operations on a large scale. The latter part of this [214] sentence is underlined in red pencil and, to my best recollection, was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

It was noted that the Japanese were adopting more and more security provisions by passing old traffic for a period of two or three days prior to the change of calls to defeat the traffic analysis and in an attempt to match in a previous call with a new call. This could not be done on a series of passing old dispatches.

They had noted also that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more radio security provisions. It was also noted then an effort had been made to deliver all dispatches using the old calls prior to the change so that there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and resultant confusion and compromise of new call signs. To clarify this, I would say that if your call sign is A and it is changed to Q and a message addressed to you as A, which we knew to be you, is sent to Q, we know that your new call sign is Q. Also it was observed that the large volume of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume of traffic to make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. This is an old Jap trick.

Traffic analysis showed nothing to indicate that the First Fleet was outside of Empire Waters. I should say that "Empire Waters" is synonymous to "Home waters." The Second Fleet was believed to be proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area towards South China and Indo-China, and certain units of the Second Fleet task force were already in the Indo-China area. Specifically prominent were Cruiser Division 7 and Destroyer Squadron 3. The Third Fleet traffic showed nothing new in the way of associations, but its associations with South China and Indo-China forces continued. There were no changes in the Mandates or in the Fifth Fleet or in the Combined Air Force.

[215] It was noted that large numbers of the submarines of the Submarine Force were believed to be to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima-Saipan line, and that the flagship of the Submarine Force was somewhere in that general area.

Under "Carriers" it was stated there was no change. This was presumed to mean no change since the previous report, since there had been no report of carriers recently and the last report said in the Empire area, with the exception of Cardiv 3, with the possibility of one carrier in the Mandates.

Mr. SONNETT. Before you go into the dispatches, Captain, I have one question on this. What, if any, discussion do you recall, Captain, with Admiral Kimmel concerning the significance of the change in Japanese service radio calls referred to in the summary of 1 December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Our discussion merely reviewed what I have previously read in testimony, that it was an unusual step, that it was an advance in radio security, that they were doing everything they could to defeat our radio intelligence, that they were apprehensive that we would know of the move that was underway. Unfortunately, we didn't know the extent of the move completely. But under the conditions obtaining there, we discussed radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and yet the overall picture that it will produce. Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact that a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never be detected except by visual or other sighting.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again to the communication intelligence summary for 1 December 1941, concerning the Fifth Fleet it was stated, "Nothing to report." I believe you testified that the Fifth Fleet was the [216] fleet in the northern area of Japan.

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I said the fleet in the northern area. The Fifth Fleet was a new organization of which nothing was known, but from past indications it was believed that the Fifth Fleet was a force assembled for operations in northern waters, as had been done in previous years. There had been a Fifth Fleet prior to that during a maneuver, which was based in the Ominato-Hokkaido area, but, as I recall it at this time, there was no positive information on the Fifth Fleet; and further, Admiral Kimmel had asked me several times to check with the communication intelligence people to see if there wasn't something that we could ascertain regarding this force, its intentions or its composition. You go way back in here and you will find there was considerable discussion when this first came up, but we did not know anything about that fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Then, the statement "nothing to report" concerning the Fifth Fleet meant that you had no information concerning the fleet and did not mean that you had information indicating no change?

Captain LAYTON. It would mean that there was no information rather than that the information showed no change. If you will note, he said under "Combined Air Force" "No change." It would mean that the normal traffic pattern was followed and there were no new associations. And also recall that this was a day of call sign changes, when the identification of these units would be most difficult and the analyst cannot on a flood of new call signs really make any commitments; so he was satisfied with the words "no change" and satisfied with the words "nothing to report" as meaning we had nothing to report.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches for 1 December, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. We had a dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December, [217] addressed to CincAF, ComSIXTEEN, information CincPac and ComFOURTEEN. It referred to the intrigue in Thailand, on which conferences in progress in Bangkok—Japanese conferences in Bangkok were considering plans aimed at forcing the British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as a countermove to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Since Thailand intended to consider the first invader as her enemy, the Japanese believed this landing in Malaya would force the British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would then declare war and request Jap help. This plan apparently had the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff, Bijitto. It observed that Thai Government circles had been sharply divided between the pro-Japanese and the pro-British factions until about 25 November, but now Wanitto and Shina, who favored joint military action with Japan, had silenced the anti-Jap group and intended to force the Premier, Pibul, to make a decision. The Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok expected early and favorable developments to be possible.

On 1 December, ComSIXTEEN informed CinC, Asiatic Fleet, which readdressed it for information to CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and OpNav, that Japanese radio station JVJ press tonight in closing at 1700 hours (presumably minus 9 time) stated: "All listeners be sure and listen in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be important news." ComSIXTEEN suggested frequencies 7327, 9430, and 12275. All times Tokyo, minus 9.

ComSIXTEEN also sent a dispatch on 1 December that radio intelligence had showed that among the arrivals in the Takao area during the past two days were Comdesron 5 in the NATORI, and that the NAKA was to join Desron 4 there; units of number Two Base Force and CHOGEI, the latter being considered a tender for two submarine divisions, had arrived in the Takao area, and that all these units were under command of the CinC Third Fleet. ComSIXTEEN noted that the CinC Second Fleet in the ATAGO had shifted from Kure to the Sasebo [218] communication zone, apparently en route to South China waters.

Referring to ComSIXTEEN dispatch in which Japanese radio station JVJ requested all listeners to "be sure and listen in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be important news," the impression

received was that the "winds" code was about to go on the air, meaning by that the fake weather broadcast at the beginning and end of news broadcasts to signal the rupture of relations between either Japan and America or Japan and Britain or Japan and Russia. The monitors were told of this and placed on the double alert, but nothing came of it.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 2nd, Captain, will you give us the highlights of that?

Captain LAYTON. Of interest was the Japanese were having difficulty in routing their traffic due to the change of calls and the probable unfamiliarity of operators with the new calls and the location of the units thereof.

Also it was noted that ComSIXTEEN had reported the Second and Third Fleets to be in the Takao area and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic for these fleets. The broadcast was not heard in Hawaii, but it was observed here in ComFOURTEEN that there was one indication that these two fleets weren't close to Takao. For instance, in several instances Takao forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was summarized as the belief that a large fleet, made up of Second, Third, and First Fleet units, had left the Empire waters and was either not close enough to Takao for good communications or was proceeding on a course not close to Takao.

It was noted that Radio Shanghai handled considerable amounts of traffic which obviously were originated by and destined for units in the Takao area.

[219] It was noted that the Chief of Staff, South China area, continued to appear in Shanghai. It was observed that ComSIXTEEN had reported nine submarines proceeding south of Camranh Bay. These were assessed to be Subrons 5 and 6, which units normally operated with the First Fleet, but which had been repeatedly shown to be included in the Second Fleet task force for southern operations.

Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared to remain relatively quiet. Inconclusive evidence suggested there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that there may be two supreme commanders with staffs. Lack of identifications was noted as precluding precise information on the Second Fleet, but it contributed to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet was underway. Cruiser Division 7 and Destroyer Squadron 3 were unlocated since the change of calls.

There was nothing to report concerning the Third Fleet, but the association of the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet, that is, the Fourth Fleet, continued. Some traffic for the Fourth Fleet was still seen going through Truk.

Under "Carriers" it was stated:

Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

It was noted that the Combined Air Force, the shore-based air force, continued to be closely associated with the Second, Third, and Indo-China Fleets, and that some units of the Combined Air Force, which previously [220] had been shown in the Takao area, had de-

parted. The direction was not given, but it was inferred as south, as their previous associations had been south.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall what, if any, discussion you had with Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of information concerning the carriers?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe that there was any amount of discussion at this time, because in the past when call sign changes had been made, there was a blank—

Mr. SONNETT. Was the fact, as stated in the communication intelligence summary, evident, that the failure to identify one carrier call indicated that carrier traffic was definitely at a low ebb?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel read that. Whether he commented on it, I do not recall.

Mr. SONNETT. If so, he did no comment to you?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall that he commented, but, if so, he would have commented to me, I presume.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your own analysis or evaluation of that fact, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. At that time, as best I can recall it, I laid it to the fact that there was a lack of identifications and in the past there had been many times when carrier calls didn't appear, as you will notice on previous days carrier calls didn't appear when there was identified traffic. There have been many times and sometimes over a considerable period when the carriers just did not appear because they weren't operating. When they are tied at the buoy in Yokosuka or Kure or other naval ports that have wire communications to Kure, they receive their traffic by land line or on the teletype. They wouldn't use high power. They wouldn't be called on broadcasts because their operations were all local. They would also receive and pass considerable local traffic.

[221] Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether the previous Japanese advance into Hainan was preceded by a similar lack of carrier traffic?

Captain LAYTON. No. On the contrary—do you mean Hainan or French Indo-China?

Mr. SONNETT. French Indo-China.

Captain LAYTON. On the contrary, in the French Indo-China demonstrations of January and July, 1941, Carrier Division 2 appeared in the traffic, and also at this occasion of the formation of this southern invasion force under CinC Second Fleet, with the amphibious forces under CinC Third Fleet, plus the shore-based air force under major commands, it was noted definitely that Cardiv 3 and possibly Cardiv 4 were associated with this force, Cardiv 4 being much less associated and some lack of close association seen. It was also noted that prior to the apparent formation of this task force, Cardiv 4 and 3 had been in the Takao area, or Nansei Shoto area, and that they had returned to the Empire. Having been in that area, and since Cardiv 3 was definitely southbound and since Cardiv 4 was lightly suggested as possibly being associated, it was on this basis that I placed Cardiv 3 and Cardiv 4 in my estimate as in the Southern Task Force. It was believed that had the carriers been intending to operate, they would likely have appeared in the traffic.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, you are speaking now of December 2, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Had other carriers, other than those I have men-

tioned, other carrier divisions, intended to operate, it would have been suggested in traffic. It is to be noted here that Commander Carriers is not associated in any of these dispatches.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am getting at, Captain, is when you say it was believed, do you refer to December 2, 1941?

[222] Captain LAYTON. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And at that time you believed that were the carriers thought to be in home waters in operation, that would have shown up in the traffic?

Captain LAYTON. If the carriers had been operating in active status in home waters, they would have been shown in traffic.

Mr. SONNETT. That was your belief at that time?

Captain LAYTON. That was my belief at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary of December 2, 1941, referring to the Second Fleet, it stated, "No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." Was the lack of traffic concerning the Second Fleet, therefore, a reason for believing that the fleet was underway?

Captain LAYTON. There was no lack of traffic; there was lack of identification. The amount of traffic handled in the rough on Second Fleet circuits, the presence of the call signs on the frequencies used by those people, indicated that they were underway. It wasn't a case of radio silence. Certain units used certain frequencies, just as our Navy does, and the Second Fleet, and certain of its units, was using certain frequencies and traffic was on these frequencies. We had no identification of calls, but the fact that the traffic was on the circuits would suggest that the Second Fleet was underway and probably in company since they weren't handling it by broadcast methods. I would have to talk to the men who wrote this to know what he thought when he wrote it.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am getting at is your evaluation of the radio silence or complete blank of information as it was stated in the December 2, [223] 1941, summary as to carriers.

Captain LAYTON. The difference between the statement here and the statement as it reads, "No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days"; this is referring to the Second and Third Fleets.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you compare this with the statement concerning the carriers, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today"?

Captain LAYTON. I took that to mean that he had no information on the carriers that day.

Mr. SONNETT. In the one case did you believe that the Second Fleet units were underway and in the other case did you believe that the carrier units were not underway and for the same reasons?

Captain LAYTON. I will repeat. The Second Fleet units were using their radios. They were using their radios on known frequencies. They were handling a normal pattern of traffic. A normal number of unidentified calls on these circuits appeared. It was my belief that even though these people were not identified as names, they were units operating normally and at sea. Under "Carriers" there was a complete blank of information, meaning since there had been no identified calls, there was a complete blank of information. The carrier circuits

were definitely not up, that is, there were no calls identified on circuits that would be called carriers. The difference between a unit operating at sea and a unit operating in home waters under an umbrella of broadcasts. The things on broadcast can go to shore stations and special landing forces and air forces and carrier forces and everything else and there is no way of identifying who they are, but if a unit is identifying under its tactical circuits at sea, that is a force. If a unit is operating under a broadcast, you wouldn't hear them. [224] If they are operating in local waters and using only their local circuits of low power or voice, for instance, you cannot hear it at the intercept station. You cannot hear it at Cavite. It is too far away. Whenever they go into local waters, they have always gone to local maneuvering circuits, which applies to all vessels in that area. That is the impression that I received from reading this, as best I recall it, on 2 December.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, on or about December 2, 1941, have the belief that the operations of carriers or any other types of ships of Japan might be conducted in a period of radio silence?

Captain LAYTON. Radio silence is a means that can be used by any force at any time, and that fact had been known to me for a considerable period. It was not particularly apparent to me on December 2nd any more than it was on July 16th, for instance, but that fact had been discussed. I don't believe there was any thought of radio silence in my mind in reading this paragraph, nor do I think that the paragraph was written to imply that there was any radio silence of carriers. We know, in fact, now that there was, but at that time, in trying to recall as best I can, the reaction that I obtained in reading this summary and discussing it with Admiral Kimmel was, for one thing, this was only the second day of a change of call signs which will run somewhere around 20,000 calls. It is beyond the capabilities of our organization at this time to be able to tabulate and fit these all in in one day. You never could do it if you had all the men in the world, because there isn't any way of doing it. It is only after many days of traffic that you can lay the traffic down and identify it. Even in those days, you see, commanders had several call signs, but the ships had only one.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, was it not the fact that on December 2, 1941, the radio intelligence unit here had identified over 200 service calls [225] partially since the change on December 1, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. They stated that they had identified partially over 200 service calls.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it not further the fact that the radio intelligence unit said that in view of that fact and the further fact that they hadn't recovered one carrier call, it was evident that carrier traffic was at a low ebb?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Did that signify something unusual, then, to you concerning carrier radio traffic?

Captain LAYTON. Not at all, because in the previous days' summaries, there was no significant carrier traffic noted or no remark to that effect. You see, the summary brings out things that are significantly noted, new associations, or if there is undue activity or if people are heard, they put them down, because with this I kept my location sheet. This was the only way that anyone could try to keep track of the Japanese Navy. We had no espionage system that could

tell us when they went in and out of Kure or Sasebo or anywhere else. This was the only way we had of doing it; so when they had the identification for one of the Jap ships, if he was working with Yokosuka, they would say so, just as they had the AKAGI in there working with MARUS, so that we could keep track of as many major ships as possible.

The fact that they didn't appear tended to indicate that they were in an inactive status as they had returned in late October from operations in the Nansei Shoto. It was sometimes the custom of the Japanese after operations to take their carriers into the general Inland Sea area, put their air groups shore-based and you wouldn't hear from the carriers for [226] a considerable period of time.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you interpret this note on the carriers, then, as meaning that there was lack of traffic on the carrier frequencies?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir, lack of traffic on the carrier frequencies and lack of carriers' call signs appearing on any frequencies even in administrative types of dispatches about paymasters or personnel changes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, whether or not you had any discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning that fact specifically?

Captain LAYTON. I believe I said before that I do not have any recollection that it was brought up, and I have not.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches for December 2nd, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. ComSIXTEEN on the 2nd of December reported to OpNav, CincPac, CincAF, and ComFOURTEEN that the CinC Second and CinC Third Fleets were in the Takao area and Commander Southern Expeditionary Force was in the Sama area. The Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, incidentally, was the Commander who had taken charge at the demonstration off French Indo-China and had remained back in that area as a Fleet Area Commander. ComSIXTEEN noted that broadcasts to fleet units were now being sent by Takao or Bako Radio in addition to Tokyo. ComSIXTEEN also said in this dispatch that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes.

On 2 December we received a dispatch from CincAF, timed 020345, addressed to OpNav, info CincPac, that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines, speed 10, course south, at 0230 Greenwich, latitude 13-10 north, longitude 110-00.

And in a dispatch at 020730 CincAF reported to OpNav, info CincPac, that bearing 070 from Saigon, distant 180 miles, three I-61 class [227] submarines had been sighted in cruising formation, headed south at 15 knots; that twenty-one transports were anchored at Camranh Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.

At 012200 the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, reported to OpNav, info CincPac, CincAF, ComSIXTEEN, Naval Attache, Chungking, Naval Attache, Tokyo, as follows: that between Wednesday and Saturday there had arrived there (Shanghai) 14,000 troops plus others on two special trains. He was unable to get an accurate check on numbers. "Equipment with arrivals include field artillery and tanks. Those (troops) sailing from Shanghai week ending 22nd believed to have included Fourth Division."

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 3, 1941, Captain, will you give us the highlights of it?

Captain LAYTON. Highlights were that the volume of traffic was normal, with the receiving conditions good. It was observed that the "present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained." It noted the extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands and stated that it slowed up the identification of these units, stating that very few units had been positively identified so far.

It was noted that the Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three navy dispatches to CinC Combined, CinC Second, CinC Third Fleets. Tokyo Intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same commanders.

It was observed that the presence of the CinC Second Fleet in Formosan waters was not revealed in the radio traffic, but the impression was gained that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that was not verified by radio intelligence means.

It was noted that some of the Fourth Fleet units were in the Marshall Islands area and included some of the Fourth Fleet staff. It [228] stated that the identity of these units was not known.

It was noted that the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit addressed several messages to CinC Fourth Fleet.

It was also noted that some Swatow units were addressed at Saigon, indicating movements south of certain of the South China units to Saigon.

It was noted that Bako Radio originated many dispatches to the Resident Naval Officer at Taihoku, Formosa, and the Task Force Commander.

It stated, "No information on submarines or carriers."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches of December 3rd?

Captain LAYTON. On December 3rd, OpNav addressed CincAF and ComSIXTEEN, information CincPac and ComFOURTEEN, that Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy their purple machines. The Batavia machine had already been sent to Tokyo. On December 2nd Washington had been directed to destroy their purple machine and all but one copy of other systems. It stated that the British Admiralty that date had reported that the Japanese Embassy in London had complied with its orders to destroy it.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the purple machine, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It was an electric coding machine.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning the destruction of the purple machine by the Japanese?

Captain LAYTON. All I recall of it is that Admiral Kimmel sent for me when he received this dispatch I have just mentioned, or one similar to it, and asked what was the purple machine. I told him that I didn't know, that I would find out. I then approached Lieutenant Coleman, the Fleet Security Officer, who had come from Washington, and asked him, and he told me it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding machine.

[229] Mr. SONNETT. Did you communicate that to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. Which information I communicated to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, evaluation was made of the fact that the Japanese were going to destroy the purple machine?

Captain LAYTON. It indicated that the Japanese were preparing for any or all eventualities and most of the addresses were in the southern area, with the exception of Washington and London.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you know whether or not the Japanese Consul in Hawaii had a purple machine?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know, but I have subsequently discovered that he did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know at this time whether or not the Japanese Consul in Hawaii was destroying or burning papers?

Captain LAYTON. He was not at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 3, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe it was the 3rd. I thought it was a little bit later. It may have been the 3rd. I don't recall which day I was informed that he was burning his papers, and I said, "That fits the picture that the Japanese are preparing for something, destroying their codes."

Mr. SONNETT. Was it brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention that the Japanese Consul in Hawaii was burning papers?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, whether or not the Army in Hawaii was advised of the information concerning the Japanese destruction of the purple machine or of the Japanese destruction of records in Hawaii?

[230] Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, Commander Rochefort told me that he had informed his opposite number in the Army the Japanese were destroying their secret and confidential papers not only in Hawaii but in other places. I don't know whether he told them that they were destroying the purple machine. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't think that he would. I don't know. It is my best recollection that I told Colonel Raley that the Japanese were destroying their important papers and code books and everything else not only here but everywhere else. I didn't want to mention the purple machine because I didn't want to explain what I meant.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any other dispatches, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. OpNav sent another dispatch, containing the same information, time 031850, addressed for action to ComSIXTEEN, CinePac, ComFOURTEEN, CineAF, and it said:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington X and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

We received a dispatch from the Naval Attache, Singapore, time 020335, on the 3rd, which stated that CinC China had issued the following to British and Allied merchant ships in that area: All ships north of Hong Kong proceed south thereof, Crown Colony's and all ocean-going ships to Singapore, proceeding to Singapore,

and bring such shipyard equipment as possible X except for coast Malaya and West Borneo no vessels leave near northbound without permission XX Dutch issued orders none their ships go north their islands without authority.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the intelligence summary for December 4, 1941, Captain, will you give us the high lights of that?

[231] Captain LAYTON. It was noted that Takao Radio instituted a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that Radio Tokyo used. This was rather an important move from a communications point of view in that you had two complete broadcasts which carried the same indicators but had different serial numbers. It also indicated that Takao had now assumed the position that Tokyo had been in two weeks before of handling major fleet traffic on high speed circuits. It was noted, however, that only few messages had been placed on that broadcast. Moreover, it was noted that there were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to major commanders, and, among others, there was a Tokyo intelligence dispatch in seven parts addressed to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, the Combined Fleet, the Third Fleet, the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and Sama, Hainan. In all, Tokyo radio intelligence sent out twelve dispatches to the major commanders.

It was noted that the outstanding item of the day's traffic was the lack of messages originating from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. It was noted that these were previously very talkative and were now very quiet. While the fleet calls were not as yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands could not be ascribed to that. They are still prominent as addressees. It was believed now that the CinC Second Fleet was in the vicinity of Takao and that the conflicting evidence before was due to the two broadcasts that had been brought up. CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for action and for information to the Third Base Force at Palao, CinC Second Fleet, and CinC Third Fleet, thereby renewing Palao's association with the Southern Invasion Force.

CinC Fourth Fleet sent a message to the Chief of Staff Combined Air [232] Force, information Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, and Air Squadron Twenty-four, the Third Base Force at Palao, and the Fourth Base Force at Truk. This undoubtedly had to do with air movements or preparations. They couldn't find anything further in the day's traffic to check on the present of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls, as has previously been stated. Jaluit Radio was associated with the Commander Submarine Force and with Tokyo Radio and with an unidentified call which was believed to be an oil tanker.

There was an impression, a definite impression, as I recall it, from this summary that these commanders, who had previously been very active in originating dispatches, from the dispatches which tied in their groups, suddenly now became quiet, but they were still the addressees of many intelligence reports; they were the addressees of many other dispatches from Empire and shore-based originators.

Now you do get the impression they are at sea and maintaining radio silence. They are in the traffic, but they don't send the traffic themselves. I would like to state here that the Japanese then hadn't found out the hidden little trick of putting it from no originator. We taught them that in the war, which they dutifully followed thereafter, much to our chagrin.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any dispatches for December 4th, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch, time 020704, received on 4 December, stated that an unidentified modern 10,000 ton cargo ship converted as a seaplane tender. It had a flush deck, raised forecastle, raked bow, cruiser stern, armed with one 4.7 gun on an elevated platform forward and one also on the poop. Also that Japanese naval craft sighted were as follows: On the 15th off Saigon were seven transports; on the 20th northeast of Amoy was a 10,000 ton seaplane carrier, having eight [233] catapults.

Assistant Naval Attache's dispatch from Shanghai, 020702, received on 4 December, in general stated that local Nazis of military age were being sent to Japan for training and believed to be for duty on the German vessels interned there. Eighty men, average age thirty, were known to have departed the past ten days; also that the officials in the Shanghai area were exerting pressure on the French Concession to discharge Anglo-American volunteer members of the police reserves, who were to be replaced by Germans and Italians. He confirmed previous movements of the large liners KAMAKURA MARU, the NITTA MARU, and the ARGENTINE MARU, had been carrying building material, personnel, oil, and supplies to the Caroline Islands; that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit, and that the following three islands were being specially developed: Katherine, Majuro, and Mejit.

We received from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, time 030630, received on 4 December, a dispatch to the effect that two escort vessels had been recently completed in the Yokohama dockyard; that one transport loaded with aircraft plus another one carrying naval personnel departed Yokohama 27 November.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 5, 1941, Captain, will you give us the highlights of that?

Captain LAYTON. It was noted that the traffic volume was extremely heavy and all circuits were overloaded. There were several new intercept schedules heard, and Ominato Radio was working with Sama and Bako, and that the Takao broadcast was handling traffic to the Second and Third Fleets, and that the Tokyo broadcast was also handling traffic for those units. It was observed that some traffic being broadcast was several days old. It was adduced that this indicated uncertainty of delivery [234] existing in the radio organization. It was also seen that there were many messages of high precedence which appeared to have caused a jammed condition on all circuits. They quoted a plain language dispatch sent by Captain, OKAWA, from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, and addressed to Fujihara, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, which said,

In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, what was the OKAWA? Do you know?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know.

It was noted that neither the Second Fleet Commander nor the Third Fleet Commander originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed and are receiving their traffic over the broadcasts. It was believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or

farther south since the Takao broadcast handled nearly all their traffic.

It was stated that no traffic from the Commander Carriers of Submarine Force had been seen either.

Third Fleet. It was noted that the Commander Fourteenth Army was aboard the RYUJO MARU in the Third Fleet and that a number of MARUS had been addressing the CinC Third Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. What was a MARU, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. A MARU is any Japanese merchant vessel. Rather than saying merchant vessel or Japanese merchant vessel, you say MARU, because all Japanese merchant vessels have MARU at the ends of their names; so that is another little standardization that we use.

The Flag Secretary of the Fourth Fleet and the Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed in Jaluit, strengthening the [235] impression that the CinC Fourth Fleet was in the Marshalls. Again we had an association between the Palao Radio, the Resident Naval Officer at Palao, and Commander Second Fleet by being addressed by the Commander South China Fleet.

Sama, Hainan, addressed much traffic to CinC Second Fleet, and Bako in the Pescadores sent considerable traffic to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander of the Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of his air corps. Shiogama Air and at least two other unidentified air corps appeared to be moving, probably to Indo-China.

On December 5th we received no intelligence traffic from any source whatsoever.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary for December 6, 1941, Captain, do you know whether that was delivered to Admiral Kimmel before or after the attack on December 7th?

Captain LAYTON. It was delivered to me after the attack on December 7th and Admiral Kimmel did not see it and was too busy to read it. It contained no positive information of anything we didn't already know and, in fact, contained nothing of what we then did know.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any dispatches received prior to the attack on December 7th?

Captain LAYTON. On 7 December there was a dispatch and I believe it was received after the attack, but I am not positive. It may have come in in the early morning and I didn't see it until afterwards. It was a dispatch which ComSIXTEEN sent to OpNav, information CinCPac, CinCAF, and ComFOURTEEN. They estimated the South China Air Force Headquarters were now in the Saigon area; at least four groups of planes, strength unknown, were at that station; that a heavy concentration of aircraft were at Formosa and [236] based at Takao, Taichu, and Kagi naval air stations; that eight MARU air tenders, that is, converted ex-merchant marine, probably freighters to seaplane tenders, were in the South China area, five of them being in the Takao general zone, one near Saigon, and two near Sama, Hainan; that the direction finder bearings indicated the AKAGI was moving south from the Empire and now was in the Nansei Shoto, Okinawa, area. "Estimates based on call recoveries

since 1 December and may be considered conservative." This estimate is based on call sign recovery since 1 December and may be considered conservative. The large volume of high precedence traffic from air activities in the Saigon area indicates extensive air operations may be imminent.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any other dispatches received before the attack?

Captain LAYTON. These are dispatches I have in my file, and whether they came in to us before, I don't know. A dispatch, time 060550, from Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, and dated 7 December 1941, reported that approximately 14,000 troops who had arrived in Shanghai by rail the latter part of the week before had embarked and departed south; that the equipment included ninety armored cars, and that the Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai had been augmented by a thousand persons brought from Nanking and Hanchow. The Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, remarked that there was "no apparent reason for this increase unless policing of additional local areas is contemplated."

A dispatch received on 6 December 1941 from CinC Asiatic Fleet, addressed to OpNav, information CinCPac, ComSIXTEEN, and ComFOURTEEN, stated that the CinCChina reported:

25 Ship convoy with escort 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers lat 8 north 106 east at 0316 GCT today X Convoy 10 ships with [237] 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers 7-40 north 106-20 east 2 hours later X All on course west X 3 additional ships 7-51 north 105 east at 0442 course 310 X This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron X By scouting force sighted 30 ships and 1 large cruiser anchored Camranh Bay X

A dispatch from the Naval Observer, Wellington, time 050600, received on 6 December 1941, which said that the naval intelligence, New Zealand, had informed our Naval Observer there in confidence and not for transmission that the Jap Consul in Wellington had received orders to destroy his codes. A reply, using the code word set up for that, indicating compliance therewith, had been sent to Tokyo. Also he reported that the Japanese consuls in Australia and New Zealand had been directed to forward all possible geographical data. He enjoined secrecy in this matter to keep the source still available to the British.

Admiral HEWITT. We will adjourn at this time until 9:15, tomorrow morning.

(The investigation was then, at 5:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:15 a. m., 30 May 1945.)

[238] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

ELEVENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:15 a. m., Wednesday 30 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, entered and, after having been warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as witness.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you Exhibit 15 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a certified copy of an OPNav dispatch of November 24th, and ask you whether you recall having seen that.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral, before this investigation?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The dispatch referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 24.")

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is the dispatch that Admiral Kimmel had me take and show to General Short in person the day it was received. I gave it to Admiral Short for his perusal shortly after 12:15, as he was then listening to the news, which, I believe, ran from 12 to 12:15, at his headquarters. He read it and asked me what naval air strength we had at Guam [239] and I replied that as far as I knew, we had no naval air strength unless there was a transient patrol plane or so passing through. He asked me concerning the former landing field at Guam and I told him that while I did not know at first hand, it was my impression that some time after 1930 and probably before 1932 the shore-based Marine observation group that was stationed at Guam had been withdrawn and the airfield had been allowed to revert to its original state, that is, unimproved and not kept up. General Short then asked about the defenses of Guam. I told him again I did not know at first hand, but when in Tokyo on duty at the American Embassy, I had seen a copy of a memorandum or *aide memoire* submitted to the Japanese Government, informing them that all coast defense guns on Guam had been withdrawn and that Guam was to be considered thereafter as an undefended island. While I do not recall the date of this note, it is my impression it was somewhere around 1933, possibly 1934. General Short made some remark to the effect about appeasing Japan both in the past and in the present and returned the note to me and thanked me for bringing

it. I returned the note to CincPac Headquarters and reported that I had completed the mission sent on.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the sentences in exhibit 24 of this investigation, which is the OpNav dispatch of November 24th, as follows:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
move in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility—
will you state, Captain, what conversation you had with Admiral
Kimmel concerning your evaluation or estimate of that portion of
the dispatch?

[240] Captain LAYTON. I don't recall that Admiral Kimmel asked me specifically for my evaluation of that special part of the dispatch. I do recall that in general a statement was made to the effect that that was borne out by the present information we had at hand; an aggressive move was then under way. I believe that the fact the Philippines and Guam were mentioned was given particular attention, although I do not believe it was stressed in my presence. I know that when dispatches of this nature or other important dispatches having to do with fleet movements or dispositions were received, the Admiral, the Chief of Staff, War Plans Officer, Operations Officer, and the Aviation Officer were closeted with the Admiral for sometimes hours at an end. During these conferences, I was seldom, if ever, present.

Mr. SONNETT. Did the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations as expressed in this dispatch, namely, that the movements of the Japanese naval and military forces and statements of the government indicate a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, coincide or agree with your own estimate of the situation at that time?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, and it is more than three and a half years since then, and it is very difficult to recall what you thought after this period, and particularly when I have been engaged in fleet intelligence work daily since then—I believe that my impression was they have the same information we have; they note this southern movement as we do, and they have found in their judgment that the Japanese may not leave us on their flank either. That had been a subject of conversation, as to whether the Japanese would proceed on with the indicated movements, leaving us on their flank, or would they have to take us out on the way down. It was my personal impression, and I so stated, that Japan had never yet, with [241] the exception of Russia, left a strong enemy on a flank.

Mr. SONNETT. It appears from the exhibit, Captain, that an attack on American territory, namely, the Philippines or Guam, was regarded as a possibility by the Chief of Naval Operations. Was that in accord with your estimate at the time?

Captain LAYTON. The possibility of a Japanese attack on the Philippines or Guam was in accord with my belief at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you express that belief to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe that my belief was specifically requested as you have so stated it. I believe he asked me to the extent that, didn't this bear out what we were thinking at the time, namely,

would they or would they not leave us on the flank when they moved south? By the possibility of the Japanese leaving us on their flank, I meant, and it was understood, I believe, that the Japanese in their move into French Indo-China and Thailand or even across into Burma to cut the Burma Road, as was conjectured by some observers, would consider our position in the Philippines as a direct menace and threat on their immediate flank; that should they leave us on their flank, our position in the Philippines would be a threat to their line of communications should we decide to take action in assistance to Great Britain or French Indo-China or the Thai operations, as the case might be.

Mr. SONNETT. By that, Captain, do you mean that you expected an attack on the Philippines or Guam in the event of Japanese war with the United States?

Captain LAYTON. I did not expect the attack, but I was not unaware of its possibilities. In other words, the whole problem was would the Japanese leave us on their flank? If they would leave us, they wouldn't [242] attack. On the other hand, if they left us there, we would be a threat. So, since the Japanese have rarely left a strong enemy in an immediate flank, they might attack so as to protect their own wing, their own line of communications, as a measure of security.

Mr. SONNETT. What directions of movement were considered in your estimate other than Japanese movement or attack on the Philippines or Guam?

Captain LAYTON. My estimate was there were two task forces under CinC Second Fleet, one proceeding down south from the Formosa-Hainan-Bako area into the South China Sea and aiming at the Kra Isthmus or its vicinity, the Gulf of Siam. The other task force was proceeding via Palao in the Western Carolines with the intention perhaps of threatening Timor, Celebes, or other Dutch holdings in that general zone.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you at that time, Captain, believe or estimate that in the event of war with Japan, an attack on Hawaii was a possibility?

Captain LAYTON. I did not believe it a possibility at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief believed at that time that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised) of October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you were familiar with that.

Captain LAYTON. I had seen it.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to paragraph 2 (b) of that letter, does it not appear that the security of the fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian area was predicated at that time on two assumptions and that one of the assumptions was that a declaration of war might be preceded by [243] a surprise attack upon ships in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is what this letter from the Commander-in-Chief says.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, was that not, Captain, an estimate, then, of CincPac concerning the possibility or indicating the possibility of a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor prior to a declaration of war?

Captain LAYTON. I presume it was. I was not consulted on the writing of that letter; therefore, I cannot speak at first hand. Its face value would say that that was true.

Mr. SONNETT. Did your own estimate agree with that of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on that subject?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. That had been discussed in the past. As a matter of fact, that point of Japan's actions was informally discussed with Admiral Kimmel on the occasion some months before Pearl Harbor when I presented him with a translation of a Japanese novel which purported to tell for the layman what would be expected during a Japanese-American war, and in which were laid out three problems for the American Commander-in-Chief, who, they presumed, would proceed from the West Coast and be based in Pearl Harbor. One problem was the possibility of a surprise task force raid on the Hawaiian Islands. Another possibility was an expedition or raid in the Aleutian Islands. As I recall it, the third proposition was an amphibious expedition against the Hawaiian Islands. Under the first of these, the surprise raid by a task force on the Hawaiian Islands, they listed in this book the possible composition of such a task force, listing fast carriers, KONGO class battleships, and NACHI class cruisers, stating that because this force was fast and America had no fast battleships, it could run away from any superior force; because the force was strong, it could close with [244] any inferior force and destroy it.

This very point was informally discussed and the Admiral asked me what I thought concerning such a proposition. As I recall it, I stated that that was a potentiality the Japanese always had and that I hoped that our air search would find them before they got too close. He then excused me and thereafter sent for other officers. Whether they discussed this point or not, I do not know, as I was not present.

Mr. SONNETT. It was, Captain, I take it, a part of your duties to maintain an estimate of the situation so far as possible enemy action was concerned, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. It was, to maintain the enemy forces section of the estimate. In other words, an estimate of the situation is built up from all material, political, economic, military, and so forth. Particularly, an estimate regarding a nation is a very large and a very bulky document; yet it is a result of considerable information and clear thinking. My job was to keep up that part of the enemy forces, which my 1 December memorandum purports to be.

Admiral HEWITT. Does that include possible enemy courses of action?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe so, sir. I would have to get out the War College book. Unless it has been changed—this was written when the old gray-covered book was in use. I would have to check to see.

Admiral HEWITT. It is not your recollection that it was your duty to formulate possible enemy courses of action?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir, I don't think that was part of it. This was only formulation of enemy forces. I think possible enemy courses was part of the Plans Division. I furnished them with the psychological and other things for the broad estimate of the first part.

[245] Admiral HEWITT. The composition and position of the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. The composition and position of the fleet was my section, too, of the estimate. It was at best, of course, the best information that we had, but was lacking considerably in detail, particularly on land forces and certain of the air forces, although our day to day check on the intelligence, even though at times it was a little contradictory, when the end averaged out, was we knew there was a considerable concentration of air, for instance, in the Southern Formosa-French Indo-China-Hainan area, and at the same time there was a concentration of some submarines in the Marshalls. There was a concentration of considerable naval force—as a matter of fact, a large naval force—in the South China Sea area which was amphibious in nature. And my estimate showed that remaining in the Empire were only the battleships of Batdivs 1 and 2, the cruisers of Crudiv 6, which were put down as tentatively moved to the Mandates, which they did, Desron 1, and probably or possibly Cardivs 1 and 2, plus Cruiser Division 8 also. Of the Pearl Harbor task force, with the exception of the first section of Batdiv 3, that is, the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA, and the two carriers that we carried down in the Hainan area, the Pearl Harbor task force was carried as in home waters.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 23 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which is the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, Annex number VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, dated 28 March 1941, and Addendum 1, Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan number A-1-41. I refer you to the summary of the situation set forth in the Addendum and to the possible enemy action also set forth in the Addendum, and ask whether that was in accord with your estimate during the year 1941.

[246] Captain LAYTON. I don't recall ever having seen this document, as it was produced in another command. It was not submitted to me, nor was I consulted regarding it; therefore, anything I say now concerning this document would be as I learn it at this instant.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether the summary of the situation as expressed in that document, Addendum 1, was in accord with your views as of October 1941?

Captain LAYTON. In general, I would say that the sub-paragraphs listed therein had been in my mind, probably not in the same phraseology but all the points listed therein had been matters that had been previously discussed and which I was well aware of.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, does that apply, Captain, as well to the statement in the Summary of the Situation contained in Addendum 1 to the effect that, "It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence services"?

Captain LAYTON. I did not write that sentence and I would not write it in that way, although I would say the same thing. Since my interest was purely intelligence, my statement would be, as I have said before, any force under sealed orders can sail without any warning, unless you have an efficient espionage and spy system which can give you all the information, and it can arrive at any point, unless it is detected by visual or other sighting. That is the same language being used there, only differently phrased.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to the paragraph of Addendum 1 entitled "Possible Enemy Action," sub-paragraph (a), as follows:

A declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area; (2) a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and [247] installations in Pearl Harbor; (3) a combination of these two.

I also refer you to sub-paragraph (b), reading as follows:

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.

Do those statements accord with your estimate of possible enemy action as of October or November, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Those statements are in accord with other courses of possible enemy action which I had thought of. Paragraph (b), wherein carriers would have to come within 300 miles, was not one of my thoughts. That is, the 300 miles was a matter of air operations and I merely thought that carriers would approach within launching range, and had expressed the hope that such a task force would be found by our air search prior to getting to within striking range.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the so-called war warning of November 27, 1941, Captain, which was exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, is that the dispatch to which you referred in your testimony yesterday?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit in this case?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 25.")

Mr. SONNETT. Was that the dispatch, Captain, which you paraphrased and which paraphrase you were instructed to deliver to General Short, about which you testified yesterday?

[248] Captain LAYTON. This is a copy of the dispatch which Admiral Kimmel directed me to paraphrase and deliver to General Short on the late afternoon or early evening of 27 November.

Mr. SONNETT. Exhibit 25, the war warning, Captain, has as its first statement the following:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

What, if any, discussion of that phrase did you have with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. I had no discussion with Admiral Kimmel about that phrase. After Admiral Kimmel received this dispatch, he was in closed conference, as I have previously testified. He sent for me and told me to deliver this dispatch to General Short. He acquiesced to a paraphrase being delivered to General Short and I retired to make the paraphrase. When I brought the paraphrase back, the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought in an urgent dispatch from General Short, which was handed to Admiral Kimmel. During my wait in the Admiral's cabin to receive the Admiral's approval of my paraphrase and receive it for delivery to General Short, I was asked no questions that I recall. I did not take part in the discussions, I feel sure.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Captain, evaluate that dispatch as indicating that war with Japan was apt to break out in the near future?

Captain LAYTON. I felt that.

Mr. SONNETT. At that time, Captain, was it the fact that your estimate of the location of the Japanese carriers, briefly, was as follows: That one carrier was possibly in the Marshalls and that, according to ComSIXTEEN, the First and Second Fleet carriers were in home waters?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that was a fact.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Exhibit 8 of this investigation, Captain, and to the ComSIXTEEN dispatch of 26 November, does it appear that ComSIXTEEN [249] was of the opinion that Carrier Division 3 was expected to operate in the Mandates?

Captain LAYTON. It was my opinion on reading this dispatch where ComSIXTEEN said:

and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as second section X estimated units . . . second section Crudiv Five and Cardiv Three Ryujo and one maru x Desrons two and four X Subron five X Desdiv twenty-three X first base force of third fleet X third base force at Palao X fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet

referred-to units to operate from the Palao area of the Japanese Mandates and not the central, northern, or eastern Mandates, that is, the Eastern Carolines, Marianas, or Marshalls.

It is to be noted that ComFOURTEEN's dispatch 260110 had stated there is believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airon twenty-four x at least one carrier division unit x plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

I believe, and it was my interpretation at the time, that the ComSIXTEEN dispatch placing Cardiv 3 in the Mandates was in accordance with our existing information that Cardiv 3 would operate to the south with the Southern Invasion Fleet and possibly based out of Palao, while the presence of one carrier unit in the Marshalls was still a potentiality, and that while there was a disagreement on the latter point, there was no disagreement on the former point.

Mr. SONNETT. The ComSIXTEEN dispatch of November 26th, Captain, contained in Exhibit 8, states, among other things,

our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area.

What carriers were comprehended by the description "First and Second Fleet [250] carriers"?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that the ComSIXTEEN dispatch, speaking of First and Second Fleet carriers in home waters, referred to Cardiv 1, AKAGI and KAGA, and Cardiv 2, HIRYU and SORYU, plus their plane guards, and possibly another Cardiv consisting of two carriers or possibly one carrier or, in other words, the one I called Cardiv 4 on my December 1st estimate and placed with Cardiv 3 in the Bako-Takao area.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to Exhibit 23 of this investigation, which is your December 1, 1941, estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, will you state whether, having refreshed your recollection, that was delivered on December 1st or on December 2, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I believe, having considered this throughout the evening, that it was on December 1st that Admiral Kimmel told me to prepare a location sheet of the Japanese Fleet, and that it was that evening I prepared it and so dated it in my rough draft; that it was

most likely, and I believe most probable, the 2nd of December when the rough draft was written up into the smooth copy and the date of the day before had been written on there; and that it was on the 2nd of December and not the 1st of December that this delivery was made to Admiral Kimmel. Two dispatches which I referred to in my testimony yesterday from CinC Asiatic Fleet regarding the sighting of submarines and transports along the French Indo-China Coast and in Camranh Bay, respectively, are penciled notations on this memorandum. Their time group indicates they were written as of the late afternoon and early evening of 1 December, Honolulu time and date, and, as these corrections were made the following morning after its typing in the smooth, I am sure in my recollection that it was done when these dispatches reached my desk and prior to its submission to Admiral Kimmel. [251] So, I believe the date of the 2nd is thereby fixed and I wish to have all previous testimony so corrected.

Mr. SONNETT. As of the date of the delivery of your estimate, which is Exhibit 23, just to summarize the situation as to Japanese carriers, Captain, you placed Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 in the Bako-Takao area and possibly the KORYU in the Marshalls area, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. I placed Cardiv 3 and 4 plus their plane guard destroyers and the KASUGA MARU (XCV) in the Bako-Takao area, and the "KORYU (?)" plus plane guards in the Marshalls area. The "KORYU (?)" was to indicate that while this was a carrier or a converted carrier, the name might be incorrect, but it was still a carrier unit with a flight deck and planes.

Mr. SONNETT. I note that in your December 1st estimate, Captain, which is Exhibit 23, you start out by saying, "From best available information units of the orange fleet are *thought* to be located as listed below." What was the significance of underscoring the word "thought"?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, the tenseness of the situation could not be underestimated in my mind. The fact that all of this information, with possibly one or two exceptions of sighting of transports and light cruisers and the submarines, was based on traffic analysis of the enemy naval radio circuits, which by itself, by its very nature, is inconclusive, sometimes contradictory, and very often incomplete. On the other hand, it does depict a picture, barring planned deception, and the picture, as I saw it, was as I laid it down to you. But I underscored the word "thought" because I had no direct evidence. I had kept track in the best way possible of every single unit, of every single command, and I wanted it plainly indicated that this was my thought and that [252] somebody else in drawing an estimate with the same material might vary in small details but would not vary over the big picture.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, in your December 1st estimate, Captain, in placing Carrier Division 4, which consisted of the ZUIKAKU and the SHOKAKU, in the Bako-Takao area, that was later discovered and in fact was an error, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. It was, but it was based on previous radio intelligence indications wherein it was noted that Cardiv 4 was associated with Cardiv 3 and had previously operated in the Takao area with Cardiv 3, had previously operated with Commander of the Combined

Air Force in joint operations, Commander of the Combined Air Force being the commander of the naval shore-based aircraft, and who was then an important command in the southern invasion units. Since this small indication existed and since this was not only one, but had occurred on two occasions, I felt that they possibly were there; and that again is my thought with very small indications.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am getting at, Captain, is that as to Carrier Division 4, then, on the basis of whatever information radio intelligence could provide, it was your estimate, subject to the limitations of radio intelligence, that Carrier Division 4 was in the Bako-Takao area?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, subsequently it has been ascertained that they were then on the high seas, heading for Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. But radio intelligence couldn't detect that fact at that time?

[253] Captain LAYTON. Nor could it detect that far in advance.

I would like to invite your attention at the present time to one phenomenon of this whole campaign. All those units that moved to the south, air submarines, carriers, cruisers, battleships, destroyers, auxiliaries, plus those commands concerned thereto, appeared in traffic, appeared in substantial traffic. They were addressed in intelligence dispatches. There were no other commands so addressed so constantly as a rule. In other words, there may be one exception. The commander of the Carrier Fleet, who became the commander of the Pearl Harbor task force, was not so addressed and hadn't been so addressed and hadn't appeared in the traffic since mid-November.

I would like to point out another fact, that in the previous Japanese naval activities in the Far East in connection with Thailand and French Indo-China, we had received substantiating information from OpNav from most secret sources which outlined exactly what was taking place. The radio intelligence picture of the fleet activities was confirmed also from newspaper accounts later published as the presence by name of various units there. In the time of which we now speak, the time of this estimate of 1 December 1941, we had what we called the framework of an intelligence picture. There are in intelligence many pieces like a jigsaw. The intelligence officer attempts to find the framework or border to find the scope of the intelligence picture and therefore to fit pieces together and form a part of the pattern or all of it if possible. In this, since we had no other source of information, we had received no dispatches that would indicate to us the possibility of the framework being larger than it was. The framework fitting into this pattern neatly, my attention was focused toward the south, and I believe that will explain why I was [254] inclined to include Cardiv 4 on the very briefest of evidence when there was no other evidence of any kind.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the absence of evidence, Captain, concerning Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 was so noticeable. I take it, that you did not include in your written estimate of December 1st any statement as to your belief concerning their whereabouts?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to explain how this estimate was made and I think you—

Mr. SONNETT. Can you answer that question?

Captain LAYTON. To say "yes" or "no" doesn't fit the picture. I would like to explain how this estimate was arrived at. I had a list of all Japanese units and commands. I went through my tickler ready scratch file where by sightings or by radio intelligence the indication of this unit or this command or of his whole command might be indicated or located. I then filled in after each unit or each ship the latest information, as it was run up day by day, of its location and then filled in the picture, as you say, but since I did not have any information on Cardivs 1 and 2, I omitted them because on all of the units, and that includes all the Japanese Fleet, there had been statements in the radio intelligence summaries as to their location or assumed location, but there had been no statements as either assumed location or their indicated location. Therefore, I left Cardivs 1 and 2 out of my thought because I really did not know. I presumed and estimated they were in the Kure area on no evidence at all.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Cardiv 1 consisted of the AKAGI and KAGA, which was the flagship, and Cardiv 2 of the SORYU and HIRYU, did they not?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

[255] Mr. SONNETT. And at the time of your December 1st estimate, they, along with Cardiv 4, were on the high seas, headed for Pearl Harbor, as we have later learned?

Captain LAYTON. True.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to your conversation with Admiral Kimmel, which, I take it, was December 2nd, concerning your estimate dated December 1st, you testified yesterday that Admiral Kimmel asked you a question about the fact that Cardivs 1 and 2 weren't listed in your written estimate.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago," and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

Mr. SONNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a [256] statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, which consists of the photostatic copies of communication intelligence summaries, and the summary for December 2, 1941, that is the summary,

is it not, which as to carriers indicates "almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today"; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is what it states.

Mr. SONNETT. And the summary for the following day, namely, December 3, 1941, states, "No information on submarines or carriers"; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Do I accurately summarize the situation, then, Captain, by saying that at that time you did not have information showing you the location of the carriers, but you did have a lack of information concerning the location of the carriers?

Captain LAYTON. There was no information on the location of the carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 4th and December 5th, Captain, is it true that the communication intelligence summaries made no mention of carriers?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring back to the war warning of November 27th, which is Exhibit 25 of this investigation, you will note the following direction contained in the warning: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46." Do you note this?

[257] Captain LAYTON. I do note it.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar, Captain, with the tasks assigned in WPL 46?

Captain LAYTON. I was at that time familiar with the general tasks. The task assigned the intelligence organization in WPL 46 was in general to receive the intelligence afforded us by OpNav.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall the tasks assigned in Pacific Fleet Operation Plan Rainbow Five and described as Initial Tasks, namely, tasks to be taken when Japan was not in the war?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall it. It was not a part of my duties and I do not recall having been consulted regarding deployment or operation of our forces at any time, except that on occasions in the past when there had been submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel asked me if I thought it was a Japanese submarine and I told him I thought it was and that we had had various unconfirmed reports from unreliable observers to the effect that there had been submarines reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor, and the Naval Attache, Tokyo, reported a rumor there that a submarine had returned from a cruise of reconnaissance there of Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands and the West Coast.

Mr. SONNETT. I would like to come to that submarine matter, Captain, again in a minute. I want at this moment to—

Captain LAYTON. I merely want to point out as far as operations or plans went, I was not frequently consulted, nor was I supposed to be that I know of, but the Admiral would ask me once in a while about matters concerning the Japanese, if I thought that was a Japanese submarine or what.

Mr. SONNETT. Then, I take it, Captain, that you do not recall [258] that one of the initial tasks assigned in the Pacific Fleet War Plan was "Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers . . . and prevent the extension of enemy military

power into the western hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necessary?"

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall that specific paragraph. I might have seen it, but again that was not in my immediate province, although all the tasks of all the members of a staff or command are all interlocking in a degree, sometimes larger, sometimes much less.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I refer you to the Staff Instructions, Staff of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, paragraph 214(a), which relates to the Intelligence Officer and which reads as follows: "Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluate same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required." Did you indicate at any time prior to December 7, 1941, that any aerial reconnaissance from Oahu was ever required by reason of enemy information?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall specifically telling the Admiral that he should conduct aerial reconnaissance as I was aware that reconnaissance was being conducted by PatWing 2.

Mr. SONNETT. What reconnaissance was being conducted by PatWing 2, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It was not my duty to check on aerial reconnaissance by our own forces and therefore I did not know the extent or the degree. That was the duty of the Fleet Aviation Officer.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you ever inquire of the Fleet Aviation Officer what reconnaissance was being conducted?

Captain LAYTON. I did not.

[259] Mr. SONNETT. Did it occur to you in the week preceding December 7, 1941, that at any time during that week aerial reconnaissance might be advisable?

Captain LAYTON. Aerial reconnaissance was being conducted as far as I knew and it would have been presumptuous of me to go and check on another officer's performance of his duty. Furthermore, it would not have tended toward good staff relationship, nor good command relationships, for people to go and check on the performance of duty of other people not in their section and to whom they were not directly or indirectly responsible up or down. The Fleet Aviation Officer was a subordinate of the Operations Division whose duties were laid out in the Staff Organization as conducted by operations. May I add that the Operations Officer was shown my periodic summaries of information received and at this time I would like to introduce in evidence my photostatic copy of my original file thereof.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 26.")

This consists of reports commencing 6 October 1941 and it starts with serial number 82 and ends with intelligence report dated 2 December 1941, serial number 102. I would like to describe how this intelligence report book was handled and disseminated. From time to time, as information was assembled or as intelligence was evaluated from assembled information, I prepared and assigned a reliability to various items, which I called intelligence reports, which were typewritten on a standard form. Since this material had already been seen by the Admiral and the Chief of Staff, the boxes 00 and 01 were crossed out in the form when printed. The other boxes in the form consisted of staff numbers 11, 12, and 13,

being the Operations Officer and the two Assistant Operations Officers, respectively; numbers 16, 17, 18, and 86 being the War Plans [260] Officer and his three assistants, the latter, 86, being the Fleet Marine Officer. Numbers 20, 21, 25, and 26—20 and 21 were the Fleet Communications Officer and the Fleet Security Officer, respectively; 25 was myself, the Intelligence Officer, and 26 my assistant.

It is to be noted in this exhibit that periodically staff boxes will not be filled. This was due to the habit of certain officers of only initialling the top page, having read those from his last initial up. For example, certain information from the most secret sources received at CincPac were by direction of OpNav available only to the Admiral, his Chief of Staff, Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as he designated. To insure that the Plans and Operations Divisions and the Communication Officer and the Security Officer were fully aware of information at hand and to protect sources of information from too wide knowledge of their basic source, this material was paraphrased by myself and its source sometimes disguised, but the picture remained unchanged.

For instance, on 25 November 1941, serial number 93, reliability rating A1, which meant communication intelligence, the following report was written and submitted and initialed:

(Attached as page 260A).

[260A]

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

SECRET

Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 93. Date, 25 Nov 1941.

For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force composed of the following:

Second Fleet—Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st Defense Division)—Combined Air Force—Desron Three—Airron 7—Subron 5—possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet). These units are linked with the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The Commander Second Fleet has intensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which is at Palao.

The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that certain units have moved on to Hainan.

The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and may be enroute South China. A strong concentration of submarines and aircraft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv and one-third of the submarine force.

Com14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in SouthEastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

00 01 11 12 13 16 17 18 20 21 25 26 90 95 86

(initials) P

[261] On 26 November 1941, intelligence report, serial number 94, reliability A, as follows:

(Attached as pages 261A, 261B, and 261C.)

[261A]

TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Secret

Reliability Rating, A. Serial No. 94. Date, November 26, 1941.

A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few days as follows. He considers it reliable:

1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being directed by CinC 2nd Flt in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects:

Section I to operate in South China Area.

Section II to operate in the Mandates.

2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Flt.

Section I

CruDiv 7 (From 2nd Flt) 4 CA's—KUMANO, MOGAMI, MIKUMA, SUZUYA)

Airon 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's—KAMIKAWA MARU, FUJIKAWA MARU, KENJO MARU)

1st Defense Division (From 3rd Flt)

Subron 6 (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4SS)) (note 4 SMs)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Crudiv 6* may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 CA's—KAKO, FURUTAKA, AOBA, KINUGASA)

Section II

Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Flt) (3 CA's (maybe 4)—MYOKO, NACHI, HAGURO)

Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Flt) (2 CV's—RYUJO?, HOSHO)

RYUJO and 1 Maru 1 CV

[261B] *Desron 2* (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs (12DD's))

Desron 4 (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (12DD's))

Subron 5 (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's))

Desdiv 23 (From Carrier Flt) (4 DD's)

1st Base Force (From 3rd Flt)

3rd Base Force (At PALAO)

5th Base Force (At SAIPAN)

Other lesser units (Names not known)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Batdiv 3* may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 BB's—HIYEL, KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) (HARUNA may be undergoing major repairs)

3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Flt in doubt but it is assumed they will be stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south.

4. Indications are that today (Nov. 26th) *Desron 3* (1st Flt), *Crudiv 7* (2nd Flt) and *Subron 6* (6th Flt) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air Force from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOIHOW, PAKHOI, SAIGON and other bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN.

5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CV's in the MANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Flts are still in the KURE-SASEBO area. (cont.)

[261C] 6. He believes that:

CinC Combined Flt is in *NAGATO* (BB)

" 1st " " *HYUGA* (BB)

" 2nd " " *ATAGO* (CA) (in KURE area)

" 3rd " " *ASHIGARA* (CA) (in SASEBO area)

" 5th " " *CHICIJIMA* area

" 6th " " *KASHIMA* (CL) (in YOKOSUKA area but this is unreliable)

7. CinC 2nd Flt, CinC 3rd Flt and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force apparently have the major roles.

8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet (probably torpedo boats).

9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expeditionary Force.

00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : 86 :

(Initials) P

[262] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring to serial number 94 of Exhibit 26, which you have just read into the record, explain the connection between that intelligence report and ComSIXTEEN's dispatch of November 26, 1941, which is contained in Exhibit 8.

Captain LAYTON. These intelligence reports are evaluations of reports received from all sources. This specific intelligence report, number 94, is my rewrite and reterming into standard phraseology the language, as I understood it, from Com SIXTEEN dispatch 261331. Also, intelligence report serial 93, which I read previously, is my interpretation and rewrite into standard phraseology of ComFOURTEEN's dispatch of 260110.

I would like to read intelligence report number 92, dated 25 November 1941, reliability A1.

(Attached as page 262A).

622A

TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Secret

Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 92. Date, 25 November 1941

Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.

00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 18 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : 90 : 95 : 86

(initials) P

[263] It will be noted that these intelligence reports are in some cases merely a paraphrased version of intelligence dispatches which I read into the record in connection with the communication intelligence summaries previously and are to complete the record for the purposes of dissemination of information within the Staff, regardless of its dissemination by copies of communication messages.

I would like to read into the record serial number 97, of 28 November, 1941, reliability A1.

(Attached as page 263A.)

[263A]
Secret

TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 97. Date, 28 Nov. 41.

Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure will be carried out by Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic relations are on the verge of severance:

On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times at the beginning and the end will have this significance:

("EAST-EAST-etc.")

HIGASHI HIGASHI: Japanese-American

("North-North-etc.")

KITA KITA: Russia

("WEST-WEST-WEST")

NISHI NISHI: England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and NEI)

On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used:

"HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (AMERICA) "Easterly winds with rain"

"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI" (Russia) "Northerly winds—cloudy"

"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England) "Westerly winds, clear"

The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.

00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : :
(initials) P C

[264] It is noted that the last intelligence report submitted was serial 102, dated 2 December 1941. Subsequent to 2 December 1941, there was a hiatus of information that could be evaluated into intelligence other than that which tended to confirm previous indications of the southern movement.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I believe you have a collection of paraphrased dispatches containing other intelligence during the period October to December, 1941, do you not?

Captain LAYTON. I have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 27.")

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state briefly, Captain, without reference to the contents, but generally, the nature of the documents contained in Exhibit 27?

Captain LAYTON. These are paraphrases of official dispatches received from various intelligence agencies—for instance, Naval Attache, Singapore; Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai; Assistant Naval Attache, Pekin; Naval Attache, Chungking; Marine Detachment, Wake; OpNav, and Naval Attache, Tokyo—in which various items of intelligence information were passed to CincPac and of which I kept a paraphrased copy for reference purposes to assist in making enemy location reports and other matters.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Captain, then, that these dispatches contained in Exhibit 27 were among the material which you considered in the preparation of your intelligence reports contained in Exhibit 26?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

[265] Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall that toward the end of November, 1941, there was some discussion of a proposed army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands?

Captain LAYTON. I do recall conferences which I attended with then Lieutenant Colonel Raley concerning a projected army reconnaissance by B-25's over Japanese positions in the Marshalls and also Truk.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you tell us how that discussion came to take place and what happened with respect to that reconnaissance?

Captain LAYTON. Either Admiral Kimmel directed me to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or my opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to me and informed me of this pending reconnaissance and requested my assistance toward delineating the appropriate objectives for the reconnaissance and to furnish the reconnaissance pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing and to assist in the successive projected reconnaissance.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what happened with respect to the reconnaissance, Captain? Did it take place or not?

Captain LAYTON. The reconnaissance unfortunately never materialized because the planes, except one, did not arrive. There was a delay from time to time due to, as Colonel Raley explained to me, uncompleted camera installations in the B-24's at Hamilton Field. I was never informed that the one plane which did arrive had arrived, but I learned later it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field on December 7th. We were very anxious that this reconnaissance be made at the earliest possible date and the Admiral, upon receipt of my memorandum stating the conferences concerning this reconnaissance had been held, asked me how soon I thought they could hold it, and I gave him Colonel Raley's answer to [266] me; that is, it was being delayed due to non-installation or non-completed installation of cameras, and that it would be made as soon as they arrived here and were briefed but that the time was still not definitely fixed.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that, Captain.

Captain LAYTON. I can. It is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, relating to him the general circumstances of the conference concerning the projected aerial reconnaissance by Army planes over the Mandated Islands, particularly those in the Marshalls, plus Truk and Ponape.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWETT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 28.")

Mr. SONNETT. In your discussions with Admiral Kimmel wherein you advised him that there was some delay on the part of the Army in getting the planes ready, was there any consideration given to the use of naval planes for such reconnaissance?

Captain LAYTON. It was not discussed with me. I presume it was discussed with the Aviation Officer.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know why such naval planes could not have been used for that reconnaissance?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know, except what I think. I think that had we used the only naval planes available, that is, PBV Catalinas, they would by their appearance over the Marshalls, the Japanese Mandated Islands, have been the overt act that the Japanese

could claim we had committed and would be a violation of the existing directives of OpNav, while the Army planes were ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin, Australia, en route [267] to the Philippines.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it also true, Captain, that the Army planes were to have special equipment for this reconnaissance that the Navy planes did not have?

Captain LAYTON. It was my personal belief that the first PBY that got near the Marshall Islands would be shot down by the fighters that I felt positive were there, whereas the Army B-24 photographic planes would have good armament, good defensive armament, and would also be very fast and would fly very high. Its chances of a successful reconnaissance flight were considered to be better than three to one. As I remember it, the Army reconnaissance planes were to be armed and they were to fire on any plane that interfered with them in the accomplishment of their mission.

I was particularly anxious, and I am sure Admiral Kimmel was also, that this reconnaissance be carried out because it would check on our other information as to the presence or absence of air strength and carriers, also submarines, and naval concentrations, that is, Fourth Fleet units, in the Marshalls area, including also Truk and Ponape. It was felt that this was an ideal opportunity to establish the credulity of existing intelligence on Japanese naval disposition and developments in the Mandated Islands to be reconnoitered.

Mr. SONNETT. Apart from the proposed reconnaissance by the Army which you have just discussed, Captain, what other information or intelligence was exchanged between the Army and Navy, to your knowledge, during the period October to December, 1941?

Captain LAYTON. The Army-Navy liaison, as I understood it, was established as a normal policy through the shore establishment, that is, the Fourteenth Naval District and the Army forces there, as a normal [268] measure. In addition, about four or five months before December, 1941, the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Raley, Air Corps, U. S. Army, called on me and stated that he had come to me to establish Army liaison on a continuing basis as his superiors considered the Bomber Command of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Navy to be the offensive weapons in the execution of war plans and the Hawaiian Department as a defensive garrison, and that, therefore, the liaison should be established on the level of air force and fleet.

From that time on I furnished Colonel Raley with various items of intelligence, particularly in the early period, stressing air field facilities in the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, where the Hawaiian Air Force was the responsible agency toward ferrying planes to the Philippines via Australia. I furnished him with the confidential and secret sections of the Dutch Airways Guide we had received from CinC Asiatic. As the trend of events commenced to develop in mid-November, I told Colonel Raley these events in general. I also told Colonel Raley, without divulging the source and by disguising its actual existence, of the general trend of movements of naval vessels to the south. Since some of the material I gave Colonel Raley was of the utmost secrecy, I cautioned him that I would give him certain very secret matter provided he made no written record of it and would

communicate such only to his Commanding General and on the understanding that he in turn would make no written record of it. I informed him of the intrigue in Thailand, which I previously discussed, in which the British were to be brought in on a false pretext and then declared the invader so that Japan could then be called upon as an ally to eject the British troops and thus facilitate their quick entry into that area.

[269] I feel sure that I told him that we were listening for a special broadcast from one of our spies, as I put it, which would give us indication through a weather report that relations between Japan and America might be terminated, or words to that effect. I do not recall distinctly telling him of the destruction of the purple machine. I think that I did, but I do not distinctly recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. You have testified, Captain, that liaison was established with the Hawaiian Army Air Force. Was there any liaison with the Hawaiian Department, that is, directly with General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know. I took messages to General Short. General Short consulted with the Admiral, and the normal liaison with the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department would be with the District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteen Naval District, they being on the same plane and echelon of command. Furthermore, the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate of the Hawaiian Department in those days and was directly under General Short. Therefore, when the Hawaiian Air Force came to me to establish liaison on fleet level, and I understood they were establishing the Army liaison, I presumed it was as far on that level as was intended to go.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it from your testimony, Captain, that you were familiar with the establishment by the Japanese of the so-called "winds" code.

Captain LAYTON. I was.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state when you learned of the establishment of that code and what the code was?

Captain LAYTON. A dispatch from CinC Asiatic Fleet, dated 28 November 1941, and addressed to OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN, for action, states as follows:

[270] Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX American Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze Hare X Unquote X British and ComSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts.

This was made the subject of my intelligence report, serial number 92, reliability A1, dated 25 November 1941, and was shown as customary to all staff members concerned. It is noted that on the photograph of this the initials only of then Captain DeLany, then Commander Goode, then Lieutenant Commander Collins, then Captain McCormick, then Commander Murphy, and then Colonel Pfeiffer, appear. It was the habit of certain staff officers not to initial each page but to read up from their last initial and then initial the top page they had read.

Mr. SONNETT. What efforts were made, Captain, to monitor for any message employing the "winds" code?

Captain LAYTON. Upon receipt of this message, I contacted Commander Rochefort and asked him what measures were going to be established. He said he had already set up a monitoring procedure wherein all our Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the results, if any?

Captain LAYTON. Almost each day thereafter I would check with [271] Commander Rochefort or he would call me and say, "Nothing so far." Up to the attack on December 7, 1941, we received no such intercept, nor did we receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified before Admiral Hart, Captain, in substance that on or about December 9, 1941, you received certain information from Captain Rochefort which had been secured from intercepted cables of the Japanese Consul General and that prior to December 9, 1941, you had received no such information from any source. Is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall the substance of the information which you did receive on December 9th from Captain Rochefort?

Captain LAYTON. The information was decryption of the Japanese Consul's cypher and it laid out various procedures and signals and also reports of movements of naval vessels into and out of Pearl Harbor and also made reference to the presence or absence of aircraft carriers, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 22 of Exhibit 13, and ask you whether that is the message to which you refer, Captain.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, what other messages of the Japanese Consul were shown to you by Captain Rochefort on or about December 9, 1941?

Admiral HEWITT. We will recess at this time.

(The investigation then, at 11:42 a. m., recessed until 2 p. m., at which time it reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties as during the morning session.)

[272] Captain Edwin T. Layton, U.S.N., resumed his seat as witness.

(The last question was read.)

Captain LAYTON. I have here a file of dispatches which are copies of consular dispatches which then Commander Rochefort delivered to me by safe hand on or after December 9, 1941. It may have been December 10th. I cannot remember exactly.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those as an exhibit, Admiral, and substitute a photostatic copy, when a copy is made, for that exhibit so that Captain Layton can retain his copies?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 29.")

Mr. SONNETT. I note, Captain, that the exhibit 29 just marked consists of copies of six dispatches. Were these the only intercepted Japanese consular messages or messages to the Japanese Consul in Hawaii that you received?

Captain LAYTON. These were the only ones received and they were received some time on or after 9 December 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, what, if any, efforts were made previously by any one to secure such messages and what were the results of such efforts made?

Captain LAYTON. I don't know at first hand, but when these messages were delivered to me, I asked then Commander Rochefort the background of them, and, as I recall it, a prominent executive of RCA, I believe perhaps Mr. Sarnoff himself, visited the Hawaiian Islands sometime prior to or just about the 1st of December and that some approach had been made—by whom I was not told—to obtain the files of the [273] consular messages, which by law our intelligence service could not touch. As I understand it, this high official, possibly Mr. Sarnoff, was sympathetic but said his hands were tied by the law the same as ours were, but would inquire upon his return to the States as to his receiving immunity, Presidential or otherwise, from prosecution in order that the intelligence services could have access to these quoted dispatches and attempt to decrypt same. As I recall it, the story went he sent a special message to Honolulu, saying in effect that this immunity had been obtained and he, the holder of those in Honolulu, could turn them over to the appropriate source. I do not know who obtained them, but Commander Rochefort led me to believe that they had been worked on from the time they were received and that they could not break the cipher but were continuing and that after December 7th efforts continued and finally the cipher key was decrypted and the messages reduced to plain Japanese and translated and then delivered to me.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, the previous investigations disclosed that ONI and the FBI were tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul prior to the 7th of December, 1941. Were you aware of that fact?

Captain LAYTON. I was aware without them having definitely so informed me. Wire tapping was also against the law. I knew that they had a source of information that was what they called "inside of the horse's mouth."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what information was secured by them from that?

Captain LAYTON. Nothing of importance as far as fleet movements went. There were certain times when the District Intelligence Officer would inform me that the Consul General had had an urgent meeting with the representatives of the NYK Line in connection with evacuation of [274] Japanese on the TAIYO MARU. There was considerable unrest and uneasiness on the part of the Japanese about the measures being undertaken by the United States, particularly those respecting inspecting mail, and that they were considerably relieved when they learned that second class and third class would not be inspected. It was presumed from my conversations with the District Intelligence Officer that all secret communications that they had wanted to send first class, they would thereafter send parcel post.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you learn at any time whether or not as a result of tapping the wires of the Japanese Consul it was learned that Japanese agents were reporting on the location and movements of United States ships in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. There was no such report made to me at any time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know whether or not as a general proposition Japanese agents were engaged in such activity?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know at first hand that they were or I would have had them arrested. It was a matter of common knowledge, without legal foundation, that the Japanese were engaged in espionage. It was suspected that the Japanese Toritsuginin, or "honorary consuls," in fact, some hundreds, were recommended by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District for arrest and prosecution under the federal statute for being the unregistered agents of a foreign government. I was interested in this because the District Intelligence Officer had informed me of this situation and so recommended. It seems that this measure was also accorded support by the FBI representative, Mr. Shivers, but it is my understanding that it was utterly opposed and disapproved by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, General Short.

[275] Mr. SONNETT. Concerning the operation of Japanese submarines in or around Pearl Harbor, Captain, what reports did you have prior to December 7th of the operation of such submarines in Hawaiian waters?

Captain LAYTON. Shortly after I joined the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, there was a submarine reported off the Pearl Harbor entrance and the destroyer which made the contact was known to be a very efficient anti-submarine destroyer. That was late December, 1940. The McDOUGAL made the contact. There had been other contacts made, both off the west coast of the United States, and as I understand it, off Hawaiian waters. These contacts were developed on a purely underwater search basis and at no time was a definite submarine sighted, nor could any actual evidence be obtained that it was in fact a Japanese submarine. However, subsequent to this first contact, to my personal knowledge, there were several other contacts, one of them again obtained by the McDOUGAL's screening group and held down by the McDOUGAL for some forty-four hours. The Captain of the McDOUGAL has told me that the first fourteen hours of this contact was a definite submarine, that the remaining hours of this contact was a temperature gradient and therefore a false contact which had permitted the supposed Japanese submarine to escape undetected by sonar search. However, during the early part of this contact, three destroyers passed over the position of the alleged submarine and obtained soundings of forty-six fathoms. The water there was thousands of fathoms deep.

There were additional reports, from unreliable sources unfortunately, that there had been rumors of Japanese submarines reconnoitering Pearl Harbor and the West Coast. The Naval Attache, Tokyo, so reported such a rumor in which, as I recall it, a Japanese submarine was supposed [276] to have returned from reconnoitering duty off the West Coast and off Pearl Harbor.

Additionally, there were reports from, I believe, the Naval Observer in Cuba or Naval Attache in Cuba. It may have been South America, but he reported that he had information to the effect that there were sunken submarines which could be raised and manned by crews located

off Molokai. These submarines were supposed to have been brought in and beached in not too deep water off Molokai, with a small hose leading up to a buoy, which was covered with kelp, and then led off ashore and was camouflaged, while the crews thereof were ashore disguised as fishermen on the island of Molokai; that at a given time they would proceed and connect up air leads to this hose and thereby blow the ballast of these sunken submarines and would then man them at the appropriate time. It was inferred that these were smaller than the normal type submarines.

By letter, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was directed and carried out a complete and thorough investigation of the coast line and off-shore areas of the island of Molokai and other islands. The report was negative. By direction, Commander Patrol Wing 2 was directed to make a close aerial reconnaissance of these waters under various conditions of light to detect if there was a possibility of this report being correct. Their report was also negative. This, as I recall it, may have been the summer or fall of 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. To sum it up, then, Captain, there was no actual evidence prior to December 7, 1941, of the operation of submarines in or around Pearl Harbor which established conclusively that they were there?

Captain LAYTON. There was no positive evidence beyond any shadow [277] of doubt to establish that they were in fact there, but Admiral Kimmel, I am sure from his remarks to me and his questions to me, felt, and I did also, that at least some of these contacts were true contacts; in other words, actual Japanese submarines. In fact, at one time when the cruiser AUGUSTA returned from the Asiatic Station, it was directed by Admiral Kimmel to pass through a position to the north or northwest of Oahu, I believe about 600 miles, and search out an area where a Japanese naval tanker was known to be passing at that general time and to ascertain if it was fueling submarines. I believe, although I am not sure, that a special aerial search was made in that area at that time. This was all very secret operations and I did not know it until after it was completed.

Mr. SONNETT. The previous investigations, Captain, have disclosed that on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese or midget submarine was attacked and sunk in Pearl Harbor and also that another Japanese or midget submarine was grounded off Bellows Field and was subsequently recovered. Were you familiar with the recovery of those two submarines?

Captain LAYTON. I am. They were recovered under my direction, but not under my personal supervision.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state approximately how long after December 7, 1941, the submarine recovered off Bellows Field was examined?

Captain LAYTON. The submarine grounded off Bellows Field on the morning of 9 December, as I recall it—it may have been the 8th—at which time we dispatched the Repair Officer of the Submarine Base, then Commander Eddy, to examine it and particularly to bring back any documents he could obtain from this submarine. He came back that evening and reported that it was too small a submarine for him—he was a large man—to get into and that the electrician's mate, who was rather small, too, could not get in either. He [278] said, however, that he could salvage that submarine with some assistance

and I directed him to proceed forthwith with the salvage. With the assistance of some Army engineers, I believe, and Oahu Land and Railroad Company's super heavy duty, many-wheeled, trailer-type trucks, the salvage was finally effected, but only after dismantling the submarine into two sections, it being too heavy in one section. It was then and throughout that time under guard and was brought to the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base, at which time a very small enlisted man was able to obtain all the documents and equipment remaining in the submarine. They consisted of maps, recognition pictures, a small note book, and various types of equipment, such as line, palm and needle, morphine syringe, first aid kit, emergency rations, and including a small cuspidor type head.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you several documents, Captain, and ask you whether you can identify those.

Captain LAYTON. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what they are?

Captain LAYTON. The first one is a series of two panoramas marked with II No. 27, entitled in Japanese, "View of Pearl Harbor from Aiea Northeast High Ground, Number 5." The lower one states in Japanese II No. 28, "View of Pearl Harbor from Aiea Northeast High Ground, Number 6." That is a rough translation.

I also recognize these panoramas as having been sold commercially in Honolulu, having been approved for publication by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, at some time unbeknownst to me. I believe the Commandant at that time was Admiral Bloch.

On the reverse of this panorama view is a short log in Japanese.

[279] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, you speak and understand Japanese, do you not?

Captain LAYTON. I am a qualified interpreter and translator of Japanese.

I would like to note for the record that in Japanese naval custom all times remain Tokyo time, minus nine, and all days remain East Longitude, Tokyo, dates, regardless of crossing the 180th meridian. So all times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit, Admiral, and substitute a photographic copy?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 30.")

Captain LAYTON. I would like to invite your attention to the fact that there are several English words in lead pencil and in read pencil on this so-called log. These were inserted by amateur translators in an endeavor to decipher it shortly after its receipt.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you whether the photograph is a true and correct copy of Exhibit 30, which is the so-called Japanese log.

Captain LAYTON. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the photograph as Exhibit 30A, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 30A.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a document, Captain, and ask you whether [280] it is a correct translation of the Exhibits 30 and 30A.

Captain LAYTON. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as 30B, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was receiving and marked "Exhibit 30B.")

Captain LAYTON. The next document is a panorama sketch, apparently a copy of panorama photograph or sketch, taken from seaward, and looking at the mouth of Honolulu Harbor from a position five nautical miles to the south of Pearl Harbor. They have written in red, "Looking at the mouths of Honolulu and Pearl Harbors from a position five miles south of the mouth of Pearl Harbor."

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the original as Exhibit 31 and substitute a copy thereof?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 31.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you two photographs, Captain, and ask you whether together they constitute a true and correct copy of the panorama sketch to which you have just referred?

Captain LAYTON. They do.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the photograph as 31A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The photographs were received and marked "Exhibit 31A.")

Captain LAYTON. May I indicate two translator's errors? Where he has "Rodgers symbol symbol," which is translated "Rodgers V place," and "Hickam symbol symbol," translated "Hickam V place," the two symbols stand [281] for "airfield."

I know the third document, recovered from the midget submarine that grounded at Bellows Field, as being a Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor on which courses and times are noted, as well as certain abbreviated signals, and a course and time projected track or tracks going around Ford Island, leaving it port hand to and returning out Pearl Harbor entrance.

Mr. SONNETT. May we deem this original map marked as Exhibit 32?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The map was received and marked as "Exhibit 32.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a photograph and ask you whether it is a true and correct photograph of the original map, Exhibit 32.

Captain LAYTON. It is a good reproduction of that map, except for the colors. It is to be noted that the times apparently scheduled for inbound, starting at 0040 and proceeding up through the channel and around Ford Island, leaving it on its port hand, up until 0515, when he is just south of Peninsula Point, are in blue crayon; all positions plotted thereafter are in red crayon, starting at 0520 and ending at 0600. It should be noted that the speed inbound is relatively slow and the speed outbound is much faster.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as Exhibit 32A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 32A.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, can you tell by examining Exhibits 32 and 32A whether this chart represents an attack plan of the submarine from which it was recovered, or does it represent a log of an actual trip of [282] the submarine from which it was recovered?

Captain LAYTON. I give as my professional opinion as a seaman that it is a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings and distances as indicated hereon. It is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the CO₂ absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary gang.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I call your attention to the Japanese symbols appearing on the exhibit under the time 0450 and ask you if you can translate those for us.

Captain LAYTON. These four symbols are Chinese characters which translates "Enemy ship—the first two—and the work "sink." The word "sink" can be "sink," "sank," or "sunk," or any connotation because no verb suffixes are appended to show tense.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you examine this submarine after it was recovered?

Captain LAYTON. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you find whether or not it had torpedoes aboard?

Captain LAYTON. His torpedoes were still aboard, although he had tried to fire them.

Mr. SONNETT. How many were aboard, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Full allowance, two, one atop the other.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again to the symbols appearing on the chart under the time 0450 and bearing in mind that the submarine had its two torpedoes aboard when recovered, would you say that that symbol could not [283] be translated as "Sunk enemy ship" if it referred to action by the submarine?

Captain LAYTON. Based on my knowledge now from Japanese captured documents and material, I give as my professional opinion that that symbol does not represent the captain of this midget submarine recording that he himself sank an enemy ship there.

I would like further to invite your attention to this track. This track is carefully laid out both by course and by distance, course in degrees and distance in meters, and time in minutes and seconds. An examination of this time in minutes and seconds will show that his speed was varied from point to point to be able to make his arrival at these points at a predetermined time. I point out for your attention the time 0450, which would be 0920 Pearl Harbor Time. At 0920 Honolulu Time the attacks were still taking place, salvage ships were being rushed into this area, a tremendous amount of activity was then taking place, and I doubt that a midget submarine captain, as busy as he was navigating his ship, would be able to so meticulously follow his course all the way around, keeping track of the time spent from point to point. On the other hand, if he had been there at that time, he would have moved out at a predetermined course at best speed and he would not have cared what time he rounded these points but rather that he rounded them and got away. Therefore, that is on what I base my judgment that this is a predetermined track and not an actual navigational track.

It is to be noted that on his track there are frequently written in Arabic numerals two different times for the same distance. The first is generally preceded by "Bi Fu" and the second one is preceded by "Bi," the second one being the greater number. It is believed that these [284] symbols and these different times represent different pole settings of his propulsion electric motors in accordance with the state of his battery, and while the track was designed for one, the other was an emergency figure so that he would know when to turn submerged were his battery lower than he had thought, due to the fact that, going slower, his battery would last longer, and also therefore the time was greater.

I would like to invite your attention to positions made on this chart both on the right-hand and left-hand sides of the Pearl Harbor channel as you enter it. Near the time 0530 position is a position I-16. South of that position along Waipio Peninsula is a symbol and the mark I-20. South of that position and still just off the Waipio Peninsula cut is a symbol which reads I-22. On the right-hand side of the channel just southwest of the fuel dock and on the channel edge and just to the north of 0410 position of the submarine track is a circular symbol which reads I-16. Just between the 0410 and the 0115 track positions is a large circle and indistinctly can be read the symbol I-24. It is my estimation—since the I-16, 18, 22, and 24 all carried midget submarines, belong to the class of submarines carrying midget submarines, and since, as I recollect it, the submarine recovered from Bellows Field was marked I-18—that these were the positions for these midget submarines to lie in wait during that period indicated as 0115 to 0410 in blue on the right-hand side of the channel and that these symbols do not represent their mother submarine, but rather the midget submarine, which apparently carried the same number as its mother.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, will you state again the date on which you obtained Exhibits 30, 31, and 32?

Captain LAYTON. I cannot give you the exact date, but it was some [285] time between three and ten days after the 7th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you receive these exhibits before the submarine sunk in Pearl Harbor was recovered?

Captain LAYTON. Yes. The submarine sunk in Pearl Harbor was not recovered, nor was any attempt made to recover it, for a considerable time after Pearl Harbor Day due to the requirements for all salvage equipment and personnel to work on damaged and sunken ships in an effort to extricate trapped personnel. As I recall it, the salvage of the midget submarine to the north or west of Ford Island was not accomplished until three weeks and possibly a month or more after December 7th. When salvaged, an attempt was made for two days to obtain intelligence material from this submarine, but as it was full of silt and all material had been completely destroyed by the effect of silt, mud, and decaying human bodies, the submarine was found to have no further intelligence value and was disposed of by burial into the submarine sea wall face as a fill.

Mr. SONNETT. So that nothing by way of documents was recovered from the submarine which had been sunk in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Nothing in the way of documents and nothing in the way of material because even electrical leads and pipes had been

completely disintegrated. The submarine had also been depth charged and rammed, and was practically in two smashed bits.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it ascertained whether the submarine which had been sunk in Pearl Harbor had fired its torpedoes or not?

Captain LAYTON. It had. It had fired both of them. Reports reached me on the 7th of December indicated that one had been fired and had exploded on the beach of Ford Island between the RALEIGH and CURTIS, as I recall it. The other, I believe, was fired and landed in the mud and [286] silt in the vicinity of the UTAH berth and didn't explode. Attempts have been made to recover that torpedo as a safety measure, but no success was achieved. In the UTAH berth area there is very, very deep mud and silt and I believe it had buried itself completely.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, in respect of Exhibits 30, 31, and 32, which are the original documents recovered from the submarine off Bellows Field, I understand it is your desire to leave these documents in the possession of CinCPac Headquarters.

Admiral HEWITT. That is true.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you desire further, Admiral, that any particular precaution be taken to preserve them?

Admiral HEWITT. I think that attention should be called to their condition and that special efforts should be made to preserve these documents as being of future value.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to the 7th of December, it was testified by Commander Wright, who was then assigned to the Communication Intelligence Unit, that radio bearings were received that day by the unit which were conflicting but that one bearing placed the attacking force as due north and that he transmitted that information to you. Will you tell us whether or not that was correct and, if so, what you recall about that report?

Captain LAYTON. On the morning of 7 December 1941, we received several bearings, commencing about 10 o'clock, from the direction finder, which gave two-way or bilateral bearings. They were in general either 357 or 178. These came from Heeia, whose communication to intelligence unit, Fourteenth Naval District, hadn't been completely disrupted. Some time in the afternoon and, as I recall it, it was about 2 o'clock, I [287] received a report to the effect that they had gotten a bearing with the CXK, the only direction finder that can make a unilateral or a one-way bearing and that that bearing was about 358 or 000. The CXK was at Lualualei, whose communications with Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, had been completely disrupted, and although that bearing had been obtained about 10 o'clock, it could not be transmitted by telephone or other means and was finally sent by officer messenger in a car to other location to be transmitted by telephone. It may have been brought all the way to Pearl Harbor by messenger; I don't know, but telephones were out all over. By that time we had received a series of bearings by the bilateral, that is, the one from Heeia, two ways, all the way from 350 to 180. We had received conflicting and very erroneous information that the carriers had been sighted to the south. When the bearing came through from the CXK as bearing north, it tended to confirm an overlay that had been furnished me by Colonel Raley, Hawaiian Air Force. This overlay was made from a navigation chart of a Japanese fighter that had

been shot down at Hickam Field and indicated radial lines radiating out from a position to the north of Oahu. This, of course, did not prove that they were north, but indicated, along with the CXK bearing, that they were to the north of Oahu. I communicated this information to the Assistant Operations Officer, then Commander Goode, who said all I had for him was bum dope. I believe that information was used for a late afternoon search by the only remaining planes, which, as I recall it, were two or three PBY's and one B-17. No contact was made.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I have no further questions for Captain Layton.

Admiral HEWITT. I would like to mention that incorrect report of the sighting of the carrier south of Barber's point.

[288] Captain LAYTON. I don't have any records on that, sir, because that came in by—there were several incorrect sighting reports that day. The Fleet Communication Officer knew that the Army command radio system was being used for sightings and combat intelligence. He designated an APD, the BALLARD, I believe, that was alongside the Sub Base dock to get on that circuit and pass to CinCPac Headquarters radio the information received on the Army command channel. It was soon apparent, although it didn't become apparent for some little time, that this was the greatest collection of erroneous, foolish, fantastic reports that was ever passed on a radio circuit, and until these were observed to be so fantastic, so exaggerated, and so imaginary—until this was discovered to be so, they were passed in plain language to our fleet at sea, and the communication log can be examined to get them in great detail. I recall they were transmitting that some six or eight transports and destroyers were off Barber's point and a cruiser and destroyer were sent over to knock them off. It was fantastic that they could get in without anybody seeing them, and they reported nothing there. They reported two cruisers, four or five transports and destroyers unloading troops, first wave now hitting the beach at Barber's Point, and again we sent the RALEIGH and some destroyers over, and again they reported nothing there, but in approaching those areas she had a torpedo fired at her, which lead to the rumor that that had been a Japanese trap. There were also reports that the Japanese had dropped paratroops on the north of the island and also that these paratroops were wearing blue coveralls with red insignia on the sleeves. I believe it was on that same circuit that we had a report that two aircraft carriers were bearing 200 degrees from Diamond Head, distant 200 and some odd miles, and ships were sent to search that area. We also had a report that was an [289] erroneous transmission from one of our vessels about the fact that he had two aircraft carriers in sight that was later corrected to have no aircraft carriers in sight. This may have been the vessel that was sent to investigate the previous report. I am not sure.

These reports are only a few of the conflicting and fantastic and highly imaginative reports that we received until they were evaluated as being what they were and we ceased to broadcast these to our fleet because it was causing them as much confusion as it was causing us. With these sorts of reports being passed into the Operations Division of CincPac, you can imagine that the Assistant Operations Officer

could well say "All you have is bum dope" when I told him that the bearing of the carriers was now reported as being to the north. That was just one more report that they had.

I would like to state in this connection that I have never received from the Army then or since as to what direction these planes were picked up on the radar or which direction they went out on the radar on the morning of 7 December, as I have read in the Roberts Report that such a report was made, and had we had a radar report to confirm which direction they came from or went to, all of our uncertainty as to their exact location would have been dispelled.

Admiral HEWITT. You never had any information from radar at all?

Captain LAYTON. I didn't even know they had the radar until I read the Roberts Report, Admiral. I didn't know the Army had the radar until I read the Roberts Report of the Pearl Harbor investigation.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you an original chart and ask you if you can identify it.

Captain LAYTON. This chart of the Island of Oahu, as showing best [290] landing beaches and gun emplacements, with their ranges, and having navigational or predicted navigational tracks with times and courses thereon, was also recovered from the midget submarine that beached itself or was beached on Bellows Field beach.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as Exhibit 33, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you if you can identify it as a true and correct copy of Exhibit 33.

Captain LAYTON. It is a true and correct copy except for the reproduction of colored pencil that the Japanese used. The time 0845 to the south and west of Barber's Point is in red. The time 0745 just below the course symbol 250 is in red. The position at the extension to the northeast of that line, which is in a position southeast of Pearl Harbor entrance channel, is also in red; that position is 0620. The position just to the left of 0620 is 0621 and is in blue. Just to the left of that and in blue and smudged is a position that is actually 0-30, but could be 0230 in blue. It is badly smudged from oil as these charts were all recovered from the oily bilges of the midget sub. Just to the south of the 0745 position in red is a 2230 position marked in blue. The translation says midget sub released at that position. Actually, it says "tube released"; so the tube may be the abbreviation or slang expression for the midget sub. The true translation, however, is "tube."

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the photograph, may we mark it "Exhibit 33A"?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[291] (The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33A.")

Captain LAYTON. Just south of Diamond Head crater is a position 0740 in blue; also marked in blue with a circle on the map is Lualualei radio towers, as is Hickam Field and Barber's Point light. There is a blue smudge just off Sand Island, but I do not believe it is a position.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you verify, Captain, the translations stated on Exhibit 33A, which is a photograph of Exhibit 99?

Captain LAYTON. With the exception noted of the word "tube" being used for a midget sub—it may be the slang expression for midget sub—the translation appears to be correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Calling your attention to the translation "got underway" appearing under the time 0745, can you state whether that is correct, or could it as well be translated "get underway"?

Captain LAYTON. My translation of this is "proceed" and it has no verb suffix, so could be "proceed," "proceeding," "to proceed."

Mr. SONNETT. That same problem of tense applies to the other translations, does it not, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. It does. Omitted near the position Kualiki is the Japanese saying "four barracks." There is some Japanese referring to a circle of the Ewa Plantation area which is badly smudged and does not lend itself to good translation. It is noted on this chart that there are four course lines laid, three approaching Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. They are 45 degrees, 40 degrees, and 331 degrees, and the retiring course from the Pearl Harbor channel buoys is shown as 151. The course to the east from the 0621 position in blue, passing through the 0740 position in blue, is 107 degrees and passes Diamond Head Peak 3,600 meters abeam.

[292] Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I note on this Exhibit 33 that there are some words in English, as well as on previous Exhibit 32. Were those words on the exhibits when you received them?

Captain LAYTON. They were. The English words written in lead pencil on this exhibit are all believed to have been written by the Japanese owner and were on there when it came in my possession. On the translation in a position just to the southwest of Barber's Point is the legend "midget sub?" This on the original is written in large characters and says "tubes five" or "five tubes," which we assumed to mean five midget subs. The 0845 position I referred to, in red, is a navigational position about a mile and a half southwest of Barber's Point light and is connected to a position near the 0745 position in red by a line in lead pencil.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may the record show that Exhibits 30, 31, 32, and 33, which are the original documents obtained from the submarine, are being turned back to Captain Layton?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Have you got anything further now?

Mr. SONNETT. No, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much, Captain.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:55 p. m., adjourned until 1:30 p. m., 31 May 1945.)

[293] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWELFTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 1:30 p. m., Thursday, 31 May 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Charles H. McMorris, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it appears from the previous investigations that from February, 1941, until the end of 1941 you were the War Plans Officer for CincPac, is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a pamphlet, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify what that is, and, if so, I will ask you to read certain portions of it into the record.

Vice Admiral McMorris. This pamphlet is entitled "Staff Instructions, Staff of CincPac, 1941."

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar with that, Admiral, at the time?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Presumably so.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 34.")

[294] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to the provisions of this exhibit, which is exhibit 34, which contain the definitions of the duties of the War Plans Officer, and ask if you would read those into the record. I believe it is paragraph 207.

Vice Admiral McMorris (reading):

207. *War Plans Officer*—16.

(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.

(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.

(c) Member of Schedule Board.

(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.

(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters—via District Commandant if appropriate.

(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.

(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.

(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.

(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Does that accord, Admiral, with your recollection of your duties as War Plans Officer for CincPac?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a document entitled "U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five, (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46)" and ask you if you can identify that as a copy of the Pacific [295] Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 35.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 35, which is the exhibit you have just identified, it appears, does it not, that on page 24 the tasks assigned by the Navy Basic Plan are outlined?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And among those tasks, Admiral, is sub-paragraph (h), which I would like to ask you to read into the record.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS (reading) :

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the phrase "territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area" included Hawaii, did it?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 25 and to page 26 of this exhibit, Admiral, it appears that the tasks formulated by the Pacific Fleet to accomplish the assigned missions are set forth, are they not?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Those tasks, Admiral, of the Pacific Fleet are divided into Phase I—Initial Tasks—Japan not in the war; and Phase IA—Initial Tasks—Japan in the war. There is also a Phase II containing succeeding tasks?

[296] Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you read into the record from Phase I of the Initial Tasks subdivisions (b), (g), and (m) ?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. (reading) :

(b) Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

(b) Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.

(m) Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Mr. SONNETT. Does sub-paragraph (m), Admiral, contemplate that a surprise attack by Japan against Hawaii should be guarded against as a task of the Pacific Fleet?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, a carbon copy of a letter dated September 9, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-

mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and ask you whether you can identify it.

Vice Admiral McMorris. This is a copy of a letter which approves Pacific Fleet Operation Plan Rainbow Five, WPPac-46.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the letter as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36.")

Mr. SONNETT. Can you also identify, Admiral, a letter of July 25, 1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations on the same subject?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a letter submitting [297] Pacific Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow Five to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as exhibit 36A, Admiral, and substitute a copy? There is a carbon annexed to that.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36A.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to paragraph 5 of exhibit 36A, Admiral, do you know the basis for the statements made in that paragraph, and, if so, would you state the basis for the statements?

Vice Admiral McMorris. The primary offensive operations as required by the Departmental Plan were for offensive operations in the Marshall Islands with a view to causing the Japanese to withhold as much of their force as possible from operations in the South China Sea. That paragraph pointed out certain handicaps that would exist in carrying out those operations. It expressed concern particularly as to the limited number of destroyers and other anti-submarine vessels. It also noted that transports weren't available to carry assault and occupying forces to the positions that might be attacked or seized, and it also pointed out a lack of suitably trained and equipped Marine forces for such operations. There was no doubt in my mind at that time that the deficiencies mentioned were very real and that while they wouldn't prevent the operations directed, they would make their execution extremely difficult and far more hazardous than would be the case if the deficiencies could be rectified.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 23 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which consists of Annex number VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District, 1939, dated 28 March 1941, and also consists of Addendum I to [298] Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941, and ask you whether or not you can identify those.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel that these can be identified as the papers which those headings purport them to be.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether you reviewed those papers at or about the dates which they bear or at some subsequent time?

Vice Admiral McMorris. While I now have no specific recollection that I reviewed these particular papers, by their very nature I entertain no doubt that I did review them.

Mr. SONNETT. Particularly, Admiral. I take it, in view of the fact that the review of such plans of subordinate commanders was one of your regular duties as War Plans Officer?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Those were part of my regular duties and, recollecting very definitely the duties in that connection, I know I did see a number of such papers and had many discussions of this and kindred subjects. I feel it would be virtually impossible for such a paper to have been issued without my having seen it.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the second of those two papers, that is, Addendum I, you will note that it contains a so-called "Summary of the Situation." Will you examine that and state whether your own summary of the situation at that time was in accord with the summary contained in the exhibit?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is substantially correct.

Mr. SONNETT. May we read that into the record, Admiral, for the sake of clarity of the record, at this point?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[299] Mr. SONNETT (reading):

1. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

Admiral, the reference to Orange in the Summary of the Situation is to Japan, is it not?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to page 3 of that Addendum, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and (c) and (d) under Possible Enemy Action and ask if you would examine that to see whether that accorded with your own estimate of the situation at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. That section indicated possible enemy actions. To that I subscribed in a greater or less degree. I did not subscribe to some of those possibilities as being probable. In fact, I personally felt they might be quite improbable.

Mr. SONNETT. Again, Admiral, for the sake of clarity of the record, may we read in those four?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT (reading):

III. *Possible Enemy Action.*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

[300] (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

Admiral, while we are on the same subject, let me also refer to the last sub-paragraph under Possible Enemy Action and read that to you so that we may have your comments concerning that as well.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

Now, Admiral, you indicated previously that you felt that the possible enemy action as set forth in this exhibit was not probable at or about the time of this exhibit in March of 1941?

[301] Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you agree with the estimate in paragraph (a) 2 to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor"?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I agreed with the thought there expressed, but considered such an attack more probable, much more probable, in the approaches to Pearl Harbor rather than in Pearl Harbor itself.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which purports to be Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask if you can identify that.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a Fleet Letter issued at that time concerning the security of the fleet at the base and in the operating areas.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that that would have come under your official cognizance as War Plans Officer for review?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I recall reviewing this. It was prepared in the Operations Division, but a paper of this nature would unquestionably have been reviewed by myself, and while I have at this time no specific recollection of the details in preparation, I do recall that some of the earlier drafts were modified in accordance with suggestions made by myself.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the document before you, there are two assumptions set forth, are there not, upon which the plan was predicated?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read, Admiral, assumption 2 (b) into the record?

[302] Vice Admiral McMorris (reading):

2. (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:
 - (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
 - (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
 - (3) a combination of these two.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Admiral, at or about that time, namely, October 14, 1941, agree with assumption 2 (b), which you have just read?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 15 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated November 24, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated November 27, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, also to exhibit 19 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is an OpNav dispatch of November 27, 1941, and ask you whether you recall having seen that dispatch at or about that time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, I believe you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that no formal written estimate of the situation was maintained during this period of late November and early December, 1941, but that a mental estimate was maintained, is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your estimate of the situation and of possible courses of enemy action during the period November 27 to December 6, 1941?

[303] Vice Admiral McMorris. It is not possible now to give with too great a degree of exactness the deductions and estimate made at that time, but substantially I estimated that the Japanese were on the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. Somewhat earlier I had estimated that they would take such action with the expectation that the United States, unless attacked, would not enter the war in support of Great Britain, and that the Japanese were likely to proceed on the assumption that the American people would be unwilling to support a war that to them would appear primarily for the defense of Great Britain's colonies. By the time in question, however, I had come to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling to leave their line of communications abreast the Philippines exposed to American attack in case the United States did determine to come into the war.

I estimated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct possibility, but were even probable.

As our defenses at Guam were negligible and as the construction work at Wake was not very far advanced, I estimated that measures would be taken by the Japanese to seize those positions when they

initiated the war. As the defenses of Midway were markedly stronger than those at the other two places mentioned and as the Japanese were probably familiar with the details thereof, I estimated that heavy raids on that place were initially probable, but that immediate efforts towards seizure were far less likely.

I estimated that there were likely to be heavy submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto. I believed that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces operating at sea and that there was likelihood of attempts being made to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel. It seemed not unlikely that the war might be [304] initiated by an attempt to torpedo a valuable ship making ingress or egress to Pearl Harbor Channel.

I estimated that vigorous enemy submarine activity would take place in the approaches to our important Pacific Coast ports.

Those are the highlights of the estimate at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, was it your estimate also at that time, namely, after the receipt of the so-called war warning of November 27th, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility but not in your opinion a probability?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That expresses the view that I had.

Mr. SONNETT. What action, Admiral, was taken as a result of the war warning of November 27th and of your estimate which you have just stated?

Vice Admiral McMorris. As I now recall, there was considerable discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff as to action to be taken and determination was reached that the naval organization was already substantially on a war footing and no material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area. There was considerable discussion as to continuation or modification of training schedules, and the conclusion was reached that it was essential that the training continue until it was necessary to move the principal elements of the fleet for offensive operations. It had been determined before that reconnaissance in force would be made into the Marshalls as a preliminary towards seizure of positions therein with the utmost celerity when war came.

The limitations in supplies and facilities at Wake and Midway, as well as certain island outposts, had precluded stationing there requisite defensive forces until such action became virtually mandatory. This applied particularly to defensive aircraft. The only two carriers in the Hawaiian [305] area were dispatched to those places, with fighter aircraft, one going to Wake, the other to Midway. They were accompanied by cruisers and destroyers on those expeditions.

Consideration was given to sending other additional personnel to those places and consideration was also given to the withdrawal of civilian personnel who were working under contractors and developing the defenses of those two places.

It was determined, all things considered, that the best thing to do was to consider the construction work and that existing limitations of the two islands would not permit increase in personnel. It is my recollection that some small number of men and certain specialized equipment were dispatched to Wake, but it is possible that the ship carrying those elements sailed before the receipt of this dispatch.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, conferences or conversations were had, Admiral, between you and Admiral Kimmel during this period of November 27th on concerning reconnaissance from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I have no specific recollection in that connection, but during this period, this was a matter that was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and myself and with the two of us and the other members of the staffs and with other senior naval officers present in Pearl Harbor. The details I no longer remember, but I do recall some of the considerations that were in mind and, in general, the action determined upon. The number of patrol planes here was small. Certain of them were earmarked for advancement to Midway and at appropriate time to Wake for support and assistance in the reconnaissance of the Marshalls at an appropriate time. My recollection is that about this time there was some augmentation of the number of patrol craft at Midway.

[306] In case war should start, most of the fleet shore-based aircraft were to be moved to the island outposts, Midway, Johnston, and Wake, but since the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier had no aircraft of its own, some of the fleet aircraft were to remain under the operational control of the Coastal Frontier Command.

In order that the patrol craft might be ready for prompt movements to distant service where repair and upkeep facilities were limited or negligible, it was deemed highly important that as many as possible be kept ready for flight on short notice and not tie up an undue number requiring engine overhaul because of excessive use.

At this time the patrol wings in the Navy as a whole were being increased and the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in giving essential advanced operational training. After discussion and consideration, the determination was reached to continue the training as much as possible.

It was belived by myself and, I believe, generally by other officers that entered into the discussions that it was highly important to maintain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas.

Considering the requirements for anti-submarine patrols, the necessity for maintaining patrol aircraft in prompt readiness for distant service, and considering the impelling necessity for continuation of the training program, it was determined that the arrangements that were actually in effect were the best that we could do. This in effect accepted a calculated risk. Subsequent events proved that the calculations weren't good. Calculations at the time, however, did show that only very limited sectors could be continually patrolled with the forces then available. It may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness of search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the approach of the Japanese carriers on the morning of [307] 7 December would have been detected as the arc of their approach would quite possibly have been unguarded.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the various considerations concerning air reconnaissance which you have just described were, I take it, your own considerations at the time?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes, I think so. I might say that with the passage of time and various discussions of this matter, it is sometimes difficult to say whether those specific things were in your mind at that time or that possibly other considerations were in mind in ad-

dition. I feel safe in saying, however, that while the considerations which I have just mentioned are my best recollection now, it is not only possible but highly probable that they were in my mind at that time and were voiced in discussions with the Commander-in-Chief and with others concerned.

Mr. SONNETT. It is the fact, Admiral, I take it, that you do not recall any formal conference or detailed discussion with the Commander-in-Chief on that subject?

Vice Admiral McMorris. It would be better to say that it was not a practice to have formal conferences. There was not a formal conference, but there were numerous conferences and discussions, and while I cannot say that this specific question was the subject of any one conference, it undoubtedly was a matter that was discussed during this period, and the action taken was after consideration and evaluation of the factors involved in the light of information and circumstances that existed at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am trying to get at, Admiral, is you have no independent recollection of any specific discussion with Admiral Kimmel after November 27th on the subject, but you feel it must have been discussed?

[308] Vice Admiral McMorris. While I have no specific recollection as to time or date or subject matter of a conference, I can say definitely that during this period this subject matter was discussed between myself and others and the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you tell us what Admiral Kimmel said at any such discussion, Admiral, concerning reconnaissance from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMorris. No, I cannot, but manifestly the conclusions that he reached did not result in any distant search being maintained, but rather that the search at the time was against submarines in localized areas.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, any discussion with Admiral Kimmel after the war warning of November 27th and prior to December 7th concerning a projected reconnaissance flight by the Army over the Mandated Islands?

Vice Admiral McMorris. No, I do not. I do recall that General Martin was very loathe to have the fighter aircraft over water at all, and while I do not recall any discussion of Army flights over the Mandated Islands, it doesn't mean that such discussions may not have taken place, but certainly no action was ever taken leading to anything of that sort; so that, if such discussion did take place, it must have been concluded that such would be unfeasible.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, which is a memorandum from Captain Layton to the Admiral on November 28, 1941, and ask you whether, after examining it, it refreshes your recollection at all concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance.

Vice Admiral McMorris. That does refresh my recollection to some extent because I was thinking at the time in terms of visual reconnaissance by a number of planes. I do now vaguely recall some discussion with regard to photo reconnaissance, but the recollection is vague in the extreme.

[309] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall the extent of the sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes available during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is a question that cannot be categorically answered. Various combinations of diagrams were given consideration and had a search been determined upon, it would of necessity finally been based on the radius of flights and how long a period of time the searches would continue and whether or not matters of training and engine overhaul would be completely ignored. As a practical measure, had such searches been instituted at all, they undoubtedly would have been a compromise among the different features involved, just as a compromise was actually reached in limiting the searches to the fleet operating areas.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you stated a moment ago that various diagrams were given consideration. When and by whom were they considered?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That I cannot now answer. There were undoubtedly some drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the Aviation Officer, possibly or even probably by the Operations Division. I do not recall whether any were brought over by the patrol wing commander. The extent to which any were directly presented to the Commander-in-Chief or which he may have noted within my office or the Operations Office, I cannot now answer.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral Bellinger was the Air Officer at that time, was he not, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMorris. He was in command of the patrol wing of the fleet that was stationed here at that time, and the senior naval officer in the patrol craft.

Mr. SONNETT. He testified, Admiral, before the Naval Court of Inquiry [310] that during the period in question, November 27, 1941, on, continuous daily patrol could have been flown by dividing the combat crews into three groups, using twenty planes daily and covering 144°, which could have been continued for an undetermined number of days. Does that accord with your recollection as to the capabilities for reconnaissance during that period?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I would say that that wouldn't be far wrong if that were the only consideration to be given, namely, to running a search, but the Commander-in-Chief had not only that consideration to weigh, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for distant service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being built.

Mr. SONNETT. How many naval aircraft were available at that time at Oahu? Do you recall, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation, which consists of a series of photostats of a document entitled "Communication Intelligence Summaries" and I direct your attention to those particularly for the period 27 November 1941 to 5 December 1941 and ask you whether you recall having seen those at the time.

Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall being familiar with information of that general nature at that time, that frequently I did not myself read them but heard them either read or orally presented by Captain Layton, and I judge that those are the principal intelligence information that was available at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the summary for November 30, 1941, Admiral, and to the lower left-hand corner, is that your initial?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I don't know. It may well be.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recognize the initial in the lower right-hand corner?

[311] Vice Admiral McMorris. That appears to be Admiral Kimmel's initial. I certainly had access to all such material at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to the initial on the 23 November 1941 summary at the lower left-hand corner and ask you whether that is your initial.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Probably.

Mr. SONNETT. And to the one for November 22, 1941, Admiral, the lower left-hand corner.

Vice Admiral McMorris. The same comment holds. That is probably my initial.

Mr. SONNETT. Is that also true of the one for November 30th, Admiral, that it probably is your initial, or aren't you sure about it?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, that is probably.

Mr. SONNETT. In the November 30th summary, Admiral, it is indicated, is it not, that the radio intelligence unit was of the opinion that there was a Japanese carrier in the Mandates?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, discussion did you have with Admiral Kimmel concerning that belief?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not now recall any. It is quite possible, however, that discussion did occur.

Mr. SONNETT. Would it be an accurate statement, Admiral, to say that you had received during that period either these communication intelligence summaries or the substance of them?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That would be accurate.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation, which consists of photostats of various dispatches, and refer you particularly to the dispatch of ComFOURTEEN of 26 November and ask whether you recall having seen that at the time.

[312] Vice Admiral McMorris. I have now no independent recollection of that message, but would say that I probably did see it at the time. I almost surely saw it at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. That indicates, Admiral, does it not, that there was believed to be, among other things, at least one carrier division unit in the Marshalls?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you, Admiral, exhibit 23 of this investigation, which is a memorandum of December 1, 1941, from Lieutenant Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, to the Admiral, and ask you whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Again I now have no independent recollection of seeing that, but would say it is improbable that I did not see it.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that on or about December 1, 1941, there was a change in the service calls of the Japanese fleet?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I remember that about that time there was a change in their call signs.

Mr. SONNETT. And do you further recall that in the succeeding days prior to the attack there was a blank of information as to the Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that specific information was lacking, but my general impression now is that we believed at the time that we had a fairly good idea of the general location of the major elements of the Japanese fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Where did you, during the period November 27th to December 6, 1941, believe the Japanese carriers were, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Again, it is difficult to say what the specific beliefs were at that time, but generally in home waters or towards Formosa.

[313] Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the communication intelligence summaries, exhibit 22, will you point out where in those summaries is the information on which you based that belief?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Before looking, I may say that it may or may not be specifically in here.

Mr. SONNETT. I should add, Admiral, if it is not there, would you state whatever the information was on which you based the belief?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Nor would I be able to answer a question of that nature.

To answer the question now would be an attempt to take the record here and justify the conclusion reached. The information is at best vague. It would take a considerable number of quotations to give them as they come.

24 November:

Large numbers of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC Third Fleet.

25 November:

One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

26 November:

The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC Second and Third Fleets in particular. . . . Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share.

[314] Again on the 26th of November:

The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at its high level.

27 November:

Bako addressed the Chief of Staff, Third Fleet, information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five dispatches to the major commanders.

Same date:

COMBINED FLEET—There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

Again:

THIRD FLEET—Still holding extensive communication with Bako, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo-China. . . . There is nothing to indicate any movements of the Third Fleet as yet.

28 November:

Tokyo originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. . . . The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet, and RNO Palao.

Again, same date:

COMBINED FLEET—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet originated his usual number of dispatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, were Crudivs 5 and 7 and Desrons 2 and 4 and Subron 5. No traffic today from the Takao (CA).

[315] Again, same date:

THIRD FLEET—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander-in-Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in Sasebo but it is not yet located elsewhere. * * * Two Third Fleet units arrived at Bako and are apparently returning to Kure from Bako.

29 November:

Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, sent one message to Comdesron 5, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesrons 2 and 4. He held extensive communications with the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet and Bako. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

30 November:

One urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force.

30 November:

No information obtained as to the location of the Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

1 December:

FIRST FLEET—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire Waters.

SECOND FLEET—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area.

THIRD FLEET—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces continues.

[316] 2 December:

SECOND FLEET—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

Same date:

THIRD FLEET—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

CARRIERS—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

3 December :

The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same addressees.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takeo the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

4 December :

There were a large number of urgent messages today, [317] most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven-part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

Same date :

The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force, Palao, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet.

5 December :

Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen, either.

6 December :

Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the major commanders.

[318] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, as to the 6th of December summary, I would like to call your attention to a pencilled note at the bottom which indicates that that summary was not received until after the attack. I just wondered whether you could confirm that or not, or whether you have any recollection of it.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I have no recollection.

Mr. SONNETT. I also would like to refer you, Admiral, back to the December 3rd intelligence summary, which closes with the statement, "No information on submarines or Carriers."

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, may I show you exhibit 21 of this investigation, a photostat of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin number 45-41, and ask you whether you saw that on or about that date?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. It is highly probable that I did during that period.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 1 of the bulletin, do you recall the following statement:

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, ONI Serial number 27-41, supersedes and revises the former report on this subject,

The subject being the organization of the Japanese fleet.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and sea-plane tenders into separate forces and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China.

And then the major fleet commands are listed, the seventh being the carrier fleet, aircraft carriers of five carrier divisions.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Item 7, just to avoid confusion, because they give the numbers of those.

[319] Mr. SONNETT. Right, sir; item 7 listed as the carrier. Do you recall having had that information, Admiral, at that time?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel sure I must have had it.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring back to page 8, Admiral, of the bulletin, there is set forth, is there not, the composition of the Japanese carrier fleet?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes. It indicates here ten carriers and sixteen destroyers.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, is it the fact, Admiral, that after December 1, 1941, and prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, you had no intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of those carriers?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Of a carrier fleet as such we did not, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any information concerning the movements of any of the carriers of the Japanese carrier fleet after December 1, 1941?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Not specifically.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any in general? If so, what?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Without now being able to indicate anything specific, the general organization as set forth in the paper in question was to a large extent a type organization, and while there was a lack of reference to specific carriers or to carriers as a whole, I did not reach a conclusion that they were operating independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Admiral, reach the conclusion that, as stated in these communication intelligence summaries, after December 1, 1941, there was no information as to the carriers?

[320] Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that during that period there were one or two vague indications associating them with the Second and Third Fleets, which was logical, and some possible associations with Palao, and at least one instance with the Marshalls.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Admiral, referring to exhibit 23, which is now Captain Layton's estimate of December 1, 1941, of the location of the Japanese fleet, do you find any reference in that estimate to the location of Carrier Divisions Three and Four of the Japanese fleet?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I note under "Kure-Sasebo" in red pencil "Four CV." I note under heading "CinC 2nd Fleet with units at

Takao" Cardivs 3 and 4, and I note under the summation four CV at that place. I note under "Marshall Area" one CV.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to exhibit 21, that indicates on page 8 Carrier Division One of the Japanese fleet consisted of the AKAGI and the KAGA and Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and HIRYU. Do you find in the December 1st estimate by Captain Layton, exhibit 23, any indication as to the location of any of the four carriers comprising Carrier Divisions One and Two?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I do not find in that paper the names of any specific ships, carriers or otherwise.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find on page 3, Admiral, under "Bako-Takao area" Carrier Division Four and Carrier Division Three?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find any place in the paper Carrier Division One or Carrier Division Two?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No.

[321] Mr. SONNETT. Did you participate, Admiral, in any conference with Admiral Kimmel concerning the December 1st estimate of Captain Layton?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I do not recall, but if there were a discussion on that, it is improbable that I would not have been present.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I take it, Admiral, you recall no specific discussion of the lack of information concerning Carrier Divisions One and Two of the Japanese fleet on or about December 1, 1941, and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I do not so recall, but I do recall that during that general period, the information as to locations of Japanese fleet units far from as specific as was desired, but I do not recall that lack of information, taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand, that we were extremely disturbed.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring back to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court record, the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, I should like to call your attention to the following portion of that dispatch:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

I should like further to call your attention to the Initial Tasks of the Pacific Fleet and in particular items "b," "g," and "m" of the Phase I initial tasks, to be taken when Japan was not in the war, and to ask you what was done by way of a deployment preparatory to carrying out those tasks. I will read them again so that you will have them clearly in mind. (Reading):

b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the [322] Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

The question, Admiral, is—

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I know the question.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the war warning, what appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out those tasks was executed?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That question has in effect been answered in my reply in this testimony to an earlier question regarding that dispatch. In substance there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movements of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the language which I have quoted from the war warning dispatch was a direction, was it not?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, then, that it was your view that either you had already in effect an appropriate defensive deployment or that what you had in effect on November 27th plus the steps you mentioned amounted to an appropriate defensive deployment. Is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct, and in addition thereto, considering the other tasks assigned in case of war, the direction to take defensive dispositions carried with it the implication that offensive dispositions weren't to be taken. The primary offensive task of the [322] Pacific Fleet, and one that in my view would require very prompt action, was employment of our forces against the Marshalls in order to force the Japanese to withhold a portion of their forces from operations against Malaysia.

This so-called war warning order, mentioning specifically "defensive" dispositions, was issued while important conversations were going on in Washington with a view to prevention of war. It seems clearly to indicate that our forces should not be exposed in the Marshall area or close approaches thereto preparatory to an assault, as detection there might prejudice efforts to maintain peace. Since the fleet was in effect cautioned against offensive dispositions, by specific directives to take defensive dispositions, and since the fleet had to a large extent been already disposed in a defensive manner, it was felt that the directive in question was being complied with.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to the fact that the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet contained in Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five were divided into two phases: Phase I, Japan not in the war, and Phase IA, Japan in the war; and that Phase I did not provide for any raid or any offensive action toward the Marshalls or elsewhere, but did provide for protecting the communications and territory of the associated powers, the prevention of the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and also provided for guarding against surprise attack by Japan.

What specific deployment was made to accomplish those tasks?

Vice Admiral McMorris. The disposition of the major portion of the fleet in Hawaiian rather than in coastal waters was a major action [323] in that regard. The reenforcement hitherto mentioned for Midway and Wake were elements of that disposition. The employment of the fleet units underway at sea and the Hawaiian area with appropriate screens and with patrol of the area by patrol aircraft were other elements of that disposition. The maintenance of a full supply of ammunition and the requirement that all ships at all times must have a certain minimum quantity of fuel on board (my recollec-

tion is that that requirement was seventy per cent, although it may have varied somewhat with the class of the ships) was a supporting act to make the dispositions effective.

Mr. SONNETT. It would, Admiral, have been an appropriate move, would it not, in order to accomplish the initial task "m," namely, guard against surprise attack by Japan, to have established an air patrol from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, that would have been an appropriate act, but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court's record, the so-called war warning, it started out, did it not, by stating:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment, et cetera, and language that we quoted before.

[325] Now, had you received a dispatch prior to that time stating that this was a war warning or that an aggressive move was expected, other than the dispatch of November 24th, which stated in part, "... a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility"?

Vice Admiral McMorris. We had received no communication which used the term, "This is a war warning." However, in January of 1941, while I was under orders to duty as War Plans Officer, Pacific Fleet, but before I had reported as such and before Admiral Kimmel had assumed command, I did participate in a conference with Admiral Richardson, then the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer and with Admiral Kimmel and with the Chiefs of Staff of the two admirals mentioned, concerning the probability of war with Japan; and throughout the year until 7 December there were various communications by letter and by dispatch and by interchange of personal letters between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, regarding the probability of war with Japan; and the situation was tense throughout the year, so much so that the dispatch in question occasioned no surprise, nor did it convey any considerable amount of additional or startling information.

Mr. SONNETT. The conference to which you refer just before you reported as War Plans Officer, I take it, occurred in late January or early February of 1941, Admiral?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Late January, 1941, and as a result thereof a joint letter was sent by Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you at that time see the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 24, 1941, which was exhibit 9 before the Naval [326] Court of Inquiry, a copy of which I now show you?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I saw that letter in late January or early February, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Did the statements of the Secretary of the Navy in the letter, which I will now read in part, accord with your own views?

(Reading:)

If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. . . .

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Vice Admiral McMorris I had no fault to find with the views expressed therein, although not completely in accord as to the elements of danger as listed in importance there.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you also in accord with the statement of the then Secretary of the Navy, which I will quote: "The countermeasures to be considered are: (a) location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched," and the further statement referring to (a) as follows: "The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet, but quite possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war"?

[327] Vice Admiral McMorris. Those views appeared to be sound.

Mr. SONNETT. And I take it, Admiral, from your previous testimony that certainly as late as October 14, 1941, when the fleet security letter was issued, you still thought that an air attack was possible although you were of the view that it was not probable?

Vice Admiral McMorris. I felt that an air attack was possible but not probable and that the fleet should not take as its sole object of existence the defense of itself against a surprise attack, but that it should also carry on other fundamental duties.

Mr. SONNETT. Those duties, Admiral, were the duties we referred to before, set forth in the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, were they not?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, and with reference to that plan, I presume that that included the training and otherwise readying of itself for operations, but whether or not those duties are specifically indicated there, they would be implicit in any orders or plans that might be issued.

Mr. SONNETT. In that connection, Admiral, I call your attention to initial task "k" of the Phase I tasks, reading, "Continue training operations as practicable."

It is the fact, Admiral, or it was the fact, as you earlier testified, that patrols, or aircraft reconnaissance rather, was being conducted from Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period, November 27, 1941, on, was it not?

Vice Admiral McMorris. Only to a very limited extent. The aircraft that were at the outlying bases other than Midway were entirely defensive. The aircraft at Midway were partially defensive and par-

tially [328] for patrol. The amount of gas and the upkeep facilities at Midway were extremely limited and necessitated the utmost conservation of the available supplies and of the aircraft themselves in order that engines might not be worn out before a critical period arose. Again, it may be remarked in passing that had the maximum search been instituted from Midway and Pearl Harbor on the 27th of November warning, the situation with regard to aircraft engines by the 7th of December would have been in a highly critical situation.

Mr. SONNETT. By the first week in December, 1941, Admiral, you had had, of course, the war warning and you knew that Japanese forces were on the move, according to intelligence, and you also knew that the Japanese were destroying codes and the like, as I recall your previous testimony; is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. You also knew, I take it, Admiral, and were aware of the fact that the Japanese in the past had attacked without declaration of war and indeed your security orders and war plans were based on an assumption that they might do that, is that correct?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. The factors which you have mentioned were constantly in the mind of myself and, I am sure, were in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that one of the things that you were thinking about during that first week of December was the proposed reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands, which was one of the tasks set forth in Phase IA of the Pacific Fleet Plan, is that correct?

[329] Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct. During that period, I daily, or at most on alternate days, furnished the Commander-in-Chief an informal typed memo of the action that I felt should be taken by the important elements of the fleet if war ensued in the ensuing twenty-four hours.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibits 69A and 69B of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether those are the memoranda to which you referred.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. These are typical, but I believe there were additional ones.

Mr. SONNETT. Those are dated, Admiral, November 30th and December 5, 1941, respectively, are they not?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any provision made in those for reconnaissance from Oahu?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Admiral, to task "g" of Phase IA of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet—that is, the Phase IA tasks are those to be taken initially when Japan is in the war—which reads as follows: "Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases." Why was no provision made for carrying out that task?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. There was actually in effect in Oahu patrols against enemy forces, but the patrol was against submarines, which was regarded as the greatest element of danger. On the institution or commencement of war, certain of the patrol craft were to

pass to the [330] operational control of the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and such searches would have been conducted by him. However, the number of such aircraft so assigned was very small and it was expected that they would largely be used for anti-submarine patrols as was in effect at the time. Although the operations of that nature were under the general supervision and direction of the Operations Division rather than the Plans Division of the Staff, I was fully aware of what was being done and was completely in accord and had given the weight of my advice in that direction to the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. SONNETT. In advising the Commander-in-Chief during the critical period of 1941, did you evaluate and consider at any length the intelligence information showing that you had no information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers from December 1st on?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. Certainly the negative as well as the positive information available entered into the conclusions.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. In your testimony before one of the previous investigations you stated that in your opinion the island defense was adequate and in case of an air attack the chance to inflict damage was small. The question arose in my mind as to what you based that opinion on.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. It might be somewhat difficult to give the train of thought that led to those conclusions, but I felt that with the defenses here, with the anti-aircraft power and with the fighter strength, that a large proportion of the attacking planes would be destroyed and that the accuracy of the bombing would be such that no large number of [331] hits would be obtained. Notwithstanding the success of the British attack at Taranto (I believed there were peculiar conditions that existed there), I did not believe that there was a serious hazard from aerial torpedo attack in Pearl because of the necessity for attacking planes to come very low. I believed that a considerable proportion of them would be destroyed by AA fire, aside from the local fighter protection, and that the shallowness of the water and the short distance the torpedoes would have to run would mean that the torpedoes themselves would not inflict great damage. Manifestly, my conclusions were entirely wrong in all those respects. They were reached, however, from reading available information and acquaintance with the torpedo performance in our own Navy.

Admiral HEWITT. Did you have any knowledge as to the readiness of the Army anti-aircraft defenses, whether they were actually alerted and occupied their positions?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No.

Admiral HEWITT. But your assumption was that they were in readiness?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. That is correct, and perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent there. I had been around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I knew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their anti-aircraft practices and knew the quantity and general disposition of

their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely together as a more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state [332] of readiness being maintained or of the watches being kept.

Admiral HEWITT. It was brought out in the other investigations that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were very cordial and they saw each other frequently and kept each other informed as well as possible. I wonder whether that extended down to elements of the staff, whether there was much interchange of information.

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. I think there was such interchange of information rather habitually on an informal basis. I myself not infrequently saw members of General Short's staff. I know that General Martin, I believe, and Admiral Bellinger had not infrequent meetings; perhaps they shouldn't be characterized as conferences. I know that there had been called for the morning of the 8th of December a meeting between a number of General Short's officers and District officers to meet with Captain DeLany, who was the Operations Officer at the time, at his call to see if there could be brought about an improvement with regard to communications and arrangements for coordination in meeting attack. I cite those things merely as illustrative. There was a considerable amount of interchange of information and discussion with one another. At that time it is certain the two services acted semi-independently, but the local plan of defense, which Admiral Kimmel had approved, had been drawn up by the Commander of the Hawaiian Department's staff and by the Commander of the Sea Frontier's staff.

Before I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, I was Operations Officer for Admiral Andrews, who was the Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment, and was Senior Officer Present in the Hawaiian area until the fleet came out in 1940 some time. During that period, I frequently visited Fort Shafter, the military establishments in Hawaii, and discussed defensive [333] plans with the Planning Officer of the District Commandant. I witnessed a number of firings by Army elements. On more than one occasion the G-3 officer of the Department was my guest at our own firings, and after I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, that association continued, and I feel that I was not exceptional in having contact with the Army personnel on their problems.

Admiral HEWITT. When you discussed the considerations of the principal danger being from submarines, that would apply to ships in the operating areas and to ships entering and leaving the port, but would not apply to the ships inside the harbor?

Vice Admiral McMORRIS. No, sir, it did not apply to ships inside the harbor. There had been considerable fear that submarines lying outside the channel entrance might sink a ship in the entrance and consideration was given to defensive mining and to the establishment of listening posts a little farther offshore. The thought of defensive mining was abandoned because the shelf was narrow and there was a fair amount of current along there. Almost every one reached the same conclusion that the defensive mines would be more hazardous than the submarine menace might be. And there was grave concern over the lack of anti-submarine craft either in numbers or in types.

Nonetheless, it was felt that the chance of a submarine getting within Pearl Harbor was very, very remote. Actually, of course, when the time came about, we found we were unduly complacent.

Admiral HEWITT. Well, the submarines that got in Pearl Harbor weren't sea-going submarines; they were midgets.

Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct, sir. That was our first acquaintance with the midgets.

[334] Admiral HEWITT. I think that is all I have. I want to thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 5:20 p. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., 2 June 1945.)



[335] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

THIRTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:45 a. m., 2 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Beacher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH. William W. Smith, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you were Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941, to December 7, 1941, were you not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 34 of this investigation and ask you whether you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. This is Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet, issued July 14, 1941, signed by me.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, that was issued by you on or about July 14, 1941, with Admiral Kimmel's approval, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the purpose of the instructions, I take it, was to summarize the duties of various members of the staff of CincPac?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you examine, Admiral, paragraph 112 on page 1 and read paragraph 112 into the record?

[336] Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer, Admiral, to paragraph 200 on page 3 and similarly read that into the record?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

200. CHIEF OF STAFF—01—Personal Aide.

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785—786.)

(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.

(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.

(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.

(e) Signs correspondence as follows:

(1) Routine Matters.

(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.

- (3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
- (4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
- (5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.
- (6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers.

[337] Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 35 in this investigation and ask you if you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what it is, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, otherwise known as WPPac-46.

Mr. SONNETT. That was distributed to the fleet on or about July 25, 1941, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it was.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 36, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in which the Chief of Naval Operations states that he has reviewed the subject plan of exhibit 35 and accepts it.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that in accordance with your duties you supervised, at least generally, the preparation of the war plan, exhibit 35, and that you were familiar with its provisions.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I had very little to do with the preparation of it, but I did supervise it and read it before it was presented to the Commander-in-Chief for signature.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you examine Part 1 of the plan, at about page 12, relating to the composition of Task Force Nine, which was the patrol plane force, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. How many patrol planes were listed as comprising that task force?

[338] Vice Admiral SMITH. All units of Aircraft Scouting Force, 107 VP. The rest of them are ships: Two AV, two AVP, four AVD; and ten utility planes, VJR.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 19 of the exhibit, Admiral, you will find stated the basic concept of war in the Pacific as set forth in the basic plan. Will you read that into the record, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 22 of the exhibit, Admiral, which concerns the initial Japanese deployment estimated in the plan, will you read sub-paragraph "f" into the record?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading) :

1334. . . .

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area.

Mr. SONNETT. What, Admiral, was comprehended by the term [339] "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific"?

Vice Admiral SMITH. We expected raids on Wake and Midway, possible raids on Wake and Midway, and the Philippines, but everything tended to give us the opinion that the first strike would be down towards Singapore.

Mr. SONNETT. You are speaking now of your intelligence, Admiral, primarily?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What I am trying to get at at the moment is the understanding which you had of the estimated Japanese initial deployment covered by the statement that raiding and observation forces would be widely distributed in the Pacific and submarines in the Hawaiian area.

Vice Admiral SMITH. We were particularly guarding against their submarine raids in the area and perhaps we were influenced by the fact that within fifteen days after Admiral Kimmel took over as Commander-in-Chief, we had several alarms in the operating areas to the south of Oahu. In one case the destroyers had sound contact with what they believed to be a submarine for a period of more than thirty-six hours. No bombing attack was made on it. One experienced destroyer officer stated that he personally heard propeller noises. Looking back on it, we doubt very much that it was a submarine; it was probably due to different temperatures of water, because one month later when the moon was the same we had the same experience. But we were always guarding against a submarine attack. We believed that that was Japan's first attack to be made upon us and we made every effort to guard against it.

Mr. SONNETT. While you are on the subject of submarine contacts, Admiral, will you state what other contacts you recall prior to December 7, 1941, in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands?

[340] Vice Admiral SMITH. There were many of them, but they were probably large fish. The first one that I recall was in the summer of 1940 when I had the cruiser BROOKLYN and had the gunnery school on board and I came into Pearl Harbor every two or three days, and as I approached the entrance, I received orders to black out, that a submarine had been detected off the entrance, and I remained outside. Within a few hours a dispatch was received from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, stating the contact was false, that it had been a fish. And those continued all during 1941 at intervals. Whether they were real submarines, I don't know. In most cases we decided they were not.

Mr. SONNETT. With particular reference, Admiral, to the months October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, do you recall any contacts in that period?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Returning to the war plan, Admiral, will you examine at page 24 paragraph 2101, which appears to contain an Outline of Tasks, and read into the record sub-paragraph "h"?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading) :

h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, then, that Hawaii was one of the territories of the Associated Powers covered by that paragraph?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to page 25 and read into the record [341] paragraph 2201?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading) :

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption A-2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption A-1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

- a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.
- b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
- c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

Mr. SONNETT. Paragraph 2202 sets forth, does it not, initial tasks to be performed by the Pacific Fleet before the Japanese got in the war? Will you read that?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading) :

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- b. Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
- c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
- f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
- g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.

[342] h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.

j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

k. Continue training operations as practicable.

l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 32 of the exhibit and paragraph 3141 to 3143, those paragraphs set forth, do they not, the initial tasks assigned to the patrol plane force before Japan was in the war?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read those into the record, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading) :

3141. Task Force Nine will perform the task assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to Annex I, Admiral, as to Phase I, namely, when Japan is not in the war, would you read into the record paragraph 2? Annex I, I take it, is the Patrol and Sweeping Plan?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read into the record paragraph 2 of that plan?

[343] Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

(c) Covering.

(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

(e) Routing shipping.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to paragraph 3 of the Patrol and Sweeping Plan, it sets forth, does it not, specific tasks of the various task forces?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it does.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read the specific tasks set forth for Task Force Nine? I think it is on page I-16.

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

[344] (5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep en-route.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces, thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 8 of the war plan, does it appear that the plan was to become effective on W-Day?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as

W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

Mr. SONNETT. To attempt to summarize, Admiral, for the sake of the record, does it appear from the plan that it might be put into execution on a day other than the date hostilities with Japan commenced or on a day other than M, or mobilization, day?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It could have been put into effect on any date by the Navy Department.

[345] Mr. SONNETT. Do you find any provision in the plan, Admiral, which requires the designation of W-Day to require the approval of the Navy Department?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I would have to read the entire plan to answer that question. My recollection is that we had it in some form.

Mr. SONNETT. Apart from that question, Admiral, and referring specifically to the Phase I initial tasks, namely, those to be performed when Japan was not in the war—those, you will recall, are set forth at pages 24 and 25 of the plan—is it correct that the Phase I initial tasks were entirely defensive in nature?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, they are entirely defensive, and training, of course, which is very important.

Mr. SONNETT. Do any of the Phase I initial tasks, when Japan was not yet in the war, require, or did they require, a directive from the Navy Department to be discharged?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is my impression, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you specifically by way of illustration to Initial Task 1-m, which is "Guard against surprise attack by Japan." Was that a task which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was required to carry out, irrespective of any Navy Department directive?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, that was constantly in his mind.

Mr. SONNETT. And similarly, Admiral, referring to Initial Task 1-g, to protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific, that, too, was a task which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had irrespective of the Navy Department, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it was.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you Annex VII, Section VI, to the [346] Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and Addendum I thereto, which was exhibit 23 before the Naval Court of Inquiry, and ask you whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I do not recall the details of this plan, but I remember it as having been signed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and by General Short. We had it in our office.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to Addendum I, which is annexed to that document, and will you state, Admiral, what Addendum I is?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It is a "joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of a sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area."

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall having seen that at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I can't recall when I first saw it, but I did see it.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the summary of the situation contained in Addendum I, will you read that into the record and then state whether it was in accord with your views at the time?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

[347] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that in accord, Admiral, with your views at or about that date, March of '41?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I would say that this is an estimate of the situation in which all possibilities were considered. I would also state that I know of no one in this area who really believed there would be a hostile air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, but we guarded against it. I believe that prior to this date—I know that prior to this date, in fact the 15th of February, we issued an order, 2CL-41, which was later revised in the middle of October, that provided for this very thing, for both air and submarine attack, and also that our ships were so moored at all moorings in Pearl Harbor—in the first place, the heavy ships had to be headed out before they were moored, and they were so moored that it provided in all four areas there was an arc of fire from every direction from which planes could come from a 360 degree arc. And I remember that we knew at that time the Army plan was to throw a cordon of light anti-aircraft guns around Pearl Harbor, but we felt that the guns of the fleet, in case of a surprise attack, would be much more effective than anything the Army had. It was for that reason that we moored the ships as we did.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you refer to exhibit 8 of the Naval Court record and state whether or not that is the Pacific Fleet letter on the security of the fleet at base and in the operating areas which you just mentioned?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, that is. It is a revision of a similar letter issued on the 15th of February, 1941.

[348] Mr. SONNETT. And that revision was issued on October 14, 1941, was it not, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read assumption 2 (b) of the Pacific Fleet confidential letter into the record, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

2. . . .

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.

(3) a combination of these two.

Mr. SONNETT. So that, I take it, Admiral, it was your view that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, yes, but a remote possibility, I would say.

Mr. SONNETT. And that was the basis for the fleet letter on security and of the war plans?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. That possibility, also, Admiral, reflected your knowledge, did it not, of the fact that historically the Japanese had attacked without declaration of war.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you, Admiral, refer to exhibit 15 of the Naval Court record, which is exhibit 24 of this investigation, and state whether or not you saw that dispatch at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall whether I saw it at the time. I think I did. I am familiar with the dispatch.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, will you just briefly describe what that dispatch is?

[349] Vice Admiral SMITH. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and the Commandants of Districts 11, 12, 13, and 15, with information to Cinclant and Spenavo, London, and it states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X . . . Action aedes to inform senior Army officers their areas X
Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation
or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, will you refer to exhibit 17, Admiral, of the Naval Court record, which is exhibit 25 of this investigation, and state whether or not you saw this dispatch at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I saw it on the date it was received, the 27th of November.

Mr. SONNETT. Again, for the sake of the record, will you state what that dispatch is?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It starts out by saying: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," and then unfortunately it tells us where the attack is coming from or what will be attacked.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you read that language into the record, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition [350] against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British."

Mr. SONNETT. That is the so-called war warning of November 27th, Admiral, is it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer now to exhibit 18 of the Naval Court, the following exhibit, and state whether or not you saw that dispatch at or about the date it bears?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, I remember this very well.

Mr. SONNETT. Again, will you state what that dispatch is?

Vice Admiral SMITH. This dispatch was received by the Army from the War Department, as well as by the Commander-in-Chief from the Navy Department, and we were in conference for several days on it as to how to carry it out. It required us to move to replace our planes in the outlying islands, Midway and Wake, by Army planes, as I remember.

It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly [351] to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of that dispatch, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. November 26, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I believe you stated that several days were spent in conference on that subject?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the conferences were between General Short and Admiral Kimmel?

Vice Admiral SMITH. And their staffs.

Mr. SONNETT. And their staffs?

Vice Admiral SMITH. And the Commanding General of the Army Air Force.

Mr. SONNETT. As I recall your previous testimony, Admiral, you indicated that it was in connection with that subject that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had the closest to a dispute that you ever saw between them?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state just what that was?

Vice Admiral SMITH. During the discussion, we informed the Army that the planes they placed on Wake would have to remain there for the duration of a war, if any, because it was impossible to put a ship in there and take them out and Army planes are not equipped to land on a carrier, although they can take off from a carrier. Admiral Kimmel then asked, "What may I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" and General Martin of the Army Air Force replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles offshore," to which Admiral Kimmel replied, "Then they are [352] no damn good to me," or words to that effect. General Short stated, not angrily at all, that, "If I man these islands, I must command them," and Kimmel replied, "Only over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases." General Short replied, "Mind you, I do not want these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put troops and planes on them, then I must command them." And that was the extent of the controversy.

Mr. SONNETT. Actually, Admiral, subsequently Marines were used instead of Army personnel, were they not, to reenforce the islands?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Before Pearl Harbor, Admiral Halsey was on his way with the ENTERPRISE to land an additional squadron of Marine planes, but the plan, as I recall it, went further than replacing planes; the troops were involved also, because I remember that the Army had no guns and it was necessary for us to leave our guns there.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it then, Admiral, that at or about the time of the receipt of the so-called war warning of November 27th, General Short and Admiral Kimmel were engaged in considerable discussion about this proposal to reenforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, they were.

Mr. SONNETT. What conferences and discussions were held, Admiral, after November 27th concerning the so-called war warning message?

Vice Admiral SMITH. A conference was held in Admiral Kimmel's office that afternoon. Admiral Bloch was not present since he was visiting his wife in the hospital. He was represented by Captain Earle. The conference was held, to my recollection, about 5 p. m. I do not recall whether General Short was present at that one, but I know that the Intelligence [352] Officer was given a copy of the dispatch to take over and make certain that General Short got it. I am quite certain a conference was held the next day. In the meantime, on the evening of the 27th, the Army was on the march. It manned the public utilities, reservoirs, and so on, to protect them against possible sabotage, which apparently was what the Army feared most in these islands. How many conferences were held later, I do not recall, but by that time we were conferring at least every other day. I was present at most of the conferences. But one night I recall that Admiral Kimmel at 6 o'clock called up General Short at General Short's home and General Short said he was about to go up to the north side of the island and Kimmel said, "Stay there; I am coming over to see you," which he did. What that conference was about, I don't know, but I imagine it was on this same subject. I was not present at that.

Mr. SONNETT. How was the so-called war warning of November 27th evaluated by Admiral Kimmel, sir?

Vice Admiral SMITH. There were several considerations. One was negotiations had been resumed on the arrival of Kurusu. There was a report that Admiral Hart's seaplanes had discovered large Japanese forces moving south. The Intelligence Officer placed the position of some Japanese forces somewhere supposedly in the Marshalls. The Combinet Fleet, as I recollect it, was in home waters and the carriers were supposedly in home waters also. Therefore, we felt, not knowing whether the United States would be in the war or not—many of the directions we received, mostly in personal letters from Admiral Stark, but which are on file, cautioned us not to take any action that might foment a war. The people of the United States were divided in their opinions apparently. We believed that their [354] attack would be on the Dutch and British to the south and that if they did attack us, it would be in the Philippines. We had no assurance from our

government that the United States would go to war if the Dutch and British were attacked. We were in constant training, intensive training, to prepare for war, but there was nothing in that message that led us to believe that Pearl Harbor was threatened with an air attack. We did expect a surprise submarine attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the November 24th dispatch from OpNav, that dispatch started, did it not, as follows:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility?

Upon receipt of that dispatch was it found that the views of yourself and Admiral Kimmel were in accord with the situation as stated in the dispatch?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, but the words, "In any direction including an attack on the Philippines and Guam" implies that they are not coming any farther east than the Philippines or Guam.

Mr. SONNETT. Of course, it was true at that time, Admiral, that it was your estimate, as set forth in the various war plans, that a surprise attack on Oahu by air was a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Always, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And this dispatch said, did it not, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That's right.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the so-called war warning of [355] November 27th that started out, did it not, sir, by stating, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Had you ever received a dispatch before that time in such language?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, and as I have previously testified, if they put a period after the words "war warning," it would have been a much more effective message. We had received many letters from the Chief of Naval Operations—in fact, almost weekly warnings—and Admiral Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had received similar warnings. Perhaps we received too many of them. But we hadn't received one saying, "This is to be considered a war warning," not previously.

Mr. SONNETT. The second sentence of that November 27th dispatch, Admiral, was as follows, was it not:

Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that substantially in accord with your own views at the time of receipt of the warning, namely, that within a few days Japan would strike somewhere?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, but I have a vague recollection that on the same date that this was received we had some other word, possibly in the local paper, that negotiations had been resumed, and, of course, they were resumed.

Mr. SONNETT. Of course, Admiral, I take it that you do not mean to state that as between a newspaper account—

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, no.

Mr. SONNETT. And an OpNav dispatch, you would lend more credence [356] to a newspaper account?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, no. Something had happened—it must have been another dispatch—by which we learned that negotiations had been resumed.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, the receipt of dispatches during the first week of December, 1941, advising that the Japanese were destroying their codes?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And that, I take it, confirmed the impression that war was imminent with Japan?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, and we had directed Guam to destroy its codes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, what specific steps were taken between November 27th and December 7, 1941, as a result of this war warning?

Vice Admiral SMITH. We continued our intensive schedule for training, having always at least one task force operating and usually two. We notified all task force commanders of the receipt of this message and called attention to our order 2CL-41 of October 15th or 12th. We had our destroyers—the big ships were always protected by destroyers against submarine attack. We carried out our air searches in the operating area. I am quite certain we had alerts in the harbor just for training. We prepared to carry out the war plan if ordered to do so.

Mr. SONNETT. Which of those actions, Admiral, was not in effect before November 27th?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Before November 27th, on any suspicious sighting or on sound contact with anything that could be an enemy submarine, a signal was sent out immediately and all forces in the operating area [357] ceased whatever training they were doing; the destroyers went at high speed to protect the carriers and battleships, carrying out the provisions of existing directives. This happened on many occasions, sometimes when the entire fleet was at sea.

Early in Admiral Kimmel's administration he reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that he had on one occasion issued orders to depth charge a suspicious contact in the operating area and had changed those orders. The Chief of Naval Operations in his letter stated, "Thank God you didn't," or words to that effect. Before the 27th of November, Admiral Kimmel, with no instructions from the Navy Department, issued orders that any submarine within a radius of one mile, I believe it was, possibly three miles, of the entrance to Pearl Harbor would be depth charged by the offshore patrol. After November 27th, it is my recollection that he issued orders to depth charge submarines in any area in which we were operating.

Mr. SONNETT. As to the air patrol of operating areas, Admiral, that had been in effect, I take it, prior to November 27th?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Oh, yes, that had been in effect, I should say, during the entire year of 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And that air patrol of the operating areas was continued after November 27th?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, will you just state generally what the operating areas were?

Vice Admiral SMITH. The operating areas were to the south of Oahu for approximately thirty miles and extending east and west. Some ships were operating around Maui. Those were the general operating areas. Occasionally we operated to the north of Oahu, and shortly before Pearl Harbor we had a fleet exercise for the entire fleet to the north of Oahu, [358] and it was very intensive, darkened at night, as we had been for some time, and, of course, on occasions like those the air searches were to the northward to protect the fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any air search from Oahu to the north after November 27th and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I cannot recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether the operation to which you just testified occurred after November 27th and before the attack?

Vice Admiral SMITH. There were no operations to the north between 27 November and 7 December 1941, although I believe we would send a destroyer at night to make a trip along the north shore, with the possibility that the destroyer might find a submarine lurking there or communicating with the beach. I know that that was done early in the war and I believe that it was done after November 27th.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified before the Naval Court that, in substance, as Chief of Staff you did not maintain a current written estimate of the situation, but that you did maintain a current mental estimate, and that the situation was discussed daily and that daily the War Plans Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer presented their estimates to Admiral Kimmel. Is that correct?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Correct, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the War Plans Officer?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Captain, now Vice Admiral, C. H. McMorris.

Mr. SONNETT. And the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Was Lieutenant Commander, now Captain, Layton.

Mr. SONNETT. And that practice of furnishing a daily estimate was followed from November 27th to December 7th?

[359] Vice Admiral SMITH. Followed long before that.

Mr. SONNETT. And also during that period?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Before the Naval Court, Admiral, you stated in answer to a question as to the adequacy of the state of readiness existing on December 7th, in substance, as follows: That in your opinion the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages and then you said: "You must remember that what we were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. We were thinking about the fleet and the readiness of the fleet. I believe that the state of readiness is indicated by the fact that how quickly the gun crews responded to the fire which was absolutely unexpected. We exercised as much security as we could in port. We realized that the Army defenses were not adequate, that ships were stationed in sectors and every sector was always occupied for anti-aircraft fire, but we also had to get that fleet in readiness to go back to sea. It happened at a time when two task forces were in

port. Usually only one was in port. Sometimes three were at sea, depending upon the exercises that were projected by the Commander-in-Chief. The readiness of the ships—they were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out and how to get out and go into battle. They were not thinking about the defense of Pearl Harbor.”

Is that a correct statement of your views during the period after November 27, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it is.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, then, that the primary emphasis, Admiral, during that so-called critical period after November 27th was on preparation for offensive action by the fleet?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, to get ready, yes.

[360] Mr. SONNETT. And that your thinking was primarily on that score?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, among the intelligence which you received prior to the attack, do you recall any information received from intercepted telephone conversations of the Japanese, or from intercepted cable messages from the Japanese?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. Those cable messages were brought to me two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. We, so far as I know, had intercepted no important messages concerning enemy movements.

Mr. SONNETT. Either telephonically or by cable?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you state for the record your estimate of the situation and of possible enemy courses of action during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I believe I have stated before we thought that the enemy would take his first action to the south against the British and Dutch, possibly the Philippines. Early in 1941 I recall an officer messenger coming through from Admiral Hart's flagship in which he gave his estimate of the possibility that the Japanese would go south and would bypass the Philippines and not attack them at all; would get Hong Kong and places to the south before that. I don't say that we agreed with that, but it was my estimate, and I believe the estimate of the staff, that their activities would be confined to the Far East to take everything they needed there before any action was taken to the eastward; and always, because of their previous history, the possibility of a very strong submarine attack to disable our heavy ships.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, in the Pearl Harbor area?

[361] Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it also, Admiral, that it was your estimate after November 27, 1941, that an air attack at Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Vice Admiral SMITH. A possibility, but certainly not a probability.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and ask whether you recall having seen those.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall ever having seen this dispatch, but this intelligence is of the nature given to the Commander-in-Chief by our Intelligence Officer, who worked very closely with the In-

telligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, and I recall this particularly, that "our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 21, Admiral, and ask you if you can identify it.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall ever having seen this.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, having received at or about that date, which, I believe, is November 27th, information to the effect substantially that the Japanese had organized their carriers into a separate force, that they were estimated to have five carrier divisions, consisting of a total of ten carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I do not recall that. We knew how many they had, but I don't recall any special organization they had formed.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your recollection as to the number of carriers that the Japanese had?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Eleven, including the small ones.

Mr. SONNETT. And they were organized into divisions, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, as I recall it.

[362] Mr. SONNETT. How many carriers to a division?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I think two.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral exhibit 22, photostatic copies of communication intelligence summaries, and call your attention particularly to those during the period November 27th to December 6, 1941; and ask, first, if you can identify the initials appearing in the lower right-hand corner of those summaries.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you examine those, Admiral, and state whether or not you received them during the period November 27th to December 6, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't remember just when this was received, but I assume it was received on or after 27 November. I would say that the Intelligence Officer held his stuff very, very close and, as I have stated, I was usually present in his daily meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, but there was so much administrative work going on that frequently I was called from the office for some other purpose. However, I was familiar with these estimates, traffic analyses.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your estimate, Admiral, from November 27th to December 6, 1941, as to the location of the Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. About as stated here, some in the Marshalls and the remainder in home areas. As this states, "An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and the SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any combined air force to Hainan."

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you examine the summaries after November 27th and up to December 6, 1941, and point out the information which was the basis for your belief that the carriers remained in those [363] locations?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising

maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up with, "They are believed to be in home waters."

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any such statement in the summaries, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. On the 27th, "Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any combined air force units to Hainan." The 29th, "The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in the Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches indicate today that the following units are under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet." That includes several submarine divisions and destroyer squadrons and [364] two carriers, Cardiv 3. On the 1st of December, "Carriers no change."

Mr. SONNETT. On the 1st it was noted that there was a change in Japanese radio calls, Admiral, was it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes. I didn't know about that before. In fact, that impresses me more than anything I have read here, and it is followed by great confusion because they cannot locate anybody.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you note their statement, Admiral—I think it is on the 2nd—concerning the blank of information as to carriers and tell us what your evaluation of that was?

Vice Admiral SMITH. On the 2nd:

COMBINED AIR FORCE—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third, and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

Mr. SONNETT. Just after that, Admiral, the next paragraph.

Vice Admiral SMITH (reading):

Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall having seen that, Admiral, at the time?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I do not. It is too long ago. I do not recall.

Mr. SONNETT. And on the 3rd, if you will just note the reference to carriers.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't see anything on the 3rd of December—

Mr. SONNETT. On the last line, Admiral.

[365] Vice Admiral SMITH. "No information on submarines or carriers." Then on the 4th—

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall having noted the lack of information on the 3rd as to carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall it. On the 4th it gives the information that the Second Fleet, which includes the carriers, was in the vicinity of Takao.

Mr. SONNETT. What was that, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. On the 4th, speaking of the Combined Fleet:

The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet. . . . These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet is still copying. CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to the Third Base Force, Palao, and CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet as information addressees.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether the lack of information as to Japanese carriers which is set forth in the communication intelligence summaries after December 1, 1941, was discussed between you and Admiral Kimmel?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. My recollection is that he questioned the Intelligence Officer on it, in fact, every day, but I don't know that we discussed that or what it might possibly mean. It is more likely that he might have done it with the War Plans Officer. He frequently sent for the War Plans Officers while I was doing something else. He may have discussed it with them.

[366] Mr. SONNETT. In that connection, Admiral, I show you exhibit 23, which is a December 1, 1941, memorandum from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to the Admiral on the location of the Japanese fleet, and ask whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I recollect that this report was called for by the Commander-in-Chief. I probably saw it at the time. In fact, it was submitted frequently.

Mr. SONNETT. That, I take it, was a special report by the Fleet Intelligence Officer at the Commander-in-Chief's request?

Vice Admiral SMITH. To the Commander-in-Chief. That was not distributed to the staff. It may have gone through the War Plans Section.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you saw that estimate at the time, that is, about December 1 or 2, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. It looks very familiar to me, but my recollection is that I saw more than one of those, and this particular one I don't recall. Undoubtedly I saw it.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that at that time it was noted by the Commander-in-Chief that this estimate did not account for the whereabouts of Japanese Carrier Divisions One and Two?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No.

Mr. SONNETT. You recall no conversation with Admiral Kimmel on that point?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No.

Mr. SONNETT. And you did not, I take it, participate in any meetings between Admiral Kimmel and Layton at which that point was discussed?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I don't remember.

Mr. SONNETT. What discussion, Admiral, if any, during the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall with Admiral Kimmel concerning [367] aircraft reconnaissance?

Vice Admiral SMITH. He had frequent conversations with Admiral Bellinger, who is much more capable of answering that question than I am. Just on which days those conferences were held, I don't know, but they frequently discussed the practicability of more extensive use of patrol planes, and it is my recollection that Bellinger outlined his limitations to Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, that he was limited by the number of engines he had. He was trying to get leak-proof tanks installed. It was a question of whether he should put it all into training or wear out his planes, of which he had not too many.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any such discussion, Admiral, after November 27, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I could not. I could not be certain about that.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a route sheet and correspondence to which are annexed aircraft schedules, together with a photostatic copy of an outgoing dispatch from CincPac to ComPatWing Two, dated 22 November 1941, and ask whether you recall those.

Vice Admiral SMITH. My recollection is that the Fleet Aviator discussed this with Kimmel. He would never prepare a dispatch of this kind without bringing it to Admiral Kimmel's attention. And I undoubtedly released the dispatch, but I wouldn't have done so had Kimmel not known what was going on.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, those schedules, Admiral, set forth the utilization of the patrol planes of the fleet from November 17, 1941, up to and including December 31, 1941, do they not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

[368] Mr. SONNETT. And the schedules as submitted were approved on November 22, 1941?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark a photostatic copy of the route sheet and schedules together with a photostatic copy of the dispatch approving them, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And for the sake of the record, Admiral, the document I show you is a photostatic copy of the original document you have before you, is it not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 37.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, these schedules do not provide for any reconnaissance from Oahu, do they?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It is not so stated here and it probably came under "training" because it is certain that the searches were conducted daily in the operating area. It would appear that no particular squadron was assigned that duty and that was probably part of their training.

Mr. SONNETT. These schedules, Admiral, were approved before receipt of the November 24th and the November 27th, or war warning, dispatches, were they not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel after November 27th concerning the necessity or desirability for revision of these schedules?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I do not recall. So many things happened that I cannot remember that. I think it is more likely that Admiral Bellinger [369] or Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, the Fleet Aviator, would be able to answer that question.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion during the period November 27th to December 6th of any proposed Army reconnaissance over the Mandated Islands?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Two planes had long been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations to make a flight from Hawaii over the Mandated Islands, to land, I believe, in New Caledonia, then to proceed to Australia and to Manila. The purpose of this flight was photographic reconnaissance and the planes were ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations not to circle the Mandated Islands but to proceed directly over them, then furnish the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with copies of the photographs. One of the planes had arrived in Pearl Harbor, but, as I recall the conversation between Admiral Bellinger and the Commander-in-Chief, they had failed to bring their camera with them or some item of very important equipment. To the best of my knowledge, the second plane never arrived and the flight was never made before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. These were Army planes, Admiral, were they not?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, they were Army planes.

Mr. SONNETT. And when you said that the reconnaissance had been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, did you mean the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It probably was the Chief of Staff. I dare say that it resulted from a conference because their orders were to deliver the photographs to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel, the copies; so I imagine the Navy must have been in it.

[370] Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, Admiral, and ask you whether you recall having seen that at or about November 28, 1941.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recall having seen this paper, and I doubt if I did see it. However, I knew about the flight as projected. I was of the opinion—I still am of the opinion—that the flight was ordered long before November 28th, but the planes weren't ready.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you testified before the Naval Court, in substance, that you thought that the intent of the war warning message of the 27th was to get you on your toes out here and to get you ready to execute the war plan. Is that correct?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And you recall that the November 27th message directed that an appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 be executed? Do you recall that provision of the exhibit?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, will you state what discussion was had with Admiral Kimmel concerning the steps to be taken to constitute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the initial tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the war plans?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I cannot remember in detail, but I do recall conferences over the charts, Admiral Kimmel taking the type commanders personally to the War Plans Office and going over all these

islands of the Marshalls and Carolines; discussions of what might be found there; whether they would be soft or difficult; that that had been going on for months.

[371] Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 35, the Pacific Fleet War Plan, you will recall, Admiral, that the initial tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet were in Phase I, namely, Japan not in the war, and Phase Ia, Japan in the war; that under Phase I, one of the tasks was: "g. To protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and to prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necessary"; also, "m. To guard against surprise attack by Japan."

What, if any, consideration was given to the steps to be taken to carry out those initial tasks which were to be taken before Japan got into the war?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Well, the ships had already been designated for each task long before 27 November. All that was needed was the word to carry out the plan.

Mr. SONNETT. As I recall your earlier testimony, Admiral, the Phase I initial tasks required no Navy Department direction to be carried out?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Well, certain parts of it.

Mr. SONNETT. Specifically, the portions I just called to your attention, namely, to protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and also to guard against surprise attack. Was there any consideration given as to the means or methods to be employed to carry out the directive?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Certain of those items were already being done without the plan being in effect. For example, we had submarines stationed off Midway and Wake, fighting planes out of Wake, and patrol [372] planes operating from Midway. Whenever a task force moved with a carrier, they always had their planes in the air on a search. We always, over our ships, launched our planes for protection against submarines. We had been doing that a long time.

Mr. SONNETT. I note that one of the Phase I initial tasks to be taken when Japan was not in the war, as set forth in the war plan, was "h," namely, to establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. That was, of course, done, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. That was done.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What I would like to get at is what was done in connection with the other similar Phase I tasks in connection with the patrolling by light forces and patrol planes and guarding against attack by Japan.

Vice Admiral SMITH. I would say that the only thing that wasn't done was the guarding with patrol planes in the direction of Japan or to the northward. I have forgotten just where in the phase it comes,

but remember we had to send cruisers and submarines to the north and southeast Pacific, Samoa. That was not considered a necessary preliminary to the mobilization.

Mr. SONNETT. Would the establishment of aircraft patrol from Oahu have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, it would.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibits 69A and 69B of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you can identify those. [373]

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes, I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what they are, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. This is a memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief, prepared by the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris, dated 30 November 1941. It is a recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief on steps to be taken in case of an American-Japanese war within twenty-four hours of the date of the memorandum. This is followed by a second memorandum of the same nature, dated noon, December 5, 1941, recommending steps to be taken in case of an American-Japanese war within the next forty-eight hours.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you see those at or about the dates they bear, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I believe so.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find in either of those memoranda any provision made to carry out the initial tasks laid down in the war plans concerning aircraft patrol?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you participate in any discussion with Admiral Kimmel or with Captain McMorris concerning the adequacy of the steps recommended by him in those memoranda?

Vice Admiral SMITH. I don't recollect having done so.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel during this period November 27th to December 7, 1941, of the lack of information reflected in the intelligence summaries as to Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral SMITH. No. There were frequent discussions, but lack of sufficient information from the Navy Department. We believed at that time that our intelligence was adequate. We received very little from Naval Intelligence. It is possible that the Intelligence Officer of the [374] Fourteenth Naval District and the Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief received more information than I know of. Occasionally a paper from the State Department would pass over my desk on conditions in Japan, but I never saw anything alarming in one of those papers. I believe they came out monthly. There may, of course, have been other reports of the State Department of a more secret nature that weren't issued to us at all. If there were, they weren't shown to me. I do not recall any discussion of the adequacy or inadequacy of our own intelligence staff. The same two officers are continuing the same jobs; so they are apparently considered satisfactory now.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, was it the fact that, so far as your intelligence was concerned relating to the movements of Japanese naval vessels, your reliance was on the intelligence submitted by the Fleet Intelligence Officer primarily?

Vice Admiral SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Which was most current?

Vice Admiral SMITH. And based upon the analysis of radio traffic. At that time, to the best of my knowledge, our people were unable to decipher Japanese naval codes. They did decipher commercial codes, the movements of commercial ships.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to your previous testimony that your estimate was that a surprise attack by the Japanese on the fleet in the harbor by air was possible but not probable, will you state the basis for that estimate?

Vice Admiral SMITH. There was a great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the Navy Department, and our [375] intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and, I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even by a neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was for this reason that we did not fear an air attack.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation then, at 12:05 p. m., recessed until 1:30 p. m., at which time is reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties.)

[376] Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, Commander?

Commander BURR. Harold S. Burr, Commander, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Donald Woodrum, Lieutenant, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, what is your present assignment?

Commander BURR. I am Acting District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And yours, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I am attached to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your assignment in 1941, Commander?

Commander BURR. I was Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant at the headquarters of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and on the complement of the District Intelligence Office.

Admiral HEWITT. Will you give us an outline of what your duties were as Liaison Officer, generally?

Commander BURR. Sir, it was a new job and I was sort of a handyman, trying to help the Army with its problems involving the Navy, seeing that officers in the Army were placed in touch with appropriate officers in the District in order to accomplish missions of mutual responsibility or interest. It was a very broad field.

Admiral HEWITT. I suppose also you advised them about naval affairs insofar as you could?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir.

[377] Mr. SONNETT. Did you know in 1941 then Lieutenant Commander Layton?

Commander BURR. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. And what was his assignment at that time?

Commander BURR. I understood it to be Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall on or about November 27, 1941, receiving from Lieutenant Commander Layton a message for delivery to General Short?

Commander BURR. I think it was received directly from Lieutenant Commander Layton, but I am not sure. It was at CincPac and he as well as others were there at the time. The Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, was there, and I couldn't swear it was Commander Layton, although I am sure he is acquainted with the message.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask whether the message which you received at that time was a copy of this or substantially a copy of this message.

Commander BURR. I would say it appears to be substantially the same.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what you did with that message at that time, Commander?

Commander BURR. I was instructed to delivery that message to General Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. It was after hours by the time I received it, but I drove directly to Fort Shafter and attempted to locate General Short. No one seemed to know where he was at the time. I knew that the message was urgent; so I looked for the Chief of Staff, who was next senior, and I couldn't find him. The Senior Officer Present was Colonel Donnegan, then Lieutenant Colonel William Donnegan, head of G-3, which, I believe, is the next senior officer. So I showed the [378] message to him and explained my eagerness to reach General Short, and, as nearly as I can recollect, he stated that he would see to it that General Short saw it and that since he was apparently the action officer, he would proceed to act on the message at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you leave the message with him?

Commander BURR. Reluctantly.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you subsequently ascertain whether the message had been delivered to General Short?

Commander BURR. Yes, sir, I checked with Colonel Donnegan and was informed that it had been delivered to General Short.

Mr. SONNETT. When were you told by Colonel Donnegan that it had been delivered to General Short?

Commander BURR. On or about the 28th, the following day.

Mr. SONNETT. I think, Admiral, that is all on that particular point.

Admiral HEWITT. I think that is all.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, during 1941 were you familiar with the telephone taps which were on the line of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. After about October I was made familiar with them.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have in the files of the District Intelligence Office transcripts of the telephone conversations so intercepted?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to taps on the line of the Japanese Consul, were there telephone taps on the line of the Japanese Vice Consul as well?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. There was a tap on the private line of the [379] Japanese Vice Consul in the Consulate itself.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the telephone taps by ONI on the business phones of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul, did you for a time have taps on their home phones?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Yes, we did. We had a tap on the home phone of the Consul General until about September and on the Vice Consul until we shut down.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you discontinue tapping the telephone wires in question, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. December 2, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state in general the nature and type of information which was acquired from the telephone taps you have described?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. There was very little of military significance. There was a great deal of information concerning the routine activities of the Consul and some information concerning the activities of the local Japanese population.

Mr. SONNETT. Could you prepare and submit for this investigation, Lieutenant, copies of the transcripts of telephone conversations intercepted from October to December 2, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those as exhibits when received, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit 38.")

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Lieutenant, the reasons for the discontinuance of the telephone taps by ONI on or about December 2, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I have no personal knowledge of the reasons [380] for removing the taps on December 2nd, but this is my general understanding of the reason that action was taken at that time: The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with our cognizance, had placed a tap on the private phone of one Kenzi Kimura, the general manager of the NYK office in Honolulu. This occurred some time in November, 1941. Late in November, 1941, a member of the District Intelligence Office learned from a contact at the telephone company that workmen had uncovered the FBI tap on Mr. Kimura. The member of the District Intelligence Office assumed that FBI had made this tap without the cognizance of the telephone company inasmuch as the NYK office was on the ground floor of the same building in which the FBI office was located and the tap was in the basement of that building. During a subsequent visit of an FBI agent, the representative of the DIO informed him of this fact in a spirit of cooperation, with the thought of warning him that his taps had been uncovered and security violated. I was present at this meeting when the FBI agent was so informed. It is my understanding that a representative of the FBI thereafter approached the telephone company and demanded to know why their representatives were revealing FBI secrets to the Office of Naval Intelligence. The result of this approach by the FBI was to

give one or more employees of the telephone company a realization that this sort of activity was going on, whereas they previously, to our knowledge, hadn't known of it.

When Captain Mayfield learned of the FBI action, he ordered all taps to be removed. It was my understanding that the reason for this was his concern at the violation of security caused by this incident and his concern that some incident of possible international import might result from such revelations. The telephone tapping work done by ONI was kept extremely secret. Only a handful of persons in the District [381] Intelligence Office, who were directly concerned with the information gained thereby, were even aware that such work was being done. Many persons attached to the office weren't aware that such work was being done and great care was taken to prevent their obtaining that knowledge. I was told that even the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was not aware of this activity in order that he might be spared any possible embarrassment arising from his knowledge thereof.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether after December 2, 1941, the FBI tapped any of the Japanese telephone wires?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I don't know.

Mr. SONNETT. Did they have access to the trans-Pacific telephone conversations?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I have seen transcripts of taps they made on conversations between Honolulu and Japan during the months of November and December, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Among those conversations was the so-called Mori conversation, was there not?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Yes, there was.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state when the Navy first received a transcript of that conversation?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. It is my understanding that this conversation took place on the evening of December 5, 1941, and that Captain Mayfield was notified by FBI, either immediately or the following day, that a suspicious conversation had taken place and that a translation and transcription was being made by the FBI translator at that time.

It is my further understanding that a written translation of the conversation was received at the District Intelligence Office some time [382] on December 6, 1941. At that time it was studied by Commander Denzel Carr, who thereupon desired to hear the original recording of the conversation. Arrangements were made with the FBI to have him do this, but as it was late in the evening already by the time this was done, it was agreed that he would go down the following day and listen to the recording. At a time subsequent to the Japanese attack, within a day or so, Commander Carr did go down and listen to the recording. At that time he stated to me that it was his opinion that Dr. Mori was not attempting to send information from the Islands, but on the contrary was greatly surprised and mystified by the whole tenor of the conversation. It was further Commander Carr's opinion that Dr. Mori hedged and hesitated to give anything in the way of specific military information. A study of the transcript reveals that strictly military subjects were discussed only briefly and that Dr. Mori gave little or no specific military information.

Mr. SONNETT. You have supplied us with a copy of the Mori conversation, have you not?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. We have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 39.")

Lieutenant WOODRUM. The man who made this telephone call was subsequently interned for accepting the telephone call.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, was there any telephone tap by ONI or FBI which came to the attention of Naval Intelligence prior to December 7, 1941, wherein military information was furnished by persons here to any outside source?

[383] Lieutenant WOODRUM. You mean furnished here to the Consulate?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, any way. Furnished to any Japanese representative. Let's put it that way.

Lieutenant WOODRUM. There are only two instances to my knowledge in which this occurred. In one instance, in 1940—I would have to look up the right date—Japanese Vice Consul Okuda telephoned a Buddhist priest at Lahaina on the Island of Maui by the name of Vriji Hirayama and requested Hirayama to keep the Consulate informed of any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In another instance, in 1941, a woman very much agitated called the Consulate and blurted out that the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor. The person answering at the Consulate hung up without reply, and it was the evaluation of the listeners that the woman was under some sort of emotional stress and that the people in the Consulate suspected some sort of a trick.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, certain cable messages sent by the Japanese Consul over commercial cable lines were intercepted and received by the Office of Naval Intelligence, were they not?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have copies of those messages available?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can't state exactly which messages were made available. We have now copies of messages sent by the Consulate between December 1st and December 6th.

I might explain the background of that. At various times efforts had been made to secure copies of the coded messages sent by the Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. These efforts were unsuccessful. There are three cable companies in Honolulu and it was known [384] that the Consulate alternated between each of the three, using each one for a period of one month. It is my understanding that Admiral Bloch requested David Sarnoff, who was visiting in the Islands at that time, to make available to the naval service copies of messages handled by RCA Radio. Sarnoff agreed and ordered the local office to do this. On December 1st, following their usual custom, the Consulate began using the facilities of RCA. On the morning of 5 December the District Intelligence Office received the first copies of these cables, and it is my understanding that these were immediately sent out to Commander Rochefort's unit. It is also my understanding that these were not decoded until after the Japanese attack and that even then it was necessary to use a Japa-

nese code book that had been picked up in the effects of the Consulate after it was raided on December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have the messages which were so delivered to the District Intelligence Office on December 5, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. We have copies of messages sent by the Consulate between December 1st and December 6th, decoded copies.

Mr. SONNETT. Decoded copies?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Decoded copies.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you supply us with a decoded copy of each message sent by the Consul between December 1st and December 6th which was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack on December 7th?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can't say from my own knowledge which was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. No record was kept, I take it, of the messages turned over on December 5th?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I know of no record.

[385] Mr. SONNETT. Can you supply us, then, with copies of each of the messages that you have decoded, sent by the Japanese Consul between December 1st and December 6, 1941?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I can, and we have supplied you with some of those.

Mr. SONNETT. And you will supply us with a complete set of them?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those, Admiral, as an exhibit when they are received?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit 40.")

Mr. SONNETT. Aside from information received through telephone taps and from the interception of Japanese cable messages, was there any other information received by the Office of Naval Intelligence indicating Japanese interest in movements of United States ships or preparations to meet attack in Pearl Harbor, or any military subject?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. Over a period of years there was considerable information gathered by the Naval Intelligence service concerning Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. There are voluminous reports available concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It was well known that officers attached to these groups made "sightseeing trips" of the islands, including such vantage spots as Aiea Heights.

Mr. SONNETT. Did any of the information in the possession of [386] Naval Intelligence prior to December 7, 1941, indicate that the Japanese had a specific interest in the location or movements of United States ships in Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. The only instance I know of is the one heretofore cited of the conversation with the Buddhist priest on Maui.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any information showing specifically that the Japanese were interested in the anti-aircraft defenses in or around Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I know of none.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any information indicating specifically that the Japanese were interested in the question of anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th?

Lieutenant WOODRUM. I know of none prior to December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing else.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:27 p. m., adjourned until 4 p. m., 4 June 1945.)

[387]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

FOURTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 4 p. m., Monday, 4 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, sir.

Brig. General POWELL. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA.

Mr. SONNETT. General, what was your assignment in November and December, 1941?

Brig. General POWELL. Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

Mr. SONNETT. And you were stationed where?

Brig. General POWELL. Fort Shafter.

Mr. SONNETT. Did the Army operate a radio intercept unit at Fort Shafter?

Brig. General POWELL. Yes, it did.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, decryption of intercepted Japanese messages was done at Fort Shafter, General?

Brig. General POWELL. None whatsoever.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you documents 14, 15, and 18 of exhibit 13, which are dispatches or messages between Tokyo and Honolulu relating to preparations for defense of Pearl Harbor and to the Japanese interest in [388] those preparations, and ask you whether you recall having seen those messages or any of them before.

Brig. General POWELL. I never have seen them.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, General, that the intercepted messages of the Japanese were sent from Fort Shafter to Washington for decryption?

Brig. General POWELL. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. And what methods were used to send the material to Washington?

Brig. General POWELL. Messages with a certain indicator, which I don't recall, were sent by radio, and all others were sent by air mail.

Mr. SONNETT. I think that is all, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., 5 June 1945.)

THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON

FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT
TO THE PRESENT TIME

By SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D.
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
THE FIRST VOLUME.
CONTAINING THE HISTORY FROM THE FIRST
SETTLEMENT TO THE YEAR 1700.
LONDON: Printed by J. DODD, in Pall-mall.
MDCCLXXV.

THE SECOND VOLUME.
CONTAINING THE HISTORY FROM THE YEAR 1700
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[389]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

FIFTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:30 a. m., Tuesday, 5 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, sir.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Theodore S. Wilkinson, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you were Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941, were you not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. When had you assumed that position, Admiral?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. October 15, 1941, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state generally the structure of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The Office of Naval Intelligence was composed of two main branches, foreign intelligence and domestic. The domestic had to do with internal subversion, espionage, and other activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national, and particularly naval, welfare. It included several branch offices in principal cities of the United States, one of which was Honolulu. The foreign intelligence was organized under a number, approximately eight, of regional groups of which [390] the Far Eastern was one. Under the administration of ONI and directly of foreign intelligence were the Naval Attachés and Naval Observers stationed throughout the world.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was in charge, Admiral, of the foreign branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Captain Heard, I believe, at that time, though there had been a change either just before or after.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Commander McCollum.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you state in general the sources of information which the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence had?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Naval Attaché reports from Japan and China, Observers' reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station, collateral items of interest produced by the investigations of the domestic branch of

ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio intelligence matters as available in Washington, and also from a center set up in Manila.

Mr. SONNETT. And Pearl Harbor, Admiral?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The State Department reports from diplomatic agents and reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches and radio intelligence.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state your recollection as to the responsibility of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of ONI for the dissemination of the information in its possession?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The responsibility of the Far Eastern section derived from the responsibility of the office as a whole. In general, the [391] duties of any of the foreign sections were to receive, collate, and analyze information obtained either by the agencies of ONI or received from other sources and to disseminate that in one of several ways. The usual means of dissemination of technical information was transmission by mail of copies or abstracts of the pertinent reports. There was a periodical publication, bi-weekly, as I remember, to all flag officers, containing political and operational intelligence, which contained a Far Eastern section, and in which latter the Far Eastern Division of ONI would incorporate any information of value. A third means of dissemination, although not strictly dissemination, was the limited distribution within the Navy Department of highly confidential radio intelligence and all urgent or important operational information. The radio intelligence was incorporated in a secret book, which was passed by hand by a responsible officer to approximately four of the Navy Department's heads and to the President and the Secretary of State. The urgent operational information was reported to me and either by myself in company with Commander McCollum or by himself directly to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. There was also, as the situation got hot, a daily one or two paragraph summary of the Japanese picture which was given to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans. The immediate report I have mentioned above was also made to the Director of War Plans. These reports or analyses usually contained some deduction as to future moves to be expected, which we offered for such value as they might have to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans.

Mr. SONNETT. As to the dissemination of information, Admiral, outside of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then that it was the responsibility of ONI to disseminate information on the Japanese situation to the Pacific Fleet?

[392] Vice Admiral WILKINSON. That point was never fully determined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the situation, but I was told that the deductions of future movements were the function of War Plans rather than of Intelligence, and this understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, when at one time I said that I thought it was our responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of enemy prospective movements, but in the Navy system War Plans did that. I told him then that I would prepare that analysis myself in my office in order that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit, and in consequence such analyses as I made weren't trans-

mitted to the fleet, but were given to the Chief of Operations and to War Plans. The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My understanding at the time was, and still is, that I would report to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced from all sources and that they would forward to the fleet such items as they felt should be so forwarded.

Mr. SONNETT. Would it be an accurate summary, then, Admiral, to state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI, but the evaluation of Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from those movements would be the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The latter part of your question, yes. The first part, the day by day information of the Japanese movements would not, according to my then and present understanding, be sent out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their evaluation.

[393] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 9 of this investigation, which is a copy of the fortnightly summary of current national situation, issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and dated December 1, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that as a summary set up by you.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, that is a summary of which I was recently speaking.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 9 of the exhibit, paragraph C summarizes, does it not, the Japanese naval situation as seen by the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I recall this, and, in fact, the entire issue, as I read over the text of each issue before authorizing its publication.

Mr. SONNETT. Who prepared, Admiral, the portion of the exhibit to which I have called your attention, namely, relating to the Japanese naval situation?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The Far Eastern Section.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of clarity of the record, Admiral, as well as to refresh your own recollection since it has been some time ago, would you read the first paragraph of C into the record?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The heading is—

THE JAPANESE NAVAL SITUATION

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in [394] the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 10 of this investigation, a memorandum for the Director by A. H. McCollum, dated December 1, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I recall it vaguely, but I presume that it was given to me in view of its form.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and ask whether you recall having seen those or any one of them?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall having seen any. I did not ordinarily see any of the so-called COPEKS, due perhaps to their very limited distribution, although I believe that the Far Eastern Section was given access to them by inspection at the office of receipt. I do not believe that they were furnished a copy.

Mr. SONNETT. The situation as to Japanese carriers, Admiral, set forth in exhibit 9, the ONI fortnightly summary for December 1, 1941, is summarized, is it not, in the statement as follows: "Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers"?

[395] Vice Admiral WILKINSON. That was our best knowledge and belief at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, upon what information that statement was based?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. On the digest of all available information, radio intelligence and sighting, whatever we had.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall how this exhibit 9, the fortnightly summary of December 1, was sent out? By air mail?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. By air mail, I believe.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, it was sent out on or about the date it bears, namely, December 1, 1941?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. It is my impression that it had been received in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. What information, Admiral, do you recall on or after December 1, 1941, concerning the location or movements of Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. My remote recollection at this time is that we had little, if any, information as to the carriers. We had fairly complete knowledge of the movement down through the South China Sea and around Indo-China, but the movements in the Pacific Ocean as a whole, including both battleships and carriers, were completely veiled. There may have been one or two carriers involved in the South China Sea movement, but the carrier force as a whole was not definitely located.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of daily communication intelligence summaries at Pearl Harbor, and call your attention to those particularly for the period December 1 to December 5, 1941, and ask if you can recall having had any of the information contained in those summaries during that [396] period of time.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Not directly, but as digested through the Far Eastern Section. I note particularly the fact that parts of the Japanese fleet were apparently in radio silence, of which I was aware.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall any discussion with the Chief of Naval Operations or with the War Plans Officer concerning the lack of information as to parts of the Japanese fleet during the first week of December, 1941?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I think we reported daily that a large part of the Japanese fleet was apparently at sea with its whereabouts not known. We also reported, however, that the only indications we had been able to pick up of any movement were those toward the south, including through the South China Sea, and our conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent. I recall that Admiral Turner also concluded that an attack would be made on the Philippines.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion during that period of time, Admiral, concerning the question whether or not any aerial reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No discussion of which I was a part. That was in the line of operational intelligence, procured by our own operations, which I considered was a function of the Office of Operations proper, although, of course, I was interested in the results of such searches for their own value and for their consolidation in the general picture.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there, Admiral, during the month or so preceding December 7, 1941, any discussion in which you participated concerning the likelihood of a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Unfortunately, no.

[397] Mr. SONNETT. At that time, Admiral, what was your estimate as to the possibility or probability of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I thought it was improbable and I thought it was impracticable in view of the air searches which I had known were being conducted when I had last left Hawaii in May and which I presumed, in the lack of any other knowledge, were still being conducted.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, Admiral, have the view that such an attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. A remote possibility, but to my mind I thought it would be detected and driven off before it could be effective.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which consists of certified copies of Japanese diplomatic dispatches, and ask if you would examine that.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Well, not recognizing this exhibit specifically, I was familiar with the various decrypted dispatches which were available in the Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state how such Japanese dispatches were obtained?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. They were obtained by radio interceptor, if they were sent by cable, I believe that we got copies of the cable; I am not sure. The text was then given to a large decrypting unit under the immediate control of the Director of Communications, although ONI cooperated by assignment of certain technical personnel. The Army had similar experts and there was a division of labor between the two departments in connection with the decryption of all foreign texts. In general, I recall that the Navy, which had made a longer study and was more familiar with the Japanese language and codes, took care of most of the Japanese work, while [398] the Army looked after other nations.

The products of the decryption of the Japanese dispatches were embodied in a secret book which originally was shown in full text to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War Plans, myself, and the President and the Secretary of State. At some time—I don't know precisely whether before or after December 7th—I believe only abbreviated summaries were shown the President and Secretary of State. Also there was some arrangement that the Army would look after the State Department and that the President would be served on alternate days by the Army and the Navy, but I am not sure of this in my recollection. At any rate, the books contained, as I recall, the product of both the Army and the Navy work.

MR. SONNETT. Admiral, I note that various of these Japanese dispatches are indicated to have been in the so-called purple code. Will you state generally what the purple code was?

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. I don't recall, although I vaguely remember that it was a diplomatic code.

MR. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether the Japanese purple code was being decrypted at any other place besides Washington?

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

MR. SONNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to a dispatch dated 19 November 1941 from Tokyo to Washington, which is indicated to have been translated on November 28, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that dispatch or having had that information.

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. Yes, I recall the "east wind," et cetera. I do not recall the specific Japanese words.

MR. SONNETT. That dispatch, Admiral, was a dispatch setting up the so-called "winds" code to be used by the Japanese in daily Japanese [399] language short wave news broadcasts, was it not?

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. Yes.

MR. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, what efforts were made to monitor for any message using the "winds" code?

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. My recollection is that the Japanese broadcasts were all monitored, and I do not recall any specific efforts in connection with this, but since it was to appear in the regular news broadcast, it presumably would be detected therein.

MR. SONNETT. Do you recall whether or not any message using the "winds" code was ever intercepted?

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. The method was not to use the "winds" code in a whole message, but simply to put in a word which of itself was the "winds" code. I recall that at some late stage, along about December 6th or 7th, I heard, either then or immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, that there had been such a word in one of the broadcasts. I don't recall when.

MR. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that the Japanese also had established a code known as the hidden word code?

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. No, I recall no mention of it.

MR. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you document 6 and document 11 of exhibit 13 of this investigation. The first is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 27, 1941, establishing a hidden word code, and the second is a message of 7 December 1941 from Tokyo, and ask whether you recall having seen either of those messages.

VICE ADMIRAL WILKINSON. I do not recall either one of them.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which consists of various documents supplied by the Federal Communications Commission, and ask whether you recall having seen any of [400] those documents.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No, I do not recall such.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, who it was who indicated to you some time around December 7, 1941, that a "winds" code message had been received?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I recall some mention of it, but not until after the attack, but I no longer attributed importance to it since the overt act had occurred. It may possibly have been the last message of the exhibit you just showed me, which, you will note, was received on December 8th.

Mr. SONNETT. But you don't remember who it was that mentioned it to you?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall, but presumably it would have been Commander McCollum, who was in touch with the Army, to whom the reports of that exhibit were made.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, during the first week in December, 1941, that Commander McCollum prepared a long dispatch, summarizing the situation, which he desired to have released and sent out and which dispatch he discussed with you?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. From time to time Commander McCollum and I, or he after consulting me, would prepare dispatches to be submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations for release. I do not specifically recall this dispatch, but if you have any evidence of it, I could probably refresh my recollection.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, Captain Safford, who testified during this investigation and who testified in previous investigations, stated that on or about December 4, 1941, he was present when you and Admiral Noyes [401] conferred concerning the desirability of sending out a dispatch which had been prepared by Commander McCollum and that you were in favor of sending out the dispatch but Admiral Noyes was not in favor of doing so and that you indicated you would take it to the Chief of Naval Operations to try to get it released. Do you recall that incident at all?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. It is quite possible that I did take it to Admiral Ingersoll, but I do not recall it specifically.

Mr. SONNETT. And I take it, therefore, Admiral, that you do not recall the contents of any dispatch which McCollum had prepared at that time?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Not at that specific time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether in any dispatch prepared by Commander McCollum prior to the attack there was specific reference made to any Japanese broadcast using the "winds" code words relating to the United States?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. I know the "winds" code words were discussed in Washington, but I do not remember any dispatch sent outside. There was, of course, at that time considerable reluctance to any widespread information which would indicate our operations and our success in breaking Japanese codes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you document 38 and document 39 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask whether you recall having seen those intercepted Japanese messages.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I saw this in several successive parts as it was received, decrypted, and passed out in the secret book I spoke of.

Mr. SONNETT. The first, Admiral, for the sake of the record, is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, advising that the [402] Japanese had deliberated on the American proposal of the 26th of November and had drawn up a memorandum for the United States which would be in a separate message in fourteen parts?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And also directed that the long message to the United States should be presented at a time to be specified in a separate message, is that correct?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the second, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, consists of the fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, does it not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. As I recall, the date is the East Longitude date and the first thirteen parts were available to us on our date of December 6th, and the fourteenth part not till the early morning of December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I also show you document 41 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, a message from Tokyo to Washington, December 7, 1941, directing the Japanese Ambassador to submit to the United States Government the Japanese reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th, Washington time. Do you recall having seen that message?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall having seen it, but I heard it mentioned on the 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, any discussion on December 7th concerning the significance of the time set for delivery of the Japanese reply, namely, 1 p. m. Washington time, and the relationship of that time to times at Pearl Harbor and in the Far East?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I recall the discussion of the relationship [403] between the times, but whether that discussion was before or after the actual attack I do not at this moment recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state, Admiral, who participated in the discussion and what was said?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Perhaps I had better mention the discussion of the fourteenth part. On arriving at the Office of Naval Intelligence shortly after 8 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the 7th, I saw the fourteenth part and went to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where, as I recall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral Turner were present. There was a discussion that the tone of the fourteenth part presaged, if not actually promised, early overt acts, which still, to our best knowledge and indication, would be directed against Thailand and the Malay Peninsula and possibly the Philippines. As I recall, Admiral Stark said he would confer at once with General Marshall. At that time the 1 o'clock message may have been in hand, but I do not believe so and I don't recall now having heard it discussed until after the actual attack, at which time, in answer to the question, the discussion may have been with Commander McCollum or almost any one on the basis of com-

menting upon the fact that the two times apparently had been simultaneous.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 and exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you recall having seen those dispatches at or about the dates they bear.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall having seen either. They were apparently prepared by the War Plans Section, Op-12. The second I knew had been sent in substance; the first I don't remember.

Mr. SONNETT. The second is the so-called war warning, is it not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[404] Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, discussion, Admiral, was there on the morning of December 7, 1941, concerning the necessity or advisability of informing Admiral Kimmel or other fleet commanders of the prospective 1 p. m. delivery of the Japanese reply?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't remember a discussion of the 1 p. m. delivery. I remember a discussion of the immediate transmission of the status of negotiations indicated by the receipt of the fourteenth part, and my impression at the time was that Admiral Stark was to confer immediately with General Marshall for a joint decision as to notifying the Army and Navy forces in Hawaii and in the Far East.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what, if anything, was done after Admiral Stark and General Marshall conferred on that point?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Only by hearsay.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, on December 7, 1941, what telephonic connections existed between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know. It was in the province of Communications.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know at that time whether or not either the Navy or the Army had a so-called scrambler telephone?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. My impression is the Army had one. I am not sure.

Mr. SONNETT. Was any consideration given at that time, namely, December 7, 1941, to the necessity or advisability of telephoning to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or to other fleet commanders concerning the delivery of the Japanese reply?

[405] Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know, but my recollection is that Admiral Stark was to confer immediately with General Marshall with the view of getting the information and presumably a warning out by the fastest means of communication that were then available.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 14, document 15, and document 24 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which are intercepted Japanese communications between Honolulu and Tokyo, and ask whether you recall having seen those prior to December 7, 1941, or thereafter, and, if so, when.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall seeing these specifically, but I am certain that I did not see them before December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, in the interest of clarity of the record, could we have these three dispatches copied into the record at this point?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The dispatches referred to follow as pages 405A, 405B, and 405C.)

[405A]

[Copy]

A true copy. Attest:

BEN HAROLD,
*Ship's Clerk, USNR.*From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2#253 Re the last part of your #123.^a

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa,^b there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

25877

ARMY 7178

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

^a—not available.^b—Kana spelling.

[405B]

[Copy]

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ——— and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

25874

ARMY 7179

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

A true copy. Attest:

BEN HAROLD,
Ships Clerk, USNR.

[405C]

[Copy]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941
J-19

#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that

they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.

27055

ARMY 8007 (Japanese)

Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

A true copy. Attest:

BEN HAROLD,
Ships Clerk, USNR.

[406] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, these three dispatches indicate specific Japanese interest in the preparations for defense of Oahu against air attack, do they not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And it appears that they were translated by the Army after the attack, although they were dated prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. On the fact of them the note as to the date of translation would so indicate it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you know what the explanation may be for the delay in translating these messages?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. Possibly circuit delays in the original coded text reaching Washington. Possibly a jam in the decoding office, caused perhaps by the long diplomatic message which was then being decoded about December 6th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, that prior to this time there were other messages available in Washington showing that the Japanese were interested specifically in the location and movements of American ships in Pearl Harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No, not prior to that time.

Mr. SONNETT. May I call your attention, Admiral, to documents 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of exhibit 13 and ask whether they refresh your recollection on that point?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. The first three of these I do not recall and they were apparently dated and translated before my taking over the office. Number 7, dated November 20th and translated December 4th, requesting an investigation of the fleet bases, I should have seen but do not now recall. The same applies to number 9, dated November 18th, [407] translated December 5th, requesting data as to vessels anchored in a certain area in Pearl Harbor and in Manila Bay. Number 10, dated November 18th and noted as translated on December 6th, giving specific information about movements of ships, I am sure I did not see before December 7th and I do not recall having seen it thereafter. The remainder were translated after the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it your belief, Admiral, prior to the attack on December 7, 1941, that the Japanese agents in or around Pearl Harbor were interested in United States ships in the harbor?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I believe they were and I believe they were reporting them, but my belief was that they were concerned in the presence of the fleet with a view to its availability for distant operations rather than its susceptibility as a target.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to document 11 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and document 14 and ask whether you recall having seen those documents.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I believe I recall them both.

Mr. SONNETT. Those messages, Admiral, indicated that the Japanese had established deadlines beyond which there would be no further diplomatic negotiation with the United States, did they not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And referring, Admiral, particularly to the message of November 22, 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, translated on the same date, it indicated that Tokyo had fixed the 29th of November as a deadline and that that deadline absolutely could not be changed and after that things were automatically going to happen, did it not?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[408] Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to document 18 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court record, a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 28, 1941, translated November 28, 1941, do you recall having seen that at or about that time?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, that message indicated, did it not, that Tokyo regarded the November 26th note of the United States as a humiliating proposal?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And that with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal, the negotiations would be *de facto* ruptured, but that Tokyo wanted them to be careful to avoid giving the impression that negotiations were broken off?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, what consideration was given to the question of the necessity or desirability of sending to Admiral Kimmel copies of these various Japanese messages which were intercepted?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know. That was in the province of the Chief of Operations. As I have said, there was great reluctance to disseminate the knowledge of our code-breaking activities.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you please state what the arrangements were for the exchange of intelligence with the Army?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. There was a complete liaison between the decrypting agencies and complete exchange of actual texts immediately after their transcription into a smooth copy. The two Far Eastern Sections of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence were in daily and, in fact, hourly contact by telephone and by frequent exchange of visits. The head [409] of Military Intelligence, General Miles, was in constant telephonic and other contact with me and, in fact, he was at dinner at my house when the first thirteen parts of the diplomatic message were brought to us at approximately 11:30 the night of December 6th, at which time we both ascertained that they had been shown to higher authorities in our two Departments.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, what information concerning the location or movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished by the Navy to the Army?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. Why, I think everything we had, by this process of interchange between the two Far Eastern Sections. I know that we got information that they picked up with respect to Japanese Army movements and activities and, of course, from time to time some of our agents would report something having to

do with the Japanese Army and some of theirs something concerning the Japanese Navy, but all information was constantly interchanged.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not any information of significance came to your attention prior to December 7, 1941, which had been obtained from either tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese in Honolulu or from interception of their cable messages here?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No. Shortly after the attack we got word of the so-called "flower" telephone message, and I know that the local intelligence representative, the District Intelligence Officer, had endeavored to obtain copies of cable messages, but had been denied them because of the United States law concerning the integrity of civil communication.

Mr. SONNETT. You do not know, Admiral, then, whether or not, in fact, any copies of Japanese cable messages were secured at Honolulu prior [410] to December 7th?

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I do not believe there were.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I don't think I have anything further. Thank you very much.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. I don't think I have anything to add.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you have anything to add? I would be glad to have you do it.

Vice Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 11:35 a. m., adjourned until 10 a. m..
6 June 1945.)

[411] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SIXTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 10 a. m., Wednesday, 6 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name, sir.

Mr. STREET. George Street.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your occupation, Mr. Street?

Mr. STREET. District Manager, RCA Communications, Incorporated.

Mr. SONNETT. For how long have you been employed by RCA in Honolulu?

Mr. STREET. I have been with the company for over twenty-five years and have been in my present position for almost ten years.

Mr. SONNETT. During 1941, Mr. Street, did you know the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Mayfield?

Mr. STREET. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall that on or about the first week of December, 1941, certain messages were, at the request of the Navy, turned over by you to Captain Mayfield?

Mr. STREET. I do recall, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Were those messages of the Japanese Consul sent from [412] Honolulu?

Mr. STREET. Yes, there were several.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any record, Mr. Street, of the messages which were turned over at that time to Naval Intelligence?

Mr. STREET. Not now. They were legally destroyed.

Mr. SONNETT. Does your company have at any place copies of those messages?

Mr. STREET. To the best of my knowledge and belief, copies of all messages transmitted to and from Honolulu will be in the files of our company at 28 Geary Street, San Francisco.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Mr. Street, that when you said copies of the messages had been destroyed, you mean they had been destroyed locally in the Honolulu office?

Mr. STREET. Locally, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Pursuant to the authority of the Federal Communications Commission?

Mr. STREET. Yes, pursuant to the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission. It was simply a matter of my lack of storage space.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Mr. Street, whether or not, to the best of your recollection, all messages sent by the Japanese Consul during the first week of December, 1941, were turned over to Naval Intelligence?

Mr. STREET. They were.

Admiral HEWITT. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Street?

Mr. STREET. Here are three copies of press messages filed from Honolulu on December 4th and 5th which I do not recall were given to Captain Mayfield previously.

[413] Mr. SONNETT. Can you identify the senders of each of those messages?

Mr. STREET. The message of December 4th, addressed Yomiuri, Tokyo, was filed by Mrs. M. Mori, Correspondent. The two messages of December 5th, addressed Asahi, Tokyo, were filed by Mr. Onodera, Correspondent.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral, for Mr. Street.

Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 10:20 a. m., adjourned until 9:35 a. m., 7 June 1945.)

[414] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

SEVENTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, at 9:35 a. m., Thursday, 7 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rate.

Radioman HUMPHREY. Richard W. Humphrey, radioman third class, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, 1941, you were on duty at the radio station at Bishop's Point, Oahu, were you not?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I was.

Mr. SONNETT. Under whose jurisdiction did that station come?

Radioman HUMPHREY. At that time it came under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you acquainted with one C. E. Gibson?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I was.

Mr. SONNETT. And also one R. B. Moyle?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I was.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state where, to the best of your knowledge, they are now located?

Radioman HUMPHREY. To the best of my knowledge, Moyle was last known to be on a train in Florida as a shore patrolman and Gibson was a flag radioman aboard an LST.

[415] Mr. SONNETT. Who was the duty officer on December 7, 1941, at that station?

Radioman HUMPHREY. The duty officer was Lieutenant Commander A. E. Kilhefner.

Mr. SONNETT. And do you know where he is now located?

Radioman HUMPHREY. To the best of my knowledge, he is now located at a naval air station in Brazil.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time did you come on duty on December 7, 1941?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I came on duty approximately ten minutes until 8 o'clock.

Mr. SONNETT. In the morning?

Radioman HUMPHREY. In the morning, yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which is a copy of the radio log of the station for December 7, 1941, consisting of two pages, and note on the reverse side of each page a certification of that log by you, is that correct?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That is correct. I certified that this is a copy of the log that we kept at the Section Base.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the log has at the left-hand side times from 1445 to 1830. Those are Greenwich times, are they not?

Radioman HUMPHREY. They are. That is Greenwich Civil Time. Mr. SONNETT. And that would be comparable to 0415 to 0800, local Pearl Harbor time?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the entries in the log from 1445, Greenwich time, to 1508, Greenwich time, that would be from 0415 to 0438, [416] would it not, Pearl Harbor time?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. And do you find there a record of a conversation between the WARD and the CONDOR?

Radioman HUMPHREY. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, in substance, will you state what that conversation was?

Radioman HUMPHREY. In substance, it is a conversation between the two ships, trying to determine the position of a submarine operating in a restricted area.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there any indication that that conversation was addressed to your station or to the Inshore Patrol or to any one else for action?

Radioman HUMPHREY. No, there is no indication of any such thing. It is purely a conversation between the two ships.

Mr. SONNETT. In the event that your station had taken any action by way of reporting that conversation to the Inshore Patrol by radio, would that have appeared subsequently in the log?

Radioman HUMPHREY. Had we relayed this conversation to the Inshore Patrol by radio on this frequency, it would have appeared in this log.

Mr. SONNETT. And you find no record of such action in the log?

Radioman HUMPHREY. No such entry in the log.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 2 of the log, there is a report, is there not, by the WARD of having attacked a submarine?

Radioman HUMPHREY. There is.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time, both Greenwich and local, was that report logged?

[417] Radioman HUMPHREY. That is 1721, Greenwich time, and the message was transmitted again at 1723, Greenwich time, which makes it 0653, local time.

Mr. SONNETT. And that message was addressed by the WARD to whom?

Radioman HUMPHREY. That was addressed by the WARD to Commander, Inshore Patrol.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(A brief recess was taken.)

[418] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Captain DYER. Thomas H. Dyer, Captain, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Captain?

Captain DYER. I am Officer in Charge of the Cryptanalytical and Decrypting Section, Fleet Radio Unit, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

Mr. SONNETT. In December, 1941, were you associated with that unit or its predecessor?

Captain DYER. I have been associated with that unit and its predecessor since 2 July, 1936.

Mr. SONNETT. Who else, Captain, besides yourself was engaged in decryption work at that unit during December, 1941?

Captain DYER. Lieutenant Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN, was my principal assistant; Chief Yeoman Arnold M. Conant, Chief Radioman Woodward—I will have to look up his initials for you—several other enlisted personnel and several Reserve officers who had recently reported for duty and were under training, whose names I do not now recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander Wright is now at Bainbridge Island, is he not, Captain?

Captain DYER. I have been so informed.

Mr. SONNETT. And I think you also told me that you had been informed that Woodward is now in Washington?

Captain DYER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Washington, D. C.?

Captain DYER. Washington, D. C.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall where Conant is?

Captain DYER. He is also in Washington, D. C.

[419] Mr. SONNETT. Who was engaged principally in the translation of the decrypted communications in that unit in December, 1941, Captain?

Captain DYER. Captain A. B. Laswell, U. S. Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Commander R. Fullenwider were the principal translators.

Mr. SONNETT. The entire unit, Captain, was under the command of now Captain Rochefort, was it not?

Captain DYER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been testimony, Captain, in previous investigations that during the first week of December, 1941, certain communications of the Japanese Consul were delivered to ONI and by ONI to your unit for decryption and translation. Were you aware of that at the time?

Captain DYER. The only Japanese communications of which I am personally aware were received subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor and were decrypted and translated during the ensuing week.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, whether at any time prior to December 7, 1941, cable messages to or from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu were received by the Navy?

Captain DYER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SONNETT. And I take it that the first time you ever saw a translation of such a message was after December 7, 1941?

Captain DYER. Was either the 9th or the 10th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 29 of this investigation, Captain, which consists of various translations of Japanese messages supplied by Captain Layton, and for your information state that he testified before Admiral Hewitt that he received those on or about December 10th from Captain Rochefort. Do you recall having seen those at or about that time?

Captain DYER. I can definitely recall some of the items and I am [420] reasonably sure I saw all of them at about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation, Captain, which consists of two investigation reports made by ONI at Honolulu, the second of which is dated 14 February 1942, by Lieutenant Stevenson, and which sets forth various messages in translated form, which, according to the report, were learned in their translated form on 11 December 1941, and ask you whether you recall having seen those messages at or about that time, namely, December 11, 1941.

Captain DYER. I am sure I saw some of the messages at about that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you have a file with you of decryptions and translations of Japanese messages?

Captain DYER. I do have a file of certain Japanese diplomatic traffic. Here it is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this, Admiral, as an exhibit with the understanding that the Captain is going to photostat today the beginning of it up to the point indicated by the paper clip and let us have that to take with us tomorrow and will photostat the balance and send it to you at Washington?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. The beginning of the file contains various of the messages referred to in the ONI report and also some of the messages set forth in exhibit 29 which Captain Layton supplied.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The file referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 41.")

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Captain, and as illustrative, I take it, of the other translations and decryptions, will you refer to the [421] pencilled translation of a message dated 6 December 1941, bearing number 02530, and state whether that is a translation of one of the Japanese messages to which you referred?

Captain DYER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. That translation bears the symbol, Captain, PA. Would you state what that indicates?

Captain DYER. That is the designation for one of the many Japanese diplomatic systems and indicates the type of cipher.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a sheet of paper containing various letters and ask you if you can state what that is.

Captain DYER. This paper represents a portion of the decrypting process which was applied to the message you just showed me.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The paper referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 42.")

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, would you similarly photostat this afternoon exhibit 42 so that we may take a photostat and return the original as an exhibit?

Captain DYER. I will.

Mr. SONNETT. And would you, Captain, while we are thinking of it, annex to both exhibit 41 and to exhibit 42 a certificate stating that the photostats you supply are correct photostats of the original files which you have?

Captain DYER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. The PA code then, Captain, was a code which required decryption first into plain Japanese and then translation into English [422] from the Japanese?

Captain DYER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state who did the decryption and translation of this message?

Captain DYER. I am practically certain that the decryption was done by Chief Radioman Woodward. I do not recognize the handwriting and have no way of identifying the translation.

Mr. SONNETT. The decryption in question, Captain, appears in the file, I take it, in written out form immediately behind the translation into English to which we have been referring?

Captain DYER. That is true in the majority of cases.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you have any other file or, to your knowledge, is there any other file in the unit here containing decryptions or translations of Japanese messages which were sent prior to 7 December 1941?

Captain DYER. I believe there is no other file in existence, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.

[423] (The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 11:50 a. m., adjourned until 9:45 a. m., Friday, 8 June 1945.)

[424] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

EIGHTEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9:45 a. m., Friday 8 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Captain FINNEGAN. Joseph Finnegan, Captain, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Captain?

Captain FINNEGAN. Attached to the Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you first become attached to the fleet radio unit?

Captain FINNEGAN. Under regular orders on the 15th of February, '42.

Mr. SONNETT. And had you previously reported to that unit under verbal orders?

Captain FINNEGAN. On either the 9th or the 10th of December, 1941, under verbal orders of Admiral Kimmel, I reported there for temporary duty.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to that time what was your assignment, Captain?

Captain FINNEGAN. Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral David W. Bagley, Commander Battleship Division Two, USS TENNESSEE.

Mr. SONNETT. You are a translator of Japanese, Captain, are you not?

Captain FINNEGAN. Yes.

[425] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what your training and experience have been in the translation of Japanese?

Captain FINNEGAN. I took the regular Japanese language course, attached to the American Embassy in Tokyo, 1934 to 1937, followed by fourteen months of work in radio intelligence.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation, which contains twenty-eight pages of Japanese language and work sheets and translations supplied by Captain Dyer of the fleet radio unit, and ask you whether you can identify any of the handwriting in that exhibit as your own.

Captain FINNEGAN. Pages 7 and 8 and 22.

Mr. SONNETT. Page 22, Captain, is a translation of a message, is it not, dated 3 December 1941 from *Kita*? Would you state for the record what your translation of that message was?

Captain FINNEGAN. "WYOMING and two seaplane tenders departed the third."

Mr. SONNETT. Pages 7 and 8, Captain, which you identified, constitute a translation of a message from *Kita* to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, bearing number 02530, does it not?

Captain FINNEGAN. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Is it correct, Captain, that the translation of the 6th of December message, pages 7 and 8, is a translation of the handwritten message appearing on page 9 of the exhibit?

Captain FINNEGAN. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I refer you to document 14 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which appears to be an Army translation of that same message, does it not?

Captain FINNEGAN. It is a translation of the same message and it is marked Army.

Mr. SONNETT. And it bears a translation date indicating translation by the Army on December 8, 1941?

Captain FINNEGAN. It does.

[426] Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Captain, to the last sentence in paragraph 1 of the Army translation, which reads as follows: "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places," and I refer you also to the last sentence of the first paragraph of your translation, page 7 of exhibit 41, reading: "The whole matter seems to have been dropped."

I further invite your attention to the Japanese language message, page 9 of exhibit 41, and ask you to reexamine it and to state whether your translation or the Army translation is correct as to the sentence to which I have directed your attention.

Captain FINNEGAN. Without hesitation, I believe that the Army translation is correct. The position of the sentences doesn't mean anything. You can't compare the last sentence with the last sentence. The last part of the rough work sheet, that is, pages 9 and 10, is fairly garbled or missing groups, but it is quite easy and very logical to fill in the missing groups in garbles, and I would say without hesitation that the Army translation is most probable and probably correct.

Mr. SONNETT. How long had you been away from Japanese, Captain, prior to the time when you translated this message?

Captain FINNEGAN. A little more than three years.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, when did you translate this message?

Captain FINNEGAN. I don't remember the exact date. It was probably the 10th, but certainly not before the 9th of December, 1941.

[427] Mr. SONNETT. Did you translate any Japanese message at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain FINNEGAN. No, I didn't even enter the combat intelligence office.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know of any translation of any of the Japanese consular messages by anybody else prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain FINNEGAN. I do not recognize any of the messages in this file as having been made before that time and it is my distinct impression that all of these were received about the same time and translated if not on one day, within two days of pages 7 and 8, within a period of forty-eight hours, I would say.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[428] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. Monroe Harmon Hubbell, Lieutenant Commander, UNSR.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. At present I am Officer in Charge, Distribution Section, Officer Division, Naval Personnel Office, Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. What were your duties on December 7, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. I was Commanding Officer of the USS CONDOR, AMC-14.

Mr. SONNETT. On the morning of December 7, 1941, were you engaged in sweeping off the mouth of Pearl Harbor?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. We were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall a blinker signal to the USS WARD given by you that morning?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. At about what time was it?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. At approximately 0350.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the substance of the message you sent to the WARD at that time?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. It was indicated to the WARD that we had sighted what appeared to be a periscope of a submarine.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you subsequently have a radio conversation on the TBS with the WARD?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and ask if you find there recorded the radio conversation which you had with the WARD [429] that morning.

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is the substance, to the best of my recollection now.

Mr. SONNETT. And will you state for the benefit of the record the substance of your radio conversation and the time at which it took place?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. It was at approximately 0415 and it had to do with an inquiry from the WARD as to the location and course of the submarine that we had sighted.

Mr. SONNETT. What did you advise the WARD as to the location and course of the submarine?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. As I remember, it is substantially what is stated here, that we gave them the course that we were steering at the time and indicated that at the time the periscope was sighted, that it was not a positive identification, but under the conditions of visibility, it appeared that the course was approximately the same as ours and that shortly thereafter the course of the submarine changed abruptly and our own course changed rather abruptly. At the time the periscope was sighted, it appeared to be heading directly for the entrance buoys.

Mr. SONNETT. Other than your report to the USS WARD, did you make any report of this incident to the inshore patrol or any one else?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. No. The indentification at that time was not positive enough to consider making a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat there.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the Commanding Officer of the WARD, I take it?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, we have a certified copy of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard Duty Officers' information sheets, particularly as of December 6, 1941. [430] I think this might be a good point to receive it as an exhibit for the record if that meets with your approval.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 43.")

Mr. SONNETT. May we note for the record, Admiral, that exhibit 43 provides in part: "The anti-torpedo net will be closed from sunset to sunrise. To be opened and closed only upon orders from the Captain of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or the Yard Duty Officer"?

Commander, at my request you have endeavored to find out, have you not, at what time sunrise occurred at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And what information did you receive on that?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. The word received was that sunrise was at approximately 0727. That is within a few minutes of the actual time.

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract from the signal log of the USS YNG-17?

Commander, what was the USS YNG-17?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That was the gate vessel at the entrance to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. May we receive this, Admiral, at this point?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 44.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract of the quartermaster's log of the USS YNG-17 for the same dates. May we receive that also as an exhibit?

[431] Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 45.")

Mr. SONNETT. Directing your attention to exhibit 45 and to the entries for December 7, 1941, commencing at 0232, Commander, would you read those into the record for the sake of clarity? Then I want to ask you a question about that.

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. (Reading.)

0232 Gate closed.

0447 Commenced opening gate.

0458 Gate opened. White lights.

0508 CROSSBILL stood in.

0532 CONDOR stood in.

0618 Hoisted ball.

Mr. SONNETT. The entries in the log, I take it, Commander, or as to your entering after the CROSSBILL at or about 0532 on December 7, 1941, are in accord with your own log and recollection substantially?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And that is Honolulu time?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the meaning of the entry at 0618 after you stood in "hoisted ball"?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. To my present recollection, that indicated that the gate was open.

Mr. SONNETT. It appears that the next entry on the log is "0800 Japanese air raid." When does it appear that the gate was closed from that log, Commander?

[432] Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. The log indicates that the gate was closed at 0846.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the entry in exhibit 45, Commander, indicating that at 0532 on December 7, 1941, the CONDOR stood in to Pearl Harbor, can you recall what the conditions of visibility were at that time?

Lieut. Comdr. HUBBELL. To the best of my knowledge, they were very good. They were approaching daylight conditions.

Mr. SONNETT. We have one more certified extract of the log, Admiral, which is an extract from the log of the signal tower at the Navy Yard, which, if you approve, we should receive at this point.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 46.")

Mr. SONNETT. May we note, Admiral, for the record at this point that exhibit 46, the log of the signal tower, has an entry at 2250 on December 6, 1941, that the LITCHFIELD cleared and the gate was closed, and that the next entry is 0600, December 7th? There apparently were no entries kept during the morning of December 7, 1941, up to 0600.

I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation then, at 10:12 a. m., adjourned until 3 p. m., Saturday, 9 June 1945, to meet at San Francisco.)

[433] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

NINETEENTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Office of the Commander Western Sea Frontier, Federal Building, San Francisco, California, at 3 p. m., Saturday, 9 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Allan A. Murray, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, what is your present assignment?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, I am on the Staff of the Military Government Staging and Holding Area, Monterey, California.

Mr. SONNETT. What were your duties during December, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. I was one of four watch officers who stood a twenty-four hour round-the-clock watch on the wires coming in which brought in all of the messages, and so forth, that were handed to us for working over.

Mr. SONNETT. In what section, Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Op-20-G.

Mr. SONNETT. That was at Washington?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is right; Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the commanding officer of that section?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Captain Safford.

Mr. SONNETT. And who were the other three watch officers?

[434] Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. There was Brotherhood, Pering, and Brown. Then there was George Linn, who was the senior officer and normally did not stand watch, but when any one was on leave, Linn stood watch.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you standing a watch during the first week of December, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Part of the week, yes. You see, we worked a certain number of watches and then we had forty-eight hours off.

Mr. SONNETT. Who else was on watch that week of those you named?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, Brown was on vacation, so Linn was taking Brown's place, and otherwise the setup was the same.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask you whether you have ever seen that message before.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, but I did not see it in English. You see, I saw it in Japanese *kana* and at that time Commander Kramer was the language officer and, of course, I don't know enough about

the language to read the whole message, but he took out transcripts of this, such as these words here of the four winds, and handed out those words and told us the meaning of those and told us to watch out for those words.

Mr. SONNETT. That was an intercepted Japanese dispatch setting up the so-called "winds" code, was it not, Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is my understanding of it. Anything that I say on this, gentlemen, it is more or less second hand information because I am not a language expert and the only thing I can say about it is what they told me and my instructions in regard to it.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what your instructions were, Commander, in regard to the "winds" code?

[435] Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, my instructions were much the same as they had always been and that is anything of any importance that came in was to get hold of Commander Kramer and Commander Kramer always left word where he was going. He was very faithful in that respect and never moved from one place to another without calling up and telling us where he was; so we knew where he was most of the time. But our orders were in addition to that, if we couldn't get him on the phone, to go and take a car and get him by any means possible in the event of anything of any importance; and if any of those had come in, that is exactly what we would have done.

Mr. SONNETT. That translation of that message was on or about November 28, 1941, was it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Approximately, yes; about a week before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. And is it the fact that efforts were made to monitor for any Japanese message using the so-called, "winds" code?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. As far as I know, every effort was made, using even the Coast Guard to get every possible message that they could get in the hope that they might come through, because it was my understanding—I don't particularly understand this English version here—it was my understanding it would be added in in the plain text news broadcasts that were made. Now, I guess that is essentially what it says here. It says, "In the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave news broadcast." I guess that is the same, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. So far as you know, was any Japanese broadcast or message ever intercepted by any one using the "winds" code words relating to the United States?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Let me explain the whole situation on that, [436] as I mentioned to you before. It never came in on my watch and I was very particular about it and the staff that I had on there, after they had gone over it, I went over it myself to be sure, so that I don't think it is possible it could have gone through on my watch. I was on the day watch of the 4th and the 5th; then I went off on forty-eight hour watch. Now, then, when I came back after Pearl Harbor happened, it is my memory, and I am pretty clear on it, that Linn mentioned that it had come in, but it had come in at a time when they couldn't use it. Now, that is exactly as I remember it, but it did not come in on my watch and I am absolutely certain that up until 4 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th it hadn't come in, because if it had come in on any one's watch other than mine, I cer-

tainly would have known about it because all watch officers passed along the log and all events of preceding watches.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 65, Commander, of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which consists of documents received from the Federal Communications Commission, and direct your attention particularly to documents 2, 3, and 4 and ask whether any of those came to your attention.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Document 4 I never did see. Document 3 I couldn't say because it is in English and I practically never saw any of these messages in English. And Document number 2 the same. Document number 1, I remember that, but I don't remember it from the Army. That was our own organization that gave us that.

Mr. SONNETT. Document number 1, Commander, for the sake of clarity of the record, sets forth the Japanese language to be used for the three signals, does it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And you had the substance of that information, for [437] which you were watching?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. But we had it in Japanese and not in English.

Mr. SONNETT. In Japanese?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes. The first document you showed me there, I remember now that those words used there in Japanese were the words we had on a slip of paper and told to watch for, but we had none of these in English.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, you said that on or about December 7th Linn stated to you it had come in?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. After December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. After December 7th?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state exactly what he said, as best you recall?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, it was in connection with that multi-part message that came in. You see, I was off. I was to go on again at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor Day. I was sitting home, listening to my radio, when I heard the flash and I jumped into a taxicab and reported immediately. It appears then that the word that was passed on to me from the preceding watch officer was that during the night of the 6th a multi-part message had come in, which I understood later was the message that was handed to the Secretary of State the follow day—the multi-part message had come in and they had all gone to work and sweated over it and then during the course of that conversation, Linn mentioned to me—I am quite sure of this, but I can't swear to it—that the "winds" code message had come in, but I don't know whether the Army got it or whether we got it or who. You see, the Army and the Navy there were working two teams and the [438] way the set up was, that on one day—odd or even day; I can't remember which—the Navy handled it; the other day the Army handled it. Now, of course, we, to be perfectly frank about it—we went ahead on our own anyway and I think it was due to the fact that we went ahead on your own that we got a little bit of jump on that multi-part message. You see, actually that multi-part message came in on the day that was supposed to be handled by the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, on December 6th?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, but in view of the urgent circumstances, we went ahead on it anyway, that is, our organization did, and I am quite sure that Linn was on that watch because Brown—the watches got mixed up and Brown normally either preceded me or relieved me and the fact that he was on vacation, I am quite sure that it was Linn that got that multi-part message.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, when Linn said to you that this message had come in, did he indicate when it had come in?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you understand that it had come in about the same time as the multi-part message?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No. My understanding was that it came in later, because the impression I got from him was that they got it too late to do anything about it.

Mr. SONNETT. That would be, then, on December 7th?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Apparently that would be it.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Commander, document 6 and document 11 of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask whether you have seen those documents before.

[439] Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No, I don't ever remember seeing that. That is the first one.

Mr. SONNETT. That is document 6, is it, of the exhibit?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, that is 6.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Commander, can we state what that document is? That is an intercepted Japanese dispatch of what date?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. 27 November.

Mr. SONNETT. And it indicates that a code is set up?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, yes, yes. This designation here J-19, I recognize, too. That usually carried instructions of this kind.

Mr. SONNETT. The dispatch stated, did it not: "With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of dispatches using *ingo denpo* (hidden word or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully"? Then it lists a series of code words, does it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes, it gives the code word and the meaning that the code word will have.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar with the establishment by the Japanese of the so-called hidden word code as indicated in that exhibit?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. No, I wasn't.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to the next document, which is 11?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That I could have seen. You see, again if I had seen that, gentlemen—well, it was in code—

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Commander, would you read that into the record, too?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. "Relations between Japan and England are not [440] in accordance with expectations."

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of it?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. 7 December.

Mr. SONNETT. From whom and to whom?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. From Tokyo, a circular.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not, Commander, Linn was referring to that message of December 7th when he said to you that a message had come in employing the "winds" code?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Well, I am not sure what he was referring to, except this, that we all had the "winds" code on our mind and we even dreamt about it at night. We just were on our toes and on edge, looking and waiting for that thing, and as soon as he said it came in but too late to use, well, there was only one thing that came to our mind, and I will be perfectly frank about it. It was no definite specification made on it or anything further said.

Mr. SONNETT. If a "winds" code message had come in relating to England on December 7, 1941, would it have been translated the same as document 11 of exhibit 13?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Would it have been translated the same as 11? You mean written up in that form?

Mr. SONNETT. In substance, would it have conveyed the same meaning?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. I believe it would, yes, but again I have the language difficulty to contend with and I can say it is my belief that it would have been that way.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, what I have in mind is, Commander, the "winds" code established a code the use of which would signify a break in diplomatic relations between this country, England, Russia, and Japan.

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Yes.

[441] Mr. SONNETT. That was also true of the hidden word code, was it not?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. As indicated?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the message you have before you, which is document 11 of exhibit 13, conveyed the substance of the message which could have been sent in either the "winds" code or the hidden word code?

Lieut. Comdr. MURRAY. Right. In other words, it infers a warning that something is going to happen.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. I think that is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[442] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank.

Commander WRIGHT. Wesley A. Wright, Commander, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present assignment, Commander?

Commander WRIGHT. I am Officer in Charge of the naval radio activities, Bainbridge Island.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your assignment on December 7, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. Assistant Communications Officer, Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, on temporary duty in combat intelligence unit, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, had you been on that duty?

Commander WRIGHT. Since March 31, '41.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was in charge of that activity, Commander?
 Commander WRIGHT. Then Lieutenant Commander J. J. Rochefort.

Mr. SONNETT. And what were your duties in that unit?

Commander WRIGHT. Assistant Cryptanalyst.

Mr. SONNETT. Who else was engaged in cryptanalysis activities in that unit at that time?

Commander WRIGHT. Lieutenant Commander T. H. Dyer was the senior cryptanalyst and myself and we had an ensign, a Reserve, who had been there since December, '40—I think it was Wurner. We had a lieutenant, Reserve, by the name of Underwood; a chief yeoman by the name of Woodward; Chief Yeoman Rorie.

Mr. SONNETT. Is this all in decrypting?

Commander WRIGHT. All of those up to Rorie were actually engaged in decrypting and clerical.

[443] Mr. SONNETT. Woodward?

Commander WRIGHT. No. Rorie. Woodward was entirely decrypting and language assistance. Chief Yeoman Conant. Lieutenant Hopewick was available for decrypting work. His primary duties were with the IBM machines. I believe that is all.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, you recall, I take it, that during the early part of December, 1941, certain messages of the Japanese Consul in Hawaii were secured and worked on by your unit?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall approximately when those messages were received in your unit?

Commander WRIGHT. I am afraid I couldn't answer that definitely. I have discussed these things so much since that I know we got them on the 5th now, but that would be absolutely hearsay.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, I show you exhibit 29 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of translated dispatches to and from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu during the first week in December, 1941, and ask you whether you recall that they were among the dispatches received and translated at that time.

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, I believe they were among the dispatches that were delivered to us by the naval intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you exhibit 40 of this investigation and call to your attention the second ONI report contained in that exhibit, dated 14 February 1942, and ask you whether the translated Japanese messages set forth in that report were among those received prior to December 7, 1941.

Commander WRIGHT. I would say that they were all received together. [444] It is my recollection that we got them all on the 5th. It would have been very difficult for us to get one that was sent on the 6th—no, not necessarily; if it was sent the 6th Tokyo time, we could have got it on the 5th. I would state that I am fairly positive on those up to and including the day of the 5th. Those that are dated the 6th, I am not so sure about them; but I don't remember the second package coming in.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, did you work on the decryption of any of those messages which came in up to and including December 5, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. Not directly, no. In a supervisory capacity, I watched Woodward's work.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it Woodward, then, who did the bulk of the decryption?

Commander WRIGHT. Woodward, I believe, did all of the decryption with some clerical assistance.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation, Commander, which consists of twenty-eight pages of photostats of handwritten and typed decryptions and translations, and ask you whether you can identify the handwriting on any of those pages.

Commander WRIGHT. No, I am afraid I couldn't recognize the handwriting positively. I am quite sure that between Woodward and Laswell—they are in Washington—they can all be identified. They are both there in Washington, and Laswell was the translating unit out there at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Commander, whether any of the messages to or from the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii which were delivered to the Navy prior to December 7, 1941, was decrypted and translated before the attack?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I don't know whether any were or not. I have been under the impression that there were none delivered to Layton previously, but if he has testified differently, he is probably correct. I wouldn't [445] have been involved in it myself.

Mr. SONNETT. My question wasn't whether they were delivered to Layton, but whether there was any decrypted and translated prior to the attack.

Commander WRIGHT. I don't know. Again, I think Laswell and Woodward can give you a better answer.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, were you familiar with the establishment of the so-called "winds" code by the Japanese on or about November 28, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, it came to my attention at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, document 15, and ask you whether you were familiar with that dispatch of the substance of it.

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. That is the so-called "winds" code, is it not?

Commander WRIGHT. That is setting up the wind warning.

Mr. SONNETT. Are you familiar with the efforts which were made to monitor for any Japanese message employing that code?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes. As I remember it, immediately after the receipt of this message, we set a watch, a twenty-four hour watch, on those broadcasts at the radio station, one language officer on for every four hours.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the results, if any?

Commander WRIGHT. No message of that nature was intercepted by our unit.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know of the receipt by any one of a "winds" code message relating to the United States prior to December 7, 1941?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I do not know of such. That is, the execute.

Mr. SONNETT. Did any information ever come to your attention which was received as a result of tapping the telephone wires of the

Japanese [446] Consulate, that is, prior to December 7, 1941?
 Commander WRIGHT. No.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, 1941, Commander, you were on duty at the unit at Pearl Harbor, were you not?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And during the course of that day, it has been indicated by previous investigations, there were various radio bearings received as to the location of the attacking force. You testified before Admiral Hart that there was an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the southward. Is that your recollection?

Commander WRIGHT. I would say there was a general impression that the enemy forces were to the south.

Mr. SONNETT. There was one bearing, was there not, which was in direct conflict with the other bearings and indicated that the attacking force was almost due north?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, but the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of that bearing were such that it was never given the prominence that it possibly might have had.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state fully what those circumstances were, please?

Commander WRIGHT. The large direction finder which we then had had out at Lualualei, CXK, the only means of communication we had between Lualualei and our unit there at Pearl Harbor was by an Army mega-telephone and all those mega-telephones were put out of commission and we had no communication contact with the station; so we finally raised the station by radio from Admiral Kimmel's headquarters and received one bearing by radio which indicated a northern direction.

[447] Mr. SONNETT. About what time of day was that? Do you remember?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I am afraid I don't. I would say offhand maybe 10:30, 11 o'clock.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken as a result of having obtained that bearing?

Commander WRIGHT. No, I don't believe it made—it had influenced the opinion at all that the forces were to the south.

Mr. SONNETT. Was the direction finder at Lualualei a one directional or reciprocal—

Commander WRIGHT. The CXK is unilateral.

Mr. SONNETT. Unilateral?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, it gives a true direction.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any other CXK's being used in the area at that time?

Commander WRIGHT. No, the only other one we had at that time was in Mare Island.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any information received from the Army on December 7, 1941, as to the radar bearings of the attacking forces? Do you know whether any information was received?

Commander WRIGHT. To the best of my knowledge, there was none received by our unit.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, I call your attention to documents 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 of exhibit 13 of this in-

vestigation, which are all copies of Japanese dispatches relating to ships and defense preparations in the Pearl Harbor area, and ask you whether prior to December 7, 1941, you saw any of those dispatches.

Commander WRIGHT. No. To the best of my recollection, none of these [448] messages were transmitted to or received by our unit prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Commander, specifically to document 14 of this exhibit, which is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 6, 1941, in the PA-K2 system, dealing with barrage balloons, and also call your attention to pages 7 and 8 of exhibit 41, which is a pencilled translation, and ask you whether those are translations of the same message.

Commander WRIGHT. Yes, undoubtedly two different translations of the same message.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention to the last sentence of the first paragraph of document 14, which indicates that it is an Army translation, does it not?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And the last sentence reads: "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places." I call your attention to the last sentence of the first paragraph of page 7 of exhibit 41, which reads: "The whole matter seems to have been dropped"—which indicates a different translation of that portion of the message, does it not?

Commander WRIGHT. It certainly indicates a different interpretation of the Japanese in that portion.

Mr. SONNETT. Have you any information about the difference in translation, Commander?

Commander WRIGHT. None at all.

Mr. SONNETT. And you do not know, I take it, who made the translation contained on pages 7 and 8 of exhibit 41?

Commander WRIGHT. Not offhand. I would guess it was Fullenwider, [449] but it is either Laswell or Fullenwider or possibly Rochefort. I would guess from this one it was possibly Fullenwider.

Mr. SONNETT. The messages in exhibit 13 to which I have called your attention just now, Commander, indicate that many of them were translated by the Army, do they not?

Commander WRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know how the Army received those messages in the first place and, secondly, what their procedure was for decrypting and translating them?

Commander WRIGHT. Roughly, as I remember it, we had a joint source of obtaining all the diplomatic traffic. We had our own intercept stations and they had their own intercept stations. We pooled the intercepts. Then they had a day by day arrangement whereby the Navy didn't necessarily work on all the traffic for that day, but the Navy was responsible for all of the translations for that day and the Army was responsible—if it were the odd days, then the Navy would be the even days; but both units works on all of the messages. The Army on there just indicates that it was the Army's date to be responsible for that particular message.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state from those particular exhibits what Army intercept station intercepted them, that is, referring to the same ship movement and defense preparation messages?

Commander WRIGHT. In general, I would say that the numerals indicated Army and the letters indicated Navy. I am not sure of that. You can get better information on that from the people that were in Washington at that time. Murray, I think, would probably know it. That is what it looks like to me, that the letters were Navy and the numerals Army. The letter "S" would indicate that the message was intercepted at Bainbridge Island.

[450] Mr. SONNETT. Was any decryption done at Bainbridge Island, Commander? Do you know?

Commander WRIGHT. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Where was the decryption done of the Japanese messages which were intercepted?

Commander WRIGHT. In accordance with the assignment of cryptanalytical tasks, all of the decryption of diplomatic traffic was done either at Washington or at Cavite.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Commander WRIGHT. I have nothing. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:52 p. m. adjourned until 2:15 p. m., 19 June 1945.)

[451] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTIETH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2:15 p. m., Tuesday, 19 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Beecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, please.

Captain EARLE. John B. Earle, Captain, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your assignment on December 7, 1941, Captain?

Captain EARLE. Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And for how long had you been in that assignment?

Captain EARLE. Since June 9, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified previously, as I recall it, Captain, that in the several months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor you had about ten or fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor. Can you recall what those reports were?

Captain EARLE. Very indefinitely. They generally came from sampans—from fishing boats; occasionally from Army lookout posts; and now and then from planes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, the nature of the last report received prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain EARLE. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, do you recall specifically any report of submarine sighting or contact in the months of October, November, and up to [452] December 6, 1941?

Captain EARLE. No, I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall, Captain, whether prior to December 7, 1941, there was any report of a submarine just off the entrance to Pearl Harbor?

Captain EARLE. As I recall, there had been such a report, but whether it was official and not simply unofficial, I can't say at this time.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether that report was a contact or sighting, Captain?

Admiral HEWITT. You mean destroyer contact.

Mr. SONNETT. Destroyer contact or sighting.

Captain EARLE. I can't recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Did any report of a submarine contact prior to December 7, 1941, involve a depth charge on the submarine or suspected submarine?

Captain EARLE. My recollection is not sufficiently accurate to say whether or not I can recall that point. I have a vague recollection of

something of that kind, but not sufficiently accurate to make a definite statement.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall, Captain, whether any report prior to December 7, 1941, involved firing upon a submarine or a suspected submarine?

Captain EARLE. I am almost certain that there was no such report.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and direct your attention particularly to the conversation recorded at about 0520 Pearl Harbor time of that date between the WARD and the CONDOR, and ask whether that conversation or the fact of such a conversation came to your attention prior to the attack on December 7th?

Captain EARLE. It did not.

[453] Mr. SONNETT. You will note on the second page of that exhibit, Captain, a report by the WARD of its attack upon a submarine. That report did come to your attention prior to the attack, as I understand your previous testimony.

Captain EARLE. That report did come to my attention but not in the wording that it is included in the log of the section base.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state, Captain, the report of that conversation which was received by you on December 7, 1941, and state the time approximately at which you received it?

Captain EARLE. About 0710 I was informed by the Operations Duty Officer, Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, that he had received a message from the WARD to the effect that "We have attacked and fired on a submarine."

Admiral HEWITT. Nothing about depth charges?

Captain EARLE. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. That report, Captain, was a more specific report, was it not, than any previous report concerning submarine contact which had been received by you?

Captain EARLE. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What action was taken on the report?

Captain EARLE. As I recall it, I immediately told the watch officer to inform the Commander-in-Chief's Operation Officer and to take steps to get the relief destroyer ready to proceed out of the harbor, to get the message checked and verified and attempt to find out what further action was being taken by the WARD. I then called the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, informed him of what had been done, and talked the situation over with him for some time with a view to deciding what other action should be taken. Our reaction was that it was probably a mistake as we had had numerous reports of sighting of submarines, but that if it were not a [454] mistake, the WARD could take care of the situation and the relief destroyer could lend a hand, while the Commander-in-Chief had the necessary power to undertake any other action which might be desired. Mainly we were trying to definitely determine what had happened.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Captain, that no further action was taken on that report prior to the air attack on December 7th?

Captain EARLE. No other action was taken by me. I believe that in addition to that, that Commander Momsen, who was the Operations Officer, was contacted and told to take station. We were vaguely

alarmed but could see no specific threat involved except that by the possible position of an enemy submarine in that area.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask whether you saw that and were familiar with that prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain EARLE. It is my recollection that I saw this before December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to page 6 of that exhibit, Captain, sub-paragraph (m) (3), would you read that into the record, sir?

Captain EARLE. "It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

Mr. SONNETT. Were you in agreement, Captain, there with that statement of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the fleet?

[455] Captain EARLE. Most certainly in agreement, based upon the belief that such an attack might take place after the declaration of war.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring, Captain, to page 1 of that letter, you will find two assumptions stated. Would you read assumption (b) into the record? I suggest doing it that way because it has been some time since you have seen that exhibit, and also it will be clearer in the record.

Captain EARLE (reading):

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

(1) Sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) To block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by;

(1) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Captain, coming back to the previous question, it appears, does it not, that one of the assumptions of the security letter was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise Japanese attack? Having that in mind and turning to the statement that you previously read concerning the presence of a submarine, will you state why, on the morning of December 7, 1941, upon receipt of the report from the WARD, it was not believed that a large Japanese force might be in the offing and why appropriate action was not taken on that belief?

[456] Captain EARLE. In the first place, we were not sure of this supposed contact. It still seemed to have a possibility of being in error. This was particularly strengthened by a later report received from the WARD which said that she was proceeding to escort a sampan toward Honolulu. We couldn't imagine that the WARD, having actually attacked a submarine, would leave her post to proceed to Honolulu if it were a real attack. In the second place, we had no

force immediately available to resist any attack as far as the District was concerned, except the relief destroyer, and we felt that by referring the matter to the Commander-in-Chief, that we had done all that we possibly could even if the attack were real.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to the previous submarine contact reports, that is, prior to December 7, 1941, were any air searches conducted as a result of those reports?

Captain EARLE. It is my recollection that there were air searches, but we in the District had no control over these air searches and we had no airplanes ourselves, so that we assumed that when information was referred to the Commander-in-Chief, that all necessary action would be taken.

Mr. SONNETT. With respect, Captain, to the question of aircraft reconnaissance, it appears from the previous investigations that some time in July or August of 1941 Admiral Bloch suggested to Admiral Kimmel that reconnaissance be conducted on a sector towards Jaluit. Have you any information in connection with that?

Captain EARLE. I have not.

Mr. SONNETT. And you do not know what the reasons were for the suggestions made by Admiral Bloch?

Captain EARLE. I do not recall.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a certified collection of documents [457] which contains Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, this being dated 28 March 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about the time it was issued.

Captain EARLE. I do not recall definitely having seen this document, but inasmuch as when I reported as Chief of Staff in June I was shown all of the existing orders, it is very probable that I saw this.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, this contains various other documents which we don't presently need, but since it is certified, I wonder whether we shouldn't take it now as an exhibit and we can refer to it with the Captain. Some of the provisions will be of interest.

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 47.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 47, Captain, which we have just been discussing, it appears that it was approved April 2, 1941, and signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short, does it not?

Captain EARLE. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Paragraph 2 of the exhibit provides for joint air operations and paragraph 4 for joint anti-aircraft measures, including arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, and other items. Would you, referring to this exhibit, Captain, discuss what joint exercises and drills were held with the Army as a general practice in the months preceding the attack under the joint anti-aircraft procedure?

Captain EARLE. As I recall, definite problems were prepared for training purposes which would serve to develop the control features of the base anti-aircraft defense and at the same time develop the necessary coordination between the operations of the Army and Navy air components. Frequent [458] drills—I should say about once every ten days—were held in which planes would fly over the

Pearl Harbor area both day and night and the ships in the harbor would stimulate anti-aircraft fire on these planes. The entire Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors and there was a naval sector commander on a ship who was responsible for controlling the individual fire of that sector and make the necessary reports. In addition to the above, a problem was developed about once a month or less in which a definite target for aircraft was placed on a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor at a certain time and the warning was sent in to both the Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was on such and such a bearing, distance so much. At that time the various provisions of air control were used in that, fighter planes were sent aloft and bombers were actually sent out to intercept and attack the simulated target offshore. I am not certain exactly how many drills of this type were had before Pearl Harbor on December 7th, but I should say at least three.

Mr. SONNETT. When was the latest of the three, Captain?

Captain EARLE. I am sorry, but I couldn't say exactly.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall whether any such drill was held between November 27th and December 7th, that is, roughly in the two weeks preceding the attack?

Captain EARLE. I cannot recall.

Admiral HEWITT. What was the command staff setup for carrying out joint operations as between the District and the Army command in such exercises?

Captain EARLE. You mean before Pearl Harbor?

Admiral HEWITT. Any such exercise, before Pearl Harbor and what was set up after?

Captain EARLE. My recollection is colored from operations that took [459] place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an enemy had been sighted on a certain bearing, this word was given to the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations, including orders as to—detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.

To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage.

After the war started, a joint command post was set up immediately in the Operations Office of the Fourteenth Naval District and operated there for several months while the Army moved their principal com-

mand center to the Crater. Shortly after their move, the Navy moved its command center next to the Army center in the Crater.

Admiral HEWITT. That is, Fourteenth Naval District——

Captain EARLE. Fourteenth——

Admiral HEWITT. Or District and the Commander-in-Chief?

Captain EARLE. No, District; just the District.

[460] Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, Captain, the Fourteenth Naval District had a Liaison Officer with General Short's headquarters, did you not?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. What, in general, were his duties, Captain?

Captain EARLE. He was sent up to the Army to report to the Commanding General for duty as Liaison Officer and to perform such duties in that connection as would be required.

Mr. SONNETT. Exhibit 47, Captain, the Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, provided in part that the Army would expedite the installation and placing in operation of an aircraft warning service. During the period of completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warnings of hostile attacks as might be practicable. What steps were taken, in general, Captain, by the Navy to carry out that agreement?

Captain EARLE. In the first place, communications were established with the Army over radio nets and teletype system so that any information that came in could be sent promptly to the Army stations interested. The communication activities were informed that prompt reports must be made concerning any possible enemy activity. The few destroyers assigned to the District had the necessary instructions as to reporting contacts. There were no planes attached to the District, but it is my recollection that fleet planes were instructed to forward immediately any information to that extent. The District Communications Officer was thoroughly aware of the necessity for getting prompt information of enemy contacts to the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. To what extent, Captain, were you or Admiral Bloch kept informed concerning the reconnaissance being performed by the fleet panes in the months preceding the attack?

[461] Captain EARLE. I can't speak for Admiral Bloch, but as far as I am concerned, I had no information unless I came by it casually, following some special report of a sighting.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you a collection of dispatches relating to submarine contacts reported in November and December, 1941, some of which were sent for information to ComFOURTEEN, and ask you whether these are the type of reports of submarine contacts received prior to the attack to which you referred previously in your testimony.

Captain EARLE. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 48".)

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring again to exhibit 47, which is Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, it appears that the Army was to expedite the installation and placing

in operation of an aircraft warning service. It appears from previous investigations that some request was made of ComFOURTEEN for Navy liaison officers to work with the Army aircraft warning service. Do you have any knowledge or information concerning that?

Captain EARLE. The only information I have is that there was a naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their warning system installed and operating, who came to me at one time and asked for help and I told him to apply to the District Communications Officer, who would be glad to give him every possible assistance. This officer also mentioned that a certain number of naval liaison officers would be necessary at this warning center, to which I replied that we had no spare personnel in the District for that purpose as [462] we were extremely short in every department. The officer then stated that he would see what he could do to get liaison officers from the fleet, and it was my impression that no further action would be taken by the District unless the fleet found it necessary. It might be of interest to note that after Pearl Harbor liaison officers were supplied, but they all came from ships that had been damaged or sunk in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. While we are on the subject of the Army radar system, Captain, do you recall what reports you received from the Army relative to the bearing of planes or bearings of planes, received on December 7th, showing in which direction they departed from Pearl Harbor?

Captain EARLE. So far as I know, I never saw such information.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, the District Intelligence Officer was Captain Mayfield, was he not?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. And the radio intelligence unit was under then Lieutenant Commander Rochefort?

Captain EARLE. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you receive the daily communication intelligence summaries prepared by the radio intelligence unit, such as those contained in exhibit 22 of this investigation (handing the exhibit to the witness)?

Captain EARLE. No, I did not. These summaries were considered of such secret matter that the Commandant of the District wished as few as possible to see them.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not such summaries came to Admiral Bloch's attention?

Captain EARLE. I do not, but I imagine they did.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any information prior to December 7, 1941, [463] concerning any telephone taps on the lines of the Japanese Consul or Vice Consul in Honolulu?

Captain EARLE. I have no information on that subject.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not any cables of the Japanese Consul in Honolulu were intercepted prior to December 7, 1941?

Captain EARLE. I do not know.

Mr. SONNETT. At any time prior to December 7, 1941, did there come to your attention, Captain, any messages of the Japanese Consul relating to ship movements in Pearl Harbor or preparations for defense in Pearl Harbor?

Captain EARLE. There did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, with respect to the dealings of the Fourteenth Naval District with the Army, do you recall what information, if any, was supplied to the Army, particularly relating to movements of Japanese naval forces?

Captain EARLE. I do not know of any information of that character being furnished the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, immediately prior thereto, and between the 1st and the 7th there were various dispatches received at CincPac Headquarters relating to the destruction of codes by the Japanese. Did you have any knowledge of those dispatches?

Captain EARLE. I believe that I saw such a dispatch over at the Commander-in-Chief's office.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether that information was communicated to the Army?

Captain EARLE. I couldn't say. The Fourteenth Naval District didn't communicate it to the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. I think that is all, Admiral.

[464] Admiral HEWITT. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:20 p. m., adjourned until 10:10 a. m., Wednesday, 20 June 1945.)

[465] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-FIRST DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. at 10:10 a. m., Wednesday, 20 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, please?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Oliver H. Underkoffer, Lieutenant, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. Where were you assigned on December 7, 1941, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Communication Office, ComFOURTEEN.

Mr. SONNETT. What duties were you performing on the night of December 6th or morning of December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. I was the communication watch officer on watch.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, of ComFOURTEEN?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time did that watch commence, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. The communication watch officer's watch started at 0800 on the 6th and was supposed to conclude at 0800 on the 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to yourself, who else was present at that time, during that watch?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Ensign Kennedy, now lieutenant.

Mr. SONNETT. And his first name?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. I believe it was Gordon F., but I am not sure.

[466] Mr. SONNETT. On the morning of the 7th until approximately 0630 was Kennedy present with you, listening to the reports that came in, and in a position to hear them?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. No, sir, he was in the coding vault, which was at the far end of the Communication Office and was separated from the Communication Office by a bulkhead, with a port in the bulkhead about twelve inches square; so he was in no position to hear the radio.

Mr. SONNETT. You were standing what you termed a loudspeaker watch, were you not, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you describe what that consisted of?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It was a watch on the inshore patrol frequency, was established each evening at the time the minesweeps went out and commenced sweeping the channel, and we stood watch on that circuit until we received a report from the minesweeps that the channel had been swept and was clear, at which time we secured.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which consists of an extract of the radio log of the Bishop's Point Radio Station for December 7, 1941, and call your attention to the conversation between the WARD and the CONDOR, having call signs DZ5Y and DN3L, at about 1450 Greenwich time, and ask whether or not that conversation came to your attention.

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you explain why it did not come to your attention, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. On this loudspeaker watch that was set up there was no one assigned to sit by the radio and listen to it. Any one who has stood loudspeaker watches is aware that you listen to it subconsciously, [467] the same as you would any other noise in the vicinity. If your call is given, you hear it just like as if an alarm clock had been rung and you immediately answer the call. If we hadn't been called that morning, we would have paid, or the man on watch would have paid, no attention to the conversation that was carried on.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you remember what your call was?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. SONNETT. By looking at exhibit 18, can you refresh your recollection, particularly the second page?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. From the appearance of the log, it would seem that DW2X was a call for ComFOURTEEN. Those calls were assigned by the District and changed about once every two months and we made no attempt to memorize them.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring again to the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR at about 1450 Greenwich time, what time would that be, Pearl Harbor time?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Pearl Harbor time before the war was plus ten and a half hours, which would make that 4:20.

Mr. SONNETT. Is it the fact that you were not called by either the WARD or the CONDOR and given a report of the sighting of the submarine referred to in that conversation?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to page 2 of exhibit 18, there appears at 1723 Greenwich time, which, I take it, is about 0653 Pearl Harbor time, a record of the report by the WARD of an attack on a submarine. Did that report come to your attention?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It did.

[468] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the circumstances and what action was taken by you?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. There were two dispatches came through to ComFOURTEEN and I was broken out of the bunk as the first one came in and by the time the second one had come in, which came in immediately following, I was alert and received the message and delivered it to the duty officer at ComFOURTEEN.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time on the morning of December 7th had you turned in, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. At approximately 0230.

Mr. SONNETT. And from that time until you were awakened at about 0630 or thereabouts, I take it, you were asleep?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was the supervisor, if you recall, who was awake during that period of time?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. I do not recall who was on watch. I don't recall a single man that was on watch that morning.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether the conversation between the WARD and the CONDOR at about 0420 Pearl Harbor time came to the attention of any one who was standing that watch with you?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. To my knowledge, it did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Would the fact of such a conversation have been reported to you had it come to the attention of some one standing that watch?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, I am sure it would.

Mr. SONNETT. It has been testified previously, Lieutenant, that efforts were made to verify the WARD's report. Have you any knowledge of that?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, sir.

[469] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what you know about that?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. On receipt of the dispatch from the WARD at approximately 0653 Hawaiian time, the dispatch was delivered to the duty officer of ComFOURTEEN, who relayed it to the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District. I was directed to get a verification from the WARD by the duty officer and presumed that this order emanated from the Chief of Staff. I asked if it should be encoded and was instructed that it should be. The message requesting verification was enciphered in a strip code and was delivered over the voice circuit, voice radio circuit, to the WARD. A reply to the request for verification was delivered to ComFOURTEEN by radio and was deciphered at approximately the same time as the first attack by air.

Mr. SONNETT. You stated that you were instructed by the duty officer to have the report of the WARD verified. Did you receive that instruction upon delivery to him of the report by the WARD or subsequent to the delivery?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. It was subsequent to the delivery.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall approximately how long afterwards?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. That has been some time ago and the best of my remembrance, it was between ten and fifteen minutes.

Mr. SONNETT. You kept no log at the Communication Office on the morning of the 7th, did you?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. There are several different types of logs. We did not keep a log of the inshore patrol frequency over which these messages to the WARD were handled.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified, Lieutenant, that you were instructed to request the WARD for verification and to encode your request and that you did so in a strip code. Will you state what that means and the amount of time required to transmit such a message in that code?

[470] Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Use of the strip code is a substitution method, a substitution of letters method, so that when that message has been encoded, it consists of five-letter groups that are

not in any particular arrangement; in other words, indiscriminate letters in the five-letter groups. It is a slow system to use, that is, to encode or decode in, and was used because it was the only thing that the WARD had. The transmission of such a message over a voice circuit requires that each letter be given in its phonetic equivalent, which is a slow process. The reply, of course, was also enciphered and was delivered the same way, which was a lengthy process and took considerable time. I can't tell you how many minutes.

Admiral HEWITT. The original report from the WARD was delivered in clear, was it not?

Lieutenant UNDERKOFER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. That is all.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

Admiral HEWITT. We will recess at this time until 11 o'clock.

(The investigation then, at 10:30 a. m., recessed until 11 a. m., at which time it reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties.)

[471] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Patrick N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you have a statement, do you not, setting forth your duties during December, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we have it copied into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

(The statement referred to follows as pages 471a to 471h, inclusive.)

[471a] On December 6, 1941, and, for several months prior thereto, my duties were as follows:

(1) Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander, Patrol Wing Two. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings One and Two.

(2) Commander, Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two plus other units as assigned by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet for the conduct of specific operations.

(3) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

(4) Liaison with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In connection with the above duties, I functioned under the following seniors:

(a) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as type commander for patrol wings, was based at San Diego.

(b) Commander Scouting Force, the Force Command of which Patrol Wings One and Two were a part.

(c) Directly under Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet in my capacity as Commander, Task Force Nine.

[471b] (d) Under Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force when performing my duties as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(e) Commanders of Task Forces One, Two, and Three for Operation of patrol planes assigned those forces for specific operations.

A change in my status was contemplated in the then current Navy Orange War Plan. Under its provisions, the units of my command were expected to make an early move to bases on the outlying islands Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra.

My own headquarters were to be shifted to Midway. That my responsibilities in this connection were by no means considered light is evidenced by the fact that, just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, this War Plan was being played as a chart maneuver. Further, the squadron, VP-22, designated for maintenance in the highest practicable degree of readiness to expedite the initiation of the war plan move to advance bases was, in fact, transferred to Midway in October 1941.

Reverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March, 1941, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet directed me to report to the Commandant 14th Naval District to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force who, incidentally, was senior to me.

The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the operation plan of [471c] the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined the proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In so far as Naval and Marine Corps air units were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when applicable. Orders from Army sources covering the functioning of their units in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides for these aircraft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based upon the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, and signed by General Martin and myself.

That estimate was based on the conditions as they existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the naval air situation between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of sufficient significance to warrant a reestimate and my information of the Army Air Force indicated an analogous condition.

The estimate, I believed,—and still believe—to be sound. But the orders based on that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction. And the missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command.

Specifically, the organization was designed to function through "mutual cooperation" between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack. As such, the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in the event of an actual emergency or when proper authority so directed.

The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made "available" to it by the various Air Commands of both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported as [471d] available were subject to the operational control of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force or the Army Pursuit Commander in the prevailing category of readiness, only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.

The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills was for the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Force, to send dispatch reading, "Drill, Danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists, Drill". This placed the Search and Attack groups in a functioning status. On receipt of this message, I, in turn, as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units, which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At this point, during such drills, searches were immediately started by planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and their efforts were supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were reported ready for flight.

The term, Command Naval Base Defense Air Force, was actually a misnomer due to the limited composition of that portion of the Air Forces under my operational control, which included only aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detection devices, or anti-aircraft guns.

The term, Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, was even more of a misnomer as it implied authority over operating units to a degree which did not exist. This authority was non-existent until an emergency was apparent, or until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base Defense [471e] Air Force in a functioning status, and, when so called into existence, was limited in scope, in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based upon mutual cooperation. In addition, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the Search and Attack Groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force and was non-existent so far as Army Pursuit aviation and Navy Fighter aviation

were concerned which were to function under Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. Army.

To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, attention is invited to the report of a joint Army-Navy Board dated 31 October, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Area. Paragraph 4 (a) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin as senior Army member and myself as senior Navy member read as follows:

"4. The problem confronting the board as pertains to Army Aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows:

(a) The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out his mission is:

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation.

(2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation."

It was pointed out that, under the Army 54th Group program, 170 B-17's and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill [471f] the above missions.

Naval plans called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directly under the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District to supplement or function in lieu of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO, which might be ordered to advance bases on the outlying islands of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra.

Further, the planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the Naval Base Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18's were being replaced by the more modern B-17's and in Patrol Wings ONE and TWO PBV-1, 2 and 3's were being replaced by PBV-5's. The new types were subject to the usual shake-down difficulties and maintenance problems.

In the case of the Naval PBV-5 planes, there was an almost complete absence of spare parts and, in addition, a program of the installation of armor and leak-proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Considerable difficulty had also been experienced with the cracking of engine nose sections in the first planes of this type received and the installation of modified engine nose sections was in progress.

The major effort of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO during 1941 prior to December 7th was expansion training, operational training, security operations, development and equipping of air facilities—all in preparation for war. Aviation training facilities and output in the Navy at that time were considerably behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. Therefore, particular stress was placed by higher authority on the need for expansion training. This necessitated a planning [471g] of operations whereby each squadron could be required to conduct training for the qualification of additional combat crews not only for their own aircraft, but to form nuclei for new squadrons being commissioned back on the mainland as well. The highest priority was placed upon this feature.

Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was being made to increase the readiness for war. Squadron and patrol plane commanders were indoctrinated with the necessity of keeping their planes so equipped and their crews so trained that at any time during a flight they could be diverted from their peacetime objectives to combat missions.

The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the patrol planes constantly scouting to maximum range, and the bomber aircraft standing by for attack missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein the Naval planes would have been greatly reduced in material readiness and their combat crews approaching an operational fatigue point while the Army pilots would have been in need of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of *timing* with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan, and necessity for specific information as to the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.

The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force did not have the authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except [471h] in the case

of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of the attack on December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority. Orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill" was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning.

[472] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 34 of this investigation, which consists of Staff Instructions, Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, and call your attention to paragraph 224, dealing with the Fleet Aviation Officer. That sets forth, does it not, the duties of the Fleet Aviation Officer?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That sets forth the duties of the Fleet Aviation Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It has no bearing on my responsibilities and duties as Commander Patrol Wing Two or Commander Task Force Nine or any other duties I had in connection with my job in the forces of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibit 9 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which is a certified copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and ask whether that letter had ever come to your attention prior to December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't want to take your time up reading it, but I have never seen it before.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 47 of this investigation, which contains Annex number VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated March 28, 1941, and ask you whether you were familiar with that.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the circumstances under which you had connection with that document, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In connection with the preparing of this document, it came about as a result of a directive from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and my relation to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I functioned under him and in connection with the working out of a plan to bring an organization into [473] existence, this document was one of the preliminary features. It was not prepared by me, but some portions of it I did have a chance to criticize and advise in connection with its preparation.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any discussions of that document with Admiral Kimmel that you recall, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not with Admiral Kimmel but with Captain Gill, who was the Plans Officer of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and I am sure I discussed some of the points with Admiral Bloch, who was the Commander Naval Base Defense Force under that setup.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion of that document with any other members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. From time to time during the setup of this organization and even after it was in effect, I discussed general aspects of it with Admiral Kimmel, not particularly with reference to this paper, but with reference to subjects which had a bearing on it such as unity of command.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 47 and to page 4, it is stated, in part:

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an aircraft warning service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel as to that feature of the Navy's obligation under this agreement?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you some certified copies of documents and ask you whether you can identify those.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I identify those as having been [474] prepared by my organization.

Mr. SONNETT. And the next, too, Admiral, is Addendum I. Can you similarly identify that?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I identify that as an estimate of the situation which was prepared primarily by my organization with the concurrence of the Commander, Army Air Force, in the Hawaiian area.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you personally participate, Admiral, in the preparation of that estimate?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 49.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, for the sake of the record and in order to refresh your recollection of the document, would you read paragraph 1, the Summary of the Situation, and paragraph 3, Possible Enemy Action, into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

1. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval Installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

[475] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

III. *Possible Enemy Action.*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Substantially, Admiral, a basic premise of that estimate [476] was that a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor without declaration of war was a possibility, was it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It was.

Mr. SONNETT. And the second basic premise was that in the event of such an attack, it was probable that the attack would be by air?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to the section of that joint estimate entitled Action Open To Us, would you read subparagraph (a)

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading) :

IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there any provision, Admiral, under the section dealing with action open to use for reconnaissance of a sector of less than 360 degrees?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In this estimate it is not stated that less than 360 degrees might be used effectively, but, of course, it was taken into consideration in all thought and ideas.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, partial reconnaissance, Admiral, was, of course, one type of action open to the fleet, was it not, in order to meet the situation estimated in that joint estimate?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, in a degree.

Mr. SONNETT. And that was true, Admiral, both at the date of that estimate—which was about March or April of 1941, was it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. March 31, 1941.

[477] Mr. SONNETT. And similarly remained true throughout the rest of the year up to the time of the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, because at no time were we able to cover 360 degrees to the range that we thought was necessary—at any time up to July, 1942, and even later.

Mr. SONNETT. The point I wanted to get clear, Admiral, is although it is not listed in your joint estimate as a possible course of action, it nevertheless was a possible and feasible and a practical operation open to the fleet to conduct partial reconnaissance from Oahu, covering certain selected sectors?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. This estimate was not to restrict any effort to accomplish the main idea of the estimate.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, did you have any discussion of that estimate with Admiral Kimmel at any time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember discussing it with him prior to issuing it, but I am certain that he saw it because he talked to me about it, not in detail but in general, and I talked to him in general and sometimes in detail concerning the features of it.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, of course, prior to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Prior to December 7, 1941, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion of that estimate with other members of Admiral Kimmel's staff?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I feel practically sure that I discussed it many times with his aviation aide. I don't remember any details of any of the discussions.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there at any time, Admiral, any request on the part of Admiral Kimmel or any member of his staff for clarification or any disagreement [478] as to your joint estimate?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not to my recollection. As a matter of fact, he more or less complimented me on it and particularly so, I remember, when he had returned to Honolulu after a trip to Washington, where some mention apparently had been made of the general plan; not of the estimate in particular, but the general plan to attempt coordination.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, the Naval Base Defense Air Force plan?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And this estimate, of course, was the basis upon which that plan was written?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 35 of this investigation, which is the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan distributed to the fleet in July of 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that prior to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I am familiar with this Rainbow Five plan and we were in the midst of a chart maneuver of this plan by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to December 7th and it hadn't been completed up to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit and I think you will find there set forth the tasks assigned by the Navy Basic Plan to the Pacific Fleet. I call your attention particularly to subparagraph h and ask if you would read that into the record.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

[479] Mr. SONNETT. And will you refer now, Admiral, to pages 25 and 26 and you will there find that the initial tasks of the Pacific

Fleet are divided into two phases, do you not, phase IA and phase I?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you read into the record phase I-b, I-g, and I-m of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading) :

b. Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° east.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it was, therefore, an assigned initial task of the Pacific Fleet to guard against a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, was it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Evidently, yes, from the point of view that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, took upon himself to try to bring about a coordinated organization to take care of such an attack. However, I would like to refer you to a statement by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force. I was on an Army-Navy board to endeavor to adjust the control of certain airfields that were in the island of Oahu and in connection with this board's report there is a statement as follows in paragraph 4: "The problem confronting the Board as it pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows: The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor naval base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be [480] made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation; to detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation." It is therefore indicated to me that the Army also assumed a responsibility for the air defense of the Pearl Harbor naval base.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, what is the date of that report?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The date of that report is 31 October 1941. The board members are listed as Major General F. L. Martin, USA, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN, Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, USA, and Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, USN. The report was signed by General F. L. Martin, Major General, USA, Senior Army Member, and P. N. L. Bellinger, Rear Admiral, USN, Senior Naval Member.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it was true, was it not, that under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation to conduct long-range reconnaissance?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And that obligation, of course, remained right up to the time of the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It did in the setup, although I would like to invite attention to the fact that, How was the Navy going to do this and carry out the war plan, Rainbow Five?—because the available aviation couldn't be in two places at one time.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 12 of the war plan, I believe you will find set forth the composition of Task Force Nine. Would you read that into the record?

[481] Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft Scouting Force

All units of Aircraft.....	107 VP
Scouting Force.....	2 AV
	2 AVP
Utility Squadron from Base Force.....	4 AVD
	10 VJR

Mr. SONNETT. Could you state just in general, Admiral, what the 107 VP's were?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The 107 VP's were supposed to be flying boats, twin-engine. As a matter of fact, we did not have that many planes on December 6th and our total number, as I recall, was eighty-one, in varying degrees of readiness.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a carbon copy of a letter dated 20 December 1941, from Commander Task Force Nine to Commander-in-Chief and ask you whether you can identify that as a copy of a letter sent by you.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I do identify it as such.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 50.")

Mr. SONNETT. Incidentally, Admiral Bellinger, to this letter we have annexed copies of various dispatches referred to in the final paragraph of the letter. Would you take a look at those and see if you can identify those, too, so we can make them part of the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the dispatches, Admiral, as exhibit 50A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

[482] (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 50A.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 50, Admiral, which is the letter you have just identified, at page 2 you give a total of seventy-two planes in the air or ready for flight in four hours or less and subsequently you show that there were nine planes undergoing repairs, making a total of eighty-one planes. Now, is that the correct figure of the number of patrol planes which you had in Task Force Nine?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is the correct number, to the best of my information.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, with respect to the number of planes which you had in Task Force Nine, which you have stated to be eighty-one patrol planes, what efforts had been made to obtain additional planes?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. There is a letter on record, the first letter wherein I tried to paint the picture out there. That letter was dated January 16, 1941, and was the start. There was a lot of effort made on my part to improve the situation out there, covering the over-all situation. Planes are no good unless you have places to operate from and facilities to operate on and spare parts. I will give you a copy if I have it here, but it is all in the files somewhere. It wasn't so much numbers of planes in this case—the numbers were more or less controlled by the Navy Department—as it was of getting those that were assigned to us in a condition of readiness and operating ability to the maximum extent. If you really want to know what I have done

on this subject, I will have to go through the records, because there was an awful lot of letters written.

For instance, I would like to invite your attention to one letter dated 22 October 1941, and I am asking in that letter for "180 long-range, [483] high speed, landplane bombers, equal or superior to the B-17-E, and 180 interceptor fighters of the best performance available." That was in addition to any that we had, and that was in this letter, which is file 0026 of 22 October 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a photostatic copy of a letter with several endorsements thereon and ask you whether it is a copy of the letter to which you have just referred.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. And you, I take it, can also identify the endorsements, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 51.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to exhibit 51, which is the letter you have just identified, that letter was concerned, was it not, with the aircraft requirements for offensive action?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Both offensive and defensive.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention particularly, Admiral—

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Suppose I say this: Both offensive and defensive, primarily offensive, because the flying boat was known to have very little offensive power unless used under special conditions.

Mr. SONNETT. That appears particularly from the sentence in paragraph 1 reading, Admiral: "It is respectfully submitted that the Fleet is not adequately prepared for a campaign in the Pacific until, in addition to present types of aircraft, it is provided with an air striking force of high speed, long range [484] landplane bombers at least equal in performance to the B-17-E"; so that that letter was not concerned with increasing the present types of aircraft primarily used for reconnaissance, but rather was primarily concerned with getting additional planes to be used primarily offensively, is that correct?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct. It was designed primarily to bring about a more acceptable situation for the United States Navy in the Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken upon the recommendations made by you in exhibit 51?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. There were no actual results obtained from it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a letter dated January 16, 1941, and ask you whether it is a copy of a letter sent by you.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit and we will return the exhibit to Admiral Bellinger after we have had it copied?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 52.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, this exhibit 52, your letter of January 16, 1941, summarizes the situation as to the aircraft as of that time, does it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It did.

Mr. SONNETT. And points out various deficiencies and requirements for the patrol wings?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it the fact, sir, that during the year 1941 and prior to the attack, there were additional planes sent out to the Pacific Fleet?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, there were additional planes sent out [485] and also a newer type of plane, but I would like to invite attention in this letter, which is dated January 16, 1941, in paragraph 2 (b) the following quotation, which is referring to an OpNav confidential letter: "In about one year practically all Fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing Two will have armor and fuel protection," and the planes which were discussed in this letter actually arrived on the following dates: VP 11, with twelve planes, arrived in the Hawaiian area on 28 October 1941; VP 24, with six planes, arrived on 28 October 1941; VP 12, with twelve planes, arrived on 8 November 1941; VP 23, with twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 1941; VP 14, with twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 1941. Most of these planes and squadrons were replacements, and, I believe, some additions, for the old planes which we had prior thereto. But note that they arrived about a year after the above-quoted statement was made, as predicted.

Mr. SONNETT. As I figure it, Admiral, that makes a total of fifty-four new planes delivered in October and November, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And those, added to the planes you had and kept, made a total of eighty-one—

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. From November to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. But remember that practically all of these planes weren't additional groups or squadrons of planes; they were replacement planes with the newer type of PBY-5 type.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, after the attack on December 7, 1941, I understand that additional planes were sent out to Pearl Harbor.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, there were.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall in round numbers how many additional patrol planes and where they came from, if you know?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. They came from the Pacific Coast and the Atlantic Fleet and I think there were about forty-odd planes.

[468] Mr. SONNETT. Do you know why those forty-odd planes could not have been sent prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I sent a squadron commander, who had departed from Pearl Harbor with his squadron for replacement planes, to Washington to find out what was the situation with reference to the Pacific and why were we the last ones to be re-equipped, and the word he gave me upon his return to Pearl Harbor was that the Atlantic had priority.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring again to this period from the end of November up to the time of the attack on December 7th, you had a total of eighty-one patrol planes in Task Force Nine, as I understand it?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, do you recall the number of Army planes which were suitable for long-range reconnaissance and which could have been made available during that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I do not know the exact number or even an accurate approximate number because it was very difficult to get that information from the Army. It appears that their situation was changing quite rapidly and continually as their planes of the long-range bomber type were being sent to the Philippines.

Mr. SONNETT. Did they report some six or eight available during that period of time, B-17's?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In accordance with the operational directives prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and myself, a report of planes that were available—that could be made available to the other command, was sent to the appropriate command every day. I have here a copy of a dispatch from the Headquarters, Hawaiian Air Force, to Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, as of 5 December 1941, which indicates [487] that there were eight B-17's, twenty-one B-18's, and six A-20's which were to be considered available when made available.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the range of the B-17's was sufficient for long-range reconnaissance from Oahu, was it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It was, in the conception of long-range at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. About what was the range of the B-17?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Without bomb load they were supposed to be able to cover a sector of radius about 800 miles.

Mr. SONNETT. And of the B-18's, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In this B-17 situation I just spoke about, the range applied without bomb load or not more than one-half bomb load. That meant they had to put an extra gas tank in the vacant bomb bay.

The B-18's were supposed to have a reconnaissance radius of approximately 300 miles.

Mr. SONNETT. And the A-20's?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. About 150 miles radius.

Mr. SONNETT. Also for the sake of the record we might also get the range of the PBV-4 and 5, Admiral, if you will state that.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. PBV-5's and 4's had a radius of approximately 700 miles.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it was the fact, was it not, that after the attack on December 7th, long-range reconnaissance was conducted, using the PBV's, the B-17's, the B-18's as well?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct, except the B-18's did not have long-range. I made a mistake some time back. I said PBV-4's and 5's. I should have said PBV-3's and 5's. The PBV-3's had a practical operating radius of [488] approximately 600 miles.

Admiral HEWITT. We will adjourn for lunch at this time.

(The investigation then, at 1 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., at which time it reconvened.)

(Present: The same parties as during the morning session.)

Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, after having been warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as witness.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, you have produced a letter of December 11, 1940, from Commander Patrol Wing Two to Chief of Naval Operations, together with various endorsements. Are those copies of documents which were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as exhibit 53?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 53.")

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I would like to add that there are many other letters relating to deficiencies that were sent in with the idea of trying to increase the effectiveness of the patrol wings in the Pacific.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring back to the Pacific Fleet war plan, paragraphs 3141 and 3143, at page 32, sir, set forth the initial tasks assigned to the patrol planes. Would you read those into the record, please, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

[489] 3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

Mr. SONNETT. Would you refer, Admiral, to Annex I, the Patrol and Sweeping Plan, and read paragraph 2 into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

2.

Phase I

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

(c) Covering.

(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

(e) Routine shipping.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you also examine paragraph 3 (d) and read that into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

3. (d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

[490] (2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweep during initial sweep of Phase IA.

(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1.)

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, the Phase I initial tasks assigned to the patrol planes were tasks to be performed when Japan was not in the war, were they not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to page 15 of the War Plan, will you read into the record the general assumption on which the war plan is based?

[491] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. "That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand."

Mr. SONNETT. As to the second general assumption, Admiral, namely, that the United States was at war with the Axis powers, including Japan, was it in your mind, as set forth in your estimate, that war with Japan was apt to commence by surprise attack without declaration of war?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, that was the estimate, the basis of the estimate.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the plan, then, might have become effective as to Japan in the event of a surprise attack by Japan without declaration of war?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you saw that at or about the time of its issuance.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you read assumption (b) of that letter into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

That a declaration of war may be preceded by;

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

[492] Mr. SONNETT. You will note subsequently in the letter, Admiral, that there are provisions for air patrol. Would you refer to provision (B) concerning air patrol and read that into the record?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER (reading):

(2) Air Patrols:

- (a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
- (b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°-20' No. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.
- (c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than

described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, were those provisions for air patrol carried out between October 14, 1941, and December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Prior to December 7, 1941?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I am practically sure they were.

Mr. SONNETT. And in addition to the air patrol provided for in that security letter, patrols were run from Midway and Wake, were they not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The patrols run from Midway and Wake were for a certain period of time, as specifically directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

[493] Mr. SONNETT. Was there any discussion, Admiral, during the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, of the necessity or advisability of a partial patrol or reconnaissance from Oahu as a fleet security measure?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Patrols had been ordered to be run at various periods of time during 1941 and they were carried out as directed.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion of the question of patrols or partial reconnaissance during the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not other than the ones that had been directed by this letter.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, the fleet security letter?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The fleet security letter.

Admiral HEWITT. Which were merely of the operating area.

Mr. SONNETT. Merely of the operating area.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Wait a minute. October, November, and December?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember the exact date that the last patrol, other than was directed in this letter, was ordered carried out. It may have been in October. Actually there had been operations, training operations, simulating air attack, where carriers entered the training phase to simulate an attacking force and patrols had been carried out in connection with that effort, but from pure security reasons, I am in doubt as to when the last one had been ordered or was ordered.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there any reconnaissance from Oahu, other than of the fleet operating areas, during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not other than the movement that took place [494] between Wake, Midway and the Hawaiian Islands. The planes making those trips were directed to observe. However as part of planned internal Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises covering the period 1 to 4 Dec. 1941 and not as a part of any directed fleet reconnaissance, to the best of my remembrance, scouting flights were conducted daily covering a sector of approximately 90 degrees to a distance of 300 miles by probably one squadron for the sector per day. Each day there was a different sector. These scouting flights were solely for training in connection with the Wing Tactical Exercises. Usually a

Seaplane Tender was employed as the objective of search and a sled towed by the Tender served as a bombing target. I cannot recall the sectors utilized in the above exercises.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been previous testimony, Admiral, to the effect that some time around July or August, 1941, Admiral Bloch requested Admiral Kimmel to direct a reconnaissance on a sector towards Jaluit and that this was done for several days. What do you recall of that?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. On what? Jaluit?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes, on a sector towards Jaluit.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It may have been done. I do not remember, but I did not know the originator of the idea, nor any reason concerning such idea. I am not sure that it was done towards Jaluit.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I refer you to page 6 of the fleet security letter as revised on August 14, 1941, to sub-paragraph 3, and ask if you would read that into the record.

[494a] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. "It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

Mr. SONNETT. There were various submarine contacts reported prior to December 7, 1941, were there not, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether there was any air patrol directed prior to the attack for the purpose of attempting to verify any alleged reports of the presence of submarines?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. There were sound contacts, as I remember, and [495] the question was raised, Were they submarine contacts? and, as I remember it, there was considerable local effort, both with reference to patrol planes and to surface craft, to verify those sound contacts, but to my knowledge, no submarine was ever seen.

Mr. SONNETT. Who directed the patrols in those cases?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. When the Commander, Scouting Force, was the Senior Officer Present, he directed it until the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was present; then he directed it.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel or with Admiral Bloch concerning the submarine contacts prior to December 7, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I remember discussing it with many people, but I don't know that I remember discussing it with Admiral Bloch personally or Admiral Kimmel personally. It was a question, Was it a submarine or was it not?—and that appeared to be a moot question among those who had actually made the sound contact.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 37 of this investigation, which consists of a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 19, 1941, from the Commander Task Force Nine to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and which annexes a schedule, and which exhibit also contains a photostatic copy of a mailgram dated 22 November 1941 from CincPac to Compawing Two, and ask you whether you recognize those documents.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, would you state what the schedules annexed to your letter of November 19, 1941, show as to aircraft patrol from Oahu?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. They do not directly show any patrol search operations. However, in advance base operations my policy was, and as written down for the guidance of the patrol wings, that when any squadron was based at [496] an advance base, that they would carry on patrols for security reasons; and also, in connection with this schedule, although it does not show the morning patrol that was required in this security letter of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, it was an understood fact that those patrols would continue and did continue.

Mr. SONNETT. Those were patrols of the operating areas, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Those were patrols of the daily assigned operating areas.

Mr. SONNETT. That mailgram, Admiral, from CincPac to you, was the approval by the Commander-in-Chief of those schedules submitted by you, is it not?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you a series of photostatic documents and ask you whether you can identify them.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, they represent the watch and duty schedules and the general employment of Patrol Wings One and Two and those planes considered part of the Fleet Air Detachment.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

æ (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 54.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 54, which you have just identified, Admiral, and to the schedules for the period November 27th to December 7, 1941, will you discuss any provision of the schedules relating to aircraft patrol from Oahu?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Where you note the nomenclature "DP," it refers to the dawn patrol, and each day a squadron was assigned to that duty.

[497] Mr. SONNETT. And again, Admiral, for the sake of the record, the dawn patrol was the patrol of the operating areas?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. As illustrative, Admiral, of the schedules in question, would you, referring to December 7, 1941, schedule, read into the record the assignments of the patrol squadrons?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7th, Patrol Squadron 22, first division, was secured; Patrol Squadron 22, second division, secured; Patrol Squadron 23, first division, secured; Patrol Squadron 23, second division, secured; Patrol Squadron 24, tactics with submarines and the Pearl Harbor ready duty division; Patrol Squadron 11, tactics with submarines and Kaneohe ready duty division; Patrol Squadron 12, secured; Patrol Squadron 14, dawn patrol; division making dawn patrol secured upon completion, other division normal duty, 7 to 1300 except Saturdays and Sundays. Not listed in the above squadrons was Patrol Squadron 21, which was on advance base duty at Midway. Patrol Squadron 22 had returned from Midway on 5 December after

a tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October. This squadron had had strenuous duty at those bases and was in a state of rehabilitation and maintenance.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring back, Admiral, to your letter of November 19, 1941, forwarding the schedule for the planes to the Commander-in-Chief for approval, which letter is part of exhibit 37, the letter reads in paragraph 1, "Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of Task Force Nine for the remainder of the second quarter." Do you recall, Admiral, what the changed conditions were that you referred to in that letter?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I can't remember positively. In may have been because of the assignment of Patrol Squadron 22 to the Midway-Wake area or it may have been due to a change in directive from the Commander-in-Chief, [498] Pacific, wherein the task force organizations were changed. At one time patrol squadrons were assigned to the various task force commanders, One, Two, and Three, and their schedule of employment was more or less controlled by those task force commanders.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, and others, dated November 24, 1941, and ask you whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know that such a dispatch or some such dispatch had been received about that time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not till subsequent to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, and others, dated November 27, 1941, which is the so-called war warning, and ask whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know that such a dispatch had been received?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Not until subsequent to December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to exhibit 19 of the Naval Court of Inquiry a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 28, 1941, sent for information to CincPac, among others, and ask whether you saw that dispatch or knew of it prior to the attack on December 7, 1941.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation, which consists of daily communication intelligence summaries, and ask whether you saw those prior to December 7, 1941.

[499] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I don't remember seeing any of these.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 26 of this investigation, which consists of photostatic copies of intelligence reports by Lieutenant Commander Layton between October 6, 1941, and December 2, 1941, and ask whether you saw any of those prior to the attack.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 23 of this investigation, a memorandum, dated December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to the Admiral on the subject of the location of the Orange fleet, and ask whether you saw that prior to the attack.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I don't remember ever seeing it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, do you recall anything concerning a proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands which was discussed toward the end of November, 1941?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Towards the end of November, 1941?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. I do not recall such proposition.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, a memorandum by Lieutenant Commander Layton on that subject, and ask whether that refreshes your recollection concerning the matter.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember any specific plan or even a proposal.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, during the last half of November and up to December 7, 1941, what was your estimate of the location and movements of Japanese ships, particularly Japanese carriers?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I didn't know where they were.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you receive any intelligence on that subject—

[500] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. During that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Or have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch on that subject during that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. I recall no such discussion.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know before the attack that a direction had been issued to CincPac on or about November 27, 1941, in substantially the following language: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46"?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion between November 27th and December 7, 1941, concerning deployment of fleet or aircraft?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I am trying to remember the date on which a conference took place in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's, office wherein several of the fleet commands, myself included, and the Army and also the District Commandant were present, and that was in connection with the movement of Marine planes to Wake and Midway. Now, the reason for that—a specific dispatch or even a discussion of the reasons for it, other than general bolstering up defenses, was not discussed, as I remember.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 18 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, a dispatch of November 26, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac, and ask you whether you saw that dispatch.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I don't remember seeing this dispatch, but I think I attended a conference which evidently was in connection with this dispatch, that is, in carrying out some of the details of this dispatch.

[501] Mr. SONNETT. There is one other dispatch I would like to call to your attention, Admiral, and that is exhibit 13 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated October 16, 1941, to CincPac, among others, and ask whether you recall having seen that.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, I don't remember ever seeing that dispatch prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I call your attention, Admiral, to the following portion of that dispatch: "In view of these possibilities, you will take

due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." Do you recall being consulted as to any preparatory deployments after October 16, 1941, and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. If I was called in in connection with any deployment, the reasons for it weren't connected with this dispatch, that is, they weren't explained to me as having any relation to a particular dispatch as I hadn't seen the dispatch.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 19, which was the November 28th dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, which you previously testified, Admiral, you hadn't seen, that provided in part that CincPac was directed to "Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 in so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." Do you recall any conference or discussion as to the steps to be taken in order to be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL 46?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, a hypothetical question. Had you known of these dispatches which have just been shown to you prior to the attack and bearing in mind that the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet and specifically [502] of Task Force Nine included reconnaissance from Oahu, would you have recommended that such reconnaissance or partial reconnaissance be instituted?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That question was asked me once before and I will have to give you almost the same answer, which is that God only knows what I would have done, but I hope I would have recognized the situation.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state for the record what reconnaissance could have been run from Oahu with the Navy planes available during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941?

Admiral HEWITT. Do you mean what patrol could have been maintained on a continuous basis?

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I think he will develop that in his answer, Admiral. As I recall his previous testimony, he said they could have maintained a 360 degree reconnaissance for a limited time; they could have maintained 144 degrees by dividing the crews in three indefinitely. That is my recollection.

Admiral HEWITT. Of course, on 27 November they had no idea that the attack was coming on the 7th. They had no way to time it. They had to make plans for patrol indefinitely.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is a very difficult question to answer. You must remember that between 28 October and 23 November, of the eighty-one planes available later, fifty-four of these had arrived and they were the PBY-5 type and the spare parts for those planes weren't available. Also, the number of plane crews available scarcely exceeded—if I remember correctly, did not quite equal the number of planes we had available. A lot of things can be done in an emergency and when pressure is on. That was demonstrated in the Battle of Midway; the flying time carried on by plane crews under stress exceeded by far what was thought the human equation could stand.

[503] Normally speaking, considering eighty-one planes available and considering the fact that we hoped the planes wouldn't break down and be put out of commission from lack of spare parts, it was practical, of course, to utilize one-third for daily patrol, covering sectors that were estimated to be the most vital. However, you must

remember that the time of starting these operations and the duration of them would have a tremendous effect on the force that would be available at any subsequent time for further projected operations. But, normally speaking, I would say that a plane and a plane crew could have been used one day in three.

Mr. SONNETT. And how large a sector could be covered in that fashion, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Normally speaking, we considered eight degrees for 800 mile radii of operations to be what one plane would cover, and multiply that by the number of planes and you have the number of degrees of the sector.

Admiral HEWITT. You did testify before to 144, based on eighteen planes, which is one-third of 144.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Did I say 800 miles? Make that 700 miles and the eight degrees.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to your memorandum or letter of December 20, 1941, which is exhibit 50, it appears that nine planes were undergoing repairs on December 7, 1941, and that eleven planes were at Midway, which, I take it, would leave approximately sixty-one planes available at Oahu.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Sixty-one, and that is including one squadron that had just returned from Midway, having also served time at Wake. They were in commission. They had just returned. They weren't listed, as I remember, [504] as being in a state of overhaul, but they were due for considerable checking.

Mr. SONNETT. With those sixty-one planes, Admiral, and dividing the sixty-one planes into three, I take it that reconnaissance could have been run from Oahu, therefore, covering a sector of approximately 160 degrees?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is possible, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, eliminating the squadron which had just returned, Admiral, would have given you about fifty Navy planes available, I take it?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Forty-nine.

Mr. SONNETT. Forty-nine. And with the forty-nine planes available, you could have had a daily reconnaissance covering about 128 degrees?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, that is possible.

Mr. SONNETT. Would that have been not only possible, Admiral, but practical or the practicable measure and for how long could it have been continued on that basis?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. That is a very difficult question to answer. Even after December 7th when everything else was subjugated to carrying on patrol for the security of Oahu, I received letters from the Bureau of Aeronautics indicating that they couldn't support the continuous and tremendous operations of this kind, with reference to engine changes and spare parts, and were endeavoring to inveigle me into reducing the search operations. This was not an official letter. This was a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and it was the result of an official dispatch which I had sent, demanding spare parts.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Admiral, assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct 360

degree reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, could you have done it and if so, for how [505] long could you have continued it?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In conducting the 360 degree search, it would have meant that planes proceeding out on search would have had to depend on a visibility greater than would have existed. It would have been possible to do it perhaps four or five days.

Mr. SONNETT. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible partial reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It could have been done until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made it impossible. Perhaps it could have been carried on for two weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight.

Mr. SONNETT. If in addition to the forty-nine available Navy planes at that time at Oahu, you had the eight available Army B-17's and the twenty-one available Army B-18's, could you have covered 360 degrees from December 1 on and if so, for how long?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In the first place, the Army weren't schooled or able to carry on these searches in the way we would have expected them to carry them on, and that statement is made as a result of experience which showed up that situation subsequent to December 7th. Later, after more experience and training of the Army personnel had been obtained, the Army did enter this search plan with a few planes each day. The B-18's, as you remember, would only have been capable of proceeding out 300 miles, which would have netted very little in timely information. Certainly any assistance from the Army in the B-17's would have enabled more patrol and search of greater areas.

[506] Mr. SONNETT. Would it have been feasible, Admiral, to have used the forty-nine available Navy planes at Oahu on December 1, 1941, and thereafter entirely for search and to have relied on the eight Army B-17's and the twenty-one Army B-18's for an attacking force?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Would it have been possible?

Mr. SONNETT. Feasible.

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The attack force was always made up of either the Army's B-17's or whatever other types they had that might be utilized for that purpose, such as B-18's or even A-20's if the ships had come in that close. Even carrier planes were held as striking groups. No patrol planes were ever held for striking, except in special instances for night torpedo attack. They were used to the fullest extent for searching.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the forty-nine available Navy patrol planes which were available around the beginning of December 1941, could probably have been devoted entirely to searching?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. They could have been as far as they were able to be used, but the question would always have been: Is this the time to start?

Mr. SONNETT. It has been previously testified, Admiral, that certain sectors were regarded as more dangerous than others. What sectors were they?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. The northern sectors were considered to be the most vital, primarily on account of the prevailing winds. For instance, when the carrier launches her planes, later she has to recover them and it is a rather good thing to be going away from trouble when you are recovering planes.

Mr. SONNETT. It was, in fact, from the north that the Japanese task force attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not, Admiral?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. It was.

[507] Mr. SONNETT. Had you been directed on or about December 1, 1941, to institute a partial reconnaissance with the available planes, would you have covered the northern sector?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. As a matter of fact, without any information, the normal plan on December 7th was to utilize planes that we had for the northern sector. We did later send planes to the southward because of information from the Commander-in-Chief's office which indicated a radio bearing in that direction.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you define, Admiral, what you mean by the northern sector?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. More towards the northwest than the northeast.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that from December 2nd, approximately, to December 7, 1941, you were ill?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I had the flu.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, you weren't at your office during that period of time?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. I was not at my office, but I was in touch with the office and with things going on.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any conferences with Admiral Kimmel while you were ill or with any member of his staff that you recall?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No. I had conferences with my Chief of Staff.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Ramsey?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you, as best you recall it, have any conference with Admiral Kimmel in November and up to December 7, 1941, concerning the question of possible reconnaissance or the desirability of reconnaissance or any related subject?

[508] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, not with respect to Oahu. The conference I attended, and I think it was the last conference I attended, was in connection with the reenforcement of Wake and Midway.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any other conference with Admiral Kimmel or members of his staff after that conference and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No, although I am not positive that I did not see him between those dates.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that had complete reconnaissance been undertaken in November or December, 1941, prior to the attack, it would have meant a cessation of the training activities being carried on by patrol wings. Would it have been feasible to conduct reconnaissance and to have the reconnaissance as part of the training?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. In the first place, I might say that the need for expansion training had been stressed a great deal, expansion training meaning the development of air combat crews to augment and to replace those crews that were then in the squadrons. When the December 7th attack was made, all training ceased for the time being and all effort was put on search operations by all the patrol planes. The question came up how could we continue this expansion training that every one realized was such a necessity? If we endeavored to train combat air crews in planes that were on patrol, it meant an excess of personnel and extra weight. It meant also that except for navigation and the general operation of radio and engineering, very little else could be done. It was not actually qualifying personnel to take over the job in the patrol plane, nor to give them the qualification of an air crewman in a specific job. Finally we had to devote certain planes to this training and take them out of their operating status on their off days in order to accomplish some of this expansion training. So I would say if all effort had been placed [509] on searching, why the expansion training would have suffered considerably, as it did suffer after December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, if you had been told on or about November 27, 1941, that war with Japan was expected to break out momentarily, would you have considered that a valid reason for discontinuance of training?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. You will have to look at it from this angle, when you once start, then you freeze the situation and you aren't improving it. We didn't have in the Navy a training establishment that could carry on this training, which up to that time had been done in the squadrons, and the question should be viewed from the angle: Are you willing to freeze as is, with no question of expansion, and take the consequences or proceed with your efforts to expand? because aviation was known to have to expand tremendously and the training of personnel was one of the very serious problems connected with it. The discussion of this subject had gone to considerable lengths concerning where this training was to be accomplished, whether it should be done by the fleet, as an operational training program by the fleet on the Pacific Coast, or whether it was to be set up as a shore establishment.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, referring to the four or five days prior to the attack when you were ill and you were getting reports from Captain Ramsey, did he at any time report to you that he had had any conferences on the subject of reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel or any member of his staff?

Vice Admiral BELLINGER. No.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. Is there any other statement that you care to make in connection with the matter under investigation?

[510] Vice Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. I would like to state that in preparation for meeting an air attack such as occurred on December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, unity of command must exist; the organization must be in effect, manned, functioning, and operating twenty-four hours every day. There must be reconnaissance, radar nets, and complete information in regard to shipping and control of aircraft

entering and leaving the zone. All that must be in effect and functioning properly prior to the attack. No mutual cooperative organization set up on paper and developed through intermittent drills is worth much.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 3:48 p. m., adjourned until 9 a. m., Friday, 22 June 1945.)

[511] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-SECOND DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 9 a. m., Friday, 22 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name, please.

Mrs. EDGERS. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your occupation, Mrs. Edgers?

Mrs. EDGERS. Research Analyst, Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. And in what section do you work?

Mrs. EDGERS. In the Office of Communications right now.

Mr. SONNETT. What was your occupation in December of 1941?

Mrs. EDGERS. Research Analyst in the ONI. That is Naval Intelligence.

Mr. SONNETT. And that office was engaged in the decryption and translation of intercepted Japanese communications at that time?

Mrs. EDGERS. The particular branch I was working with was.

Mr. SONNETT. What are your qualifications in the Japanese language, Mrs. Edgers?

Mrs. EDGERS. My knowledge of the Japanese language is about as good as it can be. I have a diploma from a Japanese school to teach Japanese to Japanese people up to high school.

Mr. SONNETT. You lived in Japan for some time?

Mrs. EDGERS. Over thirty years.

[512] Mr. SONNETT. And when did you leave Japan?

Mrs. EDGERS. In the year before Pearl Harbor, which would make it '40.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Mrs. Edgers, document 22 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, which bears a notation that it was translated by the Navy on December 11, 1941, and ask you whether prior to December 7, 1941, you had any connection with that message.

Mrs. EDGERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, please, fully what your connection with that message was?

Mrs. EDGERS. Well, at the time it was my work to roughly translate any message which was put on my desk and this was among the messages that were put on my desk on December 6th, Saturday morning, and at the time I had only been working in this section for about a little over two weeks; so, at first glance, this seemed to be more interesting than some of the other messages I had in my basket, and so I

selected it and asked one of the other men, who were also translators working on other messages, whether or not this shouldn't be done immediately and was told that I should and then I started to translate it.

Mr. SONNETT. About what time on that day did you complete your translation, Mrs. Edgers.

Mrs. EDGERS. Well, it so happened that there was some mistake in the message that had to be corrected and so that took some time. That was at 12:30 or perhaps it was a little before or after 12:30; whatever time it was, we were to go home. It being Saturday, we worked until noon. I hadn't completed it, so I worked overtime and finished it and I would say that between 1:30 and 2 was when I finished my rough draft translation.

[513] Mr. SONNETT. That is, on the afternoon of December 6th?

Mrs. EDGERS. Of the 6th, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Mrs. Edgers, would you describe briefly what that message is?

Mrs. EDGERS. Well, without reading it over again now, just because of the fact that the message did keep in mind, I would say that it was a message saying how they were going to communicate from Honolulu to the parties interested the information on our fleet movements from Honolulu, and apparently it was something which they had had previous arrangements, but they had changed some of the minor details of how to go about it. I think there was something to do with lights, a window of a certain house, and there was also something about newspaper advertising.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether that translation which you completed in the early afternoon of December 6, 1941, was brought to the attention of now Captain Kramer?

Mrs. EDGERS. It was brought to his attention naturally because it was—well, in any case, he knew that I was working on it and I left it, as a matter of fact, in the hands of the chief whose job it was to edit messages and write them up, or ones that were more complicated and more important like this, the officer-in-charge looked it over and edited it.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Kramer was your superior officer in that section, was he not?

Mrs. EDGERS. My supervisor, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the name of the chief to whom you referred?

Mrs. EDGERS. Chief Bryant.

Mr. SONNETT. B-r-y-a-n-t?

Mrs. EDGERS. I don't remember how he spelled his name, but he had been [514] in the section for some time. He left immediately after the war for sea duty. He put in a request.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you before you left on the afternoon of December 6, 1941, show all or any part of your translation of this message to Captain Kramer?

Mrs. EDGERS. I am sorry. I will have to say I don't remember whether I did or didn't show any or all of it, although I am sure he did have occasion to see part of it, but he knew I was working on the message and I believe that is probably the reason he came back again, no doubt later, as I understand it, to work on it.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. Thank you very much, Mrs. Edgers.

(The witness was excused.)

[515] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name, please, sir.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your occupation, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency.

Mr. SONNETT. War Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And during 1941 what was your occupation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was Principal Cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. SONNETT. How long have you been in that work, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Since 1915.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 4 of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask you whether you can identify that dispatch, and also show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask whether you can identify that.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. These are translations of messages which were processed jointly by the Army and Navy Signal Intelligence Services.

Mr. SONNETT. Those were Japanese messages which set up the so-called "winds" code, were they not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any knowledge or do you have any knowledge of the efforts that were made to monitor for any Japanese message employing the "winds" code?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I know that when these code messages were translated, that steps were taken to monitor all the circuits over which an execute message [516] might appear, both in the Army and the Navy and also by the Federal Communications Commission.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, did you learn whether or not any such execute message was intercepted by any one?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. After December 7, 1941, did you have any information as to whether or not any such message was intercepted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Indirect information in the way of statements by Captain Safford of the Navy and Colonel Sadler of the Army to the effect that there had been such an execute message.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Mr. Friedman, as best you recall it, when and where you had the conversation with Captain Safford to which you refer and what was said by him on that subject during the conversation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have had several conversations with him. I am unable at the moment to indicate the dates. The first one was certainly a year and a half ago and I haven't had any conversations with him now for some six months, I dare say. In the course of the earlier conversations, Captain Safford indicated that there was—there had been a "winds" execute message; that no copies of it were to be found in the Navy files, and that nevertheless there had been testimony to the effect that it had been intercepted. His story was that it was iner-

cepted by one of their East Coast stations, he believed, and was promptly forwarded into Washington, and I don't recall now who got it. Colonel Sadler indicated also—

Mr. SONNETT. Before you come to your conversation with Colonel Sadler, Mr. Friedman, in his conversations with you, did Captain Safford state the substance of the "winds" code execute which he thought had been received prior to December 7, 1941?

[517] Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, he indicated that it not only had the affirmative for break in relations between Japan and the United States, but it also had a negative for a break in relations between Japan and Russia.

Mr. SONNETT. Now turning to your conversation with Colonel Sadler, will you state when you had that, approximately, and what was said at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Approximately a year and a half ago I had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who came to duty in Washington about then, and we talked about Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had been the head of our communications service at the time, and he indicated that he had tried his best to urge that some specific warning message be sent out to the Department commander. He indicated that the "winds" code execute message had come in on the—some time on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't think that he was clear himself as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly, he was either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in—"it's in," as I recall it, was the expression used—or it may be that the Navy source called Army G-2 and indicated that they had had word that the message was in, and that Colonel Sadler was then called to G-2 to corroborate the interception of the message.

At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese word, that was used and when Colonel Sadler couldn't indicate the word, because he hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried—I think he said that they tried to get a varification from whoever it was—Admiral Noyes—but they weren't successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over. There was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message.

Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy, but that he had been [518] told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and nothing more than that; highly inconceivable that such a thing would happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain Safford, I probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started. I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea that he would repeat it.

Mr. SONNETT. Other than what you have already testified to, Mr. Friedman, did you have any information from any source as to the existence of a "winds" code message relating to the United States?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. You mean a "winds" code execute?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not of my own direct knowledge at the time.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, has anybody else in the Navy, other than Captain Safford, ever stated to you or indicated to you that such a message existed?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have not talked with anybody else in the Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. So that either directly or indirectly, I take it, you have no information from naval sources as to the existence of a "winds" code execute relating to the United States, aside from your conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which consists of a statement by the Federal Communications Commission and has annexed to it various documents. Will you examine those and state which of those messages, in your opinion, was a genuine execute of the "winds" code?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have examined these messages anterior to this questioning and came to the conclusion that only the last, which is labelled document number 4, gives evidence of being an authentic "winds" code executive message. [519] It conforms to the form established in the "winds" code, except that there is no repetition of the *nishi no kaze hare* at the end of the message as there should have been.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the date of the "winds" execute message to which you have just referred, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. According to the statement, the date is December 8, 1941, between 0002 and 0035, GMT, which would be December 7, 1941, Washington time.

Mr. SONNETT. And that message uses the code words, Mr. Friedman, relating to what country?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. A Japanese-British break.

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Friedman, I show you documents 6 and 11 of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask whether you can identify those documents.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I can. The one dated 27 November 1941 from Tokyo to Washington established a hidden word code system whereby the Japanese hoped to be able to pass secret information to case of a closure of communications between Tokyo and places in the Western Hemisphere.

The other document, Tokyo circular telegram of December 7, 1941, I identify as being a message in the hidden word code.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you just read the text of that message into the record?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The English text is:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear from the document who translated that version of the message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It does. It says on the bottom "Navy translation."

Mr. SONNETT. And the date?

[520] Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that message translated by the Army also, to your knowledge?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know whether it was translated at that time by the Army also, but I have had it translated since then.

Mr. SONNETT. And what translation was made by the Army of that message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The one to which you refer now?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, there is quite a story about that.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you tell us that story, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw this message in the form, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," and although I was ill, I saw clearly enough that the message on its face was absurd. Any fool would realize that on December 7th Tokyo was not going to send a message out saying, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations" when the die had already been cast, and I came to the tentative conclusion that there was something wrong with that message and I asked Colonel Svennsson about the message and told him that I felt that there was something wrong with it and suggested that it be re-translated. Colonel Svennsson looked it up and told me that it was not a good translation. When I went into the details, I uncovered a very surprising situation. The translation of the message conforms to the translation set up in the 27 November 1941 code, but the translation in that code was not good.

This is the situation. The word that was set up, *hattori*, meant, according to this translation, "relations between Japan and blank are not in accordance with expectations," whereas it should have read, "Relations between Japan and blank are on the brink of catastrophe," or some strong expression [521] of that sort. Moreover, I found that the message of 7 December 1941, which mentions only relations between Japan and England, had another defect in that the original intercept included the word *minami*, meaning the USA, as well as the word *koyanagi*, meaning England.

That double error produced a concatenation of circumstances that I thought later was just an additional one in the series of accidents that contrived together to prevent due warning, because had that originally been translated accurately "on the brink of catastrophe," "on the verge of disaster," and so on, had that come in, it would have got immediate attention. That was a few hours before. Also if it had mentioned the United States, it should have.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, the error in translation in the original hidden word code, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 2, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And by whom was it translated?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that translation distributed to the Army prior to the attack?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, the error in translation in the original code was not detected until you detected it, as you have just testified?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you detect the errors of the code and in the translation of the December 7th message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I can't place it accurately. It was a few days after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you communicate your discoveries to the Navy as to the errors?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

[522] Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not the discoveries which you had made as to these messages were communicated to the Navy at any time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Friedman, referring to documents 14 and 15 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, will you examine those and state whether or not they came to your attention at any time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They were not brought to my attention at the time of their translation, but I have seen them since.

Mr. SONNETT. Both of those are Japanese messages from Honolulu, relating to the status of defenses at Pearl Harbor and vicinity, are they not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read, Mr. Friedman, into the record the last sentence of the first paragraph of document 14?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The last sentence of the first paragraph reads: "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."

Mr. SONNETT. And that message was dated what date, sir?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 6, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the date of translation of that, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It is stated December 8th.

Mr. SONNETT. And by whom translated?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It doesn't state, but on the basis of the division of labor that had been established between the Army and Navy, whereby Army processed messages bearing in their pre-handle even dates, I presume that this message was processed by the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there an indication on the message as to where and by whom it was intercepted, Mr. Friedman?

[523] Mr. FRIEDMAN. There is. Exhibit 14 bears on it an indication that it was intercepted by Station Two, which is the Army monitor station at San Francisco.

Mr. SONNETT. And does it also indicate how it was forwarded to Washington?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It is indicated as having been forwarded by teletype.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Mr. Friedman, you referred to exhibit 14, but what you meant to say was page 14 of the exhibit before you, which is exhibit 13?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you turn to page 15 of that exhibit and state whether or not you can identify that message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I identify it as being a message presumably processed by the Army since it bears the date December 6, 1941, an even date.

Mr. SONNETT. A message from——

Mr. FRIEDMAN. A message from Honolulu to Tokyo.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you read the second paragraph of that message into the record?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The second paragraph reads: "It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm."

Mr. SONNETT. And what is the date of translation of that indicated?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. December 8, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear where and by whom the message was intercepted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was intercepted by Army Station Two at San Francisco and was forwarded by teletype.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, both of those messages of December 6th, Mr. Friedman, were in the PA-K2 code, were they not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They were.

[524] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state briefly and generally what that code was and its relative difficulty?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That code was a high grade code involving keyed columnar transportation of code text, distributed in a form established by the Japanese when they set up the cryptographic system. It represents what we call a rather good form of enciphered code.

Mr. SONNETT. As of the first week of December or, more specifically, as of December 6, 1941, do you know how rapidly that code could have been read by the Army?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. We were in position usually to process this traffic fairly readily in view of the fact that we had reconstructed the entire code or practically the entire code and were able to reconstruct from time to time as was necessary the transportation keys for the super-encipherment.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit, Mr. Friedman, and state whether you can identify that message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I have seen this message before.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the date and—

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The date is December 7, 1941. The message is from Tokyo to Honolulu.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the subject matter, briefly, of the message, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The matter directs the Japanese in Honolulu to keep Tokyo informed day by day of the presence in port of warships and airplane carriers and cruisers and indicates that it is of the utmost importance to let them know.

Mr. SONNETT. Is there any reference also to barrage balloons?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. They were to wire in each case whether or not [525] there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up, and also whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Mr. SONNETT. When was that translated and by whom, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. This message was translated by the Army on December 30, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. It bears a notation that the message was received on December 23rd, does it not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear where and by whom the message was intercepted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The message was intercepted by Station Five, which is an Army station at Honolulu.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you explain, Mr. Friedman, the delay between the date of interception, which presumably was December 2, 1941, and the date of translation, December 30, 1941?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There were insufficient facilities and personnel to process all of the traffic which might be processed. Naturally, that is a situation which is beyond control of the Army because it depends upon the funds that are provided by Congress, and so on, for this sort of work. And in any case, to be able to process all the traffic that may have been intercepted would have required a very large organization, which we didn't have at the time. We set up priorities for the handling and processing of traffic according to the best standards that we could establish at the time. We naturally would process messages in the purple system first because we had found from experience that that carried the most important information, and then we would process cryptographic systems of next importance, and so on.

Now, in the case of this particular message of December 2nd, I have [526] no doubt that Honolulu intercept station had accumulated a large amount of traffic which had to be forwarded and we didn't have the radio circuits and facilities adequate to be able to forward all of the intercepted material by radio. In any case, a good deal of it, of minor importance, there is no use in forwarding by radio, which is a relatively expensive method as compared with forwarding by air mail, for example.

Mr. SONNETT. The note on that message would indicate that it was received here on the 23rd of December, would it not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. So that it took approximately seven days between the time of receipt of the message by the War Department in Washington and the time of its decryption and translation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, would the interval between December 2nd and December 23rd indicate that the message had been forwarded from Fort Shafter by mail?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It would indicate that that was the case.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the order of priority, Mr. Friedman, after the purple code, insofar as dispatching those messages to Washington?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am unable to state from memory. That is a matter of record. I could find it.

Mr. SONNETT. Where did the J-19 code come from? Do you recall?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was below purple, definitely, below purple, and presumably, according to my recollection now, it would be either on the same level with the PA-K2 or slightly below it.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, this message of December 2nd was in the J-19 code, was it not?

[527] Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the months prior to December 7, 1941, Mr. Friedman, did you have any personal connection with the decryption of Japanese communications?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I had been asked by the Chief Signal Officer to take a hand in our attempts to solve the Japanese purple system.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state approximately when that occurred, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The first time we were able to hand in a completely deciphered text was some time in August of 1940; it might have been late in August of 1940. We had been on the problem for eighteen or twenty months, something like that.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the purple code of the Japanese was, I take it from your testimony, solved by the unit under your direction?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct. As Chief Cryptanalyst, it was naturally my responsibility to solve the things that superiors asked us to solve.

Mr. SONNETT. After you worked on the purple code of the Japanese, did you continue your close connection, personal connection, with the decryption of Japanese communications and, if so, up to what time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. I regret to say that the solution of the Japanese purple machine had apparently taken such a toll of my nervous energy that I was suffering from nervous exhaustion and while I understood quite well that things weren't well with me, nevertheless I felt under extreme necessity of keeping going and did so until some time in December of 1940, when I had a complete collapse. I returned to duty some time in April of 1941, but in view of the fact that it was going to take considerable time to recover my health, the Chief Signal Officer indicated that I was to take it easy, and [528] one way of doing that was to keep me more or less out of the high pressure cryptanalytical processing and let me devote my attention to some of the signal security matters where it was a slower pace. I wasn't too happy about that.

Mr. SONNETT. So that, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, then, you weren't actually working directly on the Japanese material?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. I think that is all, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[529] Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Safford, I show you exhibit 13 of this investigation, which consists of a collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches in translated form, and call your attention to the fact that each page of the document indicates that it was translated by the Navy or the Army and that after the date there appear symbols in parentheses, letters such as the letter "S" or "X" and in other cases there appear numbers. Will you explain what they signify?

Captain SAFFORD. The letter "S" was the Navy intercept station at Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Mr. SONNETT. And the letter "X"?

Captain SAFFORD. The letter "X" was a photograph taken by the Navy, in this particular case at Washington, D. C.

Mr. SONNETT. And the letters "NR"?

Captain SAFFORD. "NR" merely meant Navy radio.

Mr. SONNETT. The number 7

Captain SAFFORD. Number 7 was an Army intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia, just outside of Washington.

Mr. SONNETT. Number 2?

Captain SAFFORD. Number 2 was an Army intercept station at the Presidio in San Francisco, California.

Mr. SONNETT. And the letters "STT"?

Captain SAFFORD. "S" was Station S and "TT" stood for teletype. Any message forwarded by teletype was marked "TT" at the bottom.

Mr. SONNETT. Did the Army follow the same practice?

[530] Captain SAFFORD. The Army followed the same practice at least in one case, because it is marked.

Mr. SONNETT. The letters "AR"?

Captain SAFFORD. Army radio, and you also have one more, number 5, which is the Army intercept station at Fort Shafter, T. H.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the document bearing number 14 and the document bearing the number 15 of that exhibit, will you state where they were intercepted, when and by whom translated?

Captain SAFFORD. They were both intercepted at the Army intercept station in San Francisco and forwarded by teletype. They were presumably intercepted on the 6th of December, 1941, which is their filing date. They were both processed and translated by the Army, and they were translated on December 8, 1941. About sixteen or seventeen months ago we sighted the original work sheets for these two messages, including the intercepted message, and found or learned that number 14 went on the air about eighteen hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor and number 15 went on the air about twelve hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, that is, to the nearest hour. The Army have all these papers in their custody.

Mr. SONNETT. Both of those messages were in the PA-K2 Japanese code, were they not?

Captain SAFFORD. Both were in PA-K2; that is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the difficulty of that code in terms of the time which would have been required for the Navy to have deciphered those messages after they were available to the Navy for such purposes?

Captain SAFFORD. The actual time of decryption for number 14, including typing in smooth, would have been about an hour or an hour and a half, and number 15 about half that time. However, in the Navy PA-K2 was given precedence [531] in processing after all the purples and after all the J-19's and it would not have been touched as long as there were any J-19's on hand being worked on by the two girls, who only performed day's duties and did not work on Sundays and handled only the PA-K2's and only the routine decoding of J-19 after J-19 had been solved by the men who were standing continuous watch.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit and state when and by whom the message was intercepted and forwarded?

Captain SAFFORD. The message was intercepted at Fort Shafter. It was processed and translated by the Army on December 30, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the date of the message, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. The message was dated December 2, 1941, and was in J-19. The message bears a note: "This message was received here on December 23."

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear when that message was received in Washington?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, December 23rd. That is from this notation

Mr. SONNETT. In what code was that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That was in J-19.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state how long it would have required for the Navy to have decrypted and translated that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That would have required from twelve hours to five days, depending upon luck and upon the volume of traffic we had available to work on. At this particular time most of the J-19 systems had been destroyed and the volume of J-19 traffic dropped off to a large extent.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, when you say "this particular time," do you mean early in December, '41, before the attack?

Captain SAFFORD. Early in December, 1941, before the attack. I would like to add that there were very few purple keys which we failed to solve, maybe two or three per cent, and there was an appreciable percentage of J-19's, maybe [532] ten or fifteen, which we completely failed to solve due to insufficient traffic or extremely bad luck.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the afternoon of December 6, 1941, and the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, will you state whether the Navy decryption unit was working and, if so, on what?

Captain SAFFORD. A continuous watch was being maintained and that watch gave priority to purple and did nothing else so long as there were any purple messages to be solved. However, during the night of 6-7 December 1941, they did get caught up and they took out something in other systems, which is a matter of record in the GY log, according to my memory. I don't know how many messages we entered into because it showed they got caught up to date and were keeping up with stuff regardless of the extra flow of work.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the so-called fourteen-part message was intercepted beginning on December 6, 1941, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. That was all in English?

Captain SAFFORD. That was all in English.

Mr. SONNETT. And required, therefore, neither decryption nor translating?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, it required decryption. It was in purple.

Mr. SONNETT. But in English?

Captain SAFFORD. But in English, so didn't require translation.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that decrypted promptly on the afternoon of December 6th and the evening?

Captain SAFFORD. They began to work on that immediately after it came in and they had found out by telephone conversation with the War Department that the Army weren't going to work over that week end. As a matter of fact, some of the parts of it were logged out in the GY log to the Army and then recalled [533] when they found out they were going home at 12 o'clock. It was the Army's day of responsibility whereby the Navy took odd days and the Army took even days.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the fourteen-part message, which is document 39 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, was dated December 6, 1941, was it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. So that under the agreement between the Army and the Navy, the Army was responsible for the decryption of that message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there also received on that day a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated December 6th. in the purple code, being message 901, advising that the reply would be in fourteen parts and that time of delivery would be fixed in a separate message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Was that message decrypted by the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe that was decrypted by the Army. It will bear their notation on the bottom if it was.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 38 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask you if you can determine from that who decrypted and translated the message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, that was processed and translated by the Army during the late afternoon and early evening of 6 December 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, will you explain, Captain, how it was that the Army came to work upon those messages when it appears from your earlier testimony that they had planned not to work that afternoon and evening?

Captain SAFFORD. About 3 o'clock, about 3 p. m., the afternoon of [534] December 6, 1941, Commander Kramer returned to the Navy Department and saw on hand roughly twenty intercepts in the purple machine. These turned out to be one long message and several short ones, and realizing that he had more than we could handle, he called up SIS in the War Department and asked for assistance. He found an officer down there making up some back work and this officer called Major Doud and Mr. Rowlett and they also called two young ladies who were Civil Service employees. All four came from their homes and got back to the War Department about 4 p. m. One of the girls, a Miss Ray Cave, a typist, came over to the Navy Department and assisted in the smooth type-ups. The others worked over in the Munitions Building. One other Army officer who was present in the Munitions Building also assisted, but he was under instruction, I believe, and not very much help. I don't recall his name. He is of no importance.

Mr. SONNETT. Which parts of the first thirteen parts of the fourteen-part message were worked on by the Army on the afternoon and evening of December 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. I will have to see that GY log to verify this. As I recall it, it was parts 9 and 10 they actually worked on, but the smooth typing was done over in the Navy Department and it was marked as a Navy translation. There was no actual translation, of course, because it was in English.

Mr. SONNETT. And the balance, I take it, of the thirteen parts were actually worked on by the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. The balance were actually worked on by the Navy.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to part 14 of the message—

Captain SAFFORD. May I add there were also three or four purple messages of relative unimportance which the Army handled at the same time.

[535] Mr. SONNETT. Will you state generally what those messages were, if you recall them, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. One message said that this long one was most secret and not to let an ordinary typist type it; it would have to be

done by the coding officer, and take great pains not to let it leak out. Then there were two congratulatory messages and one ordering somebody to be recalled to his post of duty if they knew where he was and another one ordering one of their intelligence agents to skip to Latin America.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to part 14 of the fourteen part message, which was from Tokyo to Washington, dated 7 December, in the purple code and bearing number 902, that was decrypted, I take it, on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. That is part 14?

Mr. SONNETT. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. That was decrypted on the morning of the 7th some time prior to 7 a. m. It was received in the Navy Department around 5 a. m., as well as we can determine.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to a message of December 7, 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, bearing number 907, which directed the Ambassador to submit the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th, that, I take it, was decrypted on the 7th. Do you know at what hour?

Captain SAFFORD. That was decrypted on the 7th before 7 a. m. and sent over to the Army for translation. Brotherhood, who was on watch, translated it himself and knew what it said, but he was not sufficiently skilled in the Japanese language at that time that we could trust his translations, and he sent it over to the War Department for translation as per orders.

Mr. SONNETT. This bears the note at the bottom: "Trans. 12/7/41 (S)." What does that signify?

[536] Captain SAFFORD. That means that was translated on December 7, 1941, and the "S" means it was intercepted at Bainbridge Island, Washington, by the Navy radio station there, and that also bears the notation that it was translated by the Army. It was decrypted by the Navy in this case, but the actual translation was done by the Army, and it was typed smooth by the Army.

Mr. SONNETT. That message was decrypted at about what time on December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. Before 7 a. m.

Mr. SONNETT. And the message consisted of one sentence, did it not?

Captain SAFFORD. It consisted of one sentence.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any qualified Japanese translators on duty in the Navy Department at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. There were not.

Mr. SONNETT. But Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, who was on duty, attempted a translation?

Captain SAFFORD. Attempted a translation and realized it was very important and stayed on himself after his watch had expired until Commander Kramer came down to the Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, at what time was the translation received back from the Army of this message?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know for certain, except it was received back at least by 10:15 a. m. and possibly shortly after 9 a. m. What the various people say doesn't agree and we have no written record.

Mr. SONNETT. At what time did Commander Kramer arrive at the office on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. He arrived some time prior to 9 o'clock; about 8:30 as well as I can judge.

[537] Mr. SONNETT. Was he shown the decrypted message in Japanese, that is, of message 907, directing the delivery of the reply at 1 p. m.?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know. Kramer said he never knew about the existence of that message until after he had made his first trip to the State Department.

Mr. SONNETT. December 7, 1941, being an odd day, was the day on which the Navy had the responsibility for the decryption and translation of Japanese messages?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. If that was so, why was there no Japanese translator on duty in your section at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. Because Kramer had worked overtime from 4 p. m. until about 1 a. m. after putting in a normal day's work and he was ordered to report to Admiral Stark with translations the next morning at 9 a. m. and realized that he wouldn't be available. Kramer normally took the Sunday duties himself. Kramer made special arrangements with the Army whereby they would provide a translator for Sunday in view of the fact we had handled their work the day before. At that particular time one of our civilian Japanese translators was in the hospital, where he died about two months later, and another one was not available for some reason which I can't recall at the moment.

Mr. SONNETT. The other one being Mrs. Edgers?

Captain SAFFORD. Mrs. Edgers was not good enough to be permitted to handle purple translations. I counted her out.

Mr. SONNETT. You mean her ability to translate Japanese was not adequate?

Captain SAFFORD. Was not adequate at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' history?

[538] Captain SAFFORD. She was the sister of Mr. Woodruff, one of our best translators here. Mr. Cate was the one who was in the hospital and died. I don't know what the status of Woodruff was except there was some reason he wasn't immediately available. And Doctor Hoffman had been taking Sunday duties for a long period and by some local arrangement Kramer had taken them over himself, partially because he was a little mistrustful of the doctor's evaluations of the importance of things, not his translations, but his ability to evaluate, and since Kramer would be making the distribution, it was better for him to come down himself.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' qualifications as a Japanese translator and her previous study of the language?

Captain SAFFORD. As I recall, she had been with us about three months, three to six months. She was employed by ONI and ONI was entirely responsible for translation.

Mr. SONNETT. But did you know, Captain, that she had been licensed to teach Japanese in Japan up to the grade of high school?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not know what her personal qualifications were, but on translating this technical stuff, regardless of their education, it took long experience in working with this particular type of stuff before we dared trust their translations.

Mr. SONNETT. In other words, then, your statement concerning Mrs. Edgers' qualifications was not so much, I take it, her qualifications as a translator but rather her experience with the work?

Captain SAFFORD. And her technical vocabulary. Every one we had had to go through a probationary period of about a year before we dared turn them loose on really important stuff.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring, Captain, to the question which we have [539] previously gone into, namely, the "winds" code execute message relating to the United States, did you ever have a conversation with Colonel Sadler of the War Department concerning the existence of such a message?

Captain SAFFORD. I never talked to Colonel Sadler about that.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether on or about December 4, 1941, you received a call from Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood in which he advised you of the receipt of a message apparently relating to the "winds" code?

Captain SAFFORD. I cannot recall anything distinctly about it that I would want to say in testimony. I have had a vague idea that there was another "winds" code message and the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, which contains documents supplied by the FCC, and to specifically document 2 of that exhibit, do you recall whether or not Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood advised you of that message on or about December 4, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall ever having seen this message or knowing of it in this form until I saw the FCC transcript.

Mr. SONNETT. When did you first see that, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. Some time after August 19, 1944, the day before I went on the stand.

Mr. SONNETT. Up to that time, namely, August of 1944, had you known that the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted any messages which apparently employed the "winds" code?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, I had known of it for several months.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, prior to 1944 had you known?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, no, no, not prior to 1944, no.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral, at this time.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. I don't think of anything further.

[540] Captain SAFFORD. I would like to add the following information: In May, 1945, or late in May, 1945, I had a conversation with Mr. Walter Foote, formerly American Consul General at Batavia, Java. Mr. Foote is the man who sent in a Dutch version of the "winds" setup message. Mr. Foote said that he sent this message at the urgent request of Mr. Lovink, who was technical adviser to the NEI government on Asiatic affairs. Mr. Foote is certain that the Dutch did not hear the "winds" execute message and that he would have been informed if they had heard it.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 11:41 a. m., adjourned until 1:30 p. m., Tuesday, 26 June 1945.)

[541] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-THIRD DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 1:30 p. m., Tuesday, 26 June 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Joseph H. Rochefort, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Two witnesses entered, read the precept, and each was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and rank, please?

Colonel LASSWELL. Alva B. Laswell, Colonel, USMC.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Farnsley C. Woodward, Lieutenant (jg), USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Colonel, will you state what your assignment was in December of 1941?

Colonel LASSWELL. I was a translator with the communication intelligence unit—I believe we called it combat intelligence unit at that time—Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And Lieutenant Woodward, would you state your assignment in 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. My assignment in 1941, I was attached to the same organization and I had several duties among which was cryptanalysis.

Mr. SONNETT. During the first week of December, 1941, certain messages were received by that unit for decryption and translation, which were messages of the Japanese Consul, were they not?

[542] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. And the three of you were on duty at that time?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Colonel LASSWELL. Yes.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been previous testimony that those messages were received on or about December 5, 1941. Is that in accordance with your general and several recollections?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Colonel LASSWELL. I can state that certain messages were received on the 5th, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. To the knowledge of any one of you, were such messages received by your unit prior to December 5, 1941?

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, there were not.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No.

Colonel LASSWELL. I know of none.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant Woodward, I show you a statement on the letterhead of RCA Communications, Inc., listing various messages, and ask whether you have examined that document and checked the messages listed thereon.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I have.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 55.")

Mr. SONNETT. Mr. Woodward, this document, which is exhibit 55, sets forth messages sent by the Japanese Consul General in December and November, [543] 1941, from Honolulu, does it not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the file which I show you, Lieutenant, can you identify the documents contained therein?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I can.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what they are?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, they are deciphered messages of which there is a translation that were taken out by me and translated by some one else.

Mr. SONNETT. And those are coded messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. Is that correct?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Those messages are among those listed on exhibit 55, which is the RCA statement?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state when copies of the coded messages contained in that document first came to your attention?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Around possibly 1:30, 2 o'clock Friday afternoon, December 5, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And each of the messages in the folder, according to the best of your recollection, was received by you on that date?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. At about that time?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Subsequent to the receipt of those messages, Lieutenant, did you endeavor to decrypt the messages?

[544] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I did, as soon as it was determined that the other messages that we had received along with these, what they were, plain language and so forth, we immediately went to work and worked pretty far into the night on that Friday evening.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark those as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 56.")

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, exhibit 56, which is a folder containing photostatic copies of coded messages, also contains some plain language and some translations. Are the translations contained in this exhibit correct translations of the Japanese messages, to the best of your knowledge?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. To the best of my knowledge, but I am not a linguist.

Mr. SONNETT. Colonel Lasswell, have you verified the translations in this exhibit 56 and can you state whether or not they are correct?

Colonel LASSWELL. I can state only that those which I made are correct, to the best of my knowledge and ability.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you, Colonel, exhibit 56 and ask if you will identify the translations contained therein which were made by you.

Colonel LASSWELL. None of these.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know who made the translations of the messages which are set forth in exhibit 56?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I couldn't be positive about that, no.

Mr. SONNETT. Were the translations taken from the files of the Navy Department?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. The translations that are in that book were taken from the files here, a copy of which was put in with this.

[545] Mr. SONNETT. When you say "here," you are referring to—

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Washington.

Mr. SONNETT. Washington?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the messages contained in exhibit 56, which you testified were received on December 5, 1941, there were certain other messages received, were there not, at that time?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. There were.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you describe what those messages were?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, they were plain language and they were in some less secret systems, none of which are in this book.

Mr. SONNETT. What did the plain language messages relate to?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I do not know. I didn't translate them.

Mr. SONNETT. Colonel, did you have any connection with the plain language messages received on or about December 5, 1941?

Colonel LASSWELL. Yes, I hastily read a number of them, many of which dealt with the exchange of certain amounts of money as transportation expenses, etcetera, of personnel connected with the consular department, passing through Honolulu. Many of them were concerning the transfers and movements of certain consular personnel.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any of the plain language messages which were so received prior to the attack of December 7th which dealt with defense preparations or movements of ships at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel LASSWELL. There was no such information, to the best of my knowledge, contained in any message there.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the plain language messages and the coded messages contained in exhibit 56, I believe you said, Lieutenant, there were some other coded messages in less difficult codes?

[546] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state what they were?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, you mean the gist of them?

Mr. SONNETT. Both the gist of them and the code.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the code was a simple code that they had used for years, with which we were very familiar, but as far

as the contents of the messages themselves are concerned, I don't know because I went to work right on this stuff.

Mr. SONNETT. What was the code in question?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. LA.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar, Colonel, with the messages in the LA code so received prior to the attack?

Colonel LASSWELL. Yes, quite a number of them I hastily read. However, we placed, understandably, most of our attention on the other documents in hand, but we did decrypt and read enough of them to know the general content.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state what generally was the content of the messages in the LA code so received?

Colonel LASSWELL. The messages encrypted in what was known as the LA code were almost similar or very similar to those in plain text. The degree of secrecy of that is apparently very little above the plain text.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it it was also true, then, of the LA code messages that there was no message relating to the defense preparations at Pearl Harbor, to movements of ships, or to indicating in any way the possibility of any attack?

Colonel LASSWELL. None that I know of.

Mr. SONNETT. For the sake of the record, Lieutenant, referring to exhibit 56, there are various photostatic pages followed by a translation and [547] then a blank white page. The white pages, blank, separate the various messages, do they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And the translation at the back of each group of photostats is a translation of the coded and of the Japanese language preceding it?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you state when the messages contained in exhibit 56, or any of them, were first translated or decrypted?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, except that on the morning of the 9th about 2 o'clock the first break was found; some time between there and the 10th they were all taken out and possibly translated.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you explain, Lieutenant, what you mean by saying that at that time the first break occurred?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, we were fortunate enough to discover what they had done in enciphering, which was a breach from the normal way of enciphering the messages.

Mr. SONNETT. In what code were those messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. PA-K2 system; PA base with a K2 transposition system.

Mr. SONNETT. Between December 5th, when those messages were received, and December 9th, when you first succeeded in breaking that code, I take it that efforts were made to break that code and decrypt the messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Very much so, some fourteen to sixteen hours a day.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you work on that project yourself or did you have assistants?

[548] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I worked myself on them and after getting them, I turned them over to translators for translation.

Mr. SONNETT. And the translators, in addition to Colonel Laswell, were now Captain Finnegan and who else?

Lientenant (jg) WOODWARD. That I can't be sure.

Colonel LASSWELL. There were quite a number of officers there. The ones that were used on that project, to the best of my memory, would have been Allyn Cole, John Chivley—those were the only two I remember employing.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Besides yourself and Finnegan.

Colonel LASSWELL. Besides myself and Finnegan.

Mr. SONNETT. In addition to the PA-K2 code, the Japanese had the so-called J-19 and the purple codes which they used, did they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They did.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you ever at Pearl Harbor work on any of those codes, that is, purple or J-19?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Were the Japanese code messages received on December 5, 1941, forwarded to Washington by your unit?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Copies of them were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether that was done before or after the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That I do not know. I couldn't say.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not Washington had from other sources copies of such messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I couldn't be sure about that either.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, when, prior to December 5, 1941, had you last engaged in attempting to break Japanese diplomatic code?

[549] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. From the period of 1938 in around April till June, 1940.

Mr. SONNETT. Where was that work done?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Shanghai, China.

Mr. SONNETT. Was any such work carried on in the Pearl Harbor unit during the period of time you were there prior to December 5, 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. And when did you arrive at Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. August 13, 1940.

Mr. SONNETT. So that, I take it, no attack was being made on Japanese diplomatic codes during the latter part of 1940 and up to the time of the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Except commencing on December 5, 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you another folder of photostatic copies of dispatches and ask if you can identify that.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes, I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state what that document is?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, this document contains encoded messages, which also contains the take-outs—we call them take-outs—and translations.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, messages of the Japanese Consul at Honolulu?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. When were those coded messages first in your possession?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These messages were received on the night of 7 December 1941.

[550] Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 57.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 57, which you have just identified, Lieutenant, I take it these messages were also in the PA-K2 code?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were, with the exception of the last batch at the bottom. That is not. That is in J-19 and 22.

Mr. SONNETT. And those messages weren't decrypted and translated at Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. In this exhibit is it also true that the photostatic documents relating to the one message are followed by a translation and then a blank sheet of paper? Is that correct?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. I note in exhibit 57 that the first message was one from Honolulu, *Kita* to Tokyo, dated December 4, 1941, in the PA-K2 code, bearing the number 249. Can you explain why that message was not among the messages received on December 5, 1941, which are set forth in exhibit 56?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I can't explain that.

Mr. SONNETT. The messages received on December 5, 1941, which are contained in exhibit 56 are those which after careful examination, Lieutenant, of all of these messages you identify as the only ones received prior to the attack, of the coded messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Of the coded messages, yes, sir, except the LA's, the ones in the LA system.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 55, Lieutenant, which is the RCA [551] Communications statement, listing messages of the Japanese Consul General in November and December, 1941, will you state as to each message there listed whether a copy of the message is contained in 56 or 57?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Copies of all the messages in these 56 and 57 exhibits are on this list. Do you want me to identify each one?

Mr. SONNETT. Would you?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the cable radiogram numbers are merely stamped on the blank by the company. Those numbers have been matched with the internal secret message serial number of the Japanese, where showing, and copies of all of these are in the folders as such, labelled at the bottom accordingly.

Mr. SONNETT. I note that there are more cable messages shown than there are documents contained in exhibits 56 and 57.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the reason for that is because one document carrying a number, say 245, embodies two messages, or the same message, I should say, one and two different addressees under two separate cable numbers, and there may also be some three or four addressees shown for some message.

Mr. SONNETT. The messages set forth on exhibit 55, Lieutenant, were, as you previously testified, in several of the Japanese diplomatic systems such as the PA-K2 and the J-19 and others perhaps. I believe you also testified that you translated after the attack—

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I didn't translate.

Mr. SONNETT. That you decrypted after the attack the messages in the PA-K2 system. For the sake of the record, will you identify by date and number the messages which were in systems other than the PA-K2 and which you did not decrypt at Pearl Harbor?

[552] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, the cable numbers, number 38 was a question; I don't know what that is. The cable numbers 156 and 160 were the same message going to two addressees, and the secret message, serial number was 241, that was in system J-19. Cable number 161 or radiogram number—whichever you want to call it—was secret message serial number 242, was in system J-22, not translated, but the gist—we didn't translate it at all. Number 362 and 363 and 411 in question. This system is not known and those, I didn't know what they are because I can't find them. Number 362, 363, and 411 weren't worked on by me at Honolulu and I find no record of them here.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the November messages of the Japanese Consul set forth at page 2 of exhibit 55, will you state whether any of those messages were in the PA-K2 system and were worked on at Honolulu by you?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They weren't.

(Brief discussion off the record.)

Mr. SONNETT. Captain Rochefort, I show you exhibit 23 of this investigation, which is a December 1, 1941, estimate of Japanese fleet location by Lieutenant Commander Layton and ask whether or not you saw that document prior to the attack on December 7th.

Captain ROCHEFORT. I cannot say that I saw this particular document, but undoubtedly participated in its preparation.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Lieutenant Commander Layton or with Admiral Kimmel or any other member of his staff concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese Carrier Divisions One and Two? You will note that the exhibit contains no reference to those carrier divisions.

Captain ROCHEFORT. No, I do not, other than we did not know where CarDivs One and Two were.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall in general what information your unit had after December 1, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

[553] Captain ROCHEFORT. To the best of my belief, our estimate did not vary after our dispatch of November 26th; in other words, one Cardiv somewhere in the Marshalls and the other Cardivs unlocated.

Mr. SONNETT. You were, I take it, delivering daily to Lieutenant Commander Layton the daily communication intelligence summaries which you have previously identified?

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation and ask you whether those are photostatic copies of the communication intelligence summaries so delivered by you.

Captain ROCHEFORT. Yes, they are.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much gentlemen.

(The witnesses were excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 2:08 p. m., adjourned until 2:30 p. m., 4 July 1945.)

[554] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 2:30 p. m., Wednesday, 4 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. Please state your name and rank.

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Gilbert E. Boone, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

Mr. SONNETT. What is your present duty?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. The section head of Op-20-GL.

Mr. SONNETT. And that is a sub-section of Op-20-G?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. What is Op-20-GL?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. It is a research and collateral section.

Mr. SONNETT. Who has custody of the records of Op-20-G?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Op-20-G's records are divided in custody, each sub-section or section retaining for operational purposes such records as they require.

Mr. SONNETT. When they are through with the operational use of the records, what happens to them?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Operational records no longer used for that purpose are turned over to my custody in Op-20-3GL.

Mr. SONNETT. At our request, Commander, have you made a search of the Op-20-G files to attempt to collect all messages received by Op-20-G from [555] November 27th to December 7, 1941, relating to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I directed a search from such cognizant sources.

Mr. SONNETT. And have you with you, Commander, a collection of the dispatches which you succeeded in locating on that subject?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I have, right here.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 58.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a collection of photostatic copies of documents, Commander, and ask if you can identify what they are.

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. They are photographic copies of Japanese plain language dispatches intercepted at Station S.

Mr. SONNETT. And forwarded to Op-20-G?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Forwarded to Op-20-G. They are of December 3 and 4, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. And those are news broadcasts from what source, Commander?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Jap press. That would probably be Tokyo; Domei, wherever Domei might originate. This one (indicating) is Domei from Tokyo.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 59.")

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a collection of carbon copies of memoranda, Commander, and ask if you can identify them.

[556] Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28) is a survey relating to Japanese diplomatic traffic of 1941. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 September 28) is a rough count of the work sheets held in GL-6, sub-section of GL, of various Japanese diplomatic systems. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 September 23) is a survey of messages received by Op-20-G from 1 to 8 December 1941 by stations and listing time lag.

Mr. SONNETT. And you have indicated in pencil the location of each station listed on that?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Over here, giving the identity, right. You will note one in here, Army, where Army is printed out, it may have been Army teletype; it may have been delivered—the message may have been delivered, just a copy or it may have been some other method, but Army was the source. There is one other where we have photo and X, they are two practically synonymous uses. The Army used one; we used the other. We may have used both simultaneously.

Mr. SONNETT. That symbolizes that the message was obtained by photographing at the cable office in Washington?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. That is right. Well, that may not have been necessarily Washington. It may have been any place we could get.

CT. FJPZ-2 (1944 January 19, enclosure F) is a memorandum which was made in response to an attempt to locate odd groups of files.

Mr. SONNETT. And those are correct copies of memorandum in your files in Op-20-G, are they not?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. May we receive that, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 60.")

[557] Mr. SONNETT. I show you a memorandum dated 29 June 1945 and ask if you can identify that and state who prepared it, Commander.

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. The number is CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 June 29) and it was prepared by a sub-section head under my cognizance. Its purpose was a survey of the work sheets processed by the Navy of the Japanese purple system.

Mr. SONNETT. May we receive this, Admiral, as an exhibit?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 61.")

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 58, Commander, which is a collection of dispatches produced by you from the Op-20-G files, have you examined every source known to you wherein you might find dis-

patches relating to Japanese fleet movements after November 27th and prior to December 7, 1941?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I have examined all possible cognizant sources, to my knowledge.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[558] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.

Mr. SONNETT. State your name and rank, please, sir.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Irving H. Mayfield, Rear Admiral, USN.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, what was your duty in December of 1941?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I was District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. And for how long had you been District Intelligence Officer?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Since March 15, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. What, in general, Admiral, was the mission of the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The mission, in general, was that of general intelligence matters in cooperation with the other federal and local intelligence organizations, particularly with respect to espionage and counter-espionage and such other intelligence matters as might be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or District Commandant.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the other local intelligence agencies, Admiral?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There were two other local federal intelligence agencies, namely, Military Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was in charge of the Military Intelligence?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, it was Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, who was not the G-2 on the Department Commander's staff, but was the assistant who had charge locally of matters pertaining to local intelligence. The FBI was Mr. Robert L. Shivers, who was later relieved—the exact date I do not remember—by a Mr. Thornton of FBI.

Mr. SONNETT. That was subsequent to the attack of December 7, 1941?

[559] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Subsequent to the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, in general, Admiral, what were the arrangements for the exchange of intelligence among the three local federal intelligence agencies?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The general directive from the Chief of Naval Operations, as I understood it, was complete cooperation between the three federal investigative agencies in accordance with the delimitation agreement and modifications thereto signed in Washington. There was, to the best of my knowledge and belief, complete, whole-hearted, unreserved cooperation between Naval Intelligence and the other two federal investigative organizations.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it as a matter of general practice, Admiral, that the information in the possession of the District Office of Naval Intelligence was communicated to the other agencies, that is, the FBI and G-2 of the Army?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Every bit of the information received by my organization was available to the other two organizations and if, on scrutiny of the information, it appeared of interest to either or both, they were given copies.

Mr. SONNETT. There was, Admiral, a unit known as the radio intelligence unit of Com 14, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort, was there not?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Commander.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Commander Rochefort.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There was.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Admiral, what the relations were between your office and that unit?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I received from and gave to Commander Rochefort's unit all possible assistance. However, his unit operated entirely separate [560] and distinct from my organization and I had no authority whatever over his unit.

Mr. SONNETT. To whom did his unit report, Admiral?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I believe directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, though perhaps through the District Commandant.

Mr. SONNETT. What, in general, Admiral, was the mission of the unit headed by Commander Rochefort?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It was my understanding that this was a highly specialized unit operating under the Chief of Naval Operations, and I am unable to give definite information as to its mission or work performed by it.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, did you know to whom the unit headed by Commander Rochefort reported the results of its activities?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I believe to the Chief of Naval Operations or to such other officers and officials as might be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether the unit reported to the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not know what reports were made by Commander Rochefort to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, but I do know that personal cooperation and relations between Commander Rochefort and Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, appeared to me to be cordial, thorough, and cooperative.

Mr. SONNETT. What were the relations, Admiral, between the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The relations between the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer were, to the best of my knowledge, cordial close, and cooperative. I was in more or less constant communication by telephone and by personal visit with Commander Layton and [561] it was my endeavor to supply him with every bit of information reaching me which I believed would be of interest or value to him.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, from your testimony that you did not receive, directly or indirectly, reports as to the location or movements of Japanese fleet units made by the intelligence unit under Commander Rochefort?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to the effect that during the first week of December, 1941, certain cable mes-

sages sent by the Japanese Consul were secured from the local office of the RCA Communications Company at Honolulu. Do you have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding that?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Admiral, fully your knowledge of those circumstances, including the efforts which had been made previously to secure such messages?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Shortly after taking over the duty of District Intelligence Officer, I discussed with the representative of Military Intelligence and the Special Agent in Charge of FBI methods of obtaining from the cable and radio communication companies access to their files for the purpose of obtaining copies of dispatches which might have intelligence value. We had endeavored to approach the managers of these companies or some of their employees, seeking a method whereby we could obtain copies of such dispatches. We had had no success.

By agreement with the other two organizations, I had concentrated particularly on RCA. It was not until the visit of Mr. Sarnoff that I was able to secure access to RCA files. The Japanese Consulate General alternated among the different companies on a monthly basis in sending its traffic. [562] RCA did not handle the traffic during the month of November, but did handle the traffic of the Japanese Consulate General beginning on the 1st of December. I, therefore, was able to secure the traffic sent and received by the Japanese Consulate General from and after 1 December 1941.

Since the turning over of this traffic to me was considered an unusual and perhaps an illegal matter, the detailed arrangement, to the best of my recollection, was as follows: The manager of RCA daily would have copies made on a blank piece of paper, giving little information as to origin or addressee of this traffic. This was a measure of protection for him which I considered justifiable. I did not consider that written records of receipt and delivery of these copies of messages should be kept. I called personally at the office of RCA at the beginning in the forenoon, late forenoon, and received from the manager a blank envelope containig copies of these messages. To the best of my recollection my first visit was about the 3rd of December. The envelope I received contained plain sheets of paper with the messages written thereon. I immediately forwarded these messages by officer messenger to Commander Rochefort. As I did not keep a written record of receipt and delivery of these messages, I am unable to give exact dates of receipts and deliveries to Commander Rochefort.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there more than one delivery of messages to him prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. That I cannot state definitely, but I believe there was.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the day before the attack, Admiral, that is, December 6, 1941, have you any recollection whether or not messages were obtained that day from RCA and sent to Commander Rochefort?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no definite recollection as to that date.

[563] Mr. SONNETT. Can you recall at what time of the day these messages were picked up at the RCA office?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Usually in the late forenoon, around 10 or 11 o'clock.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to the attack on December 7, 1941, Admiral, did you receive from Commander Rochefort any translations of the messages which you so obtained and delivered to him?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, I did not, or if I did receive any such translations, they did not appear to have any military or intelligence value.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 56 of this investigation, which has previously been identified by members of Captain Rochefort's unit as containing messages which were received on December 5, 1941, by that unit, and ask if you can identify those or any of those as messages which you so prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no recollection and do not believe that I ever saw the translations of any of these messages prior to December 7th.

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you, Admiral, exhibit 57 of this investigation, which has heretofore been identified as messages and translations of messages, which messages were received after the attack, on the night of December 7th, by Commander Rochefort's unit, and ask whether you recall having seen the translations of any of these messages prior to the attack.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no recollection of ever having seen the translations of any of these messages prior to December 7, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it, Admiral, that it is not possible for you to recall any of the actual messages themselves which were received on December 5th or prior to the attack in code?

[564] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. No. When these dispatches came to me from RCA, I would simply look at them and see that they were code dispatches which had been sent to me by RCA; so I just simply sent them on out to Rochefort without any attempt to recognize code groups or addressees or anything else, because supposedly it was nothing but traffic from and to the Japanese Consulate General.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation, which contains two Office of Naval Intelligence reports made at the Fourteenth Naval District, and ask whether those reports were submitted to and approved by you.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. They were submitted to me, approved by me, and bore my signature when they left my office.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state the substance, Admiral, of the first report, which is dated February 9, 1942?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. The first report reports on a message sent by the Japanese Consul General, transmitting to Tokyo a proposed system of signalling by lights and other methods, which signals would be available for use to report departures of naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system was conceived and submitted to the Japanese Consul General by Otto Kuhn, a German subject resident on the Island of Oahu. This message presumably was sent on the 3rd of December 1941 and I believe to have been one of the messages delivered by me to Commander Rochefort on the 4th or 5th of December. The translation of this message was given to me at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard

by Admiral Bloch, District Commandant, on the morning of 11 December, at which time I received certain instructions from him, the action on which is set forth in the report.

Mr. SONNETT. In substance, Admiral, was there any evidence obtained to indicate that that system of signaling had been used?

[565] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Although my office made every effort, as did the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we were unable to find any definite information that any part of the proposed system of signals had ever been used.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, will you state what action was taken with respect to Kuhn, who conceived this system of signalling?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Mr. Kuhn was tried and convicted. I believe his sentence was commuted to a long term of imprisonment.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the second of the ONI reports in exhibit 40, which is dated February 14, 1942, will you state whether that report was submitted to and approved by you, and the substance of it?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. This report was submitted to me, approved by me, and bore my signature when it left my office.

Mr. SONNETT. It appears in that, Admiral, does it not, that various of the messages sent by the Japanese Consul on December 3rd and subsequently are translated and digested in the report?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the report, Admiral, will you state briefly what messages of the Japanese Consul are set forth prior to December 5, 1941?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There appears in the report a statement that the Japanese Consul General sent a dispatch on 3 December reporting departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. On the 4th of December, another dispatch, reporting the arrival of the HONOLULU. And another, on the 5th of December, which reported the arrival of three battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers, and a statement as to vessels of certain classes of U. S. men of war in Pearl Harbor on the afternoon of the 5th, presumably December 5th.

[566] Mr. SONNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to the first page of the report, does it appear when the messages referred to subsequently in the report were received by your organization from RCA?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It appears in the report that my office received on the morning of December 5th certain communications sent and received by the Japanese Consul General during the period 1 to 4 December.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the communications set forth in the report, however, are only those of the 3rd and 4th of December, are they not, Admiral, that is, prior to the morning of the 5th?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear in the report when the Japanese Consul's messages of the evening of December 5, 1941, was received by your organization?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does not appear in the report as to when my office received a copy of the message sent by the Japanese Consul General in the late afternoon of 5 December.

Mr. SONNETT. Similarly, Admiral, as to the message of December 6th referred to in the report, does it appear when that message was received by your office?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does not appear in the report when a copy of this dispatch was received by my office.

Mr. SONNETT. The message of the 6th, Admiral, was in substance what?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. "Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th."

Mr. SONNETT. Is there another message also set forth for December 6th in the report?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There is.

Mr. SONNETT. And that in substance is what, sir?

[567] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It relates to arrival of the WYOMING and the number of various types of U. S. men of war in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear at what time that message was filed by the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It is stated in the report that this message was filed at 6:01 p. m. on December 6th.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall whether after 6:01 p. m. on the night preceding the attack your office received any messages from RCA of the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not remember that any were received and am of the opinion that none were received since it was my agreement with the manager of RCA that these messages would be delivered to me or my authorized representative during the late forenoon of each day. This arrangement was at the desire of the manager of RCA and was for his own security inasmuch as he was violating instructions and desired to have these messages copied and delivered to me or my representative only in such manner as would best safeguard and protect him as well as me.

Mr. SONNETT. So that under your arrangement with the RCA manager, you would have received the messages filed on the afternoon or evening of the 6th the following day, that is, on the 7th?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you find, Admiral, a message filed on the 6th translated and set forth in the report, relating to the use of balloons?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. There appears in the report a dispatch relating to the Army's use of balloons and the report states that the dispatch was delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 12:48 on December 6th.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, therefore, that under the arrangements which you have described, you would not have received that message until the 7th?

[568] Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And you have no recollection of having received that message at any time before the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have none, no recollection, and do not believe that I did receive it before the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you an original report from the District Intelligence Officer, dated April 19, 1942, to the Director of

Naval Intelligence, and ask whether you can recognize that as a report forwarded by you.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I recognize this report as having been made from my office by one of my assistants, approved and signed by me.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, sir, generally what the report deals with?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. In general, the report deals with coded dispatch traffic of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

Mr. SONNETT. As set forth in the incoming and outgoing logs of the Japanese Consul, sir?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. This report encloses copies of translations of the incoming and outgoing message log books of the Japanese Consulate General.

Mr. SONNETT. They were recovered, Admiral, were they not, after the attack and reconstructed?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my knowledge, they were recovered after the attack by either the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Military Intelligence. The report states that both of these organizations sent to me copies of the outgoing log book, but that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was the only organization sending me a copy of the incoming log book.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, this is the original report, which has been [569] provided to us by the Director of Naval Intelligence. I wonder if we could have it marked as an exhibit with the understanding that we will have it photostated and we will substitute a photostatic copy, so that we can return this to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Admiral HEWITT. All right; yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 62.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, it appears from prior testimony that for some months prior to the attack of December 7, 1941, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consulate General were tapped at Honolulu. I show you exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation, which have been identified as transcripts of the conversations recorded by ONI representatives and obtained via the lines of the Japanese Consul General and Vice Consul during the period October 1, 1941, to December 2, 1941. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, were the telephone lines in question tapped, Admiral?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no personal recollection of the date on which these interceptions began. That should be shown in the records of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, Admiral, it is clear from the exhibits, is it not, that certainly by October 1, 1941, these telephone lines were being tapped?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It is.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, sir, was it true that the information obtained from the telephone taps on the Consulate's lines was brought to your attention as a matter of regular routine while the taps were in effect?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. My consent had to be obtained before the interceptions were started. Thereafter, copies of the interceptions were [570] only brought to my attention when they appeared

to contain items of particular interest. All bits of information obtained from these interceptions were used to supplement information already on file in my office concerning people or locations on which we had dossiers or for use in starting new dossiers. Copies of these transcripts were delivered to FBI daily.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, did any information come to you prior to December 7, 1941, of military significance which had been obtained from tapping a telephone line to the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. None that I recollect and I do not believe that any information received by this method was considered of military or naval importance by me or my assistants.

Mr. SONNETT. You have, Admiral, examined at my request, have you not, exhibits 38A and 38B, the transcripts from October 1, 1941, to December 2, 1941? Can you state whether, having examined those transcripts, there appears to be anything of military or naval significance contained therein?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not believe there is anything of military or naval significance contained therein.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you state, Admiral, why there are no transcripts after December 2, 1941, and up to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. On or about December 2nd, it was reported to me by one of my assistants that employees of the telephone company had discovered a jumper put across the connections in a junction box by a member of the FBI organization and that an employee of the telephone company had reported this discovery to one of my assistants. It was further reported to me that one of my assistants reported this matter to one of the agents of the FBI. It was further reported to me that a member of the FBI organization, name unknown to me, had taken the matter up with the telephone company. What [571] representative of the telephone company I do not know. To the best of my recollection, I discussed the matter with Mr. Shivers and the reports made to me did not agree with the reports made to him by his assistants. My organization long before my arrival had worked up a contact with an employee of the telephone company and through this contact was able to obtain any telephone interception desired by my office. Because of the highly explosive nature of such practice, I did not desire to enter into an argument or controversy as to the merits or demerits of the case since I was afraid that by so doing, the fact that such interceptions were being made might be discovered and thereby jeopardize the future of any further interceptions. Furthermore, since the interceptions to that date had revealed nothing of particular value, I considered the wisest thing to do was to cease all interceptions of whatever kind and so instructed my assistants.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investigation—

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I would like to add that later along—the exact date I do not remember, but I believe after December 7th—the whole matter was satisfactorily straightened out and we were again able to resume interceptions.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investigation, which has been previously identified as a transcript of the so-called Mori conversation. Will you state whether that conversation and transcript came to your attention and fully the circumstances surrounding that?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, a transcript of this exhibit was brought to me by Mr. Shivers on the morning of December 6th. I believe it was very late in the forenoon. We discussed the transcript and were unable to determine that it did have any definite or particular significance. It was thought desirable to have Lieutenant Commander Carr [572] listen to the recording and give us his further opinion as to the value of the contents of the transcription before decision was arrived at as to whether or not it should be reported to the Commandant of the District.

Mr. SONNETT. Was it brought to the attention of the Commandant or to any other superior officer prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, it was not.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know whether or not it was brought to the attention of General Short prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the transcript of the telephone conversation between Mori and a person in Japan which you have before you, it appears, does it not, that after a question from Japan concerning the United States fleet and the number of ships present, the person in Japan inquired what flowers or whether the flowers were in bloom and that that question was answered by Mori, who pointed out that poinsettias and some other flowers were in bloom?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It does. The question from Japan asks, "What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply from Honolulu was to the effect that flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, but that hibiscus and poinsettias were in bloom.

Mr. SONNETT. When you studied that transcript on December 6, 1941, Admiral, did that particular portion of it come to your attention?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. It did.

Mr. SONNETT. What were your thoughts concerning it at the time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Our thoughts at the time were that it was somewhat curious but that it was a disconnected conversation in which Mori seemed to be somewhat at a loss, and, according to my recollection, that was [573] the reason for our desire to study it further and have Doctor Carr listen to the recording itself.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any knowledge at that time, or have you now any knowledge, as to the establishment by the Japanese of a code in which by the broadcast or trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation references to flowers would signify movements of United States ships from Pearl Harbor?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I think that is rather a complicated question to answer, did I have then or do I have now.

Mr. SONNETT. Would the answer be different?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Let's make it did you have then? Then we will ask you the other.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I did not have knowledge of any such code at that time.

Mr. SONNETT. Have you knowledge of any such code at this time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Of my own personal knowledge of the existence of such code, I have none. I mean I have heard or read something about it, but then—

Mr. SONNETT. Well, I think you might just state that.

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I have heard or read something to the effect that such a code may have been in existence. I have no personal knowledge of the existence of such a code.

Mr. SONNETT. As to those portions of the transcription of the Mori conversation, Admiral, which referred to the flying of airplanes daily, what evaluation did you make of that inquiry at the time?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. My evaluation at that time was that such information as to the number of planes or approximate number of planes flying was a matter of common knowledge. They could be seen and heard by any one.

[574] Mr. SONNETT. Did you attach, Admiral, any particular significance to the fact that the inquiry was made by a person then in Japan?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. Not particularly, except that the whole message seemed a bit queer and I desired to have a further study of it made before making any report.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to the effect that some time during the summer of 1941 Admiral Bloch, on the basis of some intelligence or information which he received, asked Admiral Kimmel to establish an air reconnaissance on a sector towards Jaluit. Do you have any information as to that reconnaissance or the reasons for it?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not. Such matters were not directly in my sphere of activity.

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, did you have any knowledge prior to the attack of the establishment by the Japanese of a so-called "winds" code and of any message which may have been received using that code?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I had not.

Mr. SONNETT. What, if any, conversations did you have, Admiral, with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941, concerning the likelihood of war between Japan and the United States?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. I do not remember, nor do I believe, that I had any conversations on this subject with Admiral Kimmel. I did have conversations with Admiral Bloch and Commander Layton on intelligence matters, with particular relation to counter-espionage work, but I have no recollection of any statement to me that war was imminent. I do recollect that we discussed the increasing tension, particularly with relation to counter-espionage measures.

[575] Mr. SONNETT. Were you advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941, of the so-called war warning?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, I was not.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you have any conversation with any of the four officers mentioned concerning the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese?

Rear Admiral MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

(The investigation was then, at 4:15 p. m., adjourned until 2:15 p. m., 6 July 1945.)

[576] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 2:15 p. m., Friday, 6 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, there has been testimony before this investigation that during the first week of December, 1941, you examined an intercepted Japanese broadcast which apparently used the "winds" code words relating to Russia and that after your examination of that, you stated that the broadcast was not a "winds" code message, and that you threw the message into the wastepaper basket. Do you recall any such incident?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall any specific incident of that kind, but during that week and some days before that week, there were literally hundreds of such so-called weather messages which were actually simply weather broadcasts. We were getting thorough coverage on Japanese plain language broadcasts, both *kana* and Roman letter news broadcasts. They were coming in from various stations by the hour, every hour. It threw a considerable extra burden on our limited number of translators to scan those things, but nevertheless it was done religiously, looking for one of these "stop" messages or an actual war warning message. Of those hundreds that we saw during that week or ten days, those that were not applicable, of course, we destroyed.

[577] Mr. SONNETT. I show you document number 2 of exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain, and ask you whether that refreshes your recollection as to the receipt on the night of December 4, 1941, of a message apparently using the words relating to Russia.

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall specifically having seen this, though I well may have. It appears to be one in that category of simple weather broadcasts.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, referring to the previous testimony concerning the receipt of a "winds" code message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, since your last testimony in this investigation, have you obtained any additional information concerning the receipt or non-receipt of such a message?

Captain KRAMER. No first-hand information. Simply I do have some more specific recollection of it than I did when the matter was first broached to me at Pearl Harbor during Admiral Murfin's

inquiry. That refreshing goes to the extent that I have already testified about, namely, a positive recollection of having accompanied the GY watch officer with a "winds" message to Commander Safford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I understood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special setup that he had for that type of message.

Mr. SONNETT. And you have now no clear recollection, Captain, as to which country the message referred to?

Captain KRAMER. No positive recollection. It may have been any one or all three of the nations covered by that Japanese code setup. The fact that we jumped on the ball on that message, however, would appear to me to have been applicable to at least England and probably the United States as well, but I have no first-hand recollection of it.

[578] Mr. SONNETT. Do you mean to imply, Captain, if you found a message in that code relating to Russia during that period, you wouldn't have given it as speedy treatment as you would if it related to England and the United States?

Captain KRAMER. Of course, we would have, but there isn't the slightest indication that the Japanese had any intention of attacking Russia.

Mr. SONNETT. Other than, of course, the FCC intercept telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood on the night of December 4th, which apparently related to Russia?

Captain KRAMER. That, however, was simply another weather broadcast.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, after the attack on December 7, 1941, Captain, and up to the time of your testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, did you have any occasion to refresh your recollection as to the existence of a "winds" code message?

Captain KRAMER. None whatsoever. I did not testify before the Roberts' hearing or before Admiral Hart. In other words, I was not called on to testify regarding anything concerning Pearl Harbor until the court of Admiral Murfin's.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to your testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, was your recollection refreshed by any communication from Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. In the late fall of '43, he wrote me a personal letter under classified mail, asking certain questions covering the events leading up to Pearl Harbor in connection with what he stated was a study he was making of the subject. I answered those specific questions.

Mr. SONNETT. Prior to the receipt of that communication from [579] Captain Safford, had you any recollection of the circumstances surrounding the receipt of any "winds" code message during the first week of December, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I had no occasion to recall such message. His letter, however, did refresh my memory on that one of the middle of the week.

Mr. SONNETT. And as of now, since you have testified previously in the Naval Court of Inquiry and this and have refreshed your recollection, I take it, to the fullest extent possible, your best recollection is that there was a "winds" message, but you cannot say with certainty what the contents were?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring, Captain, to the so-called hidden word code, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation, which contains a certified photostatic copy of a Japanese message and a translation of that message, and ask whether you recall having seen those.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, on the morning of 7 December.

Mr. SONNETT. The translation indicates that relations between Japan and England are not in accord with expectations, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. What is the Japanese word of code contained in the exhibit which signified that relations were not in accord with expectations?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall the exact Japanese nomenclature used, but the phrase "not in accordance with expectations" is a literal translation of the Japanese. It is typical of their way of talking in certain locution.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you document 6 of exhibit 13 of this [580] investigation, Captain, at page 2, and ask whether the Japanese word in question is not there indicated to be *hattori*?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been, Captain, other testimony before this investigation to the effect that the word *hattori* correctly translated meant that relations were on the verge of a crisis or perhaps that hostilities were imminent. Would you say that translation is a correct translation of the word?

Captain KRAMER. It is not a literal translation, which is the point I just made. It can be inferred, however, and I have testified to that effect previously, both here and before Admiral Murfin, that such phraseology could have the implication of our words "relations are reaching a crisis," with all its implications, that is, either a minor crisis or a major crisis. In this case it referred simply to the fact that negotiations concerning an understanding with the United States were at an end or that relations were to be broken or it could even mean that the crisis was so severe that war was imminent. But those were all simply implications to be drawn as a matter of interpretation from the Japanese text.

Mr. SONNETT. The code in question, Captain, that is, the hidden word code, was established by Tokyo, was it not, on November 27, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. That is the date of this message, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And as of that time, of course, war with Japan was expected by those in Naval Intelligence, including yourself, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. I wouldn't say that it was expected, no. There was a definite crisis in the offing, however. There was no indication from this source, which is the source with which I mainly had to deal—in other words, I didn't see our other secret dispatches. There was no [581] slightest indication in this source that Japan intended any overt act against the United States. There were positive indications of a break with England in this traffic.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall the receipt prior to November 27, 1941, of intercepted Japanese communications indicating that the Japanese Government had established a deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations and that unless successfully completed by the time

of the deadline, that things were going to happen automatically thereafter?

Captain KRAMER. The deadlines were set for the latter part of November, initially around the 20th, and later delayed at the request and insistence of Kurusu and Nomura until around the 25th or 26th of November. A few days after that deadline there was a message from Tokyo which directed their Washington envoys to continue the appearance of negotiation, which added up to the fact that from the Japanese point of view the negotiations were *de facto* terminated. There was a further positive indication at the end of November in a message Tokyo sent to Berlin in which for the first time during 1941 they outlined the course of the negotiations with the United States and used the phrase in that message which means, "Sooner than any one imagines Japan will be at war with the Anglo-Saxons." That is the closest there is in this traffic to anything indicating likelihood of war with the United States, with, of course, the possible exception, which I am unable to testify from first-hand recollection on, of the "winds" message of the first week of December.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you documents 10 and 11 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court, which are two deadline messages, and call your attention to the following appearing in the second message: "This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After [582] that things are automatically going to happen." I call your attention further to the fact that that message was translated on November 22, 1941. What did you understand by the sentence, "After that things are automatically going to happen"?

Captain KRAMER. This is the first time I have seen this one since the date of dissemination, the 22nd of November, '41. My recollection is a little vague on our interpretation at the time, but that it was intended to mean—well, it intended to mean—that Japan was going to war with us would be a little far fetched. It appears to be now.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, would you say, Captain, that they intended to mean—

Captain KRAMER. I might continue this. Undoubtedly it intended to mean that a course of action or policy by the Japanese already decided upon was intended to be carried out. Just what that consisted of is a matter of interpretation or guessing.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you familiar with any of the messages sent out during November to the Pacific Fleet and elsewhere, indicating that an attack by Japan on United States possessions was regarded as likely?

Captain KRAMER. I do have some slight recollection of being told of such a message. That, however, was the type of message normally originated by the War Plans Division or CNO and which I did not see and had no hand in drafting.

Mr. SONNETT. Coming back, Captain, to the second deadline message, to which we just made reference, would you say that the Japanese intended to mean more merely than that relations between the United States and Japan were not in accordance with expectations?

Captain KRAMER. That phrase "not in accordance with expectations" [583] should not be interpreted as mildly as the English appears to indicate. It is simply a literal translation of the Japanese phraseology, which can have more dire implications than the simple English terminology.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to document 6 of exhibit 13, which is the message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code, it appears that it was translated by the Navy. Did you translate the message, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. One of my professional translators did it, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Was the translation reviewed by you?

Captain KRAMER. Normally all translations were reviewed by me to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon who translated them as well as the importance.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to exhibit—

Captain KRAMER. As well as depending on the shape in which the message arrived. Sometimes a badly garbled message would call for more careful editing than one that was in good, clear text.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to exhibit 20 of this investigation, Captain, which contains the photostatic copy of the Japanese message employing certain of the hidden code words, and to the translation annexed thereto, reading, "7 December 1941. Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," I believe you testified previously that in the hurry of the morning of 7 December 1941, you saw the Japanese message and while you were about to leave to deliver other urgent messages, you hurriedly translated the Japanese message in the form in which it appears in this exhibit, namely, that relations between Japan and England were not in accordance with expectations, but that you did not note the word *minami* which also related to the United States. Is that a correct summary of your testimony?

[584] Captain KRAMER. That is correct. I might amplify that by stating that when the oversight was noted in reviewing the messages after returning from the State Department and White House, namely, about 12:30, I made some phone calls in that regard and planned, as occasionally we had done in the past, sending around a corrected translation. That procedure was not unusual, particularly in the case of garbled messages of importance, of sending around a first version. If a later better copy of a message was intercepted or if in later editing a revised version of the translation was warranted, a corrected translation would be sent around. Sometimes such correction was phoned to recipients if it involved negotiations coming up before such dissemination could be made. That was the procedure intended in the case of this message and carried out to the extent of making a couple of phone calls, with the intention of disseminating a corrected translation early in the afternoon.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you, Captain, to the photostat of the Japanese message, which indicates that the first word of the message, *koyanagi*, is underscored. That word referred to England, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, it did.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you further to the fact that the fifth word, *hattori*, is underscored, and that word meant either that relations weren't in accordance with expectations or that there was some sort of crisis, depending on the translator?

Captain KRAMER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And to the sixth word, *minami*, which is also underscored, and which referred to the United States, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, was the underscoring of that message, of those three words, made by you?

[585] Captain KRAMER. My understanding of this particular photostat you have is that it is from the log of station S, which was received some time subsequent to Pearl Harbor. Consequently, this was not the one from which we worked. As I recall it, it was a teletype version that was handled on the morning of the 7th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. Does anything on that photostatic copy, Captain, indicate where that message was intercepted by the Navy?

Captain KRAMER. Simply the station indication "S." I believe that was Cheltenham, but I am not certain offhand without refreshing my memory.

Mr. SONNETT. And it would have been sent in by Cheltenham to the Navy Department by teletype?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have any recollection whether or not you underscored the code words of the message with which you worked?

Captain KRAMER. I did no underscoring or writing at all in connection with that. I dictated on my feet while the book concerning the 1 o'clock delivery and other late urgent messages was being made up and added this to the folder as I was about to leave the office.

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to the translation annexed—

Captain KRAMER. I might amplify that further as, a point I haven't mentioned before, feeling that despite the urgency of that 1 o'clock delivery message, that delay to get this one into that folder was warranted; otherwise delivery probably wouldn't have been made until after noon since the meetings then in progress at the State Department and in CNO's office would probably have been adjourned and the recipients not accessible, out to lunch or one thing and another.

[586] Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear from the photostatic copy of the message, Captain, in exhibit 20 the time at which the message was intercepted on December 7th?

Captain KRAMER. This time group and the frequency (indicating).

Mr. SONNETT. Indicating what time, sir?

Captain KRAMER. Greenwich time, I believe.

Mr. SONNETT. What time, Greenwich time?

Captain KRAMER. Presumably this would be 0708, Washington civil time, converted into 0808 by daylighting saving hour if it was intercepted at Cheltenham, on frequency 7630.

Mr. SONNETT. I take it there is no indication of the time when the message was received in the Navy Department and came to your attention?

Captain KRAMER. I see no indications on here, no.

Mr. SONNETT. At approximately what time do you recall seeing and translating the message, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. It was about 10:30.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7th?

Captain KRAMER. Between 10:30 and twenty minutes of 11.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 7, '41?

Captain KRAMER. On December 7th, yes, as I was about to leave for the State Department on the second trip.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the translation contained in the exhibit, which is a certified copy of the translation as contained in

the Op-20-G files, you will note that there is no pencilled correction inserted concerning the United States.

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. You will recall in answer to a previous question, [587] Captain, you said that on discovering the error after your return from the State Department on December 7th, you made a pencilled correction in the copy. Can you explain why the photostat of the file does not show the correction?

Captain KRAMER. I cannot explain why that corrected copy is not currently in the files, other than that the explanation may be due to the following: The fact that sixteen, I believe, copies of this traffic were prepared, eight of which went to Army; eight retained by Navy. The originals, ribbon copy, normally went to the Secretary of the Navy; five other copies to other recipients; and two copies normally retained in section GZ, one a serially numbered numerical file which was our basic file, second copy filed by subject. That second copy was occasionally used for special dissemination to counter-intelligence people, for example. When the ribbon copy and the other disseminated copies were returned to GZ, as all papers were, the ribbon copy normally then became the primary file copy for permanent record. It could well be that since those other seven copies, six or seven copies after return in the course of a few days or a week or two to GZ, were destroyed and not more than two copies normally retained in GZ files, that the copy with the correction on it, which I have referred to, could have been destroyed with the other surplus copies. Since I have been back in Washington, since March of this year, I recall having seen a photostat of such a corrected copy with inserted pencil correction in it in the hands of Captain Safford.

Mr. SONNETT. Did Captain Safford indicate to you whether the corrected copy in his possession was a copy which had been corrected before the attack, or was it a copy which he had since corrected?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain of that point.

[588] Mr. SONNETT. Turning, Captain, to document 22 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which is a certified copy of the message from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 3rd, establishing the signal system to be used from Oahu, that document indicates, does it not, that it was translated on December 11, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Right.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been previous testimony in this investigation to the effect that on December 6, 1941, that message was translated in rough form by Mrs. Edgers, a civilian translator in Op-20-G at the time, and that it came to your attention on the afternoon of December 6, 1941. Will you state what you recall of that incident?

Captain KRAMER. It is possible that it was put on my desk on the afternoon of 6 December '41. I do not recall, however, having examined it in detail until Monday morning, the 8th of December, at which time it was in a highly garbled state still, and, in fact, it wasn't until another copy of the intercept came through and charts of Oahu and Maui were broken out and another day or two of study had been made that we were able to get out a translation that was quite legible. Even this copy still has a few garbles in it, namely, under paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5(b). If that were finished on Saturday afternoon, as you state it was, the reason that it was not

further examined in detail was undoubtedly due to the fact that starting around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, we began getting this series of important machine messages from Tokyo and turned to all hands on completing that and calling the Army for help on some of those parts. I might state in passing that we were working our professionals overtime as it was on that Saturday afternoon. Normally working hours called for Saturday afternoon off, securing at 1 o'clock, but I had held several [589] of the translators on through the early part of the afternoon, completing a number of things that were being worked on and keeping them also as a stand-by in case something more important came in that afternoon. Despite the fact that it was working overtime, we normally kept one translator on into Saturday evening, using for Sunday coverage, which was also a holiday in those days, the fifth linguist we had, a Seventh Day Adventist, who normally did not work Saturday and was used therefore on Sunday.

Mr. SONNETT. You stated, Captain, in your testimony that this message did not come to your attention in detail until Monday, December 8, 1941. Can you recall whether or not it came to your attention at all on the afternoon of December 6, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. I do not recall it, no. The reason I am pretty certain of that is the fact that when I did see it on Monday morning, we immediately turned full energies on to getting it completed in the complete form.

Mr. SONNETT. During the afternoon and evening of December 6, 1941, Captain, the important message on which your unit was working was the first thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part reply, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. That was the principal one, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, that was a message in the purple code, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. But was in English, not Japanese?

Captain KRAMER. That is also correct, but there are many Japanese procedure abbreviations and introductory phrases used at the beginnings and ends of messages, which called for some linguistic work on it.

Mr. SONNETT. Is it your testimony, Captain, that the first thirteen parts required translation as well as decryption?

[590] Captain KRAMER. Not so much translation as clearing of garbles. In the hurried version that we disseminated that Saturday evening, there were still many garbled spots; one place where there was as much as ten or a dozen lines missing.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, the purple code was a machine code, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And was the decryption of the message in the purple code also a machine operation?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Would you state just generally what that consisted of?

Captain KRAMER. It is closely analogous to running a message through our ECM. It requires initially the setting up of the machine to handle that day's key. If the key hadn't previously been re-

covered, it would involve research work by a cryptanalyst to recover that day's key.

Mr. SONNETT. Once the key was recovered, was the decryption of a message an automatic process?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. And then the resulting product of the machine decryption, which as to the thirteen parts was in English, would require examination and writing out, I take it, by your unit?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct. Another limiting factor was the number of machines we had to work on that traffic. At that time, my recollection is that the Navy had only one purple machine, while the Army had two, and it was for that reason that we sent some of those parts to the Army that evening to run through.

Mr. SONNETT. Were you working at your section on the afternoon [591] and evening of December 6, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, as I have just indicated.

Mr. SONNETT. And certain of the portions of the thirteen part reply, that is, parts eight and nine, were translated or decrypted by the Army, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. That would be indicated from this copy of that message, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the Army unit was working on the afternoon or evening of December 6, 1941, as well as the Navy, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, and to the message which directed that the Ambassador submit to the United States Government the Japanese reply at 1 p. m., when did you first see that message?

Captain KRAMER. On my return from the State Department at about 10:30 on Sunday morning, 7 December.

Mr. SONNETT. That message indicates that it was translated by the Army, does it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know at what time that message was available in decrypted form in the Navy Department prior to your seeing it?

Captain KRAMER. So far as I am aware, it was not available in the Navy Department.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it appear from the exhibit who intercepted the message?

Captain KRAMER. Navy intercept station "S" intercepted it, from this copy.

Mr. SONNETT. And that station "S" was what station?

[592] Captain KRAMER. Cheltenham, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. And messages intercepted by the Cheltenham Navy station were forwarded to the Navy Department, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. So that the message was available in the Navy Department for decryption some time on the morning of December 7, 1941, before you saw it?

Captain KRAMER. However, the fact that the Navy intercept station intercepted it did not necessarily mean that the Navy unit would handle it. The division of effort between Signal Corps and the Navy unit was on the basis of odd and even day keys in which the traffic was sent.

Mr. SONNETT. That division of effort. Captain, was not being adhered to rigidly, was it, on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?

Captain KRAMER. In general it was adhered to completely, except when one unit or the other called on their opposite numbers for assistance due either to volume of traffic or for other reasons.

Mr. SONNETT. On December 6, 1941, the Navy decrypted eleven out of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply intercepted that day, did it not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes; thirteen, as I recall it.

Mr. SONNETT. Two were decrypted by the Army, were they not?

Captain KRAMER. As I recall, they all came in on the Navy intercept.

Mr. SONNETT. But two were decrypted by the Army?

Captain KRAMER. All station "S" intercepts were thereafter received by the Navy Department direct from station "S." The fact that Army decrypted them would indicate that we had sent them over there, those particular parts over to Army, to run through their machines.

[593] Mr. SONNETT. So that on the 6th of December, 1941, both the Navy and the Army were decrypting the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply, is that correct?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, do you recall whether it was the Navy's obligation to decrypt that message that day or the Army's obligation?

Captain KRAMER. The fact that our Navy unit was going ahead with the decryption would indicate to me that it was a message for which the Navy was responsible, being in the key that the Navy was handling that day.

Mr. SONNETT. On the morning of December 7th the 1 p. m. delivery message was received in the Navy Department, as you previously testified. Do you know whether or not it was decrypted in the Navy Department that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Was there a translator on duty at the Navy Department on the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to your arrival?

Captain KRAMER. There was none actually in the Navy Department, but there was one available on telephone call who could be down here within ten or fifteen minutes after being called by the GY watch officer.

Mr. SONNETT. And who was that, Captain?

Captain KRAMER. Myself. That was a standard arrangement that had been in effect for over a year. Probably six or eight times in the course of the year I had been called down at various times in the early morning to examine something apparently hot that had come in.

Mr. SONNETT. On the night of December 6th and the morning of December 7th it was realized by you and others in the section that a very [594] critical message was coming in, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. If you are referring to the fourteenth part—

Mr. SONNETT. I am referring to the entire message. On the night of December 6th it was realized by you and others in the section that a very critical message was coming in, was it not?

Captain KRAMER. If you are referring to the fourteenth part, of which we had already received the first thirteen parts—

Mr. SONNETT. During the afternoon and evening of December 6, 1941, a very critical message had been received, had it not?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. Did you expect at that time that further critical messages would be received?

Captain KRAMER. The fourteenth part of that Japanese reply we were expecting momentarily, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. You knew that the time of delivery of the fourteen-part reply was to be fixed in a separate message, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Correct.

Mr. SONNETT. And, I take it, all hands were on the lookout for the time of delivery?

Captain KRAMER. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, in view of that situation, why was there no translator on duty in the Navy Department during such times as you could not be present?

Captain KRAMER. There was in effect a translator on duty in the Navy Department, as I have indicated. The time between the receipt of a message by teletype and its decryption by machine would normally be more [595] than the time it would take me, on being notified, to get down here; so, in effect there was a twenty-four hour coverage.

Mr. SONNETT. When you left the office on the night of December 6, 1941, did you issue instructions that you were to be called immediately upon the receipt of any Japanese message?

Captain KRAMER. I did, as I had normally done frequently before. That was about 1 o'clock Sunday morning.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was on watch at that time?

Captain KRAMER. I don't recall who specifically at the moment. There were three or four watch officers so familiar to me that I am not certain which one was on duty.

Mr. SONNETT. The message directing delivery of the Japanese reply at 1 p. m. on December 7, 1941, was a one sentence Japanese message, was it not, in the purple code?

Captain KRAMER. Directing delivery, yes. A short message, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. Will you examine the message, Captain, and state how long it would have taken for you to translate that message once it was decrypted and available in Japanese?

Captain KRAMER. Probably about two minutes.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, when you discovered the necessity for correction of the translation of the hidden word code message, you testified that before 1 o'clock you made several phone calls. Who did you call and what did you say to them?

Captain KRAMER. As I recall, I phoned all the recipients but contacted only two due to the absence of the others, and indicated that the United States was to be inserted in GZ file number such and such.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was it that you called, Captain?

[596] Captain KRAMER. Just which ones I did contact I am not certain, but I believe one was Captain McCollum and the other was Colonel Bratton.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you recall about how long prior to 1 p. m. those calls were made?

Captain KRAMER. I am not certain. It was about 12:30, though.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. I have nothing further either. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[597] Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Lieutenant, for the sake of the record, I would like to review with you the various exhibits relating to the messages to and from the Japanese Consul in the first week of December, 1941, which were received at your unit both before and after the attack.

I show you exhibit 56 of this investigation and ask you to state what that exhibit contains.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. It contains four coded messages, numbers 245, 46, 47, and 48, and some additional coded messages that are in a system, in the LA system.

Mr. SONNETT. When were those messages received by your unit at Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. About, I would say, around noon or 1 o'clock on the 5th of December, 1941.

Mr. SONNETT. Were efforts made to decrypt and translate the messages received at that time?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. There were.

Mr. SONNETT. And those efforts were made by you with the assistance of others in the unit, were they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Which of the messages in that exhibit did you succeed in decrypting and translating prior to the attack on December 7th?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Well, I myself did not decrypt anything prior to the attack on December 7th, but this was taken out and decrypted [598] and translated after it was determined what it was in the LA system, which was seen to be junk, and I immediately went to work on the other.

Mr. SONNETT. Well, various of the messages in that exhibit were decrypted and translated prior to the attack, were they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Can you identify which messages they were?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I can. They were all in the LA system. Number 125; and there is one which there is no original for, no message itself, just the decryption with the translation here; that is number 362; and also number 321; and also 852 and 124, which is the same as 852. It looks to be an answer to and request to re-send or something of that sort.

Mr. SONNETT. Re-transmission?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. A re-transmission. It is the same text, more or less.

Mr. SONNETT. To each of the copies of those messages contained in exhibit 56 you have affixed, have you not, a note stating when it was received and that it was decrypted and translated prior to the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes, I have.

Mr. SONNETT. And those messages are bound into the exhibit on the left hand side of the exhibit, are they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. You testified that you yourself did not do the decryption of those messages in the LA system, but that after it was discovered what system they were in, some one else did the decryption?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Who was it that did the decryption?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That I can't say because we were located [599] in different parts of the building and the nature of my work at the time kept me at one end, where they just turned this stuff over to me and let me go to work on it where I was.

Mr. SONNETT. Now, referring to the balance of the messages in the exhibit, which are affixed to the right-hand side of the exhibit, they were among the group which was received on the 5th of December, 1941, also, were they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. And were efforts made to decrypt those?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. Who made the efforts?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I did.

Mr. SONNETT. With what results?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Negative.

Mr. SONNETT. In what code has it since been discovered were those messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were discovered to be in the PA-K2 system.

Mr. SONNETT. Were any of those decrypted and translated prior to the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They weren't.

Mr. SONNETT. About when were they decrypted and translated?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. The night of the 8th and 9th of December. Well, there is only one here that shows it and it was taken off on the 10th. All of these messages were decrypted by the 10th that could be. There is a couple in there that can't be.

Mr. SONNETT. But none of those on the right-hand side of the exhibit, in the PA-K2 code, were decrypted prior to the attack?

[600] Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. No, sir.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you photostatic copies of documents and call your attention particularly to pages 7 to 12 and ask whether you can identify those.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These are merely copies of the messages that are in exhibit 56 on the right-hand side of the page.

Mr. SONNETT. That is, messages which were received on the 5th of December but weren't decrypted until after the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. That is right.

Mr. SONNETT. Were there any other messages, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, received prior to the attack of December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Not that I know of. If there were, they weren't turned over to me.

Mr. SONNETT. The balance of the messages contained in the folder which I have just shown you were received at what time, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These were all after the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. You have noted in red crayon, have you not, the time of receipt of the various messages?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. The date of the receipt, yes.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark this as exhibit 56A, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 56A.")

Mr. SONNETT. I refer you to exhibit 57 of this investigation, which contains a series of messages which I believe you previously identified, and ask whether you can state when they were received first by your [601] unit.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. None of these messages were received prior to 7 December. All subsequent to the attack.

Mr. SONNETT. Were they subsequently decrypted and translated?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They were.

Mr. SONNETT. And translations are set forth in the exhibit, are they not?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. They are.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a folder of photostatic copies of documents containing translations of Japanese messages and ask whether you can identify the documents contained therein.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. This document contains messages that were received subsequent to the 7 December attack, received on the night of the 7th of December.

Mr. SONNETT. And were decrypted after the attack?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Yes, some of them taken as long as the 23rd of January.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as exhibit 57A?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 57A.")

Mr. SONNETT. I also show you a similar folder of photostatic copies of documents, consisting of messages and translations, and ask whether you can identify those.

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. These messages were received after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Sources, of course—one source was the Army out there. I just don't know who they are. I really don't know who had it. But they were messages that were more or less all diplomatic circuits.

[602] Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark that as exhibit 57B?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 57B.")

Mr. SONNETT. The messages contained in exhibit 56 and at pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56A were received by your unit from what source? Do you know?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. I do not.

Mr. SONNETT. Who delivered these messages to you?

Lieutenant (jg) WOODWARD. Commander Rochefort.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark as an exhibit the precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 6 July 1945 which amends the prior precept so as to require a statement of findings and conclusions by you?

Admiral HEWITT: Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 1A.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have some further documents, Admiral, which we should like to have marked as exhibits at this time.

The first is a certified collection of documents obtained from CincPac Headquarters, relating to the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. May we mark that as exhibit 63?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 63.")

[603] Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, certified copies of other documents from CincPac Headquarters, including a copy of the Secretary of War's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated February 7, 1941, dealing with air defense at Pearl Harbor. May we mark that as exhibit 64?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 64.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified copy of CincPac secret letter, dated 7 August 1941, on the organization of the Orange fleet. May we mark that as exhibit 65?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 65.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified map, showing the location of the ships present at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and annexed overlay. May we mark that as exhibit 66?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 66.")

Mr. SONNETT. Also, Admiral, a certified copy of the telephone log of the radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing the calls made and received on December 7, 1941, as to Japanese fleet locations.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 67.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, photostatic copies of memoranda relating to the interview or interviews of the Japanese captain of the captured submarine, which photostats were supplied by Captain Layton. May [604] we mark that as exhibit 68?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 68.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have a copy of Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June 1945, which contains, at page 28, a description of the midget submarines and how they were carried to Pearl Harbor. May we mark that as exhibit 69?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 69.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, copy number 5 of a selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches which were received from

CincPac Headquarters, relating to miscellaneous subjects. May we mark that as exhibit 70?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 70.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have a similar collection of dispatches, relating to the proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941, also supplied by CincPac Headquarters.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 71.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have a collection of dispatches of December 7 and 8, 1941, from CincPac, also supplied by CincPac Headquarters.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

[605] (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 72.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have further a certified copy of CincPac secret letter, dated 12 December 1941, and reporting on the damage to ships at Pearl Harbor as a result of the attack and giving other details in connection with the attack. May we mark that as exhibit 73?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 73.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have, Admiral, a photostatic copy of the War Diary for the period 7 December to January 1, 1942, of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. May we mark that as exhibit 74?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 74.")

Mr. SONNETT. We also have the photostatic copy of the War Diary of the USS WARD, the War Diary of the Officer-in-Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District, the War Dairy of the USS CONDOR, and a certified collection of excerpts from the diary of the Officer-in-Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District, and from the WARD and from the CONDOR. May we mark the latter all as one exhibit, Admiral?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 75.")

Mr. SONNETT. We have a photostatic copy of a first endorsement and second endorsement on Com 14 letter of December 30, 1941, relating to the early morning submarine attack or contact of 7 December 1941. May we mark that exhibit 76, Admiral?

[606] Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 76.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, a final exhibit we would like to mark is a collection of correspondence, the basic letter of which is from Com-FOURTEEN to CNO, and endorsements, relating to combined operating center for the Army and Navy. May we mark that as exhibit 77 and substitute a photostatic copy?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 77.")

Mr. SONNETT. That is all, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right.

(The investigation was then, at 3:57 p. m., adjourned until 11:15 a. m., 11 July 1945.)

[607]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY

TWENTY-SIXTH DAY

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 11:15 a. m., Wednesday, 11 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Commander, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation, which includes a translation of a message from Tokyo, dated 7 December 1941, translated by the Navy 7 December 1941, and bearing number JD-1:7148, and ask whether pursuant to our request you have searched the files of Op-20-G for copies of that message.

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I have searched the files under my cognizance.

Mr. SONNETT. And those files include all files which, to the best of your knowledge, would contain a copy of that message?

Lieut Comdr. BOONE. That is correct.

Mr. SONNETT. How many copies of the message did you find in your search?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I found three.

Mr. SONNETT. The message is translated, is it not, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations"?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. Correct.

[608] Mr. SONNETT. Did you find any copy of that message during your search which contained a correction in pencil or otherwise, indicating the insertion of the word "United States" after the word "England"?

Lieut. Comdr. BOONE. I did not. I found no pencilled corrections of the text.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[609] Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Mr. SONNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation, which contains a photostatic copy of an intercepted Japanese message dated 7 December 1941 and another document which purports to be an English decryption and translation of that message. Are you familiar with those?

Captain SAFFORD. I am.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the translation of that message contained in the exhibit, Captain, do you know whether on or prior to 7 December 1941 that translation was corrected so as to indicate that relations were strained not only with England but with the United States as well?

Captain SAFFORD. I only know what Kramer told me two or three months ago after his return from the South Pacific waters. I pointed out to him an apparent error in the translation which had been turned in to higher authority and Kramer informed me that he had caught the error himself prior to delivery and had added in in pencil a correction, added "United States." I have a vague recollection of seeing scribbled in pencil "& U. S." after "England" on one of the original flimsies on file in 20-G, but I thought that had been added after 7 December and disregarded it completely.

Mr. SONNETT. I show you a typewritten translation similar to the one contained in exhibit 20, containing various notes, together with a copy of the intercepted Japanese communication contained in exhibit 20, and ask you whether these documents were produced by you.

Captain SAFFORD. These documents were produced by me. One is a photographic copy of the Station "S" log, which is on file in 20-G. [610] The other is a copy of JD-1 serial number 7148 with notes added by me in 1944 to explain as well as I could in Kramer's absence the reason for an apparent oversight in omitting "United States." Kramer at that time was in the South Pacific and nobody else knew anything about the circumstances. Lieutenant Commander Linn checked over the original intercepted message with the hidden word code, as contained in JD-1 serial number 6985, and discovered that "United States" should have been in the original translation. The first word of the hidden word message, "*koyanagi*," means "England." This can be verified from the original thing. The fifth word, "*hattori*," means "relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectations," according to the Navy translation, or "relations between Japan and blank are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger," according to the Army translation. The sixth word, "*Minami*," means "America." The last word, "stop," in English, means "This is a hidden word message." The other Japanese words of the message are mere padding to make it appear superficially as a normal plain language Japanese message.

Mr. SONNETT. Do you know, Captain, when Linn discovered the omission of the United States from the translation of that hidden word code message?

Captain SAFFORD. Some time in January, 1944.

Mr. SONNETT. And that discovery, I take it, was the basis of your note—

Captain SAFFORD. That was the basis of the notes on this paper, and noted the time so it wouldn't be forgotten.

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark the papers produced by Captain Safford as an exhibit, Admiral?

[611] Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 8.")

Mr. SONNETT. Do you have in your possession, Captain, or did you ever have, to the best of your recollection, a translation of the hidden

word code message referred to in exhibit 78 and in exhibit 20 which contained a pencilled correction adding the United States to the translation?

Captain SAFFORD. To the best of my recollection, I did, in the spring of 1944, but I thought that had been added subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor and therefore it was disregarded. I recommended that both of the flimsy copies bearing this translation, which should be in Op-20-G's custody, be examined to see if my memory in this respect could be verified.

Mr. SONNETT. Where was the copy which you examined in the spring of 1944 and which contained the correction?

Captain SAFFORD. I had borrowed all the files from 20-G covering this period of time. I cannot say whether it was in the file in which messages were arranged by serial order or JD number or whether it was the one in which they were arranged strictly chronologically by dates.

Mr. SONNETT. There has been testimony before this investigation, Captain, that no copy of the message can be found in the Op-20-G files which bears such a correction. Do you know what might have happened to such copy?

Captain SAFFORD. It is possible that it might have been erased before returning to 20-G in an attempt to remove what was considered an addition after the attack on Pearl Harbor. I do not recall making any such erasure, but it is still possible that it was done. I would like to add that it looked bad for the section and I was not trying to do anything to make it look better for us.

[612] Mr. SONNETT. Did you recognize the handwriting in which the correction was made?

Captain SAFFORD. I did not.

Mr. SONNETT. Referring to the copies of the Japanese message contained in exhibit 20 and in exhibit 78, can you state who underscored the word "*minami*" and the other words there underscored, and when?

Captain SAFFORD. These three words were underscored by Lieutenant Commander Linn or myself in January, 1944, so as to distinguish or designate the hidden words in this particular message. The actual translation was made from the teletype copy and I believe that this teletype copy could not be located among the work sheets. I won't even say that for certain.

Mr. SONNETT. I have nothing further, sir.

Admiral HEWITT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

[613] (The investigation was then, at 11:32 a. m., recessed until 7:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.)

(Present: Same parties.)

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, may we mark as exhibit 79 in this investigation a photostatic copy of page 44 of a volume containing translations of the files of operations orders, orders, memoranda, and serials dealing with Navy operations plans, recovered from the Japanese cruiser NACHI?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 79.")

Mr. SONNETT. May we mark as exhibit 80, Admiral, copy number 3 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre, and after marking it, return it to the files from which we received it?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 80.")

Mr. SONNETT. And may we also mark, Admiral, a certified collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with the organization of the Japanese Fleet and Japanese Fleet locations as estimated during November and up to December 1, 1941?

Admiral HEWITT. Yes.

(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 81.")

Mr. SONNETT. Admiral, after review of the questions for further investigation which you proposed to the Secretary of the Navy and which were approved by him, I believe that we have covered all the points [614] required for further investigation and accordingly recommend that the investigation be now closed.

Admiral HEWITT. The investigation may now be considered closed.

(The investigation was then, at 7:50 p. m., closed.)

EXHIBITS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

[See Index of Exhibits, supra, pp. 2-4]

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 2 May, 1945.

Confidential

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.

Subject: Further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy, 12 February 1944.
- (C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.

1. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. Prior to the enactment of said law, the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 had been investigated by a Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 18 December 1941, and by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944. The report of the Commission is Enclosure (A). The record of Admiral Hart's examination of witnesses is Enclosure (B).

2. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1941, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings, a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Enclosure (C) is the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which contains the Court's findings and opinion.

3. Upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, the Secretary has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

4. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that the investigation directed by Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.

5. The Secretary's present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed, in the light of all the evidence then at hand.

6. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, as may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are authorized to obtain such documents relating to said attack as may be required for inclusion in the record.

7. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter. Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will conduct your examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal or formal requirements. Upon completion of your examination you will submit the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy.

8. You are being ordered to report to the Secretary of the Navy for temporary duty for this purpose, and will request such additional orders from him as you find necessary.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 1A

Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Confidential

From: The Secretary of the Navy

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN

Subject: Further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy, 12 February 1944.
- (C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.

1. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. Prior to the enactment of said law, the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 had been investigated by a Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 18 December 1941, and by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944. The report of the Commission is Enclosure (A). The record of Admiral Hart's examination of witnesses is Enclosure (B).

2. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings, a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 3 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.

Enclosure (C) is the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which contains the Court's findings and opinion.

3. After examination of the record of proceedings and the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy has found that the evidence obtained by the Court does not warrant and will not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

4. Upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, the Secretary has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

5. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that the investigation directed by Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.

6. The Secretary's present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed, in the light of all the evidence then at hand.

7. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, as may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are required for inclusion in the record.

8. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter. Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will conduct your examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal or formal requirements. Upon completion of your examination you will submit the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy.

9. You are being ordered to report to the Secretary-in-Chief, United States Fleet, for temporary duty for this purpose, and will request such additional orders from him as you find necessary.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 2

NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

With Cross-References to Admiral Hart's Investigation Together With Addendum Thereto (Admiral Hewitt's Findings and Conclusions)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword.....	363
Chapter:	
I.	
A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet.....	365
B. Basing of Fleet at Hawaii.....	365
C. Air Patrol from Hawaii in 1940.....	367
D. The International Situation; Likelihood of Attack and the Status of Defenses Prior to Admiral Kimmel's Command.....	368
E. Joint Estimate of Richardson and Kimmel as to Situation and Defenses.....	369
F. The Grew Report of Rumored Japanese Attack and ONI Evaluation.....	370
II. Assumption of Command by Admiral Kimmel—His Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet and His Staff:	
A. Assumption of Command.....	370
B. Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet.....	371
C. Admiral Kimmel's Staff.....	371
D. General Orders Nos. 142 and 143.....	374
III. The Chief of Naval Operations—His Staff and Duties:	
A. The Chief of Naval Operations.....	374
B. Admiral Stark's Staff.....	374
C. The Duties of the Chief of Naval Operations.....	377

362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Chapter.	Page
IV. The Commanding General Hawaiian Department—His Major Mission:	
A. The Commanding General.....	375
B. General Short's Major Mission.....	379
V. Relations in General Between Navy and Army Commanders:	
A. In Washington.....	379
B. In Hawaii.....	379
VI. The War Plans Relating to Hawaii and the Adequacy of the Pacific Fleet:	
A. The Plans for Defense of Hawaii.....	381
B. Testimony Concerning the War Plans in General.....	395
C. Adequacy of Fleet Generally to Carry Out its Tasks.....	400
VII. The Possibility of Aerial Torpedo Attack at Pearl Harbor:	
A. Knowledge and Evaluation of Secretary's Letter.....	402
B. Correspondence on Anti-torpedo Baffles in Pearl Harbor.....	403
VIII. The Situation Prior to the Freezing of Japanese Assets:	
A. The Inadequacy of Local Defense Forces and Necessity for Reliance on the Fleet.....	405
B. Admiral Kimmel's View Concerning the Possibility of a Surprise Attack.....	405
C. Admiral Kimmel's Desire for Information as to Developments.....	406
D. Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel Concerning the International Situation.....	406
IX. Admiral Kimmel's Visit in June and Annual Report:	
A. Admiral Kimmel's Visit.....	407
B. Kimmel's Annual Report—Year Ending June 30, 1941.....	407
X. Reconnaissance Toward Jaluit.....	407
XI. The Freezing of Japanese Assets—Deterioration of Situation and Fleet Security Order:	
A. The Freezing Order.....	408
B. Further Deterioration of Situation.....	409
C. Inadequacy of Equipment and Efforts to Rectify.....	411
D. Admiral Kimmel's Letter on Security of the Fleet.....	411
XII. Intelligence in Washington—The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communications:	
A. ONI Distribution and Acquisition of Intelligence in General.....	413
B. The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communications.....	416
C. Failure to Send this Secret Information to Admiral Kimmel.....	418
XIII. Resignation of Japanese Cabinet—Arrival of Kurusu—The Possibility of a Surprise Aggressive Movement:	
A. The Dispatch of October 16, 1941.....	418
B. Admiral Stark's Letter of October 17, 1941.....	420
C. Japanese Messages Concerning German Attitude; Nomura's Desire to Resign.....	420
D. Admiral Bloch's Letter on Inadequacy of Local Defense.....	421
E. Admiral Kimmel's Estimate and Action.....	421
F. The First Japanese "Deadline" Message.....	422
G. Admiral Stark's Letter of November 7, 1941.....	422
H. Japanese Interest in Ships at the Philippines and Seattle.....	423
I. Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall Recommendation as to Ultimatum.....	423
J. Further and Final Japanese "Deadline" Messages.....	424
K. The Possibility of a Surprise Aggressive Movement.....	425
XIV. Dispatches Concerning Reinforcement of Wake and Midway.....	426
XV. Intercepted Japanese Communications of November 26th and 27th.....	427
XVI. The State Department Note of November 26th.....	427
XVII. The War Warning of November 27th:	
A. The Warning.....	430
B. Preparation of the Warning.....	431
C. The Failure to Mention Hawaii.....	432
D. The Direction to "Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment".....	433
XVIII. Repetition of Army Dispatch on November 28th:	
A. General Marshall.....	435
XIX. Reinforcement of Midway and Wake.....	435
XX. Pearl Harbor—Estimates of the Situation:	
A. Admiral Kimmel.....	437
B. Admiral Bloch.....	438
C. Admiral Pye.....	438
D. Admiral Smith.....	441
E. Admiral McMorris.....	443
F. Admiral Delaney.....	446
G. Admiral Calhoun.....	447
H. Captain Layton.....	447
I. Admiral Bellinger.....	447
J. Admiral Kitts.....	448
K. Admiral Withers.....	448
L. Colonel Phillips.....	448
M. General Short.....	449
XXI. Conferences Between Admiral Kimmel and General Short after November 27th.....	449
XXII. Action Taken by Admiral Kimmel—Extent of Reconnaissance:	
A. In General.....	450
B. Responsibility for Long Range Reconnaissance.....	453
C. Readiness of Aircraft and Drills.....	456
D. Extent of Reconnaissance.....	457
E. Extent of Reconnaissance Which Could Have Been Taken.....	457
XXIII. Action Taken by General Short.....	462
XXIV. Japanese Espionage and United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor—Japanese Military and Fleet Movements:	
A. Japanese Espionage.....	463
B. United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor.....	466
C. Japanese Military and Fleet Movements.....	478
XXV. Intercepted Japanese Communications After the "War Warning" and up to December 6, 1941:	
A. Failure to Transmit to Admiral Kimmel.....	490
B. Concerning the Diplomatic Negotiations and Situation.....	491
C. Concerning United States Ships and Planes.....	496

Chapter:	Page
XXVI. The "Winds" Code and Messages:	
A. The Winds Code.....	501
B. Monitoring for the Code Words.....	502
C. Admiral Kimmel's Knowledge of Winds Code.....	502
D. "Winds" Messages Using the Code Words for Russia.....	502
E. Was There a "Winds Code" Message Relating to the United States?.....	503
XXVII. Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel After the "War Warning".....	510
XXVIII. The "Mori" Conversation: Japanese Burning Papers.....	523
XXIX. The Likelihood of a Japanese Attack at Hawaii as Estimated in Washington, December 6, 1941:	
A. Navy Estimates.....	525
B. Army Estimates.....	527
C. State Department Estimates.....	527
XXX. Japanese Message Advising of Fourteen Part Reply and First Thirteen Parts:	
A. Message advising of Fourteen Part Reply.....	527
B. The First Thirteen Parts of the Reply.....	527
C. Delivery of the Translations of the Above Messages.....	528
XXXI. December 7, 1941, in Washington:	
A. Intercepted Communications Other Than Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message".....	529
B. Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message".....	530
C. Delivery of Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message" and Action Taken.....	531
XXXII. Conditions at Pearl Harbor Prior to Attack:	
A. The Ships in Port.....	536
B. The Anti-aircraft Guns.....	538
C. Army and Navy Conditions of Readiness.....	539
D. Number and Condition of the Men.....	541
E. The Aircraft Warning Service.....	542
F. Ships' Radar.....	549
G. Steps Taken by Commander Local Naval Defense Force.....	550
H. Army Aircraft.....	551
I. The Submarines.....	552
J. Reconnaissance Airplanes and Air Reconnaissance.....	552
XXXIII. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor:	
A. Japanese Submarines.....	556
B. Detection of Planes by the Army Radar System.....	561
C. The Air Attack.....	562
D. The Arrival of the Army's Message.....	565
E. The Failure to Telephone on December 7th.....	566
F. What Could Have Been Done if There Had Been Advance Notice.....	566
G. The Casualties and Damage.....	568
Appendix: List of witness before Court of Inquiry.....	571
List of witnesses before Admiral Hart.....	573

FOREWORD

Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. N. (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. N. (Retired) and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. N., (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. N., as Judge Advocate, was appointed on July 13, 1944. The Court was directed to convene on July 17, 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval Service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.

The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on July 31, 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on October 20, 1944. During its investigation, the Court took the testimony of thirty-nine witnesses, and received seventy-seven exhibits. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classied "TOP SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."

By letter dated October 21, 1944, the Secretary of the Navy requested the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to advise as to how much of the records of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bear such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations advised, in a letter dated November 3, 1944, that a substantial part of the records of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such a relation to the national security and to current military operations as to make it essential that that information not be revealed publicly.

After thorough review of the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, the Secretary concurred with the views of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, as expressed in his letter of November 3, 1944, and accordingly has directed that in the best interests of the present and future military operations of the United States, the existing "TOP SECRET" and "SECRET" classifications of the record must be continued. The Navy Department has stated that the record of the Court will not be made public while the war is in progress.

The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by the Secretary of the Navy is that the evidence now available does not warrant and will not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

The Secretary in his findings upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. Some of the testimony will be much delayed because certain witnesses who are actively engaged in combat against the enemy are not available and will not be available within the predictable future. The present decision of the Secretary will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed in the light of the evidence then at hand.

The Secretary made this personal statement to the press on December 1, 1944: "In reaching the above conclusions and decisions I am fully mindful of the wide and legitimate public interest in the Pearl Harbor attack. However, there is one consideration which is paramount to all others, and that is: What will best serve the continued successful prosecution of the war? The actions I have taken in my judgment, are taken in the light of that consideration, and I accept full and complete responsibility for them."

In connection with the Secretary's further investigation, the following statement has been prepared, narrating the evidence obtained by the Court of Inquiry. It is believed that all significant evidence so obtained has been included. Because reference is made to "TOP SECRET" material, this statement has been classified "TOP SECRET."

On June 15, 1944, two days after the enactment of Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), completed an examination of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which had been directed by the Secretary of the Navy in a precept to Admiral Hart, dated February 12, 1944. In the course of his examination, Admiral Hart took the testimony of forty witnesses, some of whom also testified later before the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, and received forty-two exhibits. Various of the witnesses before Admiral Hart furnished information which does not appear in the Record of Proceedings of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hart has been digested. The following narrative statement of the evidence obtained by the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry has been cross-referenced to the evidence obtained by Admiral Hart. The left-hand "pink" pages refer to the record of the examination of witnesses conducted by Admiral Hart. It should be noted that the record of proceedings before Admiral Hart has been reclassified as "TOP SECRET."

JOHN F. SONNETT.

ADDENDUM TO FOREWORD

After reviewing the evidence obtained in the prior investigations and examining the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Secretary of the Navy having determined in his Third Endorsement dated 1 December 1944, that it was necessary, by precept, dated 2 May 1945, appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, as investigating officer, with John F. Sonnett as counsel, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR, as assistant counsel, to examine such witnesses and to obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order to fully develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation by Admiral Hewitt was completed on 12 July 1945.

A digest of the evidence obtained in the further investigation by Admiral Hewitt has been prepared, and keyed into the following Narrative Statement in the manner in which the evidence adduced before Admiral Hart was treated. The left-hand yellow page, under the left-hand pink pages, contain the evidence adduced before Admiral Hewitt, keyed on the white pages at the points indicated by the yellow crayon.

The findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt are attached to the following Narrative Statement as Addendum I.

JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieutenant, USNR.

TOP-SECRET

NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF NAVAL PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

[The digest of testimony from the Hart Inquiry will be found set forth in bold face type at the pertinent point. The digest of testimony from the Hewitt inquiry will be found similarly indicated in italic type]

I. BACKGROUND

A. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET AND PACIFIC FLEET

At the time of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (page 273). Admiral Kimmel's predecessor was Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN. He had occupied that post from January 1940, when he had relieved Admiral Bloch, until February 1, 1941 (page 1053).

B. BASING OF FLEET AT HAWAII

According to Admiral Richardson, in May 1940, while the Fleet was in Hawaii as part of the Fleet exercises, he received directions to announce to the press that "at his request" the Fleet would stay in Hawaii to carry out further exercises. He did not think that Hawaii was a proper base for the Fleet and so advised the Chief of Naval Operations (page 1057). The reason for basing the Fleet at Hawaii, as he understood it, was so that it would act as a restraining influence on the Japanese (page 1058). (See also Exhibits 26 and 27.)

Admiral Stark testified that the Fleet, which was normally based on the Pacific Coast, was kept at Pearl Harbor in 1941 as a deterrent to Japan, and for training for its task, which included the security of the Fleet when at anchor; Admiral Richardson had advised basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast and did not agree that the Fleet should be based at Pearl Harbor (pages 21, 22, 91). The President he said, made the decision as to the base of the Fleet (page 91). The ships, however, were allocated or based, prior to December 7, 1941, in accordance with Admiral Stark's views and recommendations (page 189).

Admiral Turner said that CincPac recommended several times that the Fleet be returned to the West Coast; Admiral Stark discussed this with the President, but made no recommendation to the President, who would not approve the change (page 1020).

Admiral Turner said that the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Pearl Harbor had been discussed a number of times and each time the decision was reached to leave the Fleet there (p. 261).

It appears that there were some differences of opinion on the part of various other Naval witnesses as to the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Admiral McMorris, for example, said that he personally felt that Hawaii was a proper base for the Pacific Fleet (page 896).

Admiral McMorris said that he had always held the view that he would have based the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the Pacific coast, although, he said, there was considerable difference of opinion about that (p. 248).

Admiral Pye said that he had expressed the opinion that it was unwise to base the battleships there (page 439).

Concerning the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that there were several reactions, first, that it might incite Japan and second, that it was a poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared

to move to the westward in time of war due to poor logistics support. There was, however, one great advantage which was that the expenditure of money on the ships for repair and overhaul in Pearl Harbor permitted expansion of the Navy Yard at a greater rate (p. 151).

And Admiral DeLany testified that he personally saw no reason for keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 496).

Admiral DeLany thought that it was inconsistent to place the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan and at the same time being advised whenever they asked for material that the war was in the Atlantic and also to get units of the Pacific Fleet moved to the Atlantic. He thought that Admiral Kimmel discussed this very thing during his trip to Washington in the summer of 1941. He thought that there was some effect on morale because of the indecisiveness about whether the Fleet was going to stay at Pearl Harbor or be returned to the West Coast but there was no effect on the material condition of the Fleet. The fact that the Fleet was based there resulted in the development of a number of wartime practices which were beneficial to the Fleet when war came (p. 82).

Admiral Smith testified that during 1940 the Fleet was told to remain at Pearl Harbor and everyone thought this meant a probability of war in the Pacific, but he knew of no military reason for keeping the Fleet there. In his opinion neither the development of the Navy Yard nor fleet logistics was a sufficient reason for keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 528). The objections in 1940 were: (1) no protected anchorage, (2) no air cover, (3) single channel entrance to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was not due to administrative difficulties facing the Fleet which resulted from the fact that the Fleet had been based at Pearl Harbor for a long time (p. 64).

Admiral Smith said that the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor rather than on the mainland did not affect the matériel conditions or readiness of the Fleet for war; he said that Admiral Kimmel often discussed the question of the conditions of the Fleet and that they felt that it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro; he said there might have been a question in the minds of some of the officers as to why the Fleet was being kept out there; a great many felt that the Administration was keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in the Pacific; the movement of a part of the Fleet undoubtedly had some effect upon the minds of the personnel of the Fleet (p. 39).

Admiral Smith said that to his absolute knowledge, Admiral Kimmel never made a recommendation during 1941 that the Fleet should be returned to the California coast either by letter or dispatch. Admiral Smith never heard him say that the Fleet should return to the coast although Admiral Kimmel knew that his predecessor had recommended it. Admiral Smith said that if Admiral Kimmel ever made any such recommendation it might have been in July 1941 when he made a trip to Washington accompanied only by Captain McMorris, but that Admiral Smith thought he would have heard about it (p. 40).

Admiral Smith said that the transfer of certain units to the Atlantic affected the mental attitude of some officers in that the danger of immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them if the units had not been transferred (p. 40).

Admiral Smith said that in his opinion the general warmindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii (p. 40).

Captain Murphy indicated that previously he had been War Plans Officer for Admiral Richardson; that at that time he had advocated basing the Fleet on the Pacific coast instead of Pearl Harbor.

Captain Glover's view was that the Fleet was kept in Hawaiian waters for the purpose of assisting in the protection of the United States east of the 180th Meridian and also to be in a position from which raiding operations could be projected (p. 176).

Admiral Halsey said that he thought that the closer the Fleet was to the Japanese, the better off they were and therefore, he thought that Manila was the first best base, then Pearl Harbor the second. (p. 295)

It may be noted that according to Mr. Grew no official representations were made to him by Japan with respect to the United States keeping the Fleet in Pearl Harbor (page 1065).

Admiral Schuirmann said that so far as he knew, there was no open disagreement between the State and Navy Departments as to the disposition of the Fleet. He said that the State Department generally favored the retention in the Pacific of the greater portion of the United States Fleet (p. 407).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled during the winter 1940-1941 that the question was raised about continuing to base the Fleet at Hawaii and that it was considered that that was the most advantageous point and that the Fleet should be kept there. He recalled no discussion of the particular point of the Fleet's security at Hawaii in that connection and recalled no protest by Admiral Kimmel and no pressure by the State Department to keep the Fleet there (p. 418).

C. AIR PATROL FROM HAWAII IN 1940

Admiral Bloch testified that in June, 1940, General Herron, then Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, came to Admiral Bloch and stated that he had received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the effect that he must be on the alert against a raid from the west by a hostile nation (page 1139). Bloch told him that he had no patrol planes for the purpose and suggested that they go to the Senior Officer Present, who was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment. They did so and Admiral Andrews instituted a dawn-to-dusk patrol, informing the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, who was then at sea. Admiral Richardson flew in to discuss the matter and finally sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, asking for information about the situation, to which the Navy Department never replied. Admiral Bloch did not recall for how long they continued that reconnaissance. To the best of Admiral Bloch's recollection, the long distance reconnaissance established by Admiral Andrews in 1940 was for three days and then was discontinued by Admiral Richardson (page 1149).

Admiral Bloch said: "Sometime in the summer of 1940, the date I cannot recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my office and stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch, that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had received a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about, but he wanted my advice. And I said, 'Well, I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet. While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here, Vice Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch.' We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this, and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral Richardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in and as he had never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a reply to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army had this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected. The Navy was in a position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief got information about it here in Washington, but so far as I know, we got nothing there." (p. 13-4)

Admiral Richardson said that in June, 1940, he received a warning from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to the effect that there was a possibility of war, and as a result of this he increased the air patrols which he had established. He reported, he said, this warning to the Navy Department and asked for information, but received no reply (page 1056). He asked the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether this was a real warning, but was informed that the Commanding General had no idea, and he acted as though it were such a warning. It appears that in personal letters he had also received warnings of the possibility of war which, he said, were not definite or clear cut (page 1055). In view of these warnings, and his belief that when war came it would come as a surprise, which was based on 20 years' study of the

Japanese, he felt that he had to maintain as adequate a patrol as he could with the available means (pages 1053, 1060).

The air patrol directed by Admiral Richardson during 1940 was a patrol of particular sectors which was daily rotated. As Admiral Richardson recalled it, this patrol covered 170° to 350° to a distance of 300 miles. A dawn and dusk patrol was also established. He regarded the Southwest sector as the sector from which an attack most probably would come (pages 1053, 1055).

Admiral Richardson did not recall the number of patrol planes which were available to him. He stated that toward the end of his command it was planned to restrict the air patrol to adequate searches of operating areas, and that it was Admiral Kimmel's intention to continue this same patrol in effect when he assumed command (pages 1055, 1053).

Admiral Bellinger's recollection was that under special conditions and orders there had been a dawn patrol of 6 to 12 planes flying to 300 miles (page 682). This patrol was discontinued after the time that Admiral Kimmel took command as CincPac. It had covered a constantly changing sector (page 683).

D. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK AND THE STATUS OF DEFENSES PRIOR TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S COMMAND

Shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, as appears from a dispatch of January 21, 1941 (Exhibit 76) from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincUS and others, it was thought that the international situation was continuing to deteriorate and that the Pacific Fleet should be in a waiting attitude or execute the tasks assigned to it in the area eastward of 160°, depending on the action which might be taken by the Japanese.

At this time Admiral Bloch, as ComFOURTEEN, complained of inadequate local defense forces and pointed out that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and that for such reconnaissance requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat. This was set forth in a letter of December 30, 1940, by Admiral Bloch.

According to Admiral Bloch, in the fall of 1940, he became convinced that the Army's defenses against aircraft attack were insufficient. He discussed this matter with the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson. As a result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson asked the then Commanding General, General Herron, to go around with him and to interview first hand the officers and find out what equipment the Army had. At the conclusion of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave Admiral Bloch a memorandum informing him of the numbers of aircraft, guns and planes which were at Oahu. As the result of this information and of his conversation with Admiral Richardson, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Navy Department concerning the inadequacy of the defenses. This letter was forwarded with a strong endorsement by Admiral Richardson. (The letter is Exhibit 23.) That correspondence was the basis of the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 4, 1941 (p. 3). (That letter and the reply of the Secretary of the Navy constitute Exhibit 40.)

Admiral Richardson's endorsement on this letter (January 7, 1941, Exhibit 28) stated that the Army's equipment was inadequate to meet a surprise attack; that the defense of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor would have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor; that plans for cooperation with local defense forces were being made; that constant readiness of fighter squadrons was not contemplated; that there did not appear to be any practical way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor; and considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of the enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of fleet operations, it was not regarded as necessary to lay such nets. This endorsement urgently recommended that local defense forces be provided ComFOURTEEN.

On January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 9) and discussed in some detail the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the adequacy of the local defense forces. The Secretary of the Navy's letter stated that the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, had been reexamined because of the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and because of reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. The letter stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl

Harbor * * *. The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

The letter continued that defense against all but the first two of the dangers appeared to have been provided for satisfactorily. As to an air bombing attack or an air torpedo plane attack, it was stated that both types were possible and might be carried out successfully simultaneously or in combination with any of the other possible operations. Attacks, it was said, would be launched from a striking force of carriers and other supporting vessels. The counter-measures to be considered were the location and engagement of enemy carriers before the attack could be launched; the location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire, the concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; and the protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. The letter pointed out that the location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched were largely functions of the fleet, but quite possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning and prior to a declaration of war; and, then discussed the status of the Army's preparations, such as pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft information service, and anti-aircraft batteries.

Various proposals were made in this letter, including proposals that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii, and that local joint plans be drawn for effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire, against surprise aircraft raids; that the Army and Navy forces agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids on Pearl Harbor; and, that joint exercises designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continued to exist.*

E. JOINT ESTIMATE OF RICHARDSON AND KIMMEL AS TO SITUATION AND DEFENSES

The views of both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, at that time, were set forth in a letter which they prepared and sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70). This stated that if Japan entered the war or committed an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific would be primarily defensive. Certain assumptions were then outlined, upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated. These included:

- (a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy,
- (b) War with Japan is imminent,
- (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.
- (f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible.

Their letter continued, that the tasks to be undertaken by the Fleet in connection with such assumptions included the taking of full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port. The letter pointed out that the Fleet was handicapped by deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and stated that, among other things, it would be necessary to expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One; that it would be necessary to establish an inner air patrol; to arrange for alertness of a striking force of planes; and to augment Army anti-aircraft defenses with batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor; also that it would be necessary to assist in local defenses of the Fourteenth Naval District, which task would require the increase of district forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels would become available to the Commandant. Various other measures were discussed, including those to be taken if Japan entered the war, among which was reconnaissance of the Marshalls.

The letter then discussed in some detail the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu among which were the inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns, the small number and condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking

* The Secretary of War's reply to this will be found at page 402.

groups of Fleet planes and the use of Fleet planes for local patrols, the lack of patrol vessels for ComFOURTEEN, and the lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. It stated that it was considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies.

Admiral Smith said that about a week before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, and Admiral Smith were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in a conference with Commander McCrea, who was returning from a mission to CinAF. At that time, Comdr. McCrea furnished Admiral Hart's estimate of each one of the Japanese naval leaders, which was the best estimate that had ever been received; this included information concerning the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto to the effect that he was efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous; Comdr. McCrea's information was copied down and put in the secret file (p. 45-46).

F. THE GREW REPORT OF RUMORED JAPANESE ATTACK AND ONI EVALUATION

* On the day when Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Naval Intelligence wrote to him concerning the rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (See letter of February 1, 1941, Exhibit 67). The letter referred to the report from Ambassador Grew, based on information from the Peruvian Minister, that in the event that trouble broke out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese would make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. This information the Peruvian Minister had transmitted, although he considered it fantastic. The letter of Naval Intelligence stated that no credence was placed in these rumors and that based on known data regarding the disposition and employment of Japanese forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appeared imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Admiral Schuirmann said that a low evaluation had been given to Ambassador Grew's report (referring to page 113 "PEACE AND WAR") that in case of trouble the Japanese planned a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. He recalled no discussion of that report with the State Department. He said that he did not think that a particularly high evaluation had been placed upon that information by the Ambassador or his staff and could not explain the prominence given to this report in "PEACE AND WAR" (p. 411).

Ambassador Grew said that the information of Japanese intention to open war by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that he transmitted to the State Department on January 27, 1941, was a rumor from reliable sources (the Peruvian Minister—page 1066). This was only such report of this rumor (page 1062). He also said that in making his later reports during 1941, including a report of November 3rd, he advised that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness.

Admiral Turner said that he usually attended the State Department conferences. He never heard of Ambassador Grew's statement that Hawaii might be attacked suddenly, until it came out in the newspapers (page 1019).

Captain Smith-Hutton, Naval Attaché at Tokyo, said that since there was so much secrecy of Japanese movements, it was highly improbable that the plan, if real, would have been known in diplomatic circles (page 1080).

II. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL—HIS REORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET AND HIS STAFF

A. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, assumed duty as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on February 1, 1941. He served as such until December 17, 1941, when he was retired on his own application (page 273).

It may be noted that Admiral Stark had recommended Admiral Kimmel for this assignment. In the fitness report on Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 25), which Admiral Stark prepared after the issuance of the Robert's Report, and in which he stated that an adverse report had been made on Admiral Kimmel, he also stated that he had always considered Admiral Kimmel to be an outstanding officer and still did (page 86).

It may also be noted that in his statement to the Court, Admiral Pye volunteered that he thought that the appointment of Admiral Kimmel as CincPac was excellent, and that he performed his duties as such in an excellent manner (page 446).

B. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

Admiral Kimmel testified that he reorganized the Pacific Fleet (page 274). The organization established by him existed, he testified, throughout the entire period of his command in substantially the same form as is set forth in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 of October 31, 1941 (Exhibit 52) as follows:

(a) *Task Force One* (Commander Battle Force) consisting of six battleships, Carrier Division One—less the LEXINGTON. Cruiser Division Nine, and part of Destroyer Flotilla One, etc;

(b) *Task Force Two* (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force) consisting of three battleships, Carrier Division Two, Cruiser Division Five, Destroyer Flotilla Two, etc;

(c) *Task Force Three* (Commander Scouting Force) consisting of Cruiser Division Four and Six, the LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group Twenty-one, and Destroyer Squadrons, etc;

(d) *Task Force Four* (Commandant 14th Naval District) which comprised that part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases, and Admiral Bloch, who was ComFOURTEEN, was also designated in other directives as Naval Base Defense Officer;

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Commander Submarine Scouting Force);

(f) *Task Force Nine* (Commander Patrol Wing Two); consisting of PatWings One and Two.

(g) *Task Force Fifteen* (Commander Base Force).

It may be noted at this point that this directive also provided that current employment schedules for the task forces would remain in effect; that the Commanders of Task Forces Seven and Nine were to submit revised schedules for the period November 15th to December 31, 1941, at the earliest practicable date. It was indicated that those schedules were to contemplate various arrangements for further training.

C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STAFF

Vice Admiral Pye was Admiral Kimmel's next senior in command, and was Commander of Task Force One;

Admiral Herbert F. Leary during 1941 was in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, and under the command of Admiral Pye. (p. 363)

During 1941, Admiral Walter S. Anderson was Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet. His superior was Admiral Pye. He was Admiral Pye's most important subordinate commander. (p. 390)

During 1941, Admiral Joel William Bunkley was Commanding Officer of the USS CALIFORNIA which was attached to the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Buckley's ship was Admiral Pye's flagship. (p. 413)

Vice Admiral Halsey was Commander of Task Force Two; Vice Admiral Brown of Task Force Three;

Admiral John Henry Newton, during 1941, was in command of Cruisers Scouting Force. His superior was Admiral Brown. (p. 314)

Admiral Bloch of Task Force Four; Rear Admiral Withers of Task Force Seven; Rear Admiral Bellinger of Task Force Nine; and, Rear Admiral Calhoun of Task Force Fifteen.

Admiral Bloch testified that during 1941 he was ComFOURTEEN,

From March 15, 1941 until the end of the year, Captain Irving H. Mayfield was District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He had had no previous experience in Intelligence work except two weeks temporary duty in Washington and two years as a Naval attache in Chile.

After July 1, 1941, Lieutenant William B. Stephenson, USNR, was designated as head of the Counter-Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District (p. 323).

Until June 9, 1941, Captain J. B. Earle was in command of Destroyer Squadron Five, thereafter he was Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District (p. 368).

Commander Wesley A. Wright was Assistant Communication Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was on temporary duty with the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit. He had had no experience in traffic analysis, which includes the location of forces by instruments, but had had about nine years' experience in other closely related branches of communication intelligence work (p. 379).

Commander Local Defense Forces, Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, Commandant Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, Commander Task Force Four, as Naval Base Defense Officer. He performed his duties in cooperation with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that he and Admiral Kimmel worked harmoniously together and conferred four to five times weekly. Admiral Kimmel, he said, made an honest effort to keep him fully informed. He was conscious that in 1941 Japanese-United States relations were strained. He did not disagree with decisions made by the High Command of the Fleet. He was not called upon to make any independent decision (page 393).

According to Vice Admiral Bellinger his duties, in general, were as:

(a) Commander Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two, plus other units as assigned by CincPac for specific operations. His senior officer was CincPac.

(b) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander Patrol Wing Two. The larger command included the patrol squadrons, aircraft tenders, attached to Patrol Wings One and Two. His senior officer was Commander Aircraft Scouting Force based at San Diego.

(c) Commander Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. Administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on Naval Air Station.

(d) Liaison with ComFOURTEEN for aviation development with the district, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnstown Island.

(e) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, and when performing such duties, his senior officer was Admiral Bloch (pages 660-61).

Captain Logan C. Ramsey, who also testified, was Operations Officer to Admiral Bellinger between November 1 and December 7, 1941 (page 574).

Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun said that he was Commander Base Force, United States Fleet, during 1941. His duties included logistic support of the Pacific Fleet, assisting ComFOURTEEN with services in Pearl Harbor, command of fleet security measure until August or September when relieved by Admiral Bloch, and he was Senior Patrol Officer in charge of all naval shore patrol (page 931).

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, during 1941, was Chief of Staff to CincPac

Vice Admiral Smith testified that he was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941 to 7 December 1941 (page 335), and that his duties, as prescribed by Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet (Exhibit 34), issued 14 July 1941, which he himself signed and issued with the approval of Admiral Kimmel, were:

"112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay."

"200. CHIEF OF STAFF—01—Personal Aide.

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785-786.)

(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.

(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.

(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.

(e) Signs correspondence as follows:

(1) Routine Matters.

(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.

(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.

(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.

(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.

(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers" (NCI Rec. p. 336).

(page 528).

Admiral Smith, on December 7, 1941, was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet which position he assumed on February 1, 1941. Previously, he served a year and a half as Captain of one of Admiral Kimmel's cruisers while Admiral Kimmel was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet. As Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith supervised all divisions of the Staff (p. 32) and everything which transpired between the Staff members and the Commander-in-Chief was brought to Admiral Smith's attention. (p. 33)

Admiral Smith said that he felt that entirely too much of his time was taken up with administrative matters; when the Commander-in-Chief and Staff moved ashore, Admiral Smith found it difficult to keep a day-by-day routine going; possibly he was to blame himself for this situation, but he attempted to reduce the paper work. However, the Commander-in-Chief kept him too long in the Commander-in-Chief's office, and he knew that because Admiral Smith told him so; Admiral Smith believes that they spent entirely too much time on staff discussions. (p. 60) Admiral Smith stated that because of his preoccupation with day-to-day matters he was not as free as the Commander in Chief to think of future events.

Rear Admiral DeLany was Chief of Staff for Operations for Admiral Kimmel from February 1 to December 7, 1941 (page 496). Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris was War Plans Officer during the last half of 1941 (page 887).

On December 7, Captain Vincent R. Murphy was on the staff of Admiral Kimmel as Assistant to the War Plans Officer, and on that day was Staff Duty Officer (p. 195).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was War Plans Officer for CincPac from February, 1941 until the end of 1941 (page 293). He stated that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Staff of CincPac, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

"207. War Plans Officer—16.

"(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.

"(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.

"(c) Member of Schedule Board.

"(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.

"(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters—via District Commandant if appropriate.

"(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.

"(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.

"(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.

"(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet." (page 294)

² Captain E. T. Layton testified that between October and December 7th, he was Fleet Intelligence Officer for CincPac (page 904).

Captain Layton testified that for one year prior to 7 December 1941, and subsequently, he had been Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, (page 182) and that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

"214. Intelligence Officer—25.

"(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

"(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).

"(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

"(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.

"(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual.).

"(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.

"(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.

"(h) In charge of censorship.

"(i) Internal Security of ships.

"(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

"215. Assistant Intelligence Officer—26.

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

"(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.

"(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.

"(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.

"(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies" (page 183).

Rear Admiral Kitts was Fleet Gunnery Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was in charge of training (pages 511-12). (3)

On December 7, 1941, Admiral Arthur C. Davis was Fleet Aviation Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He had been performing these duties for about a year and a half (p. 96). His duties primarily were concerned with technical training and logistics matters (p. 97).

On December 7, 1941, M. E. Curtis, Captain, U. S. N., was Pacific Fleet Communication Officer and had served in that capacity for about two years.

D. GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 142 AND 143

General Order No. 142, dated January 10, 1941, of which the Court took judicial notice, assigned a dual status to the Commandants of various Naval districts, including the Fourteenth, in that as Commandants they were to operate under orders of the Navy Department, and as officers of one of the fleets they were to operate under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of the Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank made them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the fleet in question when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief. It was further provided that as Commandants they were to be governed by all instructions relating to the duties of Commandants of Naval districts and the units under their command would be those prescribed in existing regulations and instructions, and would include the local naval defense forces. Their duties as officers of a fleet were to be guided by such instructions as the Commander-in-Chief of that fleet might consider desirable.

General Order No. 143, dated February 3, 1941, which the Court also judicially noticed, provided for the organization of naval forces of the United States, which included the United States Fleet, composed of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets. These were described as administrative and task organizations normally operating under the instructions of the Navy Department. The United States Fleet was said to be an administrative organization for training purposes only and a task organization when two or more fleets were concentrated or operating in conjunction with each other. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, was to prescribe standards and methods of training. It was also stated that the Commandants of Naval districts had administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for naval local defense forces.

III. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS—HIS STAFF AND DUTIES

A. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN, was Chief of Naval Operations through the period when Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

B. ADMIRAL STARK'S STAFF

Admiral Stark's principal advisers during this period, he said, were Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, head of War Plans.

Captain Robert O. Glover was in the plans division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was assigned various planning duties. (p. 171)

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, head of Central Division, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

From May until October, 1941, Admiral Howard F. Kingman was head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI, and from October on was Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. As head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch, he had general supervision of the activities of the several districts' intelligence organizations. (p. 335-6)

Captain L. F. Safford was in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications during 1941. (p. 355)

the heads of the Divisions of Ship Movements,

- (3) During 1941, Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard was Director of the Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. (p. 399)

The duties of the Ship Movements Division were summarized by Admiral Brainard as follows:

"The general functions of the Ship Movements Division involved preparation of the publications "Operating Force Plan," "Assignment of Vessels to Fleets and Forces," "Assignment of Vessels to Districts," assignment of home ports; and collaboration and coordination with the Fleet Maintenance Division of overhauls, schedules of Fleet activities as submitted by the Commanders of the forces afloat, these tentative schedules being submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and circulated for the approval or modification by the divisions under the CNO, and final approval; then returned to the forces afloat by the Chief of Naval Operations; scheduling and itinerarizing of NTS ships, the recording and accountability of ship locations in rather detailed form as the result of position reports and location reports from the ships operating individually and from Fleet units, as reported by Fleet Commanders. During the period of my incumbency, a War Information Room was started under the late Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton for the purpose of plotting and keeping track of all combatant ships of the navies of the world. Also a section of Convoy and Routing, as now called, whose duties were the plotting and as close an accountability as possible to keep track of the merchant shipping of the world. Positions of our own naval vessels also was obtained through a movement report system. Information on merchant shipping and foreign shipping and men-of-war was obtained through the various sources of ONI, naval observers at ports of the world, Naval Attaches, Maritime Commission, and other such sources. The acquisition of small craft was accomplished by the NTS Section which, later, grew into a sizeable division, and the assignments to Districts and Sea Frontiers was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations as set forth in the publication previously mentioned as prepared and distributed by this Division." (p. 399-400)

Admiral Brainard said that the assignment of important naval units was determined by echelons higher than his division. (p. 400)

Admiral Brainard said that the Ship Movements Division was primarily a record keeping division and something of an information bureau, available to proper authorities, as regards the location of shipping and that he and his division did not participate in questions of broad general policy. (p. 402)

Ship Maintenance, Fleet Training, and his Flag Secretary (pages 2, 18).

During 1941, Captain John L. McCrea was an aide to Admiral Stark. He was assigned special duties by Admiral Stark.

During 1941, Captain Charles Wellborn, Jr. was Administrative Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations (p. 383).

Admiral Royal Ingersoll said that he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, and as such generally acted for the Chief of Naval Operations in matters where policy had been established, and in an advisory capacity. He knew generally what was going on in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (page 816).

During 1941, Admiral Ingersoll was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. He described his duties as follows:

"As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been

considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent." (p. 417)

Concerning Admiral Ingersoll's familiarity with matters coming before Admiral Stark, he said:

"Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secretary of State of which he did not tell me all the details." (p. 417)

Vice Admiral R. K. Turner said that between July and December 7, 1941, he was Director of War Plans in the office of CNO. He was a professional adviser to CNO in the preparation of plans for war (page 988).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was Director of the Central Division during 1941 and was the liaison with the State Department.

The liaison between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State Department was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows:

"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time, the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling." (p. 257)

Admiral Turner summarized the situation in regard to the State Department by stating that on the whole, he was satisfied and had no complaint or criticism on the attitude of the State Department. (p. 258)

Captain Wellborn discussed the general exchange of information with the State Department. (p. 385)

The records kept of the meetings with the State Department officers were described by Admiral Schuirmann as follows:

"A 'Liaison Committee' consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was

commenced; prior to that time I would make notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were 'off the record' discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these 'off the record' discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials." (p. 405)

"Memo: The examining officer has identified the records mentioned by the witness as being contained in file titled 'Record of Liaison Meetings and some other special papers,' now on file in the Central Division (Op 13) of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, Navy Department." (p. 405 and 406) Admiral Schuirmann said that he had some informal memorandums which would be in the files of the Central Division. (p. 406)

Liaison was made by personal visits, conferences, and by telephone. He dealt with Dr. Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton, Joseph Ballantine, Under Secretary Welles, and Secretary Hull. Incomplete minutes were kept by the Central Division of State Department meetings. ONI kept him informed, he said, but there was no established system for getting information to him. He also received information, for some time prior to the attack, during daily morning conferences conducted by the Secretary of the Navy, at which the War Plans Officer, who kept a current estimate, was present (pages 195-198).

C. THE DUTIES OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The duties of Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, are set forth in Article 392 and Article 433, Navy Regulations, of which the Court took judicial notice at pages 74-77, as follows:

Article 392:

"(1) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate from among officers of the Line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years. He is charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet, with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the co-ordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or about to be commissioned. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

"(2) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title of admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 June 1922. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such. To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there are authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifteen officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be retired from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be retired with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest grade or rank held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations.

"(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under Secretary when serving, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy."

Article 433:

"1. The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

"2. The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations shall include the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Division of Fleet Training; the operation of the Communication Service, of naval districts, of vessels assigned to the

Naval Reserve, and of mines and mining; the operations of the Marine Corps, except when operating with the Army or on other detached duty by order of the President; and the operations of Coast Guard vessels when operating with the Navy; and the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization of the fleet, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and training of the fleet for war; ocean and lake surveys; with the collection of foreign surveys; with the publication and supply of charts, sailing directions, and nautical rules; dissemination of all nautical, hydrographic, and meteorological information to ships and aircraft, and with the upkeep, repair, and operation of the Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office.

"3. He shall so coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel and material thereto so as to insure at all times the maximum readiness of the fleet for war.

"4. He shall keep all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department informed in regard to action within their cognizance that is at any time necessary or desirable to improve the war efficiency of the fleet, and shall arrange for the coordination of effort of his office and of the bureaus and other offices of the Navy Department in relation thereto.

"5. He shall under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy direct the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy, including the time of their assignment for docking, repairs, and alterations, and shall prepare schedules and issue orders in regard thereto.

He shall keep records of service of fleets, squadrons and ships.

"6. He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features and design of all new ships and as to any alterations of a ship which may affect her military value; as to the location, capacity, and protection of navy yards and naval stations, including all features which affect their military value; also, as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, visual signal stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunitions, fuel, stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

"7. He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the department in regard to insular governments and foreign relations, and all correspondence in regard to these matters shall be presented for the Secretary's action through his office.

"8. He is charged with the preparation, revisions, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, general orders, tactical instructions, drill books (except such as are issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the individual instruction of officers and enlisted men), signal codes, and cipher codes.

"9. In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war, he shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the Department and the Marine Corps Headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance. After the approval of any given war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices, such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans and their maintenance in constant readiness.

"10. In carrying out his duties he shall utilize the facilities of the appropriate bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.

"11. The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer."

The Court of Inquiry also took judicial notice of General Order No. 170, dated March 23, 1942, which provided that the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations were combined and placed under one officer with the title "Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations."

IV. THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT—HIS MAJOR MISSION

A. THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Major General W. C. Short, USA, became Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in February, 1941, and was relieved December 16, 1941 (page 220). General Marshall testified that he considered General Short a very superior officer (page 853).

Colonel W. C. Phillips, USA, became General Short's Chief of Staff on November 5, 1941, prior to which he had worked through the various staff sections. He

stated that General Short discussed all important communications with him. He was relieved December 18, 1941 (page 477, 493).

B. GENERAL SHORT'S MAJOR MISSION

General Marshall said that he wrote to General Short on February 7, 1941, when General Short took command. The reason for the letter was a conference he had had with Admiral Stark on the inadequacy of Army equipment for the protection of Pearl Harbor (pages 865-6). His letter stated that Kimmel had written Stark about it but did not realize that the Army was tragically lacking in AA material, and that Hawaii was on a better basis than other places. The fullest protection for the fleet, he stated, is "*The rather than a major consideration for us.*"

Captain Wellborn said that generally it was the Navy's view that there was no more important commitment that the Army might have than the defense of Pearl Harbor, but that this view appeared not to be completely concurred in by the War Department. (p. 386)

The Navy itself, he said, made demands for other places that made it difficult to meet their demands for Hawaii. He was doing everything to build up the defenses but could not perform a miracle; Short was to make this clear to Kimmel; he was sending planes, some of which were not up to Jap speed, et cetera; he was trying to augment the machine guns. The Navy had approached the Army for barrage balloons and probably the first test would be in June in Hawaii.

General Marshall's letter also stated (page 867), "*The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real peril in the Hawaiian Islands.*"

In this letter he also said that Short should keep clearly in mind, "*that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel.*" (Page 867.)

V. RELATIONS IN GENERAL BETWEEN NAVY AND ARMY COMMANDERS

A. IN WASHINGTON

General Marshall said that he held frequent consultations with Admiral Stark and that their relations were excellent (page 856).

B. IN HAWAII

The Navy and Army witnesses were unanimously of the opinion that relations between the Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii were satisfactory.

Admiral Pye stated that the cooperation between General Short and Admiral Kimmel was greater than had ever existed previously between such commanding officers (page 441).

Admiral Delaney stated that there was complete cooperation between the higher echelon of the Army and the Navy at Pearl Harbor (page 507).

Admiral Smith testified that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were very close and that there was a free exchange of military information (page 536).

Admiral Smith said that "Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him; both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific as Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relation such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there were excellent." (p. 35)

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel never felt that Admiral Bloch was General Short's opposite number, rather Admiral Kimmel felt that he was General Short's opposite; he felt that when he was present he was the

man who should deal with the Army and with everything himself; he took that responsibility although that might not have been indicated on the official documents. However, Admiral Smith did not recall that this left Admiral Bloch in any state of uncertainty; Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch. (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that the method of command in effect in Hawaii as between the Army and Navy was the method of mutual cooperation, but that CincPac had the predominate interest which General Short recognized and that the Navy was not very much impressed with the Army's provision for defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by the Fleet itself, "which it was." (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that "Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and that when he was in port, he had the responsibility and he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordinate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually, however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say." (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that the primary reason why the Army and Navy business was conducted by Admiral Kimmel and not by Admiral Bloch was that after Admiral Kimmel moved ashore in the summer of 1941 and was there all the time practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature. That responsibility included the responsibility for the safety of the Fleet for it was realized that the only defense would be by the Fleet and that there was no defense ashore except the net or the gate. (p. 37)

However, Admiral Smith thought that it was Admiral Kimmel's intention in issuing his security order that the tasks therein prescribed for the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District involving coordination with the Army, should be performed directly by Admiral Bloch. (p. 37)

Admiral Calhoun said that Kimmel and Short were on excellent terms and cooperated fully (pages 936-937).

Admiral Kitts said that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were cordial and cooperative (page 523.)

According to Admiral McMorris, the relations of Kimmel and Short were cordial and cooperative, as to the development of plans for local defense and for utilization of fleet units in port for local defense, there may, from time to time, have been differences of opinion, but relations were habitually pleasant (page 901).

Admiral DeLany said that the relationship between the Army and the Navy out there was one of complete understanding and was very close. (p. 78)

Vice Admiral McMorris testified with respect to whether the cordiality in relations as they existed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short extended down to elements of the staffs, that there was much interchange of information on a habitual informal basis; that he himself not infrequently saw members of General Short's staff. He stated that he knew that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger had meetings not infrequently.

He stated further that prior to joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, he was Operations Officer for Admiral Andrews, who was Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment and Senior Officer Present in Hawaii until the Fleet came out sometime during 1940; that during that period he frequently visited Fort Shafter and discussed defensive plans with the Army officers, and that after joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, his association at Fort Shafter with the Army continued. He stated that he felt he was not exceptional in that respect (p. 332-333).

Captain Ramey said that he did not usually attend Army-Navy conferences but sometimes went with Admiral Bellinger. In general, cooperation between the Army and the Navy was very good (page 587).

Commander Rochefort, in charge of combat intelligence at 14ND, testified that relations between the Army and Navy were satisfactory and they worked closely together (page 476).

Admiral Bloch testified that his personal relations with General Short were friendly and his official relations were good. They had no serious disagreements and cooperated fully (page 408).

Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command and with the exception of possibly a couple of trips as sea and one trip to Washington, he

was there the entire time although his intention, in the event of hostilities, was that he would go to sea. (p. 7) Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel's presence ashore did not make him either unhappy or embarrassed. His relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good and his relations with the Commanding General were cordial and their cooperation, he thought, was good. But the Commanding General had a right to go to Admiral Kimmel directly and he also had a right to discuss matters with Admiral Bloch and on one or two occasions Admiral Bloch didn't know whether General Short had discussed particular matters with Admiral Kimmel or whether he was coming to Admiral Bloch in the first instance. This, however, did not cause any disagreement because Admiral Bloch talked everything over fully with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch did not think that there had been any doubt in his mind as to where he stood in the picture. (p. 7)

Admiral Bloch had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly concerning the matters in connection with the Joint Coastal Defense Plan. Among these were Captain J. B. Earle, Chief of Staff and Commander C. B. Momsen, the War Plans Officer and Captain Graham, the District Communications Officer. They had no serious differences of opinion with the Army. Some matters were referred to Washington but they were always settled. Admiral Bloch thought that their preparations were being prosecuted very vigorously. (p. 8)

General Marshall was informed that relations between Short and Kimmel and Bloch were excellent (page 856).

According to Admiral Kimmel his relations with General Short were "O. K." in all respects (pages 367-8).

General Short testified that in matters of cooperation with the Navy he dealt with Admiral Bloch on routine matters and with Admiral Kimmel on matters of importance. He frequently conferred with both. There were no regular conferences, but conferences were held from time to time. He and Admiral Kimmel were friendly personally and officially (pages 220-21).

Colonel Phillips said that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were very good, and that General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch conferred frequently, and that relations between them were cordial and cooperative (pages 482, 493).*

VI. THE WAR PLANS RELATING TO HAWAII AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

A. THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF HAWAII

In the Hewitt investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:

1. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five:

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36).

According to this plan the day of execution was to be designated as W-Day, and the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day, which might or might not coincide with W-Day. The plan (Exhibit 35) provided in part:

"INTRODUCTION

"CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." (Exhibit 35)

*In connection with the relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subsequently that there may be questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by one another, particularly after November 27, 1941, their exchange of information, and the degree of cooperation which existed in connection with the Army radar system at Oahu.

"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

"a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

"NOTE.—As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . . (Ex. 35)

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East." (Exhibit 35)

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

SECTION 3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

"3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

"a. Capture of Guam.

"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

"e. Reinforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the

Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probably main base in Halmahera).

"d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 35)

"PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

"a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

"b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155° East;

"e. Defend Samoa in category 'D';

"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';

"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)

CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

"a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

"b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.

"c. PHASE II, etc.,—Succeeding tasks.

"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.

"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.

"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-Day.

"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-Day.

"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° East.

"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.

"j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

"k. Continue training operations as practicable.

"l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan." (Exhibit 35)

"PHASE IA

"2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.

"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.

"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the Northern Pacific.

"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering operations.

"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.

"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.

"f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.

"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.

"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and the West Coast.

"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.

"j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.

"k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.

"l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." (Exhibit 35)

"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

"SECTION 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

"3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

"3142. On W-Day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I)." . . . (Exhibit 35)

"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND IA

SECTION 1. PHASE I

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Operation Plan

"No. 1-R5"

"1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south

of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." . . . (Exhibit 35)

"ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." . . .

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

"2. Phase I.

"This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

"(c) Covering.

"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

"(e) Routing shipping." . . . (Ex. 35)

"3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

"(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

"(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1)." . . . (Exhibit 35)

2. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 14ND-JCD-42.

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND-JCD-42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Ex. 80). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. (Ex. 80)

It will be seen that under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

The tasks assigned were as follows:

"14. Tasks.

"a. JOINT TASK. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. ARMY TASK. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." (Ex. 80)

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu). (Ex. 80)

"17: ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

"b. An anti-aircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.e.

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"m. Any measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:

"a. An inshore patrol.

"b. An offshore patrol.

"c. An escort force.

"d. An attack force.

"e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

"f. Installation and operation of an under water defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

"i. Distant reconnaissance.

"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

"l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

"m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

"p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto." (Exhibit 80)

3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

This provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action.

It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable." (Ex. 47)

4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by

a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using. (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred. (Exhibit 49)

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions, of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)

5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

C. Sortie and entry.

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them; and provided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; and that Com-FOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of Inquiry).

The war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy-WPL-46 (Exhibit 4); in United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP-PAC-46 (Exhibit 5); in "Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularly, in Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND-JCD-42 (Exhibit 7); and in Operation Plan No. 1-41, issued by Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer (Exhibit 53).

In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and issued about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral Smith said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk. With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could have been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was not yet up to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had really not been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a lever to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development. (p. 160)

Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 163)

The record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include, copies of Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.

Paragraph II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. . . .

Paragraph III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade. It also stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and the Army Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to depend on Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy. (p. 144)

Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the Army's Air Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early information and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they should not expect such information. (p. 131)

ADMIRAL HEWITT'S EXAMINATION

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District in December, 1941, was shown Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which deals with joint Army and Navy measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti-aircraft exercises and drills in the months preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle stated that definite problems were developed for training purposes, which would serve to develop the control features of anti-aircraft defense and also develop the necessary coordination between Army and Navy operations. In addition, about once in every ten days a drill was held in which planes flew over Pearl Harbor during either day or night and ships in the harbor simulated anti-aircraft fire. The Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors, with a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible for controlling the fire from that sector and making required reports (p. 457-458).

Captain Earle stated that about once a month a drill was held which entailed locating an aircraft target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warnings being sent to both Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was located at a certain distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then be sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target. Captain Earle believed that at least three of these drills were held prior to 7 December 1941, but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any was held between 27 November and 7 December (p. 458).

Questioned regarding the command set-up for the joint exercises, Captain Earle said (p. 458-459):

"My recollection is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an enemy had been sighted on a certain bearing, this word was given to the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations, including order as to—detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.

"To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage."

Exhibit 47 provided in part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft warning service, the Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt to give such warnings of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle said that to implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications with the Army over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information received could be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications activities to make prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few destroyers assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts; and since there were no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes to forward immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 460).

Captain Earle said that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval District assigned a liaison officer to General Short's headquarters for general liaison duties (p. 460). Captain Earle stated further that there had been a naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system installed and that at one time this officer came to him and asked for assistance. This officer also stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the warning center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications Officer would be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no spare personnel in the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at the center (p. 461).

The above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch and General Short.

Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement between General Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint Planning Committee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not act formally as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff acted informally with sub-committees appointed for the majority of the detailed work. (p. 368)

Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as Chief of Staff it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as time went on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish joint action. (p. 369)

Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the portion relating to planning. (p. 369)

Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army system was in operation, Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of the provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of information, but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question of assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar officer that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they would be glad to turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)

Captain Earle's recollection was vague as to other provisions of the Joint Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and the use of barrage balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan for the coordination of Fleet anti-aircraft fire with Army anti-aircraft fire in the Pearl Harbor area. Captain Earle discussed generally his recollection of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 372-3)

To the agreement was annexed Addendum One, dated March 31, 1941. Addendum One was a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

Concerning the estimate in Admiral Bellinger's air plan that the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack, Admiral Pye said that the estimate did not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than to do something else. (p. 160)

In paragraph I of the addendum there was a "Summary of the Situation." The summary indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiated hostile action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence service.

Paragraph II of the addendum was a "Survey of Opposing Strengths." This indicated, among other things, that Orange might send into the area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. Also that the most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the addendum dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." This stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two. Further, that it appeared that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be

an air attack, which would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. That a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. It was also stated that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier." It was further stated that in a dawn air attack there was a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the addendum dealt with "Action Open to Us." This stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. It contained other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the Island, and stated that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained the "Decisions." The primary decision was that this force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. There were a number of subsidiary decisions, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and was to include various units in accordance with current conditions of readiness. These units included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons, among others.

Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53). The Task Organization prescribed was (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention to, among other things, the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL Harbor Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

"ASSUMPTIONS

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nations of such powers may attempt:

"(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

"(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

"(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

"(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

"(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

"(3) A combination of these two—possible."

A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan was Annex "A" to Operation Plan 1-41, a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was Annex "Baker," a detailed Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan was Annex "C," a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan was Annex "D," and a detailed Communications Plan was Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker," the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, was dated April 9, 1941, prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch.

According to Admiral Bloch, after Admiral Kimmel assumed command and before information was received about the correspondence between the

Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War dealing with the Pearl Harbor defenses, Admiral Kimmel reviewed certain information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that since the ships had anti-aircraft batteries, they should be used to the fullest extent to increase the volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor. He also decided that since the Navy also had a number of planes on shore many of which were carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they also should be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned Admiral Halsey and Admiral Ballinger to Admiral Bloch to talk over with the Army the coordination of action of the airplanes. Conferences were held with the Army authorities and an agreement reached with the Army under which all fighter planes, including Navy fighter planes on shore at the time of an attack, would be placed under the Army's command and that all bombers would be turned over to the Navy. (p. 4)

Admiral Bloch said that generally speaking, he took no exception to the Air Defense Plan which had been worked out by Admiral Ballinger and General Martin. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel had a copy of the Joint Air Operating Plan; that it was fair to assume that he must have known about the plan; and that General Short also must have known about the plan. (p. 89)

Admiral Smith said that the Commander-in-Chief was apprised of all of the plans made by the Army and by Admiral Bloch. However, Admiral Smith did not recall the Joint Defense Plan, Exhibit 5. (p. 37)

It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with, among other things, the Joint Estimate, dated March 31, 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The plan was effective upon receipt and would become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter, such as "E", signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5", signifying that all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan stating the number of planes and readiness.

General Short testified that the local joint defense plan was in effect prior to the attack, but was not in operation because, he said, it was predicated on the Rainbow Plan which had not been executed, and, therefore, the action taken under it prior to the attack was only drills (pages 259-260).

Admiral Bellinger testified that about March 1, 1941, CincPac directed him to report to ComFOURTEEN to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Force. He did so and worked with Major General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. The operations plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans, the most important of which was the plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which outlined the proposed employment of all units made available to that force (page 661).

Army and Navy orders, he said, were based on the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941. He believed this estimate was sound, but that unity of command was missing (page 662). The plan was to function through mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in an emergency or when proper authority directed. The composition varied with the planes made available by the various Army and Navy commanders; the determining factor of availability was the daily employment schedule of planes belonging to various units. Available planes were subject to operational control only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.

The normal procedure for vitalizing this organization for drill was an "air raid" dispatch from ComFourteen, as Base Defense Force Commander; then Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Commander, would send a dispatch to all units which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuits, ordering them to

place all available planes in highest readiness; searches would immediately be started then, and an attack on enemy surface forces when located (page 662).

The authority of "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Officer" was non-existent until an emergency was apparent or appropriate authority placed that force in a functioning status, and when called into existence covered not pursuit, but only the search and attack groups of that force (page 663). The planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on naval base defense (page 663).

Admiral Kimmel, he said, made final approval for naval aircraft operation. He or ComFourteen could vitalize the NBDA Force. ComFourteen worked under CincPac. NBDA Force was not composed of all aircraft but only of aircraft reported available (page 665).

Their estimate, he said, that "it appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence service" was an estimate of hostile action and not of Japanese war plans (page 666).

In summary, the NBDA Force would come into being in the event of: (a) a drill, (b) an actual emergency, (c) orders from higher authority based on information as to the imminence of attack (page 678).

Admiral Bloch said that the agreement with the Army concerning the use of aircraft was effective from the date of signature and would be put in execution in the same manner as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. (p. 7)

B. TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE WAR PLANS IN GENREAL

Admiral Bellinger stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation for meeting such an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operating twenty-four hours a day, must be fully manned and functioning. Reconnaissance, radar nets, complete information regarding shipping, and control of all aircraft in the zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must be in effect and functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be expected from a mutual cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed only through intermittent drills (p. 510).

It appears from the testimony of various of the witnesses that (1) the decisive theater, as laid down in the war plans, was the Atlantic, and that the military strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive; (2) that the primary responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's, and that the Navy was to assist the Army in that task; (3) that the method of command at Pearl Harbor was one of joint cooperation between the Army and Navy and not unity of command; (4) that the principal mission which had been assigned to the Pacific Fleet was to train for war with Japan; and (5) that the war plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the fleet technically mobilized.

(1) The decisive theatre the Atlantic; defensive strategy in the Pacific.

Admiral Bloch said that "Rainbow 1" contemplated the United States at war with the Axis Powers, including Japan, without any assistance except perhaps some of the South American Republics; JCD was based on that plan; "Rainbow 3" was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis nations, including Japan; he believed that the provisions of "Rainbow 5" were about the same as in the earlier plans insofar as they related to the Fourteenth Naval District. No. 1 was a purely defensive plan. No. 3 had certain offensive tasks in it, and he did not recall the tasks assigned by "Rainbow 5." (p. 23)

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, on December 7, 1941, was assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and was under then Captain McMorris. He was responsible for the preparation of the written war plans for the Pacific Fleet which were required to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect. He had reported for that duty on February 1, 1941. (p. 66)

Admiral McCormick said that the commitments of the Pacific Fleet for the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 Plan, in general were to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in special categories such as Guam, which was regarded as more or less indefensible; to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by

raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea communications; and to raid or interrupt Japanese communications east of longitude 180. This provided, therefore, for the use of task forces composed of combatant ships for offensive operations consisting of raids, and if the use of a covering force were taken into account it might be said that the whole of the Fleet would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase. (p. 66-7) In his opinion, had the three carriers which were attached to the Fleet been available, they could have raided an island in the fringes of the Marshalls without undue risk. There were only two carriers available around December 7th, but it is Admiral McCormick's belief that Admiral Kimmel intended to carry out the plan even with the two carriers which were then available. The operating schedules were more or less built around the war plans insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned. (p. 67)

Captain Glover worked on portions of Rainbow 5, which was completed in May. The plan contemplated, he said, the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. (p. 161) According to Captain Glover, the plan gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. Also, to divert the enemy strength from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. Captain Glover's concept of the plan was that initially, the attitude of the Pacific Fleet was to be defensive and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive. The movements which he had mentioned were to be classed as raids rather than movement of total force and he considered that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids. (p. 173)

Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL-46 represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time and a calculated risk in the Pacific and that the plan was elastic.

Captain Glover referred to a memo, dated August 21, 1941, to the Plans Section of the War Plans Division re: "Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5." This indicated that the Plans Section was charged with preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect and continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice might be given in regard to matters relating to the execution of the plan.

No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according to Captain Glover. (p. 174)

Admiral Turner discussed the background and form of WPL-46, known as Rainbow 5. (p. 251-2) Admiral Turner said that the contributory plan of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was approved by the Navy Department in about September, 1941. Concerning the offensive tasks of the war plan, Admiral Turner said, "So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it. While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific." (p. 252)

Captain Wellborn said that his recollection was that generally the officers concerned with the preparation of the war plans were of the view that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic. (p. 383-4)

Concerning the concept that Germany was the principal enemy to be first disposed of, Admiral Ingersoll said: "Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan

entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major effort would be made in one ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representation made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL-46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan." (p. 422)

Admiral Stark testified that the over-all military strategy which regarded the Atlantic as the decisive theatre had been established by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (pages 80-1). Despite this, however, he said, the Atlantic did not have exactly priority over the Pacific, and he did not believe that men had been transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic (page 794).

Admiral Smith testified that he thought the CNO considered the Atlantic more important than the Pacific since in May, 1941, the best BB's, four CL's, and two squadrons of DD's were secretly transferred to the Atlantic (pages 529-30).

Admiral Smith said that in May, 1941, the YORKTOWN, Battleship Division Three Cruiser Division Eight, and two squadrons of destroyers were detached and sent to the Atlantic; these he said were equipped with all of the modern devices that they had tried to get for them while they were attached to the Pacific Fleet. (p. 38)

(2) Testimony concerning the primary responsibility for defense.

Both Admiral Stark (page 193) and Admiral Kimmel (page 294) testified that the basic responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's. The Army, Admiral Kimmel said, had the duty of locating and engaging enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the Navy was to support the Army. The Army had the duty of repulsing air attack by artillery, the Navy to assist. Under the joint plan, the Army operated all pursuit planes and the Navy all bombers and patrol planes (page 295).

Admiral Pye stated that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor, assisted by the Navy in such manner as possible (page 438).

Admiral Bloch stated that the method of command was joint cooperation and that the Army's task under JCD-42 was to hold Oahu against attack and support the naval forces (page 385, Exhibit 7); the Navy's task was to patrol and control the coastal zone and to support the Army (page 386).

Admiral Bloch said that it might be stated that the Navy had no responsibility because there was nothing said in the Joint Coastal Defense Plan to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity to help out on account of the fact that he had means that he could use. (p. 11)

Admirals Ingersoll, Delaney, and Smith testified that under JCD-42 the Army was responsible for the defense of Hawaii (pages 848, 505, 551).

Admiral Kitts testified that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 521). The Navy's function was to support the Army. When ships were in port, the guns of the Fleet were made available to Army command through the Base Defense Officer (page 521).

Admiral McMorris said that the Fleet was not charged with its own defense while in Pearl Harbor.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the phrase "territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area," as used in sub-paragraph (h), page 24, of the "Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, (WPPac-46)", (Exhibit 35), included Hawaii, and that the duty prescribed in sub-paragraph (m) of Phase I of the Initial Tasks which was to "guard against a surprise attack by Japan," contemplated that it was a task of the Pacific Fleet to guard Hawaii against the surprise attack by Japan. (Page 295-296).

Vice Admiral McMorris further testified, with reference to the statements in the "Summary of the Situation" appearing in Addendum I to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941, to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor," that he agreed with the thought there expressed but had considered such an attack much more probable in the approaches to Pearl Harbor than in Pearl Harbor itself. (Page 299-301).

Vice Admiral McMorris also testified that at or about the time of the issuance of the Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, he agreed with the assumption therein stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by either a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, or a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, or by a combination of both of those two forms of attack. (Page 301-302).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection yet he entertained no doubt that he had reviewed, Annex VIII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier or Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and also that he had reviewed Addendum I of Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941. (Page 297-298).

but CinPac was concerned over the safety of the Fleet and felt a responsibility for urging the strengthening of the defenses (page 899).

Admiral McMorris said that Admiral Kimmel had felt an overall responsibility for safeguarding the Fleet, although he did look to ComFOURTEEN and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to protect Hawaii. (p. 239)

General Marshall said that the Army was responsible for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack; the Navy was to do long distance patrol and to search for and to attack hostile surface ships (page 855). The mission of the Hawaiian Air Force was to defend Oahu against air attack in cooperation with fleet aircraft and to attack hostile vessels (page 863).

Colonel Phillips testified that the Army's mission was the defense of the island, but that the Navy was jointly responsible (page 479).

(3) Command by joint cooperation, not unity of command.

Admiral Bellinger said that one of the main impediments of the air agreement and of the air organizations was the provision requiring agreement between the Commanding General and the Navy Base Defense Officer that a hostile raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action; the set-up that existed was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent or take action in an air attack; it was not the primary objective of either the Army or the Navy; there was no unity of command or control. (p. 119-120)

He said that if the Commanding General or he had seen an emergency situation, he felt that the Commanding General would have cooperated in any specific instance. Drills had been arranged previously by special arrangement with the Army. (p. 120)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not talk over with Admiral Kimmel the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese nor was the wording of his estimate discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and that Admiral Kimmel knew, of course, that Admiral Bellinger was not satisfied with the organization's set-up because it was based on too much cooperation and on the assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and that no such organization is any good unless it functions on a 24-hour basis. There were, he said, insufficient personnel to have an organization functioning on that basis. (p. 122-3)

Admiral Bellinger said that when the situation in the Pacific grew more tense, those portions of his estimate dealing with a carrier raid came back to his mind; he remembered discussing the subject matter with a high Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented Admiral Bellinger on the organization that had been set up, and Admiral Bellinger told him that that was all right but it would not work in case of war and indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also additional facilities and equipment. (p. 123)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not think that any joint plan based on cooperation alone would or could function properly in an emergency and he mentioned his more or less dissatisfaction with the general set-up of this air defense, both personally in conversation with Admiral Kimmel and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of the Navy. (p. 124)

Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which in part was as follows:

"Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non-existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty-four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little, if any more, in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position." (p. 134)

Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had been discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.

Admiral Pye said that for at least ten years before the attack, he felt that there was need for unity of command at Pearl Harbor; for more than a year before the attack, he had advised several Commanders-in-Chief that coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officers on their staff so that it would be better arranged at least. (p. 168)

Concerning the absence of unity of command, Admiral Stark testified that thought had been given to unity of command for the whole area, but that no satisfactory solution had been reached (page 29). He said that the President or Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War could have put unity of command in effect. Admiral Stark and General Marshall could have, subject to approval, he said, of the Secretaries. Local Army and Navy commanders could have done so by agreement. Admiral Bloch probably could not have acted independently of Admiral Kimmel (page 39). He occupied, under directive, a dual status when directed by OPNAV or on "M" day (page 41).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not discuss with the Army the desirability of invoking unity of command. Unity of command would have made operations easier. ComFOURTEEN could not, he said, have invoked unity of command without reference to him, and he would have referred the matter to the Navy Department (page 296).

Admiral Ingersoll said that unity of command at Hawaii was not discussed at the Secretary's and CNO's conferences when he was present (page 848).

Admiral Turner and General Marshall both said that there had been discussion of unity of command, but that no decision had been reached (pages 858, 1009).

Admiral Turner said, "That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL-46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore." (p. 271)

(4) The principal mission which had been assigned was training for war.

Admiral Ingersoll said that he was familiar with the problems of the Pacific Fleet in 1941. The Pacific Fleet was assigned its missions in the War Plans, and until war broke out its major mission was to prepare for war (page 820).

Admiral Smith testified that the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet during 1941 was training for war with Japan (page 529). And this was not changed prior to December 7th (page 539).

(5) The plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the Fleet technically mobilized.

Admiral Stark admittedly sent out no order to mobilize under WPL-46 (page 102).

Admiral Pye discussed the various phases of mobilization at page 440.

Admiral Smith's testimony concerning WPL-46 and the assigned tasks of the Pacific Fleet appears at pages 541-2. He said that the War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department before the attack (page 561).

Admiral Delaney said that no "M" day was set prior to December 7, 1941 (page 505). He did not consider the Fleet mobilized because of deficiencies in men and material.

Admiral McMorris said that the War Plans, which were not executed provided that the greater part of the patrol planes of the Fleet were to be advanced to Midway and Wake and a minimum number to be left under control of the sea frontier, based on Pearl Harbor (pages 901-2).

Admiral Bloch also said that no parts of JCD-42 (Exhibit 7) were executed prior to December 7th; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to agreements for tactical control of aircraft in case of attack (page 386).

Admiral Turner, on page 1011, discussed the Rainbow War Plans and their development; WPL-46 was a realistic plan. Mobilization without war, he said, is not practical in a democracy as the authority of Congress to mobilize is tantamount to a declaration of war. The Fleet was, however, so mobilized that the only thing left to be done by mobilization was the taking over of merchant shipping which can only be taken after war is declared. Execution of a part of WPL-46 would have been an act of war. Provision for the execution of a part of the plan was put in to provide for war with Germany without war with Japan (page 1012).

Admiral Ingersoll (page 844), read Articles 3721 and 3722 of WPL-46 (Exhibit 4). Mobilization of the Fleet, he said, was not ordered because the Fleet was in effect already mobilized. In this connection, the Government did not want to take any action that could be considered an overt act, and mobilization is always an act preliminary to war (page 845).

Admiral McMorris said that no technical execution of WPL-46 was necessary, he thought, to put the Fleet on a war footing; it was on a war footing (page 895).

It may be noted that Admiral Kimmel was aware, at the end of November and early in December, that WPL-46 was not yet in effect and that one of the first steps which his War Plans Officer recommended be taken, in the event of American-Japanese war, was to send dispatches to Task Force Commanders advising that WPL-46 was effective (Exhibits 69A and 69B).

C. ADEQUACY OF FLEET GENERALLY TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS

Admiral Stark testified that certain units were detached from the Pacific Fleet during 1941 for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic. The units transferred in June were three BB's, four CA's, one CV, and one DesRon, which amounted to about 25 per cent of the Pacific Fleet (pages 100-101).

He stated that from October to December, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 (pages 23, 25); and later testified that in 1941 the United States did not have sufficient men and material to meet an attack on one ocean, much less in both (page 800).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Pacific Fleet was regarded as adequate to carry out the initial tasks prescribed for it in the War Plans, which were primarily defensive with the exception of diversionary raids against the Carolines and the Marshalls. (p. 421-2) Admiral Ingersoll discussed the transfer of ships of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic which he said was in accordance with the basic concept of the War Plans which indicated that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis powers. These contemplated that the British would release certain forces for the Far East but Admiral Ingersoll did not know why it took until November, 1941, for a small detachment of British capital ships to arrive in the Indian Ocean. (p. 419)

Admiral Turner considered that the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared on November 26th to carry out missions assigned to it in the War Plans. These missions were defensive, except for possible raids (page 1017).

Admiral Turner said that forces were withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet to support an occupation of the Azores but that project was abandoned and the occupation of Iceland was substituted and some of the forces which had been withdrawn were then returned to the Pacific.

Admiral Turner said that he did not recall any official protest by Admiral Kimmel concerning the detachment of units to the Pacific Fleet, but that Admiral Kimmel did not approve the matter. (p. 253)

Admiral Turner discussed the Rainbow Plan No. 3, the practice of keeping the war plans up to date and the movement of forces in accordance with the commitments of the war plans. Concerning the adequacy of the Fleet,

Admiral Turner said, "We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally, was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength." (p. 256)

Admiral Turner said that the Fleet logistics were believed to be adequate for initial Fleet operations. (p. 257)

According to Admiral McMorris, while there were deficiencies in the Pacific Fleet, he felt that it would be effective to carry out the missions of WPL-46. WPL-46 was based on the Japanese starting war (page 893). The Fleet would have been alerted by dispatch and was advised for sometime that the situation was tense (page 894).

Admiral McMorris was of the view that the Pacific Fleet was adequate to carry out the missions assigned to it in the War Plans, although there were many marked deficiencies in the Fleet, particularly in anti-submarine craft. He said that he thought that Admiral Kimmel considered that the Pacific Fleet did consist of strong naval forces which could be effectively employed notwithstanding some handicaps. (p. 234)

Admiral McMorris said that he was not happy over the logistics situation, but certainly not discouraged over it. (p. 235)

Admiral McMorris thought the intention of Admiral Kimmel with respect to the carrying out of the War Plans in the event of war was to sweep for Japanese merchant ships, to make immediate reconnaissance of the Marshalls, to carry out as expeditiously as possible operations to establish our forces in the Marshalls, and to inaugurate patrol plane searches in the approaches to Hawaii. (p. 235)

Admiral Pye testified that the Pacific Fleet could have operated as far as the Marshall Islands, but no farther (page 431). It would have been difficult to operate long there because of the scarcity of tankers. Fuel was also short (page 432), but there was sufficient to operate up to 7 December. The fleet would have been more effective if the detachment had not been sent to the Atlantic (page 432).

Concerning the detachment of three battleships, four cruisers and a squadron of destroyers in June of 1941, Admiral Pye said that this materially reduced the power of the Pacific Fleet, but that it did not make much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished because the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Fleet could not have operated more than 2,500 miles from Honolulu no matter what its strength. Admiral Pye said that the greatest deficiency was in tankers. Another deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. He said that he thought all of the officers agreed that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands and that even with plenty of tankers, he doubted that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that because of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases. (p. 151) Admiral Pye said that during the training periods previous to December 7, fuel was being used at a greater rate than the rate at which fuel was being delivered so that the reserve was being reduced. (p. 152)

Admiral Delaney testified that he was familiar with the naval war plans in 1941 (page 500). He stated that WPL-46 could not have been executed with the forces then available to CincPac, but some of the tasks might have been carried out (page 501).

Admiral Calhoun was familiar with WPL-46 and the preparation for carrying out the tasks of the Pacific Fleet (page 931). He said that their tankers were adequate to maintain the fuel supply at Pearl Harbor (the fuel tanks there were

filled to capacity on December 7, 1941), but not sufficient to do this and also to supply the fleet while operating any considerable distance to the westward of Pearl Harbor and at high speeds (pages 932-3). The number of provision ships was hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the fleet if operating to the westward (page 933). The logistic support of the fleet, however, was adequate to carry out the initial tasks of WPL-46, which were of a limited nature (page 938). There were, he said, personnel shortages in the Pacific Fleet in 1941 (page 943).

Admiral C. W. Nimitz testified that he was Chief of BuNav during 1941 (page 947). Because of the expansion of the fleets and new construction, it was necessary to draw on the fleets for trained personnel to man new ships. About December, 1941, the ships were fully manned as to officers and about 90 per cent manned as to men. There was a large proportion of Reserve officers, and a large proportion of the men were untrained (page 948).

VII. THE POSSIBILITY OF AERIAL TORPEDO ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR

A. KNOWLEDGE AND EVALUATION OF SECRETARY'S LETTER:

Shortly after he assumed command, Admiral Kimmel saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, which discussed the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor and set forth the types of attack regarded as most likely (page 286).

In that letter, it will be recalled, the Secretary said that:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

Apparently, Admiral Kimmel also received a copy of the reply of the Secretary of War to that letter. It may be noted that the Secretary of War in his reply of February 1941 (Exhibit 24), expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the questions raised by the Secretary of the Navy, and as to the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. In his letter, the Secretary of War stated that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of the overseas departments and continued to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. The letter discussed the Army's pursuit planes at Hawaii and those to be sent to Hawaii, the present and prospective anti-aircraft guns, the fact that the aircraft warning service equipment would be delivered in June, advised that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department was being directed to give consideration to the question of employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Also, it stated with reference to the other proposals for joint defense that a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter and of the reply were being forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department with instructions that he cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective. It appears from the copies of the endorsements annexed to this letter that a copy of the letter was sent to CincPac and to ComFOURTEEN.

Admiral Kimmel's testimony showed some confusion as to his agreement with, and his evaluation of, this correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. He testified that he felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine and that a bombing attack was the second most probable form of attack, and that the danger of an air torpedo attack was nil because the water was too shallow (page 286). He then corrected his testimony and stated that his previous testimony was erroneous and that he had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility (page 287).

Captain McCrea described his conferences which he had had with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, early in 1941. He recalled that Admiral Kimmel, who was shortly to relieve Admiral Richardson, specifically discussed the short-comings of the air defenses of Pearl Harbor. (p. 275)

Admiral Stark testified that the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War had been prepared by Admiral Stark and his assistants (page 24).

Admiral Ingersoll was familiar with the correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War concerning the inadequacy of defenses at Pearl Harbor. He recalled that there was some subsequent discussion of the question of balloon barrages and that the Fleet did not want

them at Pearl Harbor because of interference with aircraft operations. He recalled no further formal representations being made to the War Department on the subject of the deficiencies. (p. 418-9)

General Marshall was familiar with the Secretary of War's reply to the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, 1941 (page 853). In this connection he said that he personally took steps to meet the deficiencies discussed therein; that Hawaii for years held first priority on material and was by far the best equipped Army installation; that additional planes were sent to Hawaii, seriously handicapping the training program in the United States, and special efforts were made to expedite production. The problem of expansion was very serious in terms of limited equipment and personnel needed both for Hawaii and elsewhere, and also needed here for training essential to expansion (page 854).

Admiral Bloch said that after the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, 1941, a large number of fighters and some bombers were sent to Hawaii, but that so far as he knew, no additional anti-aircraft guns were sent. He said that they knew nothing about the defenses of the coast artillery and as to the adequacy of Army personnel, but that he was definitely of the opinion that the personnel of the Army was being increased all the time and was considered by the Army generally adequate for its task. Admiral Bloch knew that the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types of planes capable of performing inshore patrol. (p. 8)

General Short testified that he saw both the Secretary of the Navy's letter and the War Department's reply. He agreed with the Navy's recommendations except as to smoke and balloon barrages (page 237).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that the Secretary of the Navy's letter had not been shown to him, and that the State Department had not been apprised of it. He said, however, that the State Department was kept informed of the Navy's estimate of United States-Japanese relations (page 199).

Admiral Schuirmann said that he was sure that the State Department had not seen the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, and the Secretary of War's answer concerning the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He believed, however, that they were fairly well informed of the lack of certain equipment and of personnel shortages in the Army and Navy generally. (p. 408)

In his voluntary statement, Admiral Anderson said that the Robert's report indicated that nothing was done about the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 27, 1941 by the top commanders or any of the junior flag officers. He said that so far as he was concerned, he never knew about the Secretary of the Navy's letter. (p. 398)

B. CORRESPONDENCE ON ANTI-TORPEDO BAFFLES IN PEARL HARBOR

On February 15, 1941 (Exhibit 49), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated. The recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief were especially desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on February 17, 1941 (Exhibit 54).

The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on March 20, 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient net were developed (page 293).

In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Commandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent developments, and to experience at Taranto, which stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo, but that such attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely than in shallow water (Exhibit 55). The torpedoes at Taranto,

it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have been in eleven.

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor—and that even after the June letter, he did not think torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor (page 293). He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason (page 331).

Admiral Smith recalled the first letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning anti-torpedo nets, but not the June letter. He said they did not think the Japanese would attack with torpedo planes (page 536).

Admiral Smith said that he was familiar with the earlier correspondence on the subject of the need for anti-torpedo nets, and that they concluded that because of the shallow water at Pearl Harbor no such nets were necessary; he did not recall ever having seen the second letter. Exhibits 17, 18 and 19 are copies of the letters in question. (p. 60-1) Admiral Smith said that the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, as set forth in his letter of March 12, 1941, that anti-torpedo nets were not necessary, was never reconsidered. Admiral Smith complained that the Navy's torpedo information was kept too secret so far as the Fleet was concerned, other than the submarines. (p. 62)

Admiral Bloch testified that he believed that air torpedoes could not be launched profitably in Pearl Harbor (page 394).

Admiral Bloch said that he was familiar with the discussions concerning the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor; that he was familiar with the earlier correspondence but he never saw the later correspondence modifying the earlier views. (p. 26)

Admiral Halsey said that he had felt, prior to December 7, that the Fleet should have been protected at Pearl Harbor by anti-torpedo baffles and was strongly in favor of having them. (p. 306)

Admiral Bloch pointed out that such nets in Pearl Harbor might interfere with the take-off of seaplanes and with the sortie and entry of ships. Admiral Kimmel, he said, reached the conclusion and, insofar as Admiral Bloch was concerned, that settled the matter. Moreover, he said they had no nets available at the time except some makeshift nets used at harbor entrances which they had manufactured themselves. (p. 27)

It may be noted, incidentally, that on February 11, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance stating that experimental and development work should be undertaken on nets and booms; that there appeared to be an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which could be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use; and that efforts should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms (Exhibit 56).

VIII. THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE FREEZING OF JAPANESE ASSETS

During the five months of Admiral Kimmel's command which preceded the freezing of Japanese assets, Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark exchanged, in addition to official correspondence, "personal correspondence," which referred to official matters. This, Admiral Stark testified, was a "Navy custom," but these personal letters never changed official orders (pages 41-2).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel showed him every letter which he wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations; that these were personal letters, but had to be considered as official documents. (p. 33)

Admiral McMorris said that he thought he had read every one of the "personal" letters between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. (p. 242)

The highlights of this correspondence concerned

- (a) The inadequacy of the local defense forces at Hawaii and the necessity for reliance on the Fleet,
- (b) Admiral Kimmel's view concerning the possibility of a surprise attack,
- (c) Admiral Kimmel's desire for information as to developments,
- (d) the international situation.

A. THE INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES AND NECESSITY FOR RELIANCE ON THE FLEET

Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941 (Exhibit 29), and said, among other things, that he wished they could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces but they simply did not have them. He said: "If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving heaven and earth to speed a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the district, but like everything else, it takes time and 'dollars cannot buy yesterday.'"

In a letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941 (Exhibit 30), it was stated, among other things, that as many Army bombers and supplies as the Army could send to Oahu should be sent, together with Army aircraft guns; that active and immediate steps were being taken to coordinate Army and Navy effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor; that Admiral Kimmel had a couple of interviews with General Short and found him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative, and Admiral Kimmel recommended that Admiral Stark keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu; that the detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District would have to be made from the Fleet, which was a further strain on the Fleet's small craft. He adverted to the possibility of a surprise attack and then discussed a question of the "highest importance," the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet and the need for such planes.

Admiral Stark replied on March 22, 1941 (Exhibit 32) to Admiral Kimmel's letter of February 18, 1941, and, among other things, pointed out that the highest priority had been given to Naval planes including patrol planes.

On May 7, 1941 (Exhibit 41) and on May 20, 1941 (Exhibit 42), there were letters from Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel concerning the vessels and planes needed for defense, particularly against submarine attacks. Admiral Bloch's letter stated that he had no aircraft and complete reliance had to be placed ("exclusive of the Fleet") on Army planes. The letter of Admiral Kimmel referred to previous correspondence on the subject and discussed in some detail the additional vessels needed. A memorandum was sent by Admiral Kimmel discussing various matters of interest and various inadequacies of Pacific Fleet. In connection with aviation it was stated, among other things: "Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early possibility for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area."

The memorandum also stated that the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor was a matter of considerable concern and that "we" should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes, and radar equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this continental and expanding Army needs. The Naval forces available to the Commandant, it was said, were meager to the point of non-existence.

Admiral Stark replied to Admiral Kimmel's letter dealing with the inadequacy of the local defense force of the Fourteenth Naval District on June 23, 1941 (Exhibit 43). He stated that he realized the necessity of increasing the strength of the Naval Local Defense Forces, but advised that "until the unsatisfactory situation pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief can be remedied, the light forces and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will have to be employed in the local defense of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier."

Admiral DeLany discussed in general the forces available to CincPac and the organization thereof; the general nature of the tasks assigned in the war plans to the Fleet; methods of training the Fleet prior to the attack, which also involved training with the Army in exercises. He said, among other things, "I think everybody realized that the defense of the island did depend on the Navy there because certainly the Army didn't have any ground forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or anything else that would make Pearl Harbor a well-defended operating base." (p. 75-6)

B. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VIEW CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE ATTACK

In his letter of February 18, 1941, to Admiral Stark, concerning inadequacy of the local defense, Admiral Kimmel stated: "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to insure that the attacking force will pay. We need antisubmarine forces—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive."

C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S DESIRE FOR INFORMATION AS TO DEVELOPMENTS

In a postscript to his letter of February 18th, Admiral Kimmel stated that he had been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considered it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature, and that he had also heard that Operations considered that the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information was that of ONI. Admiral Kimmel said he did not know that he had missed anything but if there were any doubt as to whose responsibility it was to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, would Admiral Kimmel kindly fix that responsibility so that there would be no misunderstanding.

In his reply Admiral Stark stated that ONI was fully aware of its responsibility to keep Admiral Kimmel adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States; and that information concerning the location of Japanese Merchant Vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could be issued more frequently.

In a memorandum dated May 26, 1941, surveying conditions in the Pacific Fleet as to personnel, aviation, material, communications, operations, national policy, and information, Admiral Kimmel stated that it should be a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, should be immediately informed of all important developments as they occurred and by the quickest secure means available.

D. INFORMATION SENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

On February 25, 1941 (Exhibit 31), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the Southern route. Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum for the President, of February 5, 1941, consisting of an analysis of the situation in Indo-China, which had been prepared by Admiral Stark. This stated Admiral Stark's views that Japan had some fear that the British and the United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indo-China and Thailand; that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines, and so far as Admiral Stark could tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major move; and, that as Admiral Stark saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time, and at present she desired not to go to war with the United States at all.

Admiral Newton discussed a trip which he had made around March, 1941, under secret orders, with a force consisting of cruisers and destroyers. He never learned the purpose of this trip." (p. 315)

Admiral Stark's observations on the international situation were also set forth in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Exhibit 73) to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, which incidentally also discussed the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. The basic idea of this plan, he said, was that the United States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet, that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier, and that the U. S. Asiatic Fleet would be supported by offensive operation of the United States Pacific Fleet.

He then discussed the British proposals and the dangers facing Britain. He stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic; that for some time past, Japan had shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in the Far East; and, he advised the addressees to watch this situation keenly. Unquestionably, he said, the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. The question, he said, was when and not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about two months, but that there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he advised that as much time as available be devoted to training.

IX. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VISIT IN JUNE AND ANNUAL REPORT

A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VISIT

Admiral Kimmel visited Washington in June, 1941 and, according to Admiral Stark, they reviewed matters of policy (page 113). According to Admiral Turner, in the fall of 1941, Admiral Kimmel came to Washington and they discussed the proper methods of conducting the initial phases of war (page 1019).

Admiral Kimmel said that in June, 1941, he told Admiral Stark and the President of the dangers to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, i. e. air attack, blocking of harbor, etc. He told the President that the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port when an attack came; that it took two to four hours to sortie and that once an attack was started it would be completed before they could change the disposition of the Fleet (page 367). In general, he said, he felt that the Fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor; but he made no protest and made no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers.

On June 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote a memorandum for Admiral Stark (Exhibit 10) with copies to General Marshall, Admiral King and Admiral Towers, in which he stated:

"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

"(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

"(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

"The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

"There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands."

B. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S ANNUAL REPORT—YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1941

This official report, dated August 15, 1941 (Exhibit 44), was in five parts (1) Organization, (2) Operations and Training, (3) Material, (4) Personnel, and (5) Inspections. The report stated, among other things, that the Fleet had been organized into three Task Forces; that the Fleet was adequate for only limited offensive operations; and, that there were many deficiencies of ships, planes, equipment and men. The deficiencies included "inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor . . ." and it was said, there were insufficient patrol craft, and district patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, were not yet available.

X. RECONNAISSANCE TOWARD JALUIT

Captain Layton testified that in the latter part of November, 1941, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. The reconnaissance never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived, and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance

be made at the earliest possible date and Admiral Kimmel, upon receipt of Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton advised the Admiral to the effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of installation of cameras and that the time was still not definitely fixed. There is in evidence a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance (Exhibit 28). Captain Layton stated that the question of using Navy planes for this reconnaissance was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalinas" could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air strength, and carriers, submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk (p. 265-267).

Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands (p. 499).

Admiral Bloch stated that long range reconnaissance was instituted in the summer of 1941 when he received some Intelligence information, and thought that it would be advisable to make long distance reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit (page 1139). Admiral Bloch went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended that he put in this service. He thought it was to 500 miles out (page 1140).

Admiral Bloch said: "In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situation arose and I cannot recall how we received information of it, whether it was by letter to the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 to 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued." (p. 14)

Admiral Bloch said that somewhere about the summer of 1941, after the President by Executive Order designated Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston as defensive sea areas, Admiral Bloch gave the commanding officers instructions that planes which came in and were not identified as friendly were to be fired on. (p. 14)

XI. THE FREEZING OF JAPANESE ASSETS—DETERIORATION OF SITUATION AND FLEET SECURITY ORDER

A. THE FREEZING ORDER

On July 24, 1941 (Exhibit 71), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart and sent a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel which, among other things, referred to a two-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that he thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid an open rupture; they had a very plain talk; that Admiral Stark liked him, and that he had many friends in the Navy; that he had dwelt at length on Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indo-China; that Admiral Stark's guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt the Japanese would use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road; of course, there was the possibility that they would strike at Borneo, but Admiral Stark doubted this in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he had talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but conditions were not getting better.

Admiral Schuirmann did not recall the extent to which the office of the Chief of Naval Operations participated in the decisions to establish "moral embargoes" to prevent the export to Japan of various strategic commodities. (p. 406) He did remember that there was a discussion of the question of Japanese reaction particularly to the oil embargo and that Admiral Stark expressed the view that a total embargo on oil would of necessity force the Japanese to move south or to collapse. (p. 407)

In connection with Admiral Stark's conversations with Nomura, it may be noted that on July 25, 1941, Nomura reported (Document 1, Exhibit 63) to Tokyo that:

"Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

"Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

"To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

"Please relay this information to the Navy."

Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on July 26th (Exhibit 34), requesting information as to steps to be taken in the event of Russian participation in the war, and making various requests for equipment.

According to Admiral Stark, the Navy Department knew of the proposal to freeze Japanese assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order.

Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any discussion prior to the freezing order, but was informed of it after the decision was made. (p. 258)

Admiral Schuirmann believed that the Executive Order freezing Japanese credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department. He did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of the freezing order. Admiral Schuirmann said that his own state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo-China and perhaps Malaya and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in hopes that the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective measures by the United States. (p. 408)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in July freezing Japanese credits. (p. 422)

He stated that he advised the State Department that if the United States embargoed oil shipments to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with the United States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless this country were prepared to accept the risk of war (pages 43-45).

Admiral Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular advance knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously. He thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States (page 989).

Admiral Turner said that the Navy and War Departments both felt that the freezing of Japanese credits would almost surely result in war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. (p. 254)

As a result of the freezing order the Japanese, according to Admiral Schuirmann, conducted a bitter press campaign against the United States (page 198). And, General Short testified, relations became strained and he noticed uneasiness in the local Japanese population (page 247). Admiral Kimmel stated that this worsened Japanese-United States relations (page 296).

B. FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION

The correspondence between Admirals Stark and Kimmel indicated that the situation in the Far East continued to deteriorate, and that the conversations with Nomura were not improving the situation. Thus, in a letter dated July 31, 1941 (Exhibit 72), he discussed the over-all situation, and stated that "after the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies; that he thought it fairly safe to say that opinion here in general held that Japan would not go into the N. E. A.; but that Turner thought Japan would go into the Maritime Provinces in August and that

Turner might be right and usually was; Admiral Stark's thought had been that while Japan could ultimately go into Siberia she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia and that he hoped that Russia and Germany would exhaust themselves; that a Europe dominated by Russia was no more, and in fact, less attractive picture than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. A postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that "obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual."

In a letter of August 28, 1941 (Exhibit 11), Admiral Stark, among other things, discussed the status of the Japanese situation and said that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do Admiral Stark did not know; that he had told one of their statesmen that another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long ways toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained; that Admiral Stark had had some extremely frank talks with them; that Admiral Stark had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he could wish the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter of September 12, 1941 (Exhibit 36), such as whether he should not change his orders and issue orders to shoot to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. He said, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941 (Exhibit 12, 37), and stated, among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in Article 723 of the Navy Regulations, which Article was quoted. The Article provides for the use of force in self-preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort.

The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i. e. not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."

Admiral Stark also stated that the British planned to send various battleships to the East Indian station by late December, and that these, with other British ships, should make the task of the Japanese in moving forward considerably more difficult. "It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time."

Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

In this letter, Admiral Stark asked ". . . would it not be possible for your force to 'carefully' get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

A postscript to this letter stated that Secretary Hull had informed Admiral Stark that the conversations with the Japanese had practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there was some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. Whether their inability to come to any sort of an understanding at the time was or was not a good thing, he hesitated to say.

A second postscript to the letter referred to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that Admiral Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark stated that conversations without results could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark had again talked to Hull and thought Hull would make one more try; Hull kept Admiral Stark

pretty fully informed, and if there was anything of moment, Stark would of course hasten to let Kimmel know.

This letter also enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines, which indicated, among other things, that on September 30th, twenty-six Flying Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

C. INADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND EFFORTS TO RECTIFY

There was during this period further correspondence on the inadequacy of equipment in the Hawaiian area. Thus on July 26, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark and stated that when the proposed visit of Mr. Forrestal had been announced, a list of topics for discussion had been prepared by Admiral Kimmel's staff. Admiral Kimmel said that not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit, or whether Mr. Forrestal was informed of the war plans and of Admiral Kimmel's problems, that he decided it was better to combine the notes into a letter for Admiral Stark. The principal items were then listed in the letter. These were the importance of keeping CincPac advised of the Department's policies and decisions, and changes to meet changes in the international situation; questions of priorities in connection with a Pacific war, such as the need for transports and for guns and ammunition for Marines, for new construction to complete ammunition facilities, for building up the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, for more personnel, for small craft for patrol in the Naval District, etc; the necessity of improvement as to communications, including identification, friend or foe, equipment for aircraft; and, various aviation requirements.

On August 22, 1941 (Exhibit 35), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (in answer to Exhibit 34) and discussed the efforts made in connection with the development of radar equipment, and the other requests made by Admiral Kimmel.

Again in August (Exhibit 45), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac stating that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth Naval District, and related his efforts to secure additional patrol vessels.

D. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER ON SECURITY OF THE FLEET

Admiral McMorris testified that no formal written estimate of the situation was maintained by him, but that a mental estimate was maintained (page 887).

His estimate of the situation on October 1st was that United States-Japanese relations were strained and that the Japanese might go to war with Britain and the United States, or possibly with Russia, in which case the United States might not be involved (page 887); also, that war between the Japanese and Dutch and British was possible without the United States being initially involved.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued on October 14, 1941 (Exhibit 8). This was Admiral Kimmel's security order for the Fleet and the only general order for this purpose (page 278). This order, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not primarily an estimate but was a basis for training in order to meet contingencies (page 283). The possibilities of attack set forth therein, he said, were not necessarily in order of importance as to probability of attack (page 287).

Admiral Bloch said that almost immediately after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, he issued a "Base Defense Order" known as "2CL." As Admiral Bloch understood it, the object of this was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Commander-in-Chief could augment the forces of the Army which really had the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor. This order was revised in October, 1941. (p. 3)

This order provided that the security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) that no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) that a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,* (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

Admiral Smith said that the October 14th directive on Fleet security contemplated air attack on Pearl Harbor, but that in the minds of the people out there such an attack was not expected. Unfortunately, he said, he believed that the attitude of most of the officers there was that they did not believe that the Japanese had the "guts" to try such an attack, and if they had they would not get away with it. He said that the estimate of the situation contained in the Pacific Fleet Contributory War Plan issued around July 1, 1941, had contemplated Japanese attack upon the outlying islands and against Malay and the Philippines, but did not consider an air attack against Pearl Harbor itself. (p. 57)

Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force; an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force; air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in the preceding. There was also to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

Security provisions were also prescribed for:

C. Sortie and entry.

Concerning Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 2CL-41 dealing with the security of the Fleet, Admiral Anderson said that prior to December 7 on more than one occasion he had proposed changes to the effect that whenever ships entered or sortied, depth charges should be dropped by the destroyers. This would be for the purpose of training and also for the purpose of having any Japanese submarines in the area assume defensive rather than offensive attitudes. (p. 395)

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G) referred to the anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist; that any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; that air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor were prescribed;

Admiral Pye said that in regard to the Commander-in-Chief's instructions for the security of ships at port, the only thing that was questionable in his mind was the part about the sector fire control; he never felt that ships could or should be confined to one sector; he had written a modification of the order which he said was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsibility which he did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander. (p. 167)

that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CinCPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; that ComFOURTEEN as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft and arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Present (exclusive of CinCPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain,

Admiral Smith interprets the directive in 2CL-41 concerning the condition of readiness as granting authority to ComFOURTEEN to order conditions of readiness. (p. 55)

and by holding drills, etc.

*This, Admiral Kimmel testified, contemplated a surprise air attack. However, it was merely an assumption on which to base training—there being sufficient probability of such an attack to justify training. He thought it more probable that the Japanese would attack while the Fleet was away from, rather than at, Pearl Harbor. But it was never considered more than a possibility which ordinary prudence would make him guard against (page 287).

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed in the event of an air attack was also set forth, under which the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie orders sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie, the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc., and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, should inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, should launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. This provided, among other things, that in such event the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details, various actions were to be taken by other ships, and the Patrol Wings to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. This also provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack." It also stated that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assembly his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

It may be noted that Admiral Kitts stated that he continued as Fleet Gunnery Officer until September, 1942, and that the plans made by Admiral Kimmel were not essentially changed after the attack. The plans were generally sound, he said, but after Pearl Harbor, the Fleet got guns and men to make the plans effective. Nets and balloons were subsequently installed, but the balloons were later removed, as they interfered with operations (page 527).

Admiral McMorris said that they were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore, and there were discussions and conferences to improve the same. On the whole, however, he felt that his view was that the security arrangements set forth in the Fleet Security letter was satisfactory or else he would have recommended a change. (p. 239)

Exhibit 58—Pacific Fleet Letter 23CL-42, prescribing battle organization and conditions of readiness watches at sea, as issued by Admiral Nimitz on May 6, 1942, it was said, amounts to a reissue of Admiral Kimmel's instructions (page 503). It may be noted that Condition III, as defined in this letter, provided that all anti-aircraft batteries were to be manned on BB's, CA's and CL's, and one-half on CV's. Also it may be noted that in this letter, Admiral Nimitz stated that he believed that with efficient radar and the security afforded by air and surface screening, Condition III would normally meet security requirements when not in contact with the enemy. These provisions differ somewhat from Admiral Kimmel's letter on the same subject, dated February 21, 1941, a copy of which is annexed to Exhibit 58.

XII. INTELLIGENCE IN WASHINGTON—THE INTERCEPTION AND DECODING OF SECRET JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS

A. ONI DISTRIBUTION AND ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE IN GENERAL

Captain McCollum, officer-in-charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., said that his duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence concerning the Far East, correlating it, and informing the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations. (p. 10) In case information of serious import

was received, it was his responsibility to immediately bring it to the attention of the Director of Naval Intelligence and recommend necessary action. Usually direct access was available to Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division, and to the Chief of Naval Operations himself. (p. 20)

Speaking of the dissemination of information to the fleet commanders, Captain McCollum said that the Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for preparing from the information available to it factual statements, which did not make an estimate of enemy intention. These statements were then submitted by the Intelligence Division to the Plans Division and to CNO, who made the decision as to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet. (p. 20) He said that prior to about February, 1941, the Division of Naval Intelligence had occasionally submitted estimates of probable enemy intentions, but that at about that date its authority to do so was removed. Thereafter, ONI was restricted to presenting the facts of the situation, and higher echelons made and disseminated the estimates as to enemy intentions. (p. 41-42)

Captain McCollum made the following general statement as to the organization of the office of Naval Intelligence. (p. 40-41)

"The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center for the fleet as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence center for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department; equipped to supply combat type of intelligence, which prior to outbreak of war is nearly always closely related with diplomatic negotiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was equipped with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which served him directly. With the exception of more static types of intelligence, such as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on, your combat intelligence was designed to function in the Navy Department to advise the Chief of Naval Operations, at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through his fleet intelligence officer, . . . and in the Asiatic Fleet, which in some respects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organization, to keep the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, advised.

"The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to make [available] certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which would produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic Theatre those intelligence agencies operating out there were made known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and their reports in every case funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Our naval attaches, for instance, were under orders to submit copies of every report that they made both to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well as to the Department. So, you had in effect a three point system in which combat intelligence common to any one of them was common to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief supreme in his own area. And that is essentially the way it has functioned throughout the war."

Captain McCollum said that there was close cooperation between the Far Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division (Army). He stated (p. 20-21):

"The Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division had full information of the situation. We were in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships, and they had full access to all of the radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department. That was given by me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to day with officers of the Far Eastern Section of MIS in the War Department, and that had been true for some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as withdrawing our naval language officers from Japan or sending a dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers . . . without notifying my opposite number in the War Department what we intended to do."

Captain McCollum said that so far as he knew all Army information was made available to his section in ONI. He said, however, that the Army radio intelligence organizations did not furnish information of value regarding the Jap Fleet, since "they didn't touch the Jap Navy systems." Any radio intelligence organizations were working on Jap diplomatic ciphers and on certain minor Japanese Army systems. (p. 22-23)

The cooperation between the Far Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence service was "unofficial," but had the sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. (p. 23)

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence on 7 December, 1941, and for about 2 months prior to that date, named the following as, in general, the sources of information available to the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of ONI: Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Section, collateral items of interest produced by the investigations of the domestic branch of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio intelligence, State Department reports from diplomatic agents and reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches and radio intelligence (p. 390).

Admiral Wilkinson stated that it was his understanding, confirmed by Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Operations, that final evaluation of information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence was the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations. Dissemination of information outside of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet was, likewise, understood to be the responsibility of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations following their evaluation and selection of those items which they believed should be forwarded. (p. 392)

Admiral Wilkinson said that such analyses as were made in the office of Naval Intelligence were submitted to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations to use as they saw fit. (p. 392)

Questioned regarding the exchange of intelligence in Washington between the Army and the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson replied that ONI and G-2 were in constant communication with each other and that in fact General Miles, Head of Military Intelligence was dining with him on the night of 6 December. (p. 408-409) Admiral Wilkinson stated that through this steady and effective liaison, all the information the Navy had regarding movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished the Army. (p. 409)

The organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence had been revised on August 11, 1941. It consisted of a Director, Assistant Director, Domestic Branch, Foreign Branch, Administrative Branch, and field offices (page 461). Captain Heard was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI from October 9, 1941 to June 30, 1942 (page 461).

He stated that Intelligence was distributed as follows: Urgent, by oral report; usually a daily Japanese summary to the Director of Naval Intelligence by the head of the Far East Section, which was relayed to CNO; a daily summary of State Department dispatches; weekly reports of dispositions of foreign fleets; a daily bulletin for the Naval Aide to the President; fortnightly summaries of current international situations and sometimes special summaries; and dispatches to foreign posts and naval attaches. Generally, the information was evaluated as to credibility and to a less degree as to the conclusions to be drawn. War Plans made the final evaluation of enemy intentions. Copies of all reports and oral reports were directed to the Chief of Naval Operations. A daily report of political information was made to CNO (page 462). Military information was promptly passed to CNO (page 463). (1)

Admiral Ingersoll recalled receiving frequent visits from a Naval Communications Officer who had Japanese messages, but whether he saw all of the messages or not he did not know. (p. 417-8)

In the exchange of information as to United States-Japanese relations, there was close cooperation between the State Department and the Navy, according to Maxwell M. Hamilton, who during the latter part of 1941 was Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs in State Department. He stated that he had frequent contact with Admiral Schuirmann (page 1070) which involved questions which came up for decision involving foreign policy and naval policy (page 1071). The methods of furnishing information to the Navy on matters of United States-Japanese relations were: (1) the liaison office forwarded copies of paraphrases of telegrams or mail reports of interest to the Navy; (2) the Division of Far Eastern Affairs transmitted paraphrases of telegrams and mail reports from the Far East of interest to the Navy Department; (3) Conferences between Navy and State Department officials and meetings of the war council and Cabinet (page 1071). In general, he said, diplomatic information was transmitted to the Navy (page 1073).

One of the sources of Japanese military and naval information was Captain Smith-Hutton, who in 1941 was naval attache in Tokyo and who, as part of his

duties, was part of ONI. Ambassador Grew, he said, expected him to keep advised as to the Japanese Navy and they exchanged information (page 1079).

He had great difficulty in obtaining Japanese military and naval information (page 1077). He had informed the Navy Department by implication in a report that they could not depend on him to keep them informed concerning the Japanese Navy. He had to report to the Japanese Navy whenever he left Tokyo and his movements were restricted (page 1080).

He transmitted information by Japanese cable to the 4th Marine Radio in Shanghai and thence to the United States; and also by reports to Ambassador Grew and to the Navy Department by diplomatic pouch (page 1078).

By far the most important source of information in Washington as to the Japanese, however, was communications intelligence, which is discussed in the following paragraph.

B. THE INTERCEPTION AND DECODING OF SECRET JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS

Captain Safford made the following statements regarding the methods of obtaining and decoding Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches during 1941. (p. 103-104):

"They were initially obtained from intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and foreign points; mostly radio intercepts and occasionally land wire or cable. Some were photographs of station copies as they passed through the various commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-five per cent were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed Japanese systems. The principal was the 'purple,' which is a complicated electrical machine solved by the Army and machines made both by the Army and the Navy and two machines, in fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig-19 at this period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep abreast of the Jig-19 than it did the 'purple' once we had the machine reconstructed. In all these systems, 'purple,' 'Jig-19,' and the minor systems, we had an exchange between Washington, Singapore, Corregidor, and London. We pooled our efforts on that.

Captain Safford said that after Japanese messages were decoded they were evaluated and distributed as follows (p. 104-106):

"They were translated in the translation sections of the Navy Department unit and the War Department unit and the senior translator decided which were of relative unimportance, not worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with financial matters and visas and things like that; and the others were all typed smooth and turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, respectively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared briefs or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the messages and they were distributed to the higher officials in the War and Navy Departments and to the Secretary of State and to the President.

"In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usually saw them; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the War Plans Division. The Secretary of the Navy also saw them and usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide to the President saw them and took them in to the President.

"In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief Signal Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of Staff, War Department, and also to the Secretary of War.

"Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request of the President and after conference agreement between Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs was dropped and the original messages were prepared in folders and each day the folder was taken through. By agreement, all dissemination to the White House was handled through the Navy Department, and in return all dissemination to the State Department was handled through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything the Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy; and they put on a serial number. Ours were JD-1 and the Army's were SI-X, with a serial; so they were substantially duplicates unless something went wrong.

"In addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to references, and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything that was referenced to anything bearing on this subject was put on the off side of the page, so that you had the message on one side and the references on the other side, the left hand side, of the folder. Then, anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And Kramer went with them and stood in the doorway or outside and if there was any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody who was interested in the subject. Kramer also went to the White House, I believe twice. Normally he would explain things to the Naval Aide to the President and the aide would depend on his memory to answer any questions the President might want to ask. The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning."

Admiral Wilkinson stated that with regard to the exchange of ratio intelligence with the Army, that complete liaison existed between the decrypting agencies and complete exchange of actual texts immediately after their translation (p. 408).

A vitally important Japanese code had been broken. This source of intelligence was handled jointly by Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, who was Director of Naval Communications, said that Communications handled the interception and crypto-analysis of Japanese code messages and the information derived was turned over to ONI. This was a special procedure followed because this information was most secret, and would be useless if any inkling reached the enemy that we could read his communications (page 1026).

According to Admirals Redman and Ingersoll, it was the function of the Office of Naval Intelligence to evaluate and to distribute this information (pages 1102, 818).

Admiral Ingersoll stated that there was no set routine for the distribution of this information. It was distributed by Commander Kramer when there was anything important involved. The Director of War Plans kept a current estimate of the military-political situation and conferred frequently with the Chief of Naval Operations (page 819). He said that Commander Kramer almost daily brought quite a number of intercepts to him (page 824). These were given to Admiral Stark's Aide and were also shown to the Secretary of the Navy and possibly to the Assistant SecNav, the President, the Secretary of State, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and to Captain Schuirmann.

Commander A. D. Kramer testified that between October 1 and December 7, 1941, he was attached to ONI and loaned to Op-20-G, Naval Communications. He was head of a translation section of communication security. This consisted of translating decrypted intercepts and delivering them to ONI or to any persons named by DONI or CNO. Fourteen copies were made and seven went to the Army. The other seven copies were for delivery to officers in the Navy Department and also to the White House or State Department. He had the responsibility for delivery to the White House and Army for delivery to the State Department. Addressees in the Navy Department who normally got copies were the Aide to SecNav, CNO, DONI, Head of Far East Section of ONI, Director Naval Communications, and Head of War Plans Division (page 950). The seventh copy was a file copy. A complete copy went to each addressee, delivery being made daily or oftener if urgent. Earlier in 1941 he had attached a summary with asterisks to indicate important documents as the daily volume was so heavy (sometimes 130 messages a day) that the addressees would not have time to read all the messages. He marked and delivered the messages and it was up to the addressees as to what they would read. All decrypted Japanese traffic was passed to his section. He knows the Japanese language (page 951).

The decision as to whether translated messages should be passed to higher authority was made by ONI and he acted for DONI. As a rule an attempt was made to show the messages to McCollum and DONI before distributing them. Nothing was eliminated from the books of messages, but occasionally DONI would indicate something as being of greater or lesser interest to CNO or SecNav (page 953-4). During the latter part of the year he discontinued making summaries (page 954). As Japanese-United States relations were then strained, he used clips to indicate the important matter so as to get the information to those con-

cerned as swiftly as possible. He left the folder of messages for CNO with CNO's aide customarily. On "hot" messages, he often gave it to CNO personally (page 955).

C. FAILURE TO SEND THIS SECRET INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL

The information obtained from the interception and decoding of secret Japanese communications was not sent, as such, to Admiral Kimmel. It will be recalled that he had earlier requested that he be kept promptly advised of developments and that the responsibility for furnishing secret information to him be fixed by Admiral Stark; and, that he had been advised that ONI was aware of its responsibility in this connection.

Information of the greatest importance, as will later appear, was obtained from secret Japanese communications, particularly after the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and the arrival of the special Japanese emissary, Kurusu.

In his testimony, Admiral Kimmel asserted that he had not been adequately informed of this information; Admiral Stark asserted that Admiral Kimmel had been kept adequately informed by the various dispatches sent to him.

Admiral Redman said that although none of the intercepted messages were sent to Admiral Kimmel, as intercepted and decoded, they were used as the basis of the dispatches sent to him. He said that it was beyond the capabilities of his organization to encode and transmit all this traffic to CincPac. This information could not be sent by air mail. Its security was important as the source of intelligence would be jeopardized if the enemy knew of our success in interpreting it. The secrecy of this material has been vital to war effort since December 7, 1941 (page 1102). His section could have handled sending briefs of these messages to CincPac (page 1105). Admiral Noyes said that it would have been a physical impossibility to keep CincPac informed of the contents of all "purple" messages (page 1045) and, according to Admiral Ingersoll, it would have been too much of a burden on naval communications to repeat all the intercepts to CincPac, although selections therefrom might have been sent (page 839).

Admiral Turner said that Admiral Kimmel was kept adequately informed and that the information not sent to him would have been of no help to him (page 1014). Moreover, he had thought that CincPac had the same intelligence that CNO did, including the "super-secret" class of information (page 1018).

It may be noted that General Marshall said that he did not see all of the intercepts, nor was the decision as what should be passed on to the field commanders always instituted by him (pages 874-7).

XIII. RESIGNATION OF JAPANESE CABINET—ARRIVAL OF KURUSU—THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

A. THE DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16, 1941

Following the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Turner drafted a dispatch to CincPac and others, which the Joint Board approved (page 989).

Admiral Turner said that he prepared the dispatch of October 16 which had been discussed with the Army and modified by the Joint Board. (p. 263)

Admiral Ingersoll said that the dispatch of October 16 concerning the change in the Japanese cabinet was based on an estimate by Admiral Stark and Captain Turner and he had no recollection of any correspondence from the State Department which would have formed the basis for that dispatch. (p. 423)

Admiral Turner said that at this time he was convinced that if the Japanese attacked England in the Far East, the United States would go to war to aid England, and that the Japanese had decided to drive Britain out of the Far East. Some Japanese, he said, wanted to keep the United States out of this war, but the United States during 1940 and 1941 had made movements contrary to Japan's interest, and the whole political situation and Japanese interest in the Philippines convinced him that war was not far off. He considered that Japan would take the initiative (page 990).

He estimated where such an attack might be made, and had issued Rainbow War Plan No. 3 in January, which envisaged an attack by Japan against the Philippines, Borneo, and Malaya, and called attention to the fact that the Secretary of the Navy had written to the Secretary of War in January, 1941, stating that such an attack would be accompanied by an attack on Hawaii and on the Fleet by air, submarine or surface vessels (page 990).

On October 16th, when the dispatch was sent, he still considered that the same considerations set forth in the Secretary of the Navy's January letter continued in effect. These matters, he said, were constantly discussed with Admirals Stark and Ingersoll (page 991).

The dispatch of October 16, 1941 (Exhibit 13), stated that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation; if a new cabinet were formed, it would probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American; if the Konoye Cabinet remained, it would operate under a new mandate which would not include rapprochement with the United States; in either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia were a strong possibility; since the United States and Britain were held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there was a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities, the addressees were directed to take due precautions, including such "preparatory deployments" as would not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. CincPac and CincAF were directed to inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities.

Exhibit 6 is the October 16, 1941 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30)

Admiral Leary said that he thought there was complete and free interchange of information among the higher naval command. He, however, did not recall having seen or having heard discussed the October 16 dispatch or the war warning. (p. 364-5)

Concerning the change in the Japanese Cabinet in October, 1941, Admiral Schuirmann said that the State Department had not taken as serious a view of this Cabinet shift as had the Navy Department. (p. 408)

General Short stated that he had been advised of this dispatch through Admiral Kimmel (page 247). Apparently the Navy Department did not advise the State Department of the dispatch (Schuirmann, page 200).

According to Admiral Turner, the "preparatory deployments" contemplated by the dispatch were the sending of submarines to the Marshalls and sending the Fleet to sea westward of Hawaii and in supporting and covering positions for Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands (page 991).

Admiral Smith said concerning the directive to take "preparatory deployment" that an alert was sent to the forces in the operating areas, the training exercises were halted, the ships assembled with their destroyer screens and placed until further orders as a fleet and kept at sea, and directed to advise of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area; the ships in port, however, were not moved out although conditions of readiness were prescribed; this was not done for the protection of the base. (p. 49-50)

Admiral Halsey said that the "preparatory deployments" effected after the October 16 dispatch included readiness of the ships to take action and the dispatch of submarines to Midway and Wake, and also sending additional guns and ammunition there. (p. 296)

Concerning "preparatory deployments" directed in the October 16 dispatch, Admiral Ingersoll said:

"I think the preparatory deployments that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intention against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the southern Philippines, rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here, in connection with this dispatch and others which followed, that they were released by me. In all cases, such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases, I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not bother him further, I released the dispatch in the form which he had approved." (p. 423)

Admiral Ingersoll said further he did not recall that they expected the Pacific Fleet, as distinguished from the Asiatic Fleet, to make any important new dispositions. (p. 423)

The direction not to take provocative action against Japan was inserted by him because the State and Navy Departments were agreed that the United States should get as much time as possible to prepare, and there were conversations with

the Japanese which appeared on the surface to be a possible solution so there would be no war, and this government did not desire war with the Japanese at that time. Therefore, they did not want the Fleet to assume a threatening position by cruising near the Marshalls or sending submarines near the Japanese islands. Nor did they want to arrest disloyal people in Hawaii. They wanted to retain peace as long as possible and to make sure that when war came, it would be Japan and not the United States which started it (page 992). The question of shifting the Fleet back to the West Coast had been continuously discussed, he said. This was put up to the President and each time it was decided to keep the Fleet out there, except that about one-third or one-quarter of the Fleet would come to the West Coast for repairs and recreation. But, by October 16th, every one believed that the Fleet should stay at Pearl Harbor (page 992).

It is of interest to note that at about this time Admiral Turner had a conference with Nomura, at which, according to Nomura, Admiral Turner said to him that what the United States wanted was not just a pretense, but a definite promise; that should a conference be held between the leaders of the two governments without a definite preliminary agreement, and should an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament; that Japan spoke of peace in the Pacific as if she could decide matters independently, and so it would seem to Admiral Turner that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance (Doc. 2—Exhibit 63).

B. ADMIRAL STARK'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 17, 1941

On October 17, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (exhibit 38). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been popping here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility'; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."

Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

Also annexed was a memorandum of October 17, 1941, by Rear Admiral Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make that decision on the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet in power.

C. JAPANESE MESSAGES CONCERNING GERMAN ATTITUDE: NOMURA'S DESIRE TO RESIGN

On October 18, 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated October 1, 1941, which stated that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's position, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United States, although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63).

A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated October 16, 1941, was intercepted and translated on October 17, 1941. In this Toyoda advised Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for revision

of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy and the United States, which, under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63).

On October 22, 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted and translated on October 23, 1941, in which he said that he was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet; that he knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in Japan; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same way, that they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse; that he did not want to continue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people"; that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63).

On October 23, 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations had a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government would proceed; that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter; that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post (Document 6, Exhibit 63).

D. ADMIRAL BLOCH'S LETTER ON INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE

On October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter dealing with the local defense forces and their inadequacy (Exhibit 46). In this letter, Admiral Bloch stated that he recently had tried to obtain, without much success, the assignment from the Commander-in-Chief of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol; the only planes available for the purpose were Army planes, the types and numbers of which were inadequate for the purpose. Admiral Kimmel's endorsement pointed out that any assumption that forces could be diverted from the Fleet for this purpose were false; that a Fleet tied to its base by diversion of light forces necessary for its security at sea is no Fleet at all, and that the Fleet was assigned, in the event of war, certain tasks which would require all of its units and men.

E. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S ESTIMATE AND ACTION

Admiral Kimmel stated that after receiving the October 16th dispatch, he did not consider war imminent. He tried to find out, he said, what the United States would do if Japan attacked the maritime provinces, but received no answer; he learned, after December 7th, that the United States had made a commitment to England to the effect that, even if not attacked, she would aid England in the Far East (page 297).

Admiral Turner said, "That detachment went to Australia for the purpose of indicating to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief informed, to the best of his ability, as to the international political situation and the probabilities of the future. While the Government could not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked Great Britain, they fully believed that we would do so. In our conversations with the British, we never could make a firm commitment that at any particular time the United States would enter the war, for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive Department did not have the power to put the Country into war. Conversations were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the British authorities, and joint plans, not too definite in nature, were drawn up but we never could be sure that if the Netherlands East Indies or the British were attacked the United States would surely come into the war. (p. 254)

He took the action described in his letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14), which was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (page 297). In his letter, Admiral Kimmel advised that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

It may be noted that in connection with his need for cruisers, Admiral Kimmel stated in this letter that, "I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks." The letter also stated, among other things, that Admiral Kimmel was forwarding an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra.

Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel's action, as set forth in his letter, was considered satisfactory.

Admiral Kimmel's War Plans Officer, Admiral McMorris, testified that the October 16th dispatch had indicated to him that there was a greater chance that the United States would be involved in war with Japan (page 887). Admiral Pye stated that he had not seen the October 16th dispatch, nor did he have any knowledge of it. He was on the Pacific Coast and about that time received a dispatch from CincPac to be prepared to return to Oahu, whereupon he recalled his officers and men and put his force on twelve hours sailing notice (page 423).

Admiral Bloch recalled that after the dispatch advising of the change in the Japanese Cabinet there was a conference with Admiral Kimmel, whom he saw practically every day. He does not recall who else was present. (p. 14)

Concerning the October 16, 1941 dispatch, Admiral Smith said that to the best of his recollection no specific change of plans was made because they had received warnings constantly for a period of more than a year; he did not recall that anything was done particularly about that dispatch; he believed that everyone of the dispatches of that nature were discussed by General Short, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and usually with members of the staff. (p. 48)

F. THE FIRST JAPANESE "DEADLINE" MESSAGE

It will be recalled that throughout this period the Navy Department was receiving information from intercepted Japanese communications. Some of these indicated that the Japanese Government had established "deadlines" for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. The first was a Navy translation on November 5, 1941 (Exhibit 63, Document 7), of an intercepted Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 5, 1941, the substance of which was: This message is of "utmost secrecy." It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of the month. . . . I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. . . .

G. ADMIRAL STARK'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 7, 1941

On November 7, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 74). He stated, among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question is—what next?!" Also, "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets 'worse and worse'! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good."

Admiral Kitts said that he was in Washington on temporary duty between October 6 and November 8, and that when he returned to Hawaii he carried a message from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel to be delivered orally, that Admiral Stark outlined the courses of action which the Japanese might follow, and that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no way indicated by the message which he carried. (p. 187)

H. JAPANESE INTEREST IN SHIPS AT THE PHILIPPINES AND SEATTLE

During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68). According to one of these messages, which was dated November 5, 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

I. ARRIVAL OF KURUSU; STARK AND MARSHALL RECOMMENDATION AS TO ULTIMATUM

The special Japanese emissary Kurusu arrived in Washington at this time.

Admiral Smith said that when Kurusu was en route to the United States, his plane broke down at Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBV, and Admiral Smith told him not to do this for it might be that the plane had been told by the administration to break down; that they knew more about what was going on than Admirals Bellinger and Smith knew and that Kurusu should be permitted to stay there.

Captain Wellborn discussed the general reaction to Kurusu's visit. (p. 386).

The situation then existing was summarized by Nomura, in a report to Tokyo, dated November 10, 1941, intercepted on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit 63) by reference to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation with "a certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretary of State believed "those reports." Nomura also said that his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan moved, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the United States.

Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated November 14, 1941 (Exhibit 39).

Concerning the withdrawal of Marines and gunboats from the Chinese territory and waters, Admiral Schuirmann said: "I remember this proposal but the United States and British armed forces from China were withdrawn principally because they were in jeopardy and not because of a desire to withdraw our forces as an example to the Japanese. Naturally, the suggestion to the Japanese that they undertake to withdraw all their military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China was probably based on desire to capitalize on this action in diplomatic course. The question of withdrawal of our gunboats and Marines from China had been under discussion for since sometime during 1940. Various recommendations were received from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the question was taken up with the State Department at various times during the year 1941. The difficulty in reaching a decision was because of a number of factors, such as the effect on the Chinese of our withdrawal, i. e., would it appear to them that we were abandoning China to its fate; the question of the effect on the Japanese, principally whether the Japanese would regard it as withdrawing from China in fear of the Japanese or whether they would regard it as a step preparatory to clearing the decks for action. As the situation became more tense and upon receipt of Admiral Hart's letter of August 28, 1941, which was transmitted to the State Department on October 3, 1941, the question was discussed many times with the State Department. Failing to reach an agreement with the State Department, I prepared a memoran-

dum, dated November 4, 1941, which Secretary Knox approved, suggesting a plan for withdrawing from Shanghai, and on 8 November, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a confidential message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, stating that the President had approved the withdrawal of Marines from China except those required for communication and custodial duties, and subject to State and Navy making a plan for orderly that civilians, nationals, and others might have prior notice. November 14, the President announced the decision to withdraw the Marines from Shanghai, and that withdrawal would begin shortly." (p. 409-410)

Admiral Schuirmann said that the delay in taking the foregoing action was due to a lack of agreement as to the effect on the Japanese and the Chinese and a certain lack of agreement as to the urgency of withdrawing the Marines. The State Department was of the view that sufficient time should be allowed to withdraw civilians in China before completely evacuating the Marines. The State Department generally was in opposition to the removal at least to the extent that the Navy was unable to get a definite answer as to whether or not prior to November 4 the State Department would agree. (p. 410)

With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated November 5, 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the middle of December 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that all aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.

According to General Marshall, during 1941 he felt that war with Japan was imminent and both he and Admiral Stark exerted their efforts to delay a break with Japan as long as possible in order to be better prepared (page 860).

J. FURTHER AND FINAL JAPANESE "DEADLINE MESSAGES"

At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows:

(a) A translation on November 17, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which were:

... The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

What you say is of course so . . . but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States) . . . try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient . . . the situation renders this out of the question. "I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to side-track us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."

(b) On November 22, 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63), a translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great

Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

General Marshall had no definite recollection but thought that he had been informed of the various intercepts concerning the course of diplomatic conversations prior to December 6, 1941, such as the preceding "deadline" message (page 871).

Admiral Turner was familiar with the second message establishing November 29th as the final "deadline" date. He interpreted this as meaning that Japan was going to attack England, the United States, or both, and that forces were already under way which could not be recalled. He knew such movements were under way from sightings and dispatches from China and he thought that troops were moving south and into Indo-China (page 904).

K. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

Mr. Grew said that on or about November 17, 1941, he telegraphed the State Department and emphasized the need to guard against sudden Japanese action, naval or military, in areas not involved in the Chinese theatre. He was taking into account the probability that the Japanese would exploit the advantage of surprise (page 1063). He had no idea of the definite date Japan would attack, though he knew they had been preparing for any eventuality (page 1065).

Admiral Stark testified that he had received intelligence early in November that the Japanese situation was so bad that the Japanese government had concluded that a war or a diplomatic victory was necessary to distract popular attention, and that a deadline had been fixed and then changed (page 159). He probably saw the "deadline message."

On November 24, 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept—page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility x Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam will be informed separately"

Exhibit 7 is the November 24 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30)

Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 24th did not indicate to him any new information. (p. 244)

Admiral Stark testified that he personally was responsible for the statement that "... surprise aggressive movement in any direction ..." was a possibility. He stated that he had thought at the time that it might be on Hawaii and had said so when he wrote these words in (page 49-50). The Philippines and Guam were mentioned specifically, he said, because Japanese movements indicated an attack to the south; this dispatch was intended to give a condensed picture of the situation and left up to Admiral Kimmel the question of any additional measures to be taken. No specific instructions were sent; they did not wish to go "all-out" at the time (pages 50-53). Admiral Stark said that he always considered Japanese hostile action without declaration of war possible, and that Hawaii was a possible place of attack, but that the information which he had did not indicate that it was a probable place of attack (page 792).

Admiral Turner said that the dispatch of November 24th was discussed in the Joint Board and that at this time Admiral Stark and General Marshall were conferring daily. Admiral Turner prepared this dispatch and it was referred to General Marshall. It was changed in order to keep it from being too specific. The Navy Department and War Department were not specific as they did not want Admiral Kimmel not to be on guard as to other matters under his cognizance. At this time, Admiral Turner was convinced that the Japanese were going into Siam, Malaya, and attack the Philippines (page 996). He pointed out that late in October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations was convinced that

war was coming and had diverted merchant shipping from the Central Pacific to the south so that the ships would not be captured (page 1013).

Admiral Kimmel testified (page 298) that he felt that the dispatch of November 24th required no action other than the action which he had already taken; that he considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility; that he expected a submarine attack at Pearl Harbor if the Philippines were attacked; that he considered the words "in any direction," as used in the November 24th dispatch, included Pearl Harbor only as regards submarine attack, and that any other attack, other than on the Philippines or Guam, would be on foreign territory (page 299).

Admiral Smith stated that the words of this dispatch "in any direction including Philippines or Guam" implied that the Japanese were not going any farther eastward (page 534).

On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 47), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of October 17, 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A Marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do."

On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 16), Admiral Stark also wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general policy; after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. . . . I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be anything."

XIV. DISPATCHES CONCERNING REINFORCEMENT OF WAKE AND MIDWAY

On November 26, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40) was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable; also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for advance bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take this into consideration and advise when practicable the number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Also on November 26, 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac, which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OPNAV had requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later

trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army understood that these forces must be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might fly to those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

XV. INTERCEPTED JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS OF NOVEMBER 26TH AND 27TH

On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows:

(1) A Navy translation on November 27, 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:

"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while."

(2) A Navy translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI",

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA",

"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI."

"The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."

(3) An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68) of a message to Manila, dated November 20, 1941, in the "Purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft—presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay. (Near Manila, P. I.)

"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo."

(4) An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63) of a message to Washington, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code, which stated:

"To be handled in Government Code.

"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will use the following code: (Codes were then set forth.)"

XVI. THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOTE OF NOVEMBER 26TH

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, of the State Department, testified that by the end of October it was evident that Japan and the United States could not agree. Early in November, the Secretary of State came to the conclusion that the question could not be solved by diplomacy (page 764). On November 20th, the Japanese submitted the things they wanted, which it was impossible to agree to. On November 26th, the Secretary of State gave Nomura and Kurusu a note setting forth the United States position. The following day the Secretary of State again said that he could not settle this by diplomacy, but that he still hoped that the Japanese might come forward with some reply. Between November 26th and December 7th, the President sent a note to the Emperor of Japan (page 764). While it was evident that no agreement could be reached, this did not necessarily mean that Japan and the United States could not get along without an agreement (page 765).

Dr. Hornbeck had no recollection of discussing the note of November 26th with Admiral Stark or the Secretary of the Navy (page 765). He did not consider this note as an ultimatum to Japan (page 766). The text of the note of November 26th was not released until after December 7th. The Secretary of State had a press conference at which he announced that a note had been sent and the press discussed a variety of possibilities (page 772).

Mr. Hamilton, also of the State Department, said that on November 21st, there was a conference which the Secretary of State, Admiral Stark, General Gerow, and Mr. Hornbeck, Ballantine and he were present, and at which the general military and diplomatic situation in the Pacific was discussed (page 1073). There were later meetings at which he was not present, including one of the War Council on November 25th and also on November 28th (page 1074). Mr. Hamilton could not be sure whether the note of November 26th or the substance thereof was given to the Navy Department (page 1073).

Admiral Turner remembered the Japanese dispatch concerning the note to Japan of November 26th and he saw it on November 28th. He believed that Admiral Schuirmann had brought it over from Secretary Hull to show it to Admiral Stark, and that Admiral Stark had stated that there was no possibility of Japan accepting this note (page 995).

Admiral Stark stated that he did not recall the November 26th note to the Japanese (page 108) but that on November 27th, Secretary of State Hull had advised him that negotiations were terminated (page 109). Admiral Stark later testified that when first asked about this note he had not remembered it, but after reading it his recollection was refreshed, and that Admiral Schuirmann may have discussed this note with him at the time (page 809).

Admiral Schuirmann stated that to the best of his recollection he did not deliver a copy of the November 26th note to the Navy Department, nor did he specifically inform Admiral Stark of this note (page 217). He characterized this note as an "ultimatum" in the sense that no one expected the Japanese to accept its terms (page 716).

Admiral Turner said that negotiations with Japan had been conducted so as to delay war as long as possible in order to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for war (page 1013). He knew that the Army and Navy had recommended that no ultimatum be given to Japan (Exhibit 39A). He did not consider that the note of November 26th was an ultimatum, although he did not expect Japan to accept its terms (page 1015). He did not know whether Admiral Stark saw a draft of the November 26th note before it was sent, but Admiral Turner did see it. He said that no note given by one government to another is ever entirely acceptable (page 1016). He did not regard the note as important (page 1023), nor think it hastened the time of war because Japan was then already on the move (page 1024).

General Short testified that prior to December 7th, he had no knowledge of the State Department note of November 26th (page 263).

The court took judicial notice of the note of November 26th (page 147). A Japanese summary of the diplomatic situation and of the American proposal, and the reaction of the Japanese to that proposal, were contained in communications intercepted, decoded and translated on November 28th. These were:

(1) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63) of a message from Washington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," Message #1180, reading:

"From NOMURA and KURUSU.

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.

Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back instantly."

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was familiar with this message, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark (page 696).

(2) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63) of a message from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent", which stated:

"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'

"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

"(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

"(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

"(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

"(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

"(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)"

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thia that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having seen this message, but that it may have been discussed (pages 776-777). Admiral Schuirman said he was familiar with it, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark, although he probably told Admiral Stark that such a note had been sent (page 697).

(3) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63) of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 28, 1941, in the "Purple" code, reading:

"Re your #1189.

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say

that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." (NOTE.—The man is the Navy Minister.)

Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen this message (pages 775-6). Admiral Schuirmann was familiar with this, but did not deliver it to Admiral Stark (page 698). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 826).

Captain Layton said that neither he nor Admiral Kimmel had been advised of the note of November 26th. He thought that Admiral Kimmel could have been better informed, and that if he had had a full picture he would have had a clearer conception of Japanese-United States affairs (page 914).

Admiral Kimmel stated that he was not advised of the contents of the United States' note of November 26th, which was given to the Japanese, until after his return to the United States (page 301). And, he and Admiral Smith stressed, the press and radio indicated that negotiations between the Japanese and the United States continued after November 27th. But, Admiral McMorris, his War Plans Officer, said that the press may have indicated that Japanese-United States negotiations were continuing after November 27th; he did not recall (page 893).

Admiral Stark testified that he had no recollection of press and radio statements between November 27th and December 7th which indicated that negotiations with the Japanese were resumed. He pointed out that, according to "War and Peace" on November 25th and November 28th, Secretary of State Hull had said that there was practically no possibility of an agreement, that the Japanese might break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force, that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy, and that the plans for military defense should include the assumption that the Japanese might use the element of surprise and attack at various points (page 149). There was, Admiral Stark said, a further conversation with the Japanese on December 1st (page 149).

Dr. Hornbeck stated that between November 26th and December 7th, there were some further conversations with the Japanese representatives (page 767).

Mr. Hamilton stated that there were some meetings with the Japanese Ambassadors between November 26th and December 7th. He, however, considered that negotiations with the Japanese ceased on November 26th. There was a bare possibility that diplomatic conversations might continue, but they had virtually reached a conclusion, and the matter, therefore, was one for the armed services. He considered that there was no chance of getting a favorable reply from the Japanese (page 1074).

Ambassador Grew, on the other hand, did not think that negotiations with Japan had definitely ceased until Tojo saw him on December 7, 1941, after the attack (page 1046).

XVII. THE WAR WARNING OF NOVEMBER 27TH

A. THE WARNING

Captain Layton testified that he learned of the receipt by CinCPac, of the war warning message of 27 November 1941, in the mid-afternoon of that day on being shown a tape copy in the communications office. He stated that subsequently, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a paraphrase copy of the dispatch which was shown to and approved by Admiral Kimmel, therefore, thereafter, he (Layton) gave to Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, for delivery to General Short; that subsequently he checked with Lieutenant Commander Burr and ascertained that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short. (Page 189-190).

Captain Layton also testified that at the time he showed Admiral Kimmel his paraphrase copy of the war warning message a large conference in the Admiral's office had just been terminated, and that, while Admiral Kimmel was examining the paraphrase, Captain Earle, Chief of Staff to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, entered Admiral Kimmel's office stating he had a very urgent message which General Short had delivered to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and which was further to be delivered to the Commander-in-Chief. Captain Layton stated that Captain Earle delivered the message to which he referred to Admiral Kimmel, and that both of them remarked to the effect that it was the same dispatch in substance that they had just received. (Page 189).

On November 27th, after delivery of the State Department note of the 26th, but before receipt of the intercepted communications showing the reaction of the Japanese Government, the "war warning" was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac and CincAF. It read:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform district and Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department x Spenavo inform British x Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"

Exhibit 8 is the November 27 dispatch by CNO to CincPac and CincAF. (p. 30)

B. PREPARATION OF THE WARNING

Admiral Turner said that he prepared the "war warning" after talking to Admiral Stark and that it meant just what it said. Admiral Ingersoll assisted in the drafting of this message (page 839). Admiral Stark testified that the working of the "war warning" dispatch had been carefully considered by him and by his advisers, and also by the Secretary of the Navy (page 54).

Concerning "M" Day, Captain Glover said, "M" Day is commonly understood as the day of execution of a war plan. In the case of WPL-46, "M" Day, unless otherwise designated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch worded as follows: "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon receipt of this Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the execution of WPL-46, including acts of war. WPL-46 stated that all parts of the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating the enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken. (p. 177) Captain Glover said that possibly declaring "M" Day west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier would have been more effective in alerting our forces than the method actually used by the Navy Department. He said, however, that the plan did not lend itself very easily to being put into effect as a means of warning only but was based on war activities. (p. 177)

Captain Glover said that Rainbow 5 contemplated the commencement of hostilities after a declaration of war. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, he said, might have become effective on "M" Day or certain features of it might have been placed in effect before "M" Day and that plan stated that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war. This plan, therefore, could have been made effective on about November 27 if desirable. (p. 178)

Admiral Turner thought that the war warning was the proper way to advise the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet of the situation and that the war plans could not be partially executed because it would have been an involved situation and not as clear as the warning given. Moreover, it would not have been practicable to have declared a mobilization, in certain areas prior to the existence of the state of war. (p. 270)

Admiral Turner said that the preparation of the dispatches of November 24 and of November 27 was similar to that of the October 16 dispatch. He discussed the situation at the time of the preparation of the November 27 dispatch as follows:

"As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State, at a small meeting at which I was present, that the State Department has no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from Intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South. It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the

dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic analyses were being made by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I brought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured, each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses. Japanese radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions." p. 265).

Admiral Turner said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that to all intents and purposes the negotiations were over on November 27th, though he (Hull) was not going to close them. Mr. Hull, he stated, kept Admiral Stark well informed (page 995). This was the basis of the statement in the "warning" that negotiations had ceased.

Admiral Ingersoll believed that the "warning" was sent because the Secretary of State had delivered the note of November 26th to the Japanese (page 851).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the reason for sending the war warning of November 27 was indicated in the dispatch, referring to the number and equipment and organization of Japanese naval forces. He said that the reason why the dispatch referred to an aggressive move in the Western Pacific was that the character of the landing craft referred to in the dispatch were such that they could not have been used in any area other than in the far eastern area. (p. 425)

Admiral Brainard did not recall having had any part in the drafting of the October 16 dispatch or the November 24 dispatch or the war warning. He did not know definitely that a set of war warning dispatches were prepared and held in readiness for dispatch to merchant shipping and that for a period of two or three weeks prior to December 7, they were restraining entry of merchant vessels and vessels of the NTS service into the Western Pacific so as to avoid their being trapped. (p. 402)

C. THE FAILURE TO MENTION HAWAII

Admiral Stark said that he did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning" because he indicated, from the best intelligence which he had, where the blow was most likely to fall (page 793). It was agreed in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, he testified, that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility but that the information available indicated that the Philippines, Guam and the Kra Peninsula would be attacked (page 797). Generally speaking, he and his advisers did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).

At the time of drafting the "war warning," Admiral Turner said, he expected that the Japanese would make some kind of an attack on Hawaii (page 995). He did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning," he said, because the places named were the strategic objectives and he did not believe that the Japanese would launch an amphibious attack on Hawaii (page 1020). He invited attention to the difference between the dispatch of November 24th, which had warned of the possibility of a "surprise aggressive movement," and this dispatch, which warned of "an amphibious expedition." The earlier dispatch, he said, was the result of deduction and covered any type of action by the Japanese. On November 27th, however, they knew that, as a fact, the Japanese were on the move (page 997).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he had made the insertion of "Thai" and "Continental districts" in the "war warning" (page 839). The breaking of diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean war, he said. But, the information as to Japanese movements indicated action at Siam or Kra Peninsula and it was quite evident that if the Japanese made war on the United States, the Philippines were a probable objective and Guam would fall like a ripe plum. In the dispatch they mentioned southeast Asia as a probable Japanese objective because they had no information of an aggressive movement in any other direction. The intention of the war message was to state that war was imminent—on the other hand, there was the wish not to take any step which could provoke war with Japan (page 842). And, Admiral Kimmel never asked for any clarification of the "war warning." (page 842).

D. THE DIRECTION TO "EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT"

Vice Admiral McMorris directed his attention to:

(a) the provisions of the Rainbow Five War Plan in respect of the initial task of the Pacific Fleet at times when Japanese were not in the war, including the maintaining of Fleet security and protecting the territory of the associated powers (which included Hawaii), and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with patrol planes and light forces and by the action of striking groups, and guarding "against a surprise attack by Japan."

and

(b) the direction in the war warning message of November 27, 1941, to CinCPac, to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46,"

and testified in the respect of what appropriate defensive deployment was executed, that, "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movements of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft." (Page 321-322).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the language in the war warning of 27 November 1941, with reference to the defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46, "was a direction." (Page 322).

He stated further that he considered that the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deployment, (page 322), that it was a major action in line with the measure to execute an appropriate defensive deployment, that the major portion of the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and that reinforcements were sent to Midway and Wake; that it was likewise in accordance with the directive that the ships were maintained with a full supply of ammunition and a minimum quantity of fuel. (Page 323-324).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an appropriate act, "but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements." (Page 324).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishment of long distance air patrol from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. (Page 324).

The "war warning" directed the addressees to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

Admiral Bloch recalled a discussion between Admiral Kimmel and someone else in his presence discussing the directive to carry out a "defensive deployment." So far as Admiral Bloch knew, he had never encountered that terminology before. He doesn't recall what it meant to him at the time nor does he know whether or not Admiral Kimmel regarded the submarines at Midway and Wake as a "defensive deployment." (p. 22)

Admiral Turner said that the things they expected CinCPac to do were not communicated to CinCPac in detail because the Navy Department's plan was to give broad discretion to commanders. They expected CinCPac to take appropriate action on the "War Warning" dispatch (page 998).

The expectation in the Navy Department as to the "Defensive Deployment" that would be taken was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows:

"It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic, the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to their deployment for defense of territory." (p. 265)

Admiral Stark said that he had anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness

measures, distant reconnaissance and A/S measures, and that the measures previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. He did not require a report of the actions taken pursuant to this message (pages 54-62, 84). He considered that after this message Admiral Kimmel had a "free hand" (page 801).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he considered that the "war warning" put additional tasks on the Pacific Fleet of security of itself and readiness for any eventuality, but that the message was not to completely interrupt training (page 849). Training, however, should have been secondary after this message (page 821). The October 16th dispatch had directed CincPac to make certain dispositions; he had informed the Chief of Naval Operations and those had been considered satisfactory (page 849). After November 27th, any measures that were necessary to guard the security of a fleet were necessary in all fleets.

Admiral Pye said that as to the directives in the November 27 dispatch concerning deployment, it would have been necessary to recall the Task Forces which were at that time absent, in order to prepare them from a logistic point of view and consequently, there was no deployment that could be made immediately which would have better prepared Task Force One; Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes and was not expected to return for over a week; there appeared to be no action to be taken by the Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress. Admiral Pye said that no change was made in the scheduled deployment of his task force after the November 27 dispatch. (p. 155)

Concerning the deployment referred to in the War Warning, Admiral Ingersoll said, "Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reinforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war." (p. 426)

The reason why Admiral Kimmel was not called upon to report what he was doing after the War Warning was Admiral Ingersoll said, because they knew that submarines were out on observation missions, that reinforcement of Wake and Midway was contemplated and they believed that the routine air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some time were being continued. They believed at that particular time that the air patrol was by no means as complete as it should have been. (p. 426 and p. 427).

XVIII. REPETITION OF ARMY DISPATCH ON NOVEMBER 28TH

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information (Exhibit 19) which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue x Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment x If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act x This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense x Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent x Report measures taken x a separate message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States x Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan x Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further: "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act x be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur"

Exhibit 9 is the November 28 dispatch from CNO to CincPac.**A. GENERAL MARSHALL**

General Marshall thought that he had seen the Army dispatch which was repeated in the Navy dispatch of November 28th (page 864). However, General Gerow did not think that Marshall had seen it. The language made Marshall believe that he had seen it particularly because the instruction that Japan must commit the first overt act came from the President. He had no recollection that the warning not to alarm the civilian population came from the same source (page 865).

XIX. REINFORCEMENT OF MIDWAY AND WAKE

It will be recalled that on November 26th dispatches had been sent to CincPac by the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the proposed reinforcement of Midway and Wake with Army planes and personnel, and requesting that Admiral Kimmel confer with General Short about this and advise the Chief of Naval Operations as soon as practicable (*supra*, page 56).

Captain Wellborn said that he thought that the background of the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense at Midway and Wake was that the Navy felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility and that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be reserved for amphibious work. One method of reducing overhead requirements of the Marines was to relieve the Marine Corps Units of their static defensive duties. (p. 386)

On November 28th, dispatch 280627 (Exhibit 76) was sent by CincPac to OPNAV. This advised that ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes were being discharged at Wake.

Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force Two on November 28. (p. 291-293)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled clearly one conference on November 27 when it was decided to send fighting planes to Wake. He said that he was with Admiral Kimmel that day until about six in the evening. The discussion of the defense of Wake and the dispatch of fighter planes was participated in by General Short, General Martin and some other Army officers and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey. He said Marine planes were selected because the Army could not fly their fighters more than 15 miles from the coast. (p. 297)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled that there was some prior discussion of sending Army units to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked upon those bases as part of the Fleet and for that reason he wished to confine the forces ashore to Marine and Naval personnel. It soon became evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases were picked, he said, to be garrisoned by Army forces.

Admiral Halsey said that when he left to go to Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far Admiral Kimmel wanted him to go and Admiral Kimmel said, "Use your common sense." (p. 298)

Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the ENTERPRISE to deliver Marine fighters to Wake, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces. Admiral Kimmel said that in that case he was to use his own discretion. And, Admiral Halsey replied, that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret and that if he found even a Japanese sampan he would sink it. (p. 43)

that similar items would be landed at Midway.

Admiral Newton said that he was at Pearl Harbor from November 27 until the morning of December 5 and was temporarily in command of a task force because Admiral Brown departed around December 4 for a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions. He received no particular information concerning the international situation. (p. 316)

Although Admiral Newton was commander of the most powerful unit under the Commander Scouting Force, he never saw the October 16 dispatch nor was he ever informed of the contents of it and recalled no warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments which were given to him thereafter. (p. 317) Admiral Newton said that he never saw or heard of

the November 24, November 27 and December 3 dispatches. Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton during the period November 26 to December 5 did not learn anything indicating the increased danger of the situation with Japan. (p. 317)

When Admiral Newton left on December 5, he was directed to proceed to Midway to fly off a squadron of planes. He had the LEXINGTON, CHICAGO, PORTLAND and five destroyers on that mission. He considered the mission solely one to reinforce Midway and attached no special significance to the mission. He considered that there might be more danger from submarines than in the past and zig-zagged his course and had scouring planes cover his advance. He gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparation for war other than ordinary routine. (p. 318)

About November 26 or 27, Admiral Brown and his Task Force Three had returned to Pearl Harbor. They left Pearl Harbor on December 5.

Admiral Brown was of the view that the movement of the two task forces to the outlying islands after November 27, may have been in pursuance of the instructions contained in the dispatch regarding defensive deployment. (p. 141)

and that about December 1st ground material for temporary operation of twelve Army bombers would be sent, but that only six of such planes on Oahu were in operating condition. The dispatch also discussed the use of Army pursuit planes for insular defense and the need for additional, anti-aircraft guns; the fact that Army troop reinforcements were being made on outlying bases but that such use was considered not advisable as Marines were available; that twelve Marine fighters would leave November 28th in a carrier for Wake; that other Marine planes would be sent to Midway later; and that on December 1st, twelve patrol planes would be sent from Midway to Wake, and those at Midway would be replaced by planes from Pearl Harbor.

The Chief of Naval Operations replied on November 28th (Exhibit 75) in a dispatch stating that the steps described in CincPac's 280627 appeared to be the best that could be done under the circumstances. This also stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General to cooperate with the Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and troops in support of Marines, and would endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses, but that it was doubtful if much improvement was possible soon. An immediate report on the effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in the immediate future was requested.

Admiral Brainard said that a dispatch recently examined by him showed that it was contemplated that a group of vessels under Admiral Halsey's command would leave around December 1, 1941, to land reinforcements on Wake but he found no indication of his having seen the dispatch at the time. The daily movement sheets, he said, from 21 November to 10 December showed movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier movements between Pearl Harbor, Wake and Midway. (p. 401)

Admiral Ingersoll said that they received reports of ship movements which were plotted and that he thought that the movements to Wake and Midway in early December were known at the time in Washington but he is not certain. He said that in keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kimmel's ships they relied on the ship movements reports and in the quarterly schedules of employment. (p. 424)

In letters of December 2nd to Admiral Stark (post, pages 113-114), Admiral Kimmel further stated his views as to the desirability of using Army planes and personnel at Midway and Wake and his concern that the replacement of Marines would weaken the defense, would raise the question of unity of command, and that the increase in Army and Navy stations requiring Fleet support would interfere with offensive operations. (5)

Admiral Bloch discussed the various construction projects at Pearl Harbor and at the outlying islands. (p. 91-92)

Admiral Bloch said that the security of the outlying islands, such as Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, was a matter of some concern in November 1941; that the water capacity of the islands was small and that as a result of having civilian construction workers present there, the garrisons were small; he was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway than on Oahu. (p. 94)

According to Admiral Delany, during the tense period preceding December 7, the outlying islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake were a matter of

great concern to the Commander in Chief's staff. (p. 81) The proposal to change from Marine to Army garrisons caused additional worry and concern and was a subject of many conferences out there. (p. 81)

Admiral Smith stated that he did not believe that the dispatch concerning the reinforcement of outlying islands by the Army was considered related to the war warning of November 27. He said that the discussions concerning the outlying islands lasted several days and, as a result, there was a decided mental preoccupation with this on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii. (p. 63)

Captain Glover said that the decision to reinforce Wake had been made by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and that Captain Glover and Captain Moore did not share the view that it should be done. They did believe that Midway should be fortified. (p. 176)

XX. PEARL HARBOR—ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION

A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL

Admiral Kimmel testified that after receiving the "war warning" dispatch of November 27th, his estimate was that the Japanese would move within the next few days by amphibious expedition against the Philippines or Kra, or possibly Borneo, and that there was a good chance of a mass submarine attack at Oahu. He did not expect an air attack at Pearl Harbor, although an air attack was still a "remote possibility" because, he said, of the tenor of the dispatches sent to him, the other information which he had, the difficulties of making such an attack, and information received from the Navy Department and from other sources indicating that the greater portion of the Japanese carrier forces was in home waters. He thought that a primary cause for the "war warning" dispatch was the fact that diplomatic negotiations had ceased, and when the newspapers indicated that the negotiations were resumed, the warning lost much of its force. He further assumed that no ultimatum had been given to the Japanese because the Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the President that no ultimatum be given to them (page 301). He testified that the phrasing of the "war warning" dispatch and the phrasing of the dispatch of November 28th led him to believe that anything other than a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor was most improbable (page 302). In his testimony concerning the November 28th message, Admiral Kimmel stated that it furnished no new information and that it stressed that Japan should be permitted to commit the first overt act (page 325).

The "war warning," was discussed with ComFOURTEEN. A dawn fighter flight patrol was considered, but was not regarded as practical because of the limitations of the Army planes (page 303).

He considered that the action of the Navy Department in failing to make any change in his plans to send carriers to Midway and Wake indicated that the Navy Department expected no immediate activity in either the outlying areas (page 307) or in the Hawaiian area (page 309).

He further testified that the day after receipt of the "war warning" of November 27th, he had a conference with General Short, attended by members of their staffs.

Admiral Smith said that there was no set hour for a Staff conference, that Admiral Kimmel had a conference practically every day and would send for the people that he wanted; he would usually have over officers from the Fleet and very frequently would have Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye, at such conferences (p. 34).

He said that while he presently did not recall the incident that General Short testified to a statement made by McMorris at that conference, in response to a question by General Short, to the effect that there was no chance of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, he testified that the message of November 27th followed a pattern that he had been continuing for some time, and that he felt that before hostilities commenced he would receive additional information which would be more definite. When the attack came without this information, he was inclined to blame himself for not having been smarter, but when he found some time later that the information was in fact available in the Navy Department which would have changed the action taken by him had he known it, he felt differently about the matter. If he had had that information, he said, he would have thoroughly alerted all shore going activities, including the Army, and in all probability would have had the Fleet put to sea in an intercepting position, and would have instituted reconnaissance to the best of their ability.

Admiral Kimmel admitted, however, that during the entire period when he was CincPac, he maintained the same estimate as was set forth in his letter of February 18th (Exhibit 30), which stated that "a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility . . ."

B. ADMIRAL BLOCH

Admiral Bloch testified that he had estimated that if the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, it would be by (1) submarine attack, (2) blocking the channel, (3) laying mines, (4) sabotage. He believed that an aerial torpedo attack could not be successful and if there were an air attack it would be by bombs (page 409). He considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility (page 394). He saw the "war warning" dispatch, conferred with Admiral Kimmel and did not disagree with his conclusions.

On November 27, after the receipt of the "War Warning", the Chief of Staff brought over a paraphrase of the dispatch. Admiral Bloch saw Admiral Kimmel the next morning. There were others present but he does not recall who they were. There was a term in the dispatch concerning defense deployment. Just what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was Admiral Bloch did not know, but they had at that time two submarines at Midway and two at Wake. (p. 14)

The dispatch concerning the sending of planes to Midway and Wake (Exhibit 18) did not change his estimate (page 394). The part of the November 28th dispatch which impressed him was the desire that Japan should be allowed to commit the first overt act and that the public should not be alarmed (page 395).

Admiral Bloch said that after the War Warning of November 27, negotiations between Japan and the United States were resumed and that this had a very definite effect on his mind. Also, he said he had no feeling of impending hostilities in the Hawaiian area around the 7th of December. (pp. 15 and 16)

Admiral Bloch volunteered at the end of his testimony a statement that the Navy Department had more information than they had in Hawaii; that a number of warnings were sent to them; that the Navy Department had in the War Plans a means of putting into effect all of the plans prior to "M" day; that such action would have been more effective than the warnings sent out; and in this connection he referred to the State Department note of November 26 concerning which he had no knowledge until after December 7.

Admiral Bloch said that he had not seriously considered nor had he heard anybody else talk about the influence on public opinion in the United States which an attack on Pearl Harbor would produce. (p. 88)

Prior to December 7, Admiral Bloch was of the opinion that a carrier attack against Hawaii prior to a declaration of war was remote; one important consideration was his belief that a large body of surface vessels could not cross such a large expanse of water without the Navy having some knowledge. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that although he could not recall that any officer had ever expressed the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was improbable, yet he was definitely of the opinion that such an attack was remote although he is unable to analyze that opinion and to determine the various factors which had caused him to reach that opinion. (pp. 89 and 90)

Captain Earle said that they had considered the estimate indicating that the most likely form of attack would be by air, but somehow or other they always felt that it couldn't happen here and that the Japanese would not take that chance. (p. 377)

C. ADMIRAL PYE

Admiral Pye testified that he saw the November 24th dispatch (warning of an aggressive move in any direction) on November 29th. He recalled no decisions made as a result of it (page 424)

Admiral Pye said that on November 29, he had a conference with Admiral Kimmel during which Admiral Kimmel showed him the November 24 message and called in his Intelligence Officer who explained the locations of the enemy forces, indicating no unusual activity in the Naval forces of the Japanese navy. They discussed possible action to be taken by Task Force 1 which was the only Task Force in port aside from the battleships of Task Force 3

and decided that there was no action that could be taken by that Task Force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. (p. 153)

Admiral Pye said that he was not present at any conferences between Admiral Kimmel and his staff or other senior officers. In his own discussions with Admiral Kimmel, there was no mention of the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. For some months there had been a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. His feeling in this connection was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action but an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers it was felt that the Fleet in port with the presumed effectiveness of the Army air forces would be in a better position for defense than they would be at sea. Admiral Pye also saw the war warning message on the same day, i. e., on November 29. (p. 154)

Admiral Anderson said that the war warning was shown to a group of Flag officers including Admiral Anderson in the office of the Commander in Chief. Under the war plans in force, Admiral Anderson had no specific duties to perform. He said that he knew that there were two task forces at sea and knew that there was an excellent plan in existence for long distance daily air reconnaissance. He assumed that whatever was considered necessary to be done was being taken care of. (p. 393)

Admiral Anderson said that his ideas during early December were that he expected the Japanese would not attack farther east than the Philippines. He was influenced in all his thoughts as to security by the knowledge or what he thought was the knowledge that a long distance daily reconnaissance by air was being maintained. He assumed that such distant air reconnaissance was being maintained and said that he had read a very complete plan for such daily reconnaissance and knew that it had been placed into effect but did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7. (p. 394)

He felt that this dispatch indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam. He saw the "War Warning" at the same time and discussed it with CincPac. It was sent to several addressees. The "War Warning" to him was nothing more than they had been receiving for some time (page 425). He did not see the November 28th message until after December 7th (page 427).

Admiral Pye testified first that he had not made any estimate of the situation during the period November 27th to December 7th (page 429). In response to the Court's questions he then stated that the maneuvers which he was on had not prevented him from making an estimate, but that he had made no written estimate (page 434). He kept a running mental estimate. He considered a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility but not a probability (page 435). He thought it a bad move because it was the one thing to unite the United States people in an all-out effort, and therefore that it was unlikely to be undertaken (page 435). He considered a submarine attack the most likely act in advance of war (page 436). Before the attack he felt the defense measures taken were consistent with the situation; they thought torpedoes could not be launched from the air in waters less than 75 feet deep (page 436); and a bombing attack alone would not have been profitable (page 437).

He thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor was remotely possible and did not consider that such an attack would be made before diplomatic relations were broken off (page 438).

Admiral Pye stated that WPL-46 required the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, but there were no carriers in port and the Fleet at sea without carriers would be more vulnerable than in port; moreover, Intelligence had indicated that all major units of the Japanese fleet were in home ports. No additional security measures were taken in his command. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the phrase "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL-46" was meaningless, according to Admiral Pye (page 426).

He did not know if CincPac had made a direct estimate as to air attack (page 426).

Concerning his estimate of the probability of a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that a primary feature was that he felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry into the war than they could possibly gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. He said further that the Secretary of the Navy when he came to Pearl Harbor after the 7th of December said that no one in Washington had stated to him that there was any possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner who

was the most aggressive minded of all. Admiral Pye thought that the feeling in Honolulu was influenced by the attitude of the Department in the preceding months in taking forces from the Pacific and indicating that they considered the German situation more serious than the Japanese situation. He also said that they had not been adequately advised of the development of conditions as known in Washington.

Admiral Pye said that although an attack against the United States was not expected, they did expect the Japanese to proceed against the Dutch and British. Admiral Pye said that he thought that the general impression then had been that the Japanese naval air pilots were fairly good but that they did not think that these pilots were as good as they appeared to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. (p. 158) Admiral Pye said that they had had no information as to the torpedoes which had actually been developed by other nations. (p. 158)

Admiral Pye said that he did not think that any of them had felt that an attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. (p. 151)

Admiral Brown was not familiar with the security measures such as air search and other matters relating to the internal defense of Oahu except in a most general way. (p. 137)

Admiral Brown's Task Force had assigned to it the task of developing the technique and examining the materials for amphibious warfare and during the six months preceding the attack, his energies and the energies of his staff were devoted to that subject. The primary task was training. During the year preceding Pearl Harbor, it was his impression that there must have been at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break out with the Japanese and each time the question was discussed whether or not defensive measures should be taken or training continued. His feeling was that training should be continued until the moment that war developed. This is what happened to the Fleet. (p. 137)

During the last days of November, Admiral Brown participated in conferences with the Commander in Chief. His recollection was that the greatest concern had been as to the security of the outlying islands. They had all believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when war came and had discussed the possibility of an air raid. His belief was that an air raid was possible but highly improbable; that dispositions should be made for the defense of the outlying islands and he believed that the greatest threat to Pearl Harbor was local sabotage. (p. 137) Admiral Brown believes that during the week preceding December 7, he was in almost daily conference with the Commander in Chief. Admiral Brown said he did not remember whether or not he saw the November 27 dispatch. It was his recollection that there was a prolonged discussion of that dispatch. (p. 139)

Admiral Brown said that during the last few days prior to December 7, he felt that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of his misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. He did not consider the air a menace and was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor. His own estimate in December was that the Japanese would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the Dutch or the British. He probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation. (p. 145)

Admiral Brown's recollection of the conferences which were attended by Army representatives was vague. He believed that the conferences primarily were in connection with internal security on the island and with shortages in defense weapons and various forms of air craft. He recalled that in about November, somebody suggested that there might be a surprise air attack at Hawaii, that at the time Admiral Halsey was present that Admiral Brown expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a mission successfully and that if they did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment. (p. 142)

Admiral Brown said that his erroneous belief at that time was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. (p. 142)

Admiral Halsey said that the war warning dispatch affected him very seriously. He thought that there was going to be a fight before he got back to Pearl Harbor. He said that when he left Pearl Harbor, he diverted the battleships, cruisers and destroyers and told them to carry out exercises in a certain area and then headed West with the remainder of his task force. He then issued orders to put in war heads in all torpedoes, to regard any submarine as hostile and to sink it, to arm the planes with bombs and to

shoot down any plane that was not identified. When they neared Wake, they went from Condition 3 to Condition 2. He tried to make full preparation for combat and he carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles. Admiral Halsey said that he felt he might be attacked before he returned to Pearl Harbor and thought it might precipitate war. (p. 299)

Admiral Halsey said that he did not feel that they were informed on what the Japs were doing and felt that they were operating in the dark. He thought that a good deal more was known in Washington than was known in Pearl Harbor. (p. 300)

Admiral Halsey said that they thought the Japanese attack would take place in the Far East except by submarine and that they underestimated the Japanese ability to operate carriers or did not give it enough consideration. (p. 301)

Admiral Halsey said that the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor had been on everyone's mind but that he personally did not expect an air attack. He pointed out that anti-aircraft drills had been had on many occasions. (p. 302)

Admiral Halsey said his personal and official relations with Admiral Kimmel were very close and that they conferred every time he returned to port. He said that Admiral Kimmel was principally worried about materiel conditions, the very heavy turnover in personnel and the question of balancing training against security. (p. 294)

Admiral Halsey said that there was a continuous flow of messages crying "wolf" and consequently the senses tended to be dull but the possibility of the international situation was constantly before their minds. (p. 296)

Admiral Newton said that for several months preceding December 7, all hands had felt a tautening up of the situation and he believed that the majority were of the view that submarines were their greatest menace. (p. 332)

Admiral Leary said that after their return to port on November 28, 1941, the security conditions existing on the ship were the same as on the previous stay in port which had ended about November 21. Admiral Leary said that the question of training is always a paramount one and that it was not possible to carry out the required training and maintain entirely satisfactory security measures. (p. 365) Admiral Leary said that in the few weeks prior to December 7, he had thought in a general way of the possibility of a surprise attack, and that they all felt that the contingency was remote and that the Intelligence Services would give adequate warning. (p. 365) He said that his estimate was that a surprise attack would be an air attack. (p. 366) He recalls no specific discussion along that line.

Admiral Bunkley said that on October 15, the CALIFORNIA was at Long Beach and received orders to be ready to sail at 24 hours' notice. He received the drastic change of orders without being taken into the confidence of Admiral Pye as to any messages received which caused such a change in plans. (p. 415)

Admiral Bunkley had no idea of any warnings having been sent in November and December indicating that the situation was dangerous. His opinion at the time was that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. He did think that an attack would come in the Philippines. (p. 415)

D. ADMIRAL SMITH

Admiral Smith testified that Admiral Kimmel kept him informed of everything (page 530). He saw the "War Warning," but though the press or radio learned that negotiations were resumed (page 531). Each day the War Plans Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave CincPac an estimate of what was happening. He remembered the November 28th message mainly because of the emphasis therein not to alarm the civilian population (page 531); but this did not affect his estimate.

It seemed odd to him to take Navy and Marine planes off Midway and Wake in accordance with the November 26th dispatch and to put Army planes there. The Army planes had to be transported by carrier (page 532). It would take two weeks to deliver these planes, and this meant the absence of carriers in the direction of Japan, and while not fully prepared for war (page 533). Admiral Smith testified that he considered this dispatch a directive, despite its language (page 543).

He said that the inference from Exhibits 15 and 17 was plain that the warning was directed against an attack on the Philippines or Guam (page 545). The

"in any direction" dispatch of November 24th may have intensified the action they were taking, but did not at all change their general estimate (page 546).

The "war warning" message, he said, would have been more effective if it had stopped with the word "warning" (page 534).

Admiral Smith stated that in the Pacific Fleet they were not thinking of the defense of Pearl Harbor, but about the Fleet and readiness of the Fleet. The ships were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out into battle, not the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 548).

He stated that the Roberts' Report was correct in stating they were aware of the possibility of hostile action without declaration of war (page 556), but they expected that the Japanese might hit the Philippines, Midway, or Guam, but not Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Smith said that the basis for his estimate that a surprise air attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable was as follows (p. 374-375):

"There was a great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the Navy Department, and our intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and, I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even by a neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was for this reason that we did not fear an air attack."

They did regard a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as a sure thing (page 557).

Admiral Smith said that they were very submarine conscious, and one reason for that was that they had had several sound contacts; perhaps all of them were false. On one occasion, in the month of February 1941, they had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head which occurred again a month later. They never found out exactly what it was, but after investigation came to the conclusion that the contact was due to two different levels of water temperature although the destroyers had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about six o'clock in the morning, told him to issue orders to bomb this contact. Before the order went out, however, he canceled it and reported the fact to CNO saying that he had no authority to do this except within the three-mile limit around Pearl Harbor; a reply of the CNO was to the effect that it was a good thing that such orders had not been issued. So, Admiral Smith said, probably all of the contacts were false, but they were submarine conscious more than air conscious and everyone in the Fleet believed that if an attack came it would be by submarine rather than by aircraft. Admiral Smith believed that the officers of the Fleet felt that there was little danger of an air attack. (p. 42)

Admiral Smith said that the warnings sent to them mentioned attacks in the Far East, and this probably resulted in a state of mind where they did not believe that they would be subjected to an air attack on Pearl Harbor, although they did expect submarine attack. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that he thought there had been too much "crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that his thought was at the time, and still was, that they spent too much time in worrying about the outlying islands. They had large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway, and the Commander-in-Chief spent a great deal of time, more than he should have spent, in efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to the extent of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pacific War Plan would indicate. Looking back on it, Admiral Smith thinks that they probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to the larger things. (p. 64)

E. ADMIRAL M'MORRIS

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November 1941 occasioned no surprise and did not convey any considerable amount of additional or startling information, because the situation with reference to Japan had been tense throughout the year of 1941 (p. 325).

Admiral McMorris said that he had thought that sabotage or a submarine attack was a distinct possibility (page 887). Up to the time of the attack he considered the possibility of an air torpedo attack very remote (page 888) and gave as reasons therefor: (a) increasing evidence of Japanese movements toward Kra Peninsula; (b) concentration of troops in South China Area; (c) movement of combatant ships from the Empire to the South; (d) Navy warnings indicated the possibility of hostilities in that area, attack on Philippines, or movement of Japanese forces in Halmahera; (e) distance involved and logistic problem; (f) despite British attack on Italian Fleet in southern Italy—here the depth of water and short distance for run of torpedo was important; (g) confidence in anti-aircraft defenses against torpedo planes.

*Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he considered sound the views expressed by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of 24 January 1941 (Naval Court Exhibit 9), though he had not been completely in accord as to the elements of danger as listed in importance by the Secretary (p. 325-327).**

Vice Admiral McMorris further testified that he had considered an air attack possible but not probable and further than he considered the Fleet should not take as its sole object of existence the defending of itself against a surprise attack and that it should carry on other fundamental duties, including training and readying itself for operations (p. 327).

He felt that the attack would be on the Philippines with a possible raid on Wake and Midway, and Guam would be seriously endangered (page 889). He felt that a submarine attack on Hawaii was probable.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to his estimate of the situation and possible courses of enemy action during the period of 27 November to 6 December 1941, that substantially he estimated the Japanese were on the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. His early estimate was that the Japanese would act with the expectation that the United States would not enter the war with Great Britain unless it was itself attacked, but later he came to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling to leave the line of communications abreast the Philippines exposed to attack in which case the United States would come into the war, and therefore, he estimated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct possibility but were probable.

He further estimated that the Japanese would seize Guam when they initiated the war, because of the negligible defenses there, and that, because the defense of Midway was stronger, with which the Japanese were probably familiar, it was initially a probability that Midway would be subjected to heavy raids but that it was less likely that there would be any Japanese effort towards seizing Midway.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he further estimated that there were likely to be heavy Japanese submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto; that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces operating at sea, and that there was a likelihood of attempts being made to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel, in order to block ingress and egress. He also expected that there would be enemy submarine activity along the Pacific Coast. (Page 303-304.)

After receipt of the message of November 27th, a discussion was had as to whether or not any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those in training and operating areas, and it was felt that the situation was already well in hand and it would, in effect, be a message to continue what they were doing: The only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for submarines (part 895).

*NOTE.—This was the letter in which the Secretary envisioned the initiation of a Japanese war by a surprise attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and listed the dangers in order of importance as air bombing attack, air torpedo plane attack, sabotage, submarine attack, mining, and bombardment by gunfire. The Secretary further stated that the countermeasures to be considered, in order of importance, were the location and engagement of enemy carriers, and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched, pointing out that these were largely functions of the Fleet, though perhaps not possible of being carried out in the event of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war (p. 326).

Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 26th from the Chief of Naval Operations regarding the transfer of planes to Wake, of which CincPac was an addressee, probably influenced whatever ideas or views resulted from the series of dispatches, but the question of moving Army planes there was given extensive consideration and the determination was made to send defensive planes to Midway and Wake, preferably Marine, and they felt it imperative to have protective fighters there because they anticipated operating a number of patrol planes from Wake if war should start (page 891).

A squadron of patrol planes searched in advance of the carrier and was withdrawn after she had discharged the planes at Wake (page 892). When Halsey and "Newton" moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of Marine aircraft, they were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence before they again entered port (page 894).

As Admiral McMorris recalled it, orders to depth bomb submarine contacts were issued after the war warning and orders given to Admirals Newton and Halsey to repel hostile planes. (p. 246)

The proposal to send Army troops and planes to Midway and Wake did not, so far as he was concerned, weaken the "war warning." He thought those places would be weakened in defense by such a change; that they were important; and might be subject to attack so that the time was inauspicious (page 896).

Admiral McMorris recalled that at not a great while before the commencement of war, there was a suggestion to replace the marines at outlying islands with Army forces and that this was discussed with General Short. It was concluded not to send them. They felt that the Washington proposal was badly timed. He did not feel that it vitiated the war warning dispatch. (p. 247)

Those dispatches (Exhibits 18, 40) were proposals and not directives and the recommendation was against the proposals and recommendation was accepted (page 896).

He believed from the limited knowledge he had that the danger from enemy aircraft was not great (page 896). He did not consider that the Japanese would make a surprise air attack; he felt that the only serious danger was sabotage or submarines (page 900).

With reference to testimony given by him in previous investigations to the effect that in his opinion the island defense was adequate and that the chances of an air attack inflicting damage were small, Vice Admiral McMorris testified generally that the bases of that opinion were as follows:

(a) *That the anti-aircraft guns and the fighters would destroy a large proportion of attacking planes;*

(b) *That bombing by enemy planes would not be sufficiently accurate to obtain a large number of hits;*

(c) *That notwithstanding the success of the British air torpedo attack at Taranto, which he believed was attributable to peculiar conditions that existed at Taranto, he did not believe there was any serious hazard in an air torpedo attack at Pearl, because: (1) the attacking planes would have to fly very low, thereby exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire and fighter interception, and (2) the shallowness of the water and the short distance available for torpedo runs would operate to reduce the effectiveness of this type of attack. He stated that manifestly his conclusions were entirely wrong, but that they had been reached by reading available information as to torpedo performance in our own Navy;*

(d) *He admitted that he did not have any knowledge as to whether the Army anti-aircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he assumed that they were in a state of readiness. ". . . Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent there. . . . Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or the watches being kept" with respect to the aircraft defenses of Hawaii (p. 330-332).*

Admiral McMorris said that he saw the November 28th dispatch and considered the directive for reconnaissance to mean search by aircraft for submarines or a raiding cruiser.

Admiral McMorris said that he did not believe that a surprise air attack was likely in the Hawaiian area although he did consider such an attack

possible in the Philippines and even against Midway or Wake. Probably he said, some discussions along those lines may have taken place but he had no specific recollection of such a discussion. (p. 236) He personally never considered an air attack as more than a remote possibility and he is certain that Admiral Kimmel was not anticipating such an attack.

Admiral McMorris said that the characteristics of the leaders of the Japanese Navy had been discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, Admiral McMorris, and others, and the general impression was that they were rather capable and aggressive leaders. (p. 236)

The reasons why Admiral McMorris thought a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility were as follows:

"For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict." (p. 237)

Admiral McMorris said that they did anticipate that mass submarine attacks in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were quite possible. (p. 238)

Admiral McCormick who at the time was under McMorris, said that the courses open to the enemy, as the War Plans Officer saw them, were in the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and submarine attacks and the seizure of all of our possessions in the western Pacific; it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the western Pacific; an air attack on Pearl Harbor was listed as a possible course of Japanese action. Predominant attention was focused on the preparation for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. A very low degree of probability was assigned to air attack at Pearl Harbor. (p. 68) He said that he did not think that any of Admiral Kimmel's advisers had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they made.

Admiral McCormick said that in formulating estimates of the situation, the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders were not, so far as he knew, taken into consideration. (p. 70)

Admiral McCormick said that the term "defensive deployment" use in the war warning puzzled them. The further strengthening of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral Kimmel and his staff could derive from this directive.

Admiral McCormick said that he knew of not one person at Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack. (p. 71)

Admiral McCormick, at the end of his statement, said that Admiral Kimmel was whole-heartedly and self-sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet ready for war; that "There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an approach, as has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I mentioned had not existed." (p. 72)

Captain Murphy said that he did not think that an attack, such as the attack that was made, would be made. He thought that it would be stupid for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and that they might have gone into Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies without involving the United States. He thought they might attack the Philippines.

Captain Murphy said that he thought the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks involved in Rainbow 5. (p. 199) He was not sure whether the words defensive deployment in any way signified security measures, but interpreted the words as leaving the matter open to those in Pearl Harbor. (p. 200)

F. ADMIRAL DELANY

Admiral DeLany stated that he saw all of the messages from the Navy Department. He did not consider that CinePac had been furnished complete information on relations between the United States and Japan, because full information of the negotiations and discussions were not forwarded to CinePac (page 506).

The "War Warning" dispatch meant to him that Japan was on the move, but he did not interpret it as showing an immediate Japanese attack on the United States.

Admiral DeLany said that between November 27th and December 7th, he knew that Japan was on the move, but he thought they would go into the Malays or Thailand. He did not know what we would have done if this had included an overt act against the United States. The Pacific Fleet had not been given any clear-cut view of the attitude which the United States Government was assuming toward Japan. He had not thought that the Japanese would initiate a war by attacking the Pacific Fleet as such an attack would wake up the United States more than anything; also because they had reports that the Japanese fleet was primarily based in the Empire (page 497).

In his opinion, if there were an attack, it would be by submarine. He did not envisage an attack by air or surface ships (page 498).

Rear Admiral DeLany reaffirmed his belief, previously stated to the Roberts Commission, that there was no discussion between 27 November and 7 December by the staff as to the probability of an air attack of the nature of that which occurred. (p. 165)

Asked what consideration was given to possible directions of aggressive movements, warned against in the 24 November message from OpNav to CinCPac and Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, he replied that aircraft carriers were sent to deliver planes to Midway and Wake but that an attack farther to the eastward was not contemplated. (p. 170)

Following the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November conferences between the Army and Navy retained the concept previously held that the greatest danger to the Hawaiian area lay in the possibility of submarine attacks and sabotage. (p. 172)

Admiral DeLany stated that joint Army and Navy exercises relating to defense of the islands were handicapped by lack of equipment necessary to provide a Central air warning control post. This equipment, together with anti-aircraft weapons, communication facilities and planes, was declared not available although following the Pearl Harbor attack they were received almost immediately. (p. 174-176)

Adequate air reconnaissance was impossible, in his opinion, due to the small number of planes and crews, condition of the planes and the necessity for maintaining them in readiness for an emergency. (p. 181)

From the information which he had in November 1941, he did not think a torpedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor could be launched because of the depth of the water. This information had been sent in letters by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor, Admiral DeLany said that he did not and never would have expected that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor as they did; that everyone was of the opinion that the danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area; and that there might be sabotage on the island. The general concept of the defense of the island and the security of the base there was based on that idea. (p. 77)

Admiral DeLany said that nothing in the dispatches received by them indicated that hostilities would be started in the way in which they did in fact start. (p. 78)

Admiral DeLany said that the reasons why they regarded a surprise air attack at Pearl Harbor as improbable were that the last information which they had placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters; there was inherent danger for the Japanese in bringing their Fleet in for such an attack; and it was felt that the one single thing which would inflame Americans would be an attack upon their home territory. (p. 80)

Admiral DeLany thought that in formulating the opinion that an air attack was unlikely, consideration was given to the characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, an air expert. (p. 81)

G. ADMIRAL CALHOUN

Admiral Calhoun said that he had been present at Admiral Kimmel's conferences every morning and heard all the information that Admiral Kimmel discussed. He knew of the "war warning" dispatch and interpreted it to mean that war would start in the Philippines (page 935). Nobody had expected war immediately, he said, and Admiral Kimmel did not indicate any contrary view (page 938). When the "War Warning" was read, he had thought, and believed the others also had thought that it did not necessarily mean that war was imminent and that the Fleet should go on a war footing (page 939).

In his voluntary statement at the end of his testimony, Admiral Calhoun discussed the fact that he attended all of Admiral Kimmel's conferences and that neither he nor anyone else expected any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time when it came. (p. 228)

H. CAPTAIN LAYTON

Captain Layton stated that he had seen the "War Warning" and had considered that it fitted into the picture that the Japanese were going to strike in Southeast Asia (page 911). He had no apprehension of an air attack on Hawaii. He at one time translated a Japanese novel which academically discussed an attack on Pearl Harbor. He showed this to Admiral Kimmel about three or four months prior to December 7, 1941 (page 911). From the "War Warning" message and other information he had at the time, he expected the Japanese to attack Thailand, and possibly the Philippines (page 912) and after our search planes from Manila had reported Japanese forces off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam, he reported this estimate to CincPac. This was in agreement with the "War Warning" (pages 912-3). Air attack on Pearl Harbor was a capability of the Japanese but he had considered it a remote possibility. Surprise attack was a Japanese characteristic (page 913).

Captain Layton knew Admiral Yamamoto personally and was familiar with his characteristics. He did not specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of Admiral Yamamoto's characteristics a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor was likely (page 223). He said that on one occasion when he did discuss with Admiral Kimmel a book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was mentioned and Admiral Kimmel asked him what he thought of the chances. He said "I only hope we can intercept them and I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." He also said that in the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, he thought that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned, and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much in the first battle. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that he saw the war warning of November 27th and thought that it fitted in with the picture up to date as he saw it, namely, that the Japanese were moving to the South. His estimate was unclear as to whether or not the Japanese would attack the Philippines or would leave their flank unguarded and attempt to work some compromise deal through Kurusu and Nomura. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that there was no discussion from November 27th to December 7th in his presence, "in higher authority" as to the importance of guarding against internal sabotage (page 914).

I. ADMIRAL BELLINGER

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor, of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Neither did he see or know of the CNO despatch of 28 November regarding possible hostile action by the Japanese. (P. 498-499)

Admiral Bellinger referred to Addendum I of Exhibit 53, which stated that an air attack from carriers at 300 miles was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. He envisaged air attack as the most logical form for the greatest success (page 668). He expected a bombing, not a torpedo attack (page 669).

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not thought it probable that an attack would be made on Oahu as the opening event of the Japanese-United States war (page 688), and his estimate contained in the plans was in order to work out a defense of Pearl Harbor and not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese (page 687).

During the five days preceding December 7, Admiral Bellinger was in bed with the "flu." His assistant, Captain Ramsey, conferred with him. (p. 122)

Admiral Bellinger said that late in November, 1941, he thought the most probable form of Japanese attack would be by submarine or by means of sabotage. (p. 123-124)

J. ADMIRAL KITTS

Admiral Kitts testified that he had thought an air torpedo attack was possible in Pearl Harbor, and antiaircraft measures such as nets and balloons had been considered (page 516).

Admiral Kitts did not attend staff conferences generally. He was not shown any warning dispatch but knew the general tenor of some of the warnings. (p. 185) Admiral Kitts said that he had considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a serious possibility and also a submarine attack or a combination of the two. (p. 186) Admiral Kitts said that he helped draft the Fleet Circular letter in February or March known as 2CL-41 which indicated that a surprise air attack was a definite possibility. (p. 186)

His feeling in this regard was minimized by two letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, stating that the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a successful torpedo run. Nets had not been put in because they were a hindrance to ships' movements and because it was felt that the danger of torpedo attack was slight. Balloon barrages had not been put in because of interference with normal operations of our own aircraft (page 516). Nets had been placed at the entrance to Pearl Harbor (page 517).

The deepest water in Pearl Harbor was 42 feet, or 7 fathoms, and he recalled that the Navy Department had estimated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched in less than 10 fathoms (page 519).

K. ADMIRAL WITHERS

Admiral Withers said that he had seen the "War Warning" and had been present at a conference held on November 28, 1941. He said that he told Admiral Kimmel that he thought the dispatch meant war and that he would sink Japanese ships if they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back (page 1085). General Short was not at this conference (page 1086). He had no orders to take offensive action against enemy ships within the 500 mile area from Pearl Harbor (page 1086).

He had thought there would be an attack on Hawaii, but did not consider what kind of attack (page 1086). The "War Warning" message did mention the Philippines and he had felt that an attack might come anywhere but had thought that the chances were that it would be on the Philippines (page 1087).

Captain Curts said that he had been apprehensive for a long time prior to December 7 about the danger of the Japanese starting a war without a formal declaration and he feared particularly sabotage. (p. 108)

L. COLONEL PHILLIPS

Colonel Phillips testified that General Short received an Army dispatch, corresponding to Exhibit 19, on November 27th or November 28th, and that a conference was held with Admiral Kimmel (page 483). He said that at the time of receipt of the dispatch an estimate of the situation was made which resulted in the sabotage alert. He estimated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable, and that if there were an attack, it would be by air. He did not recall receiving any information additional to that message until the afternoon of December 7, 1941 (page 485). He did not recall having seen the Navy "War Warning" message (page 486).

He stated that his opinion that the enemy might attack by air had been his own personal opinion (page 493).

M. GENERAL SHORT

General Short said that at this time he considered sabotage the main danger at Pearl Harbor since the information they had indicated that the Japanese would move southward (page 239). He said that during a conference with Admiral Kimmel, McMorris had stated that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there had been no disagreement by those present. He also knew

that Admiral Kimmel would have moved the ships out if he had thought an air attack likely.

XXI. CONFERENCES BETWEEN ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT AFTER NOVEMBER 27TH

Admiral Smith said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect; Admiral Kimmel and General Short, he "estimates," conferred every day between November 27th and December 7th (page 546). He present at some of the staff conferences (page 547).

He said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect in stating that Admiral Kimmel did not inform himself of measures taken by General Short; Admiral Smith was present at most of the conferences, and had been early directed by Admiral Kimmel to cooperate with the Army (page 550); also, Short informed himself of Kimmel's actions (page 551).

He stated that within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the "war warning," Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. General Short had been promptly advised of this message (page 561).

Commander Harold S. Burr, then Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant at the headquarters, Commanding General Hawaiian Department, while at CincPac Headquarters in the presence of Capt. Earle received from Lt. Commander Layton a copy of the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November (Exhibit 17, Naval Court of Inquiry) with instructions to deliver it to General Short. Commander Burr could not locate General Short or the Chief of Staff and left the dispatch with the Senior Officer Present, Lt. Col. William Donnegan, G-3, explaining its urgent nature. Commander Burr stated that on the following day Col. Donnegan told him that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short. (pages 377-8)

He did not recall "the details" of that conference. He thought that the message was intended to put them on their toes and to get them ready to carry out the War Plan.

Admiral Kimmel, according to Admiral Smith, had a shock in the week preceding Pearl Harbor when orders were received from the Navy Department to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all of the Marines off of the outlying islands and Marine and Navy planes and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes. As Admiral Smith remembered it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two staffs together. He said "the Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke before-hand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports." or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out." (p. 40-41)

Concerning the "war warning", Admiral Smith said that it was received somewhere in the midafternoon on the 27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and a conference was held. By six o'clock that evening, the Army was on the march, unfortunately what they did was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, and the bridges. In other words, they alerted against sabotage because it was the consensus of opinion

from this dispatch that attacks would be against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and by the others sabotage on the Japanese population. The war warning, he said, was carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning. He thought that the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except as to the danger of sabotage. The question of possible attack by air did not arise. Admiral Smith was not apprised of the contemplated action of the Army and did not believe that Admiral Kimmel had been advised. Admiral Bloch was at the conference, but Admiral Smith recalled no discussion of measures to be taken by Admiral Bloch's task force in light of the warning. Admiral Smith did not recall what condition of readiness was set for ships in port. He said the ships at sea were apprised of this warning.

Admiral Smith said that the operating schedule for ships which had been previously issued was not departed from except that the ENTERPRISE was sent to deliver planes to Wake. He said that as a result, at the time of the war warning, two of the three task forces were at sea; Admiral Pye's task force returned about the 5th of December, he thought, and also part of Admiral Halsey's task force; Admiral Brown's task force departed on the 4th of December, he had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers, but no battleships; the net result of the adherence to the operating schedules previously issued was that there was a movement of ships inward to port rather than the deployment involving movement outward. Admiral Smith said that it might very well be that these plans had been known to the Japanese and that they chose their time to attack when two task forces were scheduled to be in port.

The war warning, Admiral Smith said, did not indicate to him that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. He knew that a greater part of the approaches to Pearl Harbor were not covered by any reconnaissance, but recalled no discussion at the conferences concerning this fact. (p. 50-53)

General Short stated that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed his anti-sabotage alert into effect. According to Admiral Smith and Colonel Phillips, the Army went on the anti-sabotage alert on November 27th (pages 537, 479). General Short stated that he also conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251), they talked over every phase of what they were doing (page 242).

Admiral McMorris recalled that at about this time a conference was held between Admiral Kimmel and General Short regarding utilization of Army aircraft to strengthen defenses at Midway and Wake (page 889).

Admiral Brown said that he had overheard Admiral Kimmel frequently question General Short as to the Army's adequacy to defend Pearl Harbor against enemy air attack and that General Short had replied that his equipment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try to have it increased.

Admiral Pye said that he personally attended no conferences in which the situation was discussed by the Army High command; his conferences with Admiral Kimmel were concerned with Fleet operations. (p. 149)

Captain Murphy said that after the receipt of the war warning he, Captain Smith, Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, and Captain Layton, were called into Admiral Kimmel's office, and he read the dispatch and asked for their opinion. Admiral Kimmel said that he would have a further conference that afternoon. Captain Murphy said that he thought that at that conference the decision was made to reinforce Wake and to send some planes to Midway. (p. 197)

Admiral Bellinger did not see the warning dispatches (Exhibits 15 and 17) before December 7th, and between November 27th and December 7th did not confer with the Army Air Force Commander regarding long range reconnaissance (page 672).

Admiral Bloch recalled no discussions concerning unity of command (page 395).

XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL—EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE

A. IN GENERAL

Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941, through 7 December 1941, testified that all Pacific Fleet task force commanders were notified of the receipt of the so-called war warning (p. 356).

In this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).

Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures (p. 373).

The direction contained in the war warning to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the task assigned in WPL-46" was a new phrase, Admiral Kimmel testified. He thought it referred to measures of the type already taken by him (page 305).

As a result of the "war warning," he said, he continued the security measures already in effect (page 299). On November 27th, he issued orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in the operating areas around Oahu. He informed the Chief of Naval Operations of this. Full security measures were invoked for ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts (pages 299-300).

Admiral Bloch testified that no change was made in the condition of readiness, except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began sweeping the Honolulu harbor channel and approaches (page 395).

Admiral Bloch said, "I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought they were in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were alert and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th of December, I asked General Short about it and he told me, No, it was only a partial alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have told me they were alert No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1. Our highest form is 1 and their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy is concerned, I know of nothing particular, except the Commander of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had called in the Commanding Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80—they were the only four ships that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of those was equipped with listening gear—and had given them a pep talk. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order about the 27th of November to the effect that any submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea area should be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were told to be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war, would be in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships of the Fleet, in the operating areas, and they might make an effort to get in the Harbor. That was the reason for the pep talk. I know no other action was taken as a consequence of the warning of the 27th of November." (p. 16)

Admiral Bloch said, "So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness. I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in and the future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was informed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different condition of readiness." (p. 16)

After the War Warning, Admiral Bloch knew of no additional aerial reconnaissance. Admiral Bloch did take one other step, namely, he directed the District Coast Guard Officer, who was the Port Commander of Honolulu, to put an inshore patrol in effect from Honolulu with three Coast Guard cutters, the same as Admiral Bloch conducted from Pearl Harbor with Destroyer Division 80. (p. 17)

Admiral McMorris said that on receipt of the "war warning," CincPac had a discussion with his staff. A determination was made that its directions were largely in effect already (page 888). Instructions were given to the forces at sea to be particularly alert and to bomb submarine contacts believed hostile (page 888). The practice was started of giving CincPac daily or every other day recommendations as to what was to be done if war broke out within twenty-

four hours. Consideration was given to getting combatant ships out of Pearl Harbor if war broke out, he said, but not to getting them out as a defensive measure.

Concerning the direction to take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.

Admiral McMorris outlined his understanding of the action taken as "preparatory deployment" at page 243.

Concerning the direction in the war warning to take "defensive deployment," Admiral McMorris said that they concluded that they should keep their forces in close proximity to Hawaii where they could be kept fully fueled and ready to move toward the Marshalls, and this was in agreement with the directive. (p. 245)

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that as a result of the war warning on November 27th, there occurred considerable discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff, and the following determinations or conclusions were reached:

(a) *no material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area because the naval organization was already substantially on a war footing;*

(b) *it was essential that training continue until it became necessary to move the principal elements of the Fleet into offensive operations, and therefore, that there should be a continuation and no modification of the training schedules;*

(c) *that limitations in supplies and facilities, particularly defensive aircraft, had precluded stationing requisite defensive forces at Wake or Midway and other island outposts until it became virtually mandatory, and, accordingly, the only two aircraft carriers, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers were dispatched, one to Wake, the other to Midway, with fighter aircraft;*

(d) *that Midway and Wake, considering the personnel engaged in the preparation of defense, were not able to accommodate an increase in personnel, though possibly a small number of men and some specialized equipment were dispatched to Wake. (Page 304-305).*

Admiral DeLany said that training conditions were maintained in the subordinate commands, and that no additional security measures were invoked upon receipt of the "war warning" (page 499).

Admiral DeLany said that he believed that everything possible was done, with the available forces, to secure early information of possible attack, within their concept that enemy activity within the area would be confined to submarine and sabotage. (p. 78-9)

Concerning the instruction in the war warning to take "defensive deployment," Admiral DeLany said that as he recalled the island was alerted, the Commander-in-Chief put certain aspects of his security letter in effect with the forces afloat, and he pointed out, the actual deployment of the Fleet, in view of its organization into task forces for the accomplishment of offensive missions, existed.

Admiral DeLany also stated that the Commanding Officer of the aircraft had been given orders to accelerate the refitting of the planes which had come to them without self-sealing tanks and other offensive war equipment. (p. 79)

Admiral DeLany recalls that about this time, submarines were sent out on patrol at Midway and at Wake. (p. 79)

Admiral Calhoun said that he did not know of any additional security measures which Admiral Kimmel could have taken (page 943); he considered the existing ComFOURTEEN security orders adequate (page 944).

Admiral Smith said that because, as the Court inquired, an attack on Pearl Harbor was held only a remote possibility, that additional precautions against such a possibility were unnecessary and unjustified (page 560).

Admiral Smith said that the intended raid to the Westward called for by the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan on the outbreak of hostilities was very much in the minds of Admirals Kimmel and Halsey. The question of the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not seriously considered; the Fleet was ready to carry out its tasks at the outbreak of war; and the question of an attack before negotiations were completed was not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, seriously considered. (p. 58)

Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was not due to preoccupation concerning offensive movements. (p. 63)

Admiral McCormick said that consideration had been given to using Fleet units to augment the Army and local defense forces, and that the Fleet would constitute the backbone of any defense of its own security; the necessity for training for offensive missions naturally makes it impossible to keep the forces wholly employed in routine security measures. (pp. 69)

Admiral McCormick said that he did not think that it was true, to the state of imbalance, that the foremost thought in their minds was the offensive movements rather than the security angle, although they intended to make the maximum offensive use of the Fleet which its comparatively small size would permit. (p. 70)

B. RESPONSIBILITY FOR LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE

Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to the question of whether or not there had been any discussion by Admiral Kimmel concerning reconnaissance from Oahu during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941, that it was not a practice to have formal conferences though there were numerous conferences and discussions, and that undoubtedly such question of reconnaissance was a matter that was discussed during that period, (p. 307); that "definitely" was subject matter discussed during that period between himself and others and Admiral Kimmel. (p. 308).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he was not able to state what Admiral Kimmel had to say concerning the discussion of reconnaissance from Oahu, "but", he continued to testify, "the conclusions that he (Admiral Kimmel) reached did not result in any distant search being maintained, but rather that the search at the time was against submarines in localized areas." (p. 308).

Admiral Kimmel stated that under the provisions of Exhibit 52, Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) was to provide a long range scouting force, conduct patrols into areas, and at times, ordered by CinePac to improve the security of the Fleet units and bases, and was to issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. There were insufficient planes for complete reconnaissance. The schedules of employment of the planes were submitted to and approved by Admiral Kimmel, pursuant to Exhibit 52. Although Admiral Bloch had nothing suitable for reconnaissance, he could, Admiral Kimmel said, have asked for such planes.

Admiral Kimmel stated that the Navy patrol planes were under his direct operation (page 1125), and he assumed the direct responsibility of employing them but that Admiral Bloch was charged with the execution of that part of the plan which required the search, and he always had the right to request those planes for that purpose and did so on several occasions. However, Admiral Kimmel gave the orders to the planes (page 1125). He said that he was directly responsible for whether a distant reconnaissance with planes should be taken and that no subordinate had recommended such reconnaissance (page 374).

Admiral Kimmel said that he did not know that daily patrols were permanently flown prior to his command, as indicated by a question, over a certain arc from Honolulu. He did know that certain searches had been conducted but thought them ineffective (page 373). He had considered using part of the planes to search a probable area of enemy advance. Such search had been done previously for a few days on Admiral Bloch's suggestion, but had been discontinued after finding nothing (page 373).

To the best of Admiral Kimmel's recollection, reconnaissance patrol in certain areas was not in effect when he took command. A patrol covering the operating area was in effect, and he continued that patrol (page 1125). In any event, he thoroughly considered the question of running patrols and had to make a decision between training and running patrols. He was told by the commander of the patrol planes and by the Army of their training difficulties. In addition, they did not have a sufficient number to maintain an adequate patrol over a long period of time, and a patrol out to 300 miles is almost useless as a guard against an air raid. That was and is his opinion, although any patrol run has some value as far as surface ships are concerned.

Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion that any air attack on Oahu would come at dawn and considered at some time the placing of all available planes in the air each morning, but did not think the time had arrived to take any measures such as that (page 1131). The "emergencies" were continuing all the time and he did not have the personnel and material (page 1132). If he had put the Navy PBV's

in the air at all, he would have had them out on patrol (page 1132). Had he put all the planes in the air each morning at daylight, he said, it would have alarmed the civilian population (page 1134).

Admiral McMorris said that long range reconnaissance was considered at this time and earlier, but had to be considered along with the availability of patrol planes, the status of training of these planes, employments they might be called on to carry out, the offensive operation laid down in war plans, and the necessity of covering operating areas, and supplying personnel for new squadrons (page 890).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection of any conference or conversation between him and Admiral Kimmel concerning reconnaissance from Oahu between the period of November 27 and December 7, 1941, but that such was "a matter" that was discussed between him and Admiral Kimmel and between the two of them with other members of the staffs and with other senior naval officers present in Pearl Harbor.

He stated that he no longer remembered the details but did recall the consideration that was in mind, in general, and the action determined upon. He stated that the situation as to equipment was that the number of patrol planes was small and certain of them were earmarked for Midway and Wake, and for reconnaissance of the Marshalls at an appropriate time.

He stated that the following matters were considered:

(a) that it was believed to be highly important to maintain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas;

(b) that it was contemplated, in case war should start, that most of the fleet shore-based aircraft were to be moved to the Island outposts (Midway, Johnston, and Wake) but that some were to remain under the operational control of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Command since that command had no aircraft of its own;

(c) that, in order to have the patrol craft ready for prompt movement to Island outposts where the repair and upkeep facilities were negligible, it was considered highly important that there be no excessive use of such craft which would require engine overhaul and interfere with readiness for flight on short notice;

(d) that, because the Navy patrol wings as a whole were being increased, and the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in giving essential advanced operational training, that it was determined that such training should be continued as much as possible.

Considering these matters, that is, the requirements for antisubmarine patrols, readiness of patrol aircraft for distant service, and continuation of the training program, "it was determined that the arrangements that were actually in effect were the best that we could do. This in effect accepted a calculated risk. Subsequent events proved that the calculations weren't good." (page 305-306).

Admiral McMorris stated further in this connection that calculations made at this time showed that "only varied limited sectors could be continually patrolled with the forces then available." (page 306).

He further stated "it may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness of search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the approach of the Japanese carriers on the morning of 7 December would have been detected as the arc of their approach would quite possibly have been unguarded."

With reference to the extent of the sectors which could have been covered in a reconnaissance from Oahu by the patrol planes available during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the testimony of Admiral Pellinger, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that continuous daily patrols for an undetermined number of days would have been flown during the period in question by dividing the combat crews into three groups and using twenty planes daily, which would have covered 144°, "wouldn't be far wrong." (page 309-310).

However, he testified, that the only consideration given in that statement is to the question of running a search, "but the Commander-in-Chief had not only that consideration to weigh, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for distant service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being built." (page 310).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he could not state categorically the extent of the sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes during the period in question. He stated that various combinations of diagrams, some drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the aviation officer, and some probably drawn by the Operations Division, were given consideration, though he was not able to testify as to the extent the diagrams were presented to Admiral Kimmel, neither was he able to state when and by whom any such diagrams were considered.

He testified that if any long distant searches were instituted, they undoubtedly would have been a compromise among the different features involved, "just as a compromise was actually reached in limiting the searches to the fleet operating areas." (page 309).

Previously searches of rotating narrow sectors had been made daily (page 890). After due consideration, it was decided not to make long range air reconnaissance as it would be of limited effectiveness and training would suffer heavily and the material readiness of the planes would be reduced. He recalled no formal conference on this matter with Admiral Kimmel, but it was probably discussed (pages 890-1).

His war plans group and he were of the opinion that a raid on Hawaii was unlikely and wanted to have the patrol planes ready to go to Midway and Wake to cover offensive operations (page 890).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the patrol or aircraft reconnaissance being conducted from Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period from 27 November 1941 onwards, were very limited. He stated that the aircraft at all outlying bases excepting Midway were entirely defensive, while those at Midway were partially defensive and partially for patrol. He stated that the patrols from Midway were limited because of the limitations there in the amount of gas and upkeep facilities, which required conservation in order that the engines might not be worn out "before a critical period arose" (p. 327-328).

He also testified that if a maximum search had been instituted from Pearl Harbor and from Midway after the warning of November 27th, there would have been a highly critical situation with regard to aircraft engines by the 7th of December (p. 328).

Exhibit 19 (repeat of Army dispatch) directing that operations be conducted so as not to alarm the civilian population, had no bearing on the action taken by him regarding reconnaissance or other war preparations (page 891).

Admiral Bloch stated that his sole connection with long range reconnaissance was that as ComFOURTEEN, he made a joint agreement with the Commanding General which would be placed in execution on "M" day or by order of the War and Navy Departments, or upon mutual agreement of the two local commanders of the Army and Navy; that then it would be the responsibility of the Navy to provide reconnaissance planes, the delivery of which was indefinite. Commander Patrol Wing Two was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and under Admiral Bloch's control to the extent that Admiral Bloch exercised control over naval shore based aircraft, and through him Admiral Bloch arranged to coordinate joint air effort. Admiral Bellinger was ComPatWing Two, ComTaskFor Nine, ComAir Scouting Force and ComNavBase Defense Air Force. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was like a volunteer fire department. When you sounded the air raid, they came; otherwise they were doing something else (page 398). Under 2CL-41, Admiral Bloch was not responsible for long distance reconnaissance (page 399). Admiral Bellinger was to do this, subject to orders from CincPac (page 400).

On November 27, CincPac decided to make no change in schedules; that included the long range reconnaissance (page 400).

Admiral Bloch stated that he could recall no request which he made for long distance reconnaissance other than the request in June 1940, and in the summer of 1941. He felt that while he could recommend such reconnaissance, the Commander-in-Chief did not depend on him to make such a recommendation before he ordered reconnaissance (page 1140). Admiral Bloch was Naval Base Defense Officer and Admiral Bellinger was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (page 1141). Admiral Bloch had supervisory control and both he and the Commander-in-Chief could give Admiral Bellinger orders (page 1142). The planes were under Admiral Bellinger as Naval Base Defense Air Officer only when they were activated, and they were only activated while Admiral Bloch was there for drill (page 1143). The arrangement was a makeshift one, arising out of the fact that Admiral Bloch had no patrol planes with which to make reconnaissance; so Admiral Kimmel had a makeshift arrangement to furnish patrol planes to the Base Defense Air Force for reconnaissance in case of an air attack in order to locate carriers, and to supplement the deficiencies in Army fighters (page 1144). Admiral Bloch probably could have gotten planes temporarily by a request to Admiral Kimmel, but could not order a protracted daily reconnaissance without Admiral Kimmel's authority because of Admiral Kimmel's decision of November 27th that he would not make any distant reconnaissance (pages 1144-45).

Admiral Bloch said that he had discussed with Admiral Kimmel the fact that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and had asked Admiral Kimmel if he would supply the planes for such reconnaissance; Admiral Kimmel said that he could not commit himself to that duty except insofar as it might be possible on any occasion and that he, Admiral Kimmel, might have to go away from the locality and take his own forces with him, and that the District should really have its own forces. It was Admiral Bloch's very definite understanding that in the absence of any planes of his own, any missions of reconnaissance to be performed would have to be performed by the Fleet planes and that Admiral Kimmel reserved to himself or to his echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for overseas work. Actually, he said, Admiral Bellinger was the officer who, as Commander of the Patrol Squadrons of the Fleet and as Commander of the Base Defense Air Force, did this. It was obvious that the Commandant of the District could not use patrol planes without the permission of the Fleet because the patrol planes were employed by the Fleet on other missions. It had to be done by the Fleet, there was no confusion of thought as to this, and it was well understood that Admiral Kimmel actually would be the officer, or somebody delegated by him would be the officer to designate what reconnaissance was to be made. (p. 9)

Admiral Bloch said that on the occasions when he had asked Admiral Kimmel for patrol planes that Admiral Kimmel said that he would do what he could but could not make any commitments because in the event of hostilities parts of the Fleet would have to leave Pearl Harbor. But Admiral Bloch recalled no statement by Admiral Kimmel to the effect that he could not take any particular security measures because of his commitments for offensive movements. (p. 23-4)

Admiral Bellinger stated that CincPac made the final approval for naval aircraft operation. CincPac or ComFOURTEEN could vitalize Naval Base Defense Air Force. ComFOURTEEN worked under CincPac. Naval Base Defense Air Force was not composed of all aircraft, but of aircraft reported available (page 665). Admiral Bellinger said that he would have looked to ComFOURTEEN or CincPac to direct reconnaissance (page 683).

Admiral Bellinger said that in the absence of definite information as to the probability of an attack, it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance. (p. 125)

Captain Ramsey said that Admiral Bellinger was not a naval base defense officer insofar as planes were concerned, except in a drill or emergency, and he did not control fighting planes, radar, or anti-aircraft guns (page 593).

Captain Ramsey said that during the period November 27th to December 7th, there were approximately 83 Army and Navy planes available for patrol. Twelve of these were B-17's; the Army only reported six available to Navy Base Defense. The Navy patrol planes were either in Task Force Nine or associated with other task forces (page 599). All were operating on schedules approved by CincPac (page 600).

Admiral Bellinger, he said, had nothing to do with the daily employment schedules of planes and did not have authority to order them to discontinue training and institute long range reconnaissance on his own authority in absence of an immediate emergency (page 600).

Admiral Pye stated that it was not his job to advise as to patrols (page 439).

Colonel Phillips testified that distant reconnaissance was discussed but was not undertaken. The Navy, he said, was responsible for such reconnaissance (page 483).

C. READINESS OF AIRCRAFT AND DRILLS

Admiral Bloch said that in addition to the 250 fighters that the Army had of their own, the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters ashore and available to the Army. Each morning at 8 o'clock, Admiral Bellinger would give the Army a list of the planes which were available to the Army and the Army was supposed to send to him at the same time a list of the Army bombers that were available to the Navy. (p. 10)

Admiral Bloch said that in the beginning they had an air raid and black-out drill once a week, and later on they could not have it that often. The Army did not always come in on the drills. There were some interferences because the time that Admiral Bloch would choose for the drill was not always agreeable to the other forces. It interfered with the work of the

force commanders at sea and some of them complained. It was then decided, at about the time that 2CL was issued, to set the date two or three months ahead so that everyone would know that drills were going to happen on that date. (p. 10)

According to Admiral Bellinger, the condition of the planes as to readiness between November 27th and December 7th was the "normal" condition B-5 (50% on four hours notice) which was the normal condition of readiness (page 669); the Army was in Condition E-5 (in routine operation and could be made ready in four hours).

Captain Ramsey said that during the period prior to December 7, drills were held under the plans developed for the Naval Base Defense Air Force and defects were noted and corrected (page 593).

Colonel Phillips could not remember whether any reconnaissance drills were held by the Army and Navy from October 15th to December 7th (page 488).

Admiral Kimmel stated that air-raid drills had been held weekly, and later bi-weekly, for several months prior to December 7th (page 296).

D. EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE

Admiral Kimmel stated (page 299) that he ordered one patrol squadron to Wake, and that the patrol squadron at Midway be replaced by a squadron from Pearl Harbor, and that the squadrons were to conduct reconnaissance en route. Daily searches were made by the squadron at Midway on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th of December, and were to be made daily until further notice.

The ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake on November 28th, and landed planes at Wake on December 3rd. The ENTERPRISE conducted daily reconnaissance flights. The patrol squadron at Wake was withdrawn and conducted a reconnaissance sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Halsey said that there was a plan which came out daily prior to December 7 showing the reconnaissance for that day. He recalled that the Fleet operating areas were searched daily and he thought that prior to December 7 there regular searches in certain sectors believed to be most dangerous. (p. 304)

The LEXINGTON was sent to Midway with a VMF squadron on December 5th and conducted reconnaissance en route. She was 400 miles southeast of Midway when war broke out.

Daily reconnaissance of operating areas was conducted with PBY planes based at Pearl Harbor. Two submarines were operating at Wake and two at Midway on patrol.

Admiral Delaney stated that all reconnaissance was conducted in connection with training flights (page 499).

Admiral Bellinger said that from 1 to 4 December 1941 scouting flights were conducted daily, covering an approximate 90 degree sector, to a distance of 300 miles, by one squadron per day for the sector. He emphasized that these flights were flown as part of Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises only; they were training flights and not directed fleet reconnaissance. He was unable to recall the sectors utilized (p. 494).

The operating areas were under constant patrol. No additional security measures were invoked upon receipt of Exhibit 17 (War Warning), primarily because of lack of sufficient planes and pilots, and for getting planes in operating condition so far as guns and bullet-proof tanks were concerned (page 499).

E. EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN:

Vice Admiral Bellinger said that although aircraft were lacking to enable a 360 degree search from Oahu, a partial aerial reconnaissance, covering certain selected sectors, was a possible and feasible operation (p. 477).

Any regular reconnaissance must, Admiral Bellinger said, have been adopted at the expense of the expansion training program then in effect. Had he received clear warning to search for an enemy force, all his planes would, of course, have been utilized, but no thorough 360 degree search was possible with the equipment at his disposal (p. 503-509).

If a limited search had been planned, it would have been of the northern approaches to Oahu, since these were considered the most dangerous. But no limited search was contemplated, according to Admiral Bellinger, who recalled no dis-

cussion of aerial reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel in the days up to 7 December (p. 506-508).

Admiral Stark testified that the Navy did not have sufficient patrol planes and distribution was made of what he had. He was constantly trying to get more. Other obligations of the Navy under JAAN-35 generally were taken care of (pages 34-37). There were not sufficient forces for coastal work in Hawaii; forces for this purpose had to be drawn from the Pacific Fleet (page 37). Hawaii was, and Oahu was, on December 7th, in category "D", "subject to major attack," and under the agreement a stronger offshore patrol was required than under "C", and "long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of GHQ air force." He was uncertain what "GHQ" air force meant, but believed it to be a mobile force subject to direct orders from the War Department, to be used to augment a local force (page 38). Admiral Stark also testified that the trip of the carrier to Wake did not impair CincPac's ability to carry out reconnaissance (page 803).

General Marshall stated that the status of "GHQ Air Force" mentioned in "Joint Action Army-Navy, 1935" as to long range reconnaissance planes was that there were no planes in that Air Force available for transfer to Hawaii in case of emergency. It was the air force in the continental United States, he said, and was being made available in pieces for overseas use all the time (page 859).

Admiral Kimmel testified that under the joint plan, the Army was to operate all pursuits and the Navy all bombers and patrol planes and that there were daily reports as to the availability of planes (page 296). He said that long range reconnaissance to be effective should cover a radius of 800 miles (page 304) and that it would take 84 patrol planes for one flight of 360° and two and a half to three times that number for continuous daily search. All sectors around Oahu are ones from which an attack could be expected, even though he had testified before the Robert's Commission that he thought North the most probable sector (page 305). If restricted, he would search the western 180° sector first (page 305).

He further stated that his firm conviction was that long range reconnaissance over a period of time would have put his planes out of commission. Thirty days of long range reconnaissance would have reduced his planes by 25%. Incidentally, if he had sent the planes out, and when he did so, he would have armed them, and did arm them (page 329).

Admiral Bellinger made reference to a report of a Joint Army and Navy Board, dated October 31, 1941, signed by Admiral Bellinger and his Army opposite; paragraph 4 indicated that as pertained to Army aviation, the problem confronting the Board, as stated by the Army, was that the Army's mission was to defend the naval base against all attacks by an enemy; that the Hawaiian Air Force was to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment, aviation; and to detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation (page 663). This report pointed out that 170 B-17's and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill that mission. There would be needed 84 naval patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directly under ComFOURTEEN, and to supplement or to replace the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two which might be ordered to advance bases on outlying islands.

He stated that both the Army and the Navy were in the process of receiving replacement of obsolescent planes (page 663), and there were the usual shakedown and maintenance problems. There was an absence of spare parts for PBY-5 planes, and the installation of leak-proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Also there was difficulty with cracking of engine nose sections and installation of modified sections was in progress (page 663).

The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two, he said, was training in preparation for war (page 663). The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force on a functioning basis would have necessitated substantial cessation of training (page 664). Continued operation of all planes for scouting would have soon reduced their material readiness and fatigued the crews. Therefore, as stated in their estimate of the situation, advance intelligence of a possible attack within narrow limits was a prerequisite for starting long distance patrol (page 664).

Admiral Bellinger said that fifty planes per day would be required to cover 360° for 700 miles (page 672). Counting eight available Army bombers and about 54 Navy planes, there were 62 planes available for patrol. These Navy planes were in PatWing Two and PatWing One, which also included a squadron at Midway and a squadron which returned to Pearl Harbor on December 5th and needed maintenance work (page 676). There was scarcely more than one crew

per plane. Continuous daily patrol could be flown only by dividing combat crews into three groups, which means twenty planes daily which could cover 144°. This would be for an undetermined number of days, but would not be permanent. Spare parts were critically short (page 673). The 54 Navy planes were PBV-5's sent to replace obsolescent planes and had arrived, one squadron of 12, Oct. 28th; one squadron of 6, Oct. 28th; one squadron of 12, Nov. 23rd; one squadron of 12, Nov. 23rd. They were new and there were shakedown difficulties (page 673) and absence of spare parts. They had received some earlier vintage PBV-5's and had had trouble with cracking of engine nose sections. The practical range of PBV-5 was radius of 700 miles, of PBV-3's 600 miles (page 670).

Exhibit 59 (letter from CincPac to CNO of January 7, 1942, enclosing Bellinger's letter) contains data on planes needed for 360° patrol to 700 miles (page 675).

He commanded PatWing Two and had control of PatWing One (page 677). Task Force Nine included everything he had, so it included these planes. The general policy or plan as to employment schedules was set out by CincPac. Other than planes being overhauled and repaired, the balance of those planes were occupied each day in carrying out the routine schedule of operations (page 677), which schedules were matters between plane commanders and CincPac through regular channel of command.

All-out reconnaissance after November 27th would have completely disrupted training, he (Bellinger) said (page 679), and if all training had been stopped and a daily patrol commenced on October 17th, it would have affected the efficiency of the air force on December 7th; many planes would not have been in flight condition (page 680).

Admiral Bellinger testified that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available. Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PPV-5 type, with limited available spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assuming that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes, for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius of 700 miles, totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PPV-5's. Actually, on 7 December 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake and required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have been able to cover 128 degrees (pages 480-483, 485-487, 502-504).

Admiral Bellinger further testified that if he had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral Bellinger's "vague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several weeks (pages 504-505).

Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector. But there had been searches made to the south because of information received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force was to the south. (p. 506-07).

Admiral Bellinger said that when he arrived in Hawaii on October 30, 1940, he found they were operating on a shoestring (page 667), and he tried to point out to the Navy Department, via CincPac and Commander Scouting Force, the importance of remedying the existing deficiencies, but the emphasis seemed not to be on the Pacific. He was not satisfied with the supply of planes and the development of plane facilities in Hawaii up to December 1941, though there had been considerable improvement over the time he first reported (page 674) in 1940

Admiral Bellinger discussed the main effort during several months preceding the attack which consisted of training, maintenance difficulties, etc. (p. 116)

Admiral Bellinger said that prior to December 7, they were short of the allocated number of crews for patrol planes and the main training was expansion training so as to increase the number of crews. (p. 117)

Admiral Bellinger discussed the reasons why a 360° circumference could not have been maintained. He said that there was no hard and fixed decision as to the direction in which an attack might be launched although the wind direction indicated that the northern sector might be more desirable. The location of bases from which such an attack might come were in the southwesterly direction. (p. 118) Admiral Bellinger said that the 300 miles estimated as an enemy launching radius was a high estimate but had been selected as giving the enemy the advantage in the estimate.

Captain Ramsey stated that he believed a patrol of 800 miles was necessary for distant reconnaissance. One squadron of PBY-3 planes attached to PatWings One and Two could only fly a radius of 700 miles. Around November 27th it was decided to reinforce Wake with Marine fighter squadron, and one of the patrol squadrons, VP-21, which had been at Midway since October was transferred to Wake with orders to scout and cover the advance of Admiral Halsey's task force. A second patrol squadron was sent out from Pearl Harbor to Midway to scout and similarly cover Admiral Halsey's advance and retirement. VP-22 left Wake on December 3rd or 4th and arrived at Pearl Harbor on December 5th, which left just the one squadron, VP-21, at Midway (page 583). That squadron was of old, obsolete planes, PBY-3's, which were due for overhaul and to be replaced with PBY-5's.

With nine planes undergoing repair or out of commission for other reasons, they had 12 naval planes at Midway and about 60 at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe which could have been used for reconnaissance to the 700 mile point (page 583). There were also six Army B-17's which were available and which could go beyond 300 miles; they could go to 800 miles.

He, Capt. Ramsey, was asked whether, with these planes available from November 27th to December 7th, he could have complied with a directive to conduct long range reconnaissance through 360° (page 583). He stated: No. A single plane going to 700 miles could cover a sector of only 8°; only 50% of the 66 planes could be used continuously and therefore only 264° could be covered daily (page 583); 360° could be covered only one, or possibly two, days in an emergency but could not be maintained. Three weeks of intensive daily searches would have seen about a 75% reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit, placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other going. The pilots could have kept going about six weeks but then would need a protracted rest (page 584). Daily long range reconnaissance could have been maintained indefinitely by using 30 planes each day until the exhaustion period was reached, provided they were permitted by higher authority to operate that many for search alone, because that would have left them entirely without a striking group except as remaining 36 were available (page 583). Without exhausting planes or personnel, and assuming the supply of critical parts, they could have safely and indefinitely operated a daily reconnaissance to 700 miles with 18 planes and could have covered 144° (pages 584-5).

He further stated that a 700 mile radius of search with 18 planes was based upon a 25-mile visibility. Such visibility did not ordinarily prevail in the Hawaiian Area for a distance of 700 miles; it was either very good or so bad that scouting was impracticable (page 590). Except in a case of a wide-spread weather front, a patrol to 700 miles in a 144° sector had a good chance of detecting any large number of vessels on any given day (page 590).

For the PBY-5's, which in the case of several squadrons had during October and November just replaced the PBY-1, 2, and 3 planes, there were substantially no spare parts. There was the usual shakedown difficulty with a new type plane; engine sections cracked and replacement program in effect; material for installing armor and leak-proof tanks in the PBY-5's just being received, and first planes were finished December 7th (page 591).

He, Capt. Ramsey, said that once at Pearl Harbor he saw forty PBY-5's going through to Australia, New Zealand, or Dutch East Indies. This was at a time when such planes were needed at Pearl Harbor (page 602).

He agreed with the Roberts' Report to the extent that the means for distant reconnaissance at their disposal would have provided a certain degree of security, but were not adequate for absolute security (page 595).

He said that there had been discussions of the most probable sector for an enemy attack and the northwest sector was considered the most likely line of approach (page 597). In drills for readiness the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was ordered to take up the sector from 315° to 00°, and for any single day he would have sent the planes to cover this sector. On a continental control, the sector would have to be varied, as if a single sector were flown every day the enemy would learn of this and easily avoid it (page 597).

Admiral Davis said that the entire 360° circumference was not of equal importance; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another arc to the south and west were the most important. He estimated that if there had been a coverage of 180° so divided established after receipt of the dispatch of November 27, the chances would have been fairly good, perhaps two out of three that the patrol would have intercepted the Japanese carriers; based on knowledge since acquired, he would be inclined to put the chances as no better than one out of two. The chances, he said, have always been good enough so that defensive search is more than justified. However, he felt that the Japanese had launched their attack at Pearl Harbor from a long distance in order to avoid detection and therefore, that the chances of sighting the Japanese by a previous day's search were less than one out of two.

Admiral Davis said that it was the Commander-in-Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with training and other Fleet improvements and that going into a defensive status would interfere with this work. Concerning the possibility of attack and precautions to be taken, Admiral Davis indicated that he only occasionally saw or heard of warnings given to the Commander in Chief; that he had stated that comprehensive air searches were practicable and would very definitely interfere with progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet; he naturally expressed the opinion that a surprise air attack was possible and could only be prevented by the most extensive searches but he did not realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. He is sure that Naval Intelligence did its best but is convinced that information on the subject was lacking.

Admiral Davis said that he did not believe that the Commander in Chief regarded the damage possibility that might result from a Japanese air raid as very great; that it was apparent that he felt that training and improvements of our own Fleet still had priority, particularly because he believed that there would not be at that time any overt action. Precautions to a certain degree had been taken. As December 7 approached, he was concerned about the general situation with respect to the outlying islands and stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection there. (p. 98-99)

Admiral Davis said that although there were not enough planes and pilots to have established and maintained a long-range 360° search indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft. It could have been undertaken had it been considered essential but unless reinforcements arrived it could not have been maintained.

Admiral McMorris said that, in general, it was a Navy responsibility to obtain early information of the approach of any possible enemy and that forces available for such detection were in general the Fleet patrol planes of PatWingTwo and that the extent of any search that they might carry on was determined by the Commander in Chief. It was as a practical matter, impossible to maintain an effective patrol for anything but a brief period. (p. 240)

Admiral McMorris said that it was not contemplated to use ships for picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii. (p. 240)

Admiral McMorris said that he thought that as of the time in question, the provisions made for obtaining early information of the approach of an enemy were the best that could reasonably be made consistent with the training and other demands on the part of the Fleet, although from hindsight the answer would be otherwise. (p. 241)

Admiral Calhoun said that after the warning of November 27th, CincPac ordered air patrol to the limit of endurance of planes and pilots (page 941). Admiral Smith testified that patrols were flown over operating areas, but there were not sufficient planes for a 360° search (page 538).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Bellinger maintained an air patrol of the operating areas only because he had insufficient planes for a more extensive patrol; however Admiral Bellinger based his position entirely on the shortages of planes and not on personnel fatigue. (p. 43)

Admiral Smith said that if CincPac had interpreted Exhibit 17 (War Warning) to mean an attack on Pearl Harbor, he could have put out a search with available aircraft, including Army and carrier-based planes, moved the Fleet westward, and advanced carriers to intercept the Japanese (page 557). Without Fleet movement, he could have searched, with the available planes, a radius of perhaps 600 miles, but not through 360° (pages 557-8). The destroyers were required to protect heavy ships in case of the expected submarine attack and could not be used for patrol.

Exhibit 59, a letter by Admiral Nimitz, dated January 7, 1942, was an urgent request for more patrol planes so as to conduct an effective daily search to about 800 miles, which would require about fifty planes daily—there being at the time of this letter a total of 109 (Army and Navy) long range planes available. It was said that this was inadequate for search, a striking force and special missions; a minimum of three times the number needed for one day was necessary. He described the extent of the search being made: 25 patrol planes and 12 B-17's were used daily for a 700-mile search, covering 290°; and relatively ineffectual planes, such as available VSO, VJ, and B-18's were used to cover the remaining sectors to about 200-300 miles. To this were annexed supporting and detailed memoranda, including a letter by Admiral Bellinger, dated December 30, 1941.

Until August, 1941, Captain George Vanduers was an assistant to Admiral Bellinger particularly in connection with arrangements for joint Army-Navy air command. (p. 290). He prepared the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, which indicated that a surprise carrier raid appeared to be the most probable course of action for the enemy. (p. 290). Captain Vanduers stated that, in his opinion, search with 80 planes over a two-week period of the most probable sectors would have been about 40% effective.

Admiral Fitch, who preceded Admiral Bellinger and was Commander of Patrol Wing Two from June, 1940, until October, 1940, said that during the time when he was in command of Patrol Wing Two it was recognized that they had insufficient planes and efforts were made to increase the effectiveness of those they did have, to develop Western island bases and to increase the number of planes. Off-shore patrol plane searches were instituted as a routine from Pearl Harbor and varied as to the amount of searches conducted. (p. 228-9). Admiral Fitch said that assuming 80 planes, long range, available and employed over a two-week period and searching only the most probable sectors, a search plan could be evolved which could be expected reasonably to be 50% effective in detecting an enemy attack. (p. 289)

Admiral Kimmel said that if he had had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and it had met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an attack except by the means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126). Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably could have delivered a very effective attack. The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector.

XXIII. ACTION TAKEN BY GENERAL SHORT

General Short testified that Alert No. 1 against sabotage was put in effect. General Short considered sabotage as the main danger since the information received was that the Japanese would move Southward (page 239). He said that in a conference, in response to Admiral Kimmel's question, Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, had said there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there was no disagreement. Also, he knew that Admiral Kimmel did not think an air attack likely or he would have moved the ships out. The dispatch which General Short had received put emphasis on not alarming the civilian population and there had been no indication as to what form hostilities might take. He pointed out that the Army sent in B-24's on photo mission

unarmed, and also on December 6th sent out twelve B-17's not in combat condition (page 240).

He said that although he had had conferences with Admiral Kimmel during this period, no request was made of him for planes for long distance reconnaissance (page 249).

He did not recall having seen the dispatch of November 24th, but did see the dispatch of November 28th, which had repeated the Army dispatch to him.

Captain Curts discussed the general procedure for delivering copies of Navy messages to the Army and the procedure handled in connection with the November 27 dispatch as follows:

"Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase of such a dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a paraphrase to the addressee's communication office, and have them ask the Commanding General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to sign the dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular dispatch wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would take care of it by sending his Intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I tried to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused, saying that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief of Staff, had delivered a copy to General Short's G-2 officer for delivery to General Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G-2 officer, told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally in his bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, personally, about upsetting the system of receipts, but, in my own mind, I am satisfied that this dispatch was delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short, although I held no receipt." (p. 112)

In response to the direction contained in the Army dispatch, General Short advised the War Department of the action taken by him. The War Department did not reply. He received another telegram on November 28th which confirmed him in his belief that sabotage was considered the main danger (page 244). He replied on that day telling what he had done (page 245). He did not report on long range reconnaissance for that was the Navy's responsibility (page 246). He received no further information from the War Department and did not change his alert (page 243).

General Marshall said that after the Army dispatch of November 27th, no further warnings were sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short until December 7th (page 869). Two other messages warning against sabotage were sent by other parts of the War Department on November 28th, but General Marshall was not familiar with these until after December 7th (page 869).

General Marshall stated, concerning the dispatch in which General Short informed the War Department of the measures taken pursuant to the warning of November 27th, that so far as they could determine the reply from the Philippines and the reply from Hawaii came in together and were stapled together. General Marshall initialed the one from the Philippines, which was on top, but not the one from Hawaii (pages 880-1). He had no recollection one way or the other as to whether he had seen the one from Hawaii. He was away from November 26th-28th (page 880), and at other times up to December 7th, and had no recollection whether or not he knew of the precautions which General Short had taken (page 881).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having been advised of General Short's reply until after December 7th (pages 151, 802).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of alert the Army had effective at this time, but he knew that they had some alert in effect (page 326).

XXIV. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AND UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR—JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS

A. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE

Admiral Bloch said that he had been advised by the District Intelligence Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consulate who were spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the

Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on this matter dated November 10, 1941, file S-A8-5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC) A8-5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above-mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The Army would not agree to the indictment of these Japanese and the matter was referred to Washington where the War and Navy Departments agreed that they would not be brought to trial. (p. 15)

Captain Murphy said that there was a general impression that the Japanese could know anything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet. (p. 200)

Admiral Brown said that he thought it quite probable that the Japanese had a copy of the employment schedule setting forth the Fleet Movements. (p. 145)

Captain Mayfield pointed out that the topography of Pearl Harbor permitted easy observation of the ships there. Captain Mayfield was of the belief that there were about 350 Japanese societies which were active. He said that there were also 250 consular agents which he believed were used by the Japanese consulate for the purpose of getting information. (p. 311)

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of the domestic branch of ONI and the activities of the Counter-Espionage Section and conference with the F. B. I. and the Army set-up. (p. 284) Admiral Wilkinson also discussed the Navy's desire to have the Department of Justice prosecute various Japanese in Hawaii for being non-registered agents of a foreign government and said that the Commanding General had urged that prosecution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the Japanese and the Americans.

Captain Mayfield said that he had participated in conferences at Hawaii concerning the possible prosecution of the Japanese consular agents but that the Army had indicated that they did not want these men prosecuted. (p. 311-312)

Concerning the use of Japanese fishing boats and Intelligence work, Captain Mayfield said there never was definite proof of espionage in all of these boats but he believed that they were used for that purpose. (p. 312) Captain Mayfield said that he had no exact information indicating that amateur radio transmitters were used for Intelligence work or regular commercial broadcasts from Hawaii. (p. 312)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the Japanese consular agents of which there were about 240 and the fact that one of them in June 1940 had been proved to have been engaged in espionage. He discussed the correspondence relating to the prosecution of these consular agents which was resisted by General Short.

Lt. Stephenson discussed the sources of Japanese espionage information and the limitations on counter Intelligence due to limited personnel in ONI and to other reasons. (p. 326)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the measures taken to prevent the acquisition of information by visiting Japanese merchant crewmen, etc. (p. 327)

Lt. Stephenson discussed at some length the various sources of information open to Japanese and the inability of the Intelligence Section to prevent the acquisition and transmission of such information.

Lt. Stephenson referred to reports which he had written concerning the espionage problem in Hawaii dated February 9 and February 14, 1942 in the Kuehn case and a report dated April 20, 1943 in the Counter-Intelligence file of ONI. He said that it was known on the basis of information after the war that the consulate head used commercial communication facilities for the transmitting of vital Intelligence from and after December 3. (p. 331)

Lt. Stephenson said that no evidence had ever been found establishing that Japanese sampans had been used for espionage purposes but it was recognized that they were so used. (p. 332)

Concerning Japanese espionage, Admiral Smith said:

"I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was sent

out by the Japanese by plane. The Intelligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who flew back to the West Coast, and, as the result of all this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe of Charles Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Department intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these priests, but it was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement between the United States and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part of Japanese communications between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii, trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working, but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them."

Captain McCollum said that it had been suspected for some time prior to December 7, 1941, that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. He said that at various times during the last 6 months of 1941 U. S. destroyers had reported contacts with enemy subs in and around the Hawaiian group: Several of these contacts were considered well authenticated. Although most of the contacts were not in the immediate vicinity of Honolulu, he believed that one had been made in Molokai Channel—the approach to the drill grounds of the fleet. In July or August, 1941, it had actually been suggested that a search be made of a certain point to the north of Midway, where it was believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with some of the Japanese reconnaissance subs (p. 23-24).

Vice Admiral Smith stated that there had been many reported submarine contacts prior to 7 December 1941 in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but that in most cases these contacts had not been considered authentic. He did not recall any submarine contacts during the period October-December, 1941 (p. 340).

Captain John B. Earle, USN, in December, 1941, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, testified that in the several months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack there were ten to fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor, most of the reports coming from sampans, occasionally from Army lookout posts, and now and then from planes (p. 451). Captain Earle recalled few of the details of these reports; he remembered none in the months of October and November, 1941, or in December prior to the 6th of that month (p. 451).

A search of the files of CinCPac by Admiral Hewitt's investigation resulted in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:

(1) On 3 November 1941 an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41 was observed by a patrol plane and crossed by Task Force One. An air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032300, 040042).

(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of the CinCPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a

restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A search of part of the area by a task group of three destroyers was pursued from 1050 to 1845 on the 28th but produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).

(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23, which was lost in a change of range; it was evaluated as probably not indicating the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made by DesRon 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.

Lieutenant Woodrum said that over a period of years considerable information had been gathered by the Naval Intelligence Service concerning Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. He said, "There are voluminous reports available concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It is well known that officers attached to these groups made 'sightseeing trips' of the islands, including such vantage points as Aiea Heights." (P. 385.)

Admiral Pye stated that the Japanese had practically unlimited means of obtaining and transmitting information concerning United States ships at Oahu (page 429). Charts recovered after the attack, he said, indicated that the Japanese had planned to attack certain berths, expecting the ships to be in the position in which they had been berthed three weeks earlier (page 430).

Admiral DeLany stated that the enemy had unlimited opportunity for observation and for getting information out of Pearl Harbor. The operating schedule for the Fleet provided a varying length of time for ships to be in port and at sea (page 499). But, he had no specific information that the Japanese were endeavoring to keep currently informed of the location and movements of Units of the Fleet immediately preceding December 7, 1941 (page 500).

Commander Rochefort said that Japanese opportunities for espionage and for transmission of information were ample (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, there were no restrictions on the Japanese getting information out of Hawaii, but the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables (pages 909-910).

B. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR

Captain Rochefort, officer-in-charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, said that his immediate superior was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. In his relations with the District Intelligence Officer, he freely exchanged information and views, except for "ultra" information. The relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to "exchange all information available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by him." A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer every morning. With regard to the FBI, Captain Rochefort met the agent-in-charge frequently and discussed the general situation, but did not discuss ultra matters. In turn, the FBI agent kept Captain Rochefort informed of what he was doing, "possibly with some limitation." Captain Rochefort's relationship with the Army was similar to that with the FBI. He said that between 27 November and 7 December 1941 he had several talks and exchanged opinions with Colonel Fielder, G-2 to General Short. However, he gave the Army no ultra information. He said that his relationship with the Army was entirely on a personal basis—i. e., there was no official system set up for joint operations. Captain Rochefort's relations with the Federal Communications Commission were limited to technical matters, such as direction finding and the location of unauthorized stations (p. 44-46, 65).

Captain Rochefort said that during the latter part of 1941 the communication intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the tasks of attacking and exploiting Jap personnel code, administrative code, and the code in use in the Marshalls area. It was also to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems, except the "five-numbered system." The Washington center was charged with general control of all three units and in addition worked on Jap diplomatic systems and such others as were directed (p. 44).

Admiral Hewitt's examination brought out information not previously developed regarding the intelligence sources and activities of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

In this connection, Commander Fabian said that he had been attached in November and December, 1941, to the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor. This unit had a number of personnel detailed to the decryption of Japanese radio traffic and operated a direction finder, twenty-six radio receivers, and other equipment necessary to intercept enemy transmissions. Its general mission was to

study Japanese communications with a view to keeping track of the Jap fleet, and in this connection the unit was attempting to break the enemy naval system JN-25 (p. 68-69, 73). The unit also intercepted Jap diplomatic codes and of these was assigned the task of reading the machine cipher "purple," machine cipher "red" and the code J-19. However, the exploitation of these codes was primarily for the purpose of obtaining local information: all purple traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in the red and J-19 codes were sent to Washington for complete analysis. The latter messages were not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit, since this unit was not performing any cryptanalysis of the diplomatic codes (p. 70-72). Commander Fabian said that from breaking the "purple" dispatches during the period 27 November to 7 December they knew that American-Japanese negotiations in Washington were not proceeding satisfactorily and would probably be broken off (p. 72).

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, during 1941, said that a copy of all Jap diplomatic messages decrypted by the Corregidor radio intelligence unit was furnished daily to the Army. The Army was not given copies of dispatches sent out by CinCAF to CinCPac or to Washington dealing with purely naval matters. Captain Mason said, however, that he conferred quite frequently with the head of intelligence in the Philippine Army Department and quite often provided estimates as to the locations of the Jap fleet. Speaking generally, Captain Mason said that he was in close contact with the Army most of the time and that information was freely exchanged. He said that the Army did not have a radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, although they did have an intercept station which merely copied Japanese Army and diplomatic traffic (p. 70-71).

Captain Safford, chief of the Communications Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department, during 1941, said that the Corregidor radio intelligence unit had been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems for several years, up to and including 7 December 1941. Main interest of this unit was on the local Asiatic circuits for the information of CinCAF, but late in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering the Berlin-Tokyo circuit. These latter intercepts were forwarded to Washington and weren't touched locally (p. 98-99).

With respect to the exchange of information among the Corregidor, Pearl Harbor and Washington radio intelligence units, Captain Safford made the following statement (p. 99):

"If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the intercept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for the 'purple' machine and keys for another system which we called Jig-19, and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of duty.

"With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few."

Captain Safford said further that there was a free exchange of intelligence information between the Corregidor and Pearl Harbor units "so far as it pertained to the projects they were assigned." However, since the dissemination of intelligence was considered a function of Naval Intelligence rather than Naval Communications, Captain Safford indicated that information regarding the Japanese fleet obtained by the Corregidor unit would not necessarily be passed to the Pearl Harbor unit. He said that such information would normally be passed to CinCAF or his Fleet Intelligence Officer, and further dissemination would be made by them (p. 100-101).

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, was District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, in December, 1941. The mission of his office comprised general intelligence matters in cooperation with other federal and local intelligence organizations, especially with respect to espionage and counter-espionage and any other intelligence functions as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the District Commandant. Lt. Col. Bicknell was the Army officer charged with local intelligence. The FBI official was Mr. Robert L. Shivers (p. 558).

Admiral Mayfield testified that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations prescribed complete cooperation between the District Intelligence Office and G-2 of the Army and the FBI. Admiral Mayfield stated that cooperation was full and whole-hearted, that all information possessed by his office was readily available to G-2 and the FBI, which were given copies of any material of interest (p. 559).

Admiral Mayfield stressed that despite free interchange of assistance between his office and the radio intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District, headed by Commander Rochefort, that unit was a separate organization and in no sense subordinate to the District Intelligence Office. Commander Rochefort's unit reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the opinion of Admiral Mayfield. As to the general nature of the work of Commander Rochefort's unit, Admiral Mayfield was unable to give definite information (p. 560).

Reports by Commander Rochefort's unit, concerning the location or movements of Japanese fleet units, were not routed to the District Intelligence Office, and Admiral Mayfield said he had no knowledge of them (p. 561).

Relations between the District Intelligence Office and the Fleet Intelligence Office were, according to Admiral Mayfield, cordial, close and cooperative. He was in "more or less constant" personal communication with Captain Layton (the Fleet Intelligence Officer), to whom he endeavored to furnish all information of interest (p. 560-561).

Admiral Mayfield recalled no conversations with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort from November 27th to December 7, 1941, concerning the prospects of war between Japan and the United States. Admiral Mayfield said the only intelligence matters he discussed with Admiral Bloch and Captain Layton concerned counter-espionage measures. Admiral Mayfield added he was not advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941, of the so-called war warning (p. 574-575).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Admiral Bellinger added that not until after 7 December 1941 did he see or know of the CNO dispatch of 23 November stating that hostile action by the Japanese was possible. Nor, said Admiral Bellinger, did he see any of the daily communication intelligence summaries, 14 October to 5 December 1941, prepared by the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel (p. 498-499).

Admiral Bellinger did not remember having seen a memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel on the subject of the location of the Japanese fleet (p. 499).

(1) Sources and distribution:

Admiral Kingman said that the details of administration of the investigative activities within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the Commandant than was the case in those cases more closely connected with Washington. He recalled that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the investigative activities in the Fourteenth Naval District which were carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty thereat, and thinks that this was mentioned in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations which, however, the Examining Officer was unable subsequently to locate. (p. 336) Admiral Kingman could recall nothing relating to the activities of the so-called consular agents at Hawaii. (p. 336)

The facilities for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies were, according to Admiral Bloch, as follows: When Admiral Bloch arrived at Pearl Harbor, there were two units at Pearl Harbor composed of communicators and Intelligence people, Japanese language students. The information they secured by radio intelligence and such other information as they secured was transmitted to Cavite and to the Navy Department. That was Admiral Bloch's principal source of Japanese intelligence. They also received the intelligence that was collected at Cavite.

When Admiral Bloch arrived, he was dissatisfied with this organization and he organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence," where they were under one hand. This unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors and all the other things they had, with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, this unit was placed in a secure place, one big room in the basement of the office building, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders. Admiral

Bloch always did his best to augment this force by getting more and better men. In addition to that unit, they had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army Intelligence and the FBI and they also had such reports as were sent to them by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. They kept in touch with the Commander-in-Chief as best they could and Admiral Bloch believed that they were getting everything that was pertinent although the Commander-in-Chief had many sources of information that Admiral Bloch did not have. Admiral Bloch felt, however, that Admiral Kimmel conscientiously endeavored to give to him everything that Admiral Kimmel thought he should have. Admiral Bloch believed that the Navy Department had more knowledge about actual conditions than they did. (p. 12) All of the information received by the Combat Intelligence unit, he said, was always delivered to the Commander-in-Chief. (p. 13)

Admiral Smith said that they got very little Intelligence on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but that they had radio intelligence and every time that one or more of the three Task Force Commanders were in port or the Type Commanders were in port, Admiral Kimmel would have them over and have the Intelligence Officer point out on his chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of the location of all units of the Japanese Fleet. Admiral Smith was present at all of such conferences. The War Plans Officer (then Captain now Rear Admiral McMorris), the Operations Officer then Captain now Rear Admiral De Lany, the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Comdr. Layton) and the Fleet Communications Officer, were always fully informed of all intelligence in this manner. (p. 33)

Captain Edwin T. Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, during 1941. He had studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. (p. 214)

The sources from which he obtained information concerning the Japanese Navy in 1941 were:

"The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval Attache, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander-in-Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu." (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he thought that our intelligence coverage was good, although always incomplete.

Captain Layton said that he felt that the State Department undoubtedly had information which was not supplied to the Commander in Chief and which would have been of value. (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he intimately concerned himself with the results obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organizations. He said that the information obtained and made available to the Commander in Chief was principally from the unit at Cavite and the local unit in Pearl Harbor, that almost nothing came from Washington, and that he felt that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture. (p. 216)

Captain Layton said that he communicated the available intelligence concerning Japanese naval forces daily at about 8:15 in the morning, and if subsequent to that time important information was received, he would report it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity. When he reported to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions the War Plans Officer and senior Operations Officer were called in. When task force commanders would return to port, Admiral Kimmel would send for Layton and have him review the situation. (p. 216)

The discussions which he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized generally as follows:

"The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the

Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls the estimated air strength in the area the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby submarines—they were called 'submerged submarines'—off Molakai, were submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions." (p. 217)

Commander Rochefort had studied Japanese in Japan for three years from about September, 1929 until September, 1932, and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator. Commander Rochefort's source of information in addition to the work of his own Combat Intelligence Unit were the Washington headquarters, a unit similar to his attached to CincAF, and other government agencies such as the FBI, the Army and F. C. C. in Honolulu. The information furnished by these latter agencies, he said, was of no value prior to December 7, 1941. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort said that any message originating in one of the combat intelligence units was automatically sent to the other two units. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort reported the intelligence which came into his hands to COMFOURTEEN personally and to the Commander-in-Chief, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Captain Mayfield said that the organization of the District Intelligence Office when he reported for duty consisted of about thirteen persons. He sought and obtained additional personnel but his opinion was that that organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7. (p. 309) Captain Mayfield said that the cooperation between the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence at Hawaii was very good. (p. 309)

Captain Layton said that the Army's liaison with the Fleet was through Colonel Edward Railey and that he saw Colonel Railey almost every day. He did not receive from any Army source any information available. (p. 218)

In his statement at the end of his examination Lt. Stephenson said that there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization that Admiral Bloch was not sufficiently security conscious and not sufficiently mindful of the enemy espionage potential at Hawaii. This, however, he said could make him cite no casual connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack.

Captain Earle said that he was generally familiar with the activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District, and so far as he knew both he and Admiral Bloch were satisfied with the activities of that office. He could recall nothing of the results obtained by Commander Rochefort's unit. (p. 373-5)

Admiral McCormick remembered no instance where the War Plans Section received any intelligence derived from local sources, except one or two cases dealing with counter-espionage. (p. 70) Admiral McCormick said that he had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until they saw the dispatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo-China. He said that the War Plans Section, as a whole, was not furnished with daily or periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence or Fleet Intelligence. (p. 70)

Admiral Delany believed that the information furnished by Intelligence was the best that those sources could assemble but was aware that the sources were inadequate and believed that there was a general feeling that they were more or less operating in the dark not only from the information that they were able to collect in Pearl Harbor but also as to information furnished from other sources. This applied to information both as to the location of Japanese units and as to the probability of war. (p. 84)

Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the Naval Intelligence bulletins. (p. 138)

Admiral Pye said that Admiral Kimmel in effect turned over to him the training program and in connection with that his consultations with Admiral Kimmel were frequent. Also, Admiral Kimmel customarily called in the

Intelligence Officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known. (p. 148)

Concerning the intelligence available from the middle of October until the time of the attack, Admiral McMorris said that they felt that they would like to have known lots more than they did and that on the whole, they felt it was somewhat insufficient but did not see any probability of achieving improvement. (p. 241)

Admiral Kimmel testified that his Fleet Intelligence worked with ComFOURTEEN's Intelligence. He depended largely on units of the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence for information. The Intelligence units were satisfactory (page 280). Also he received intelligence from ComFOURTEEN, Navy Department, and forces afloat (page 280). Summaries of information were furnished him (page 281). The number of war plans officers were increased by him. Serving as such were McMorris, McCormick, Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer, and a Lieutenant. All enemy intelligence went to war plans and estimates were drawn from day to day (page 281). Information was furnished to him, to his War Plans head, to his Chief of Staff, and to Captain DeLany (Operations). The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and he interchanged intelligence (page 282). Prior to December 7th, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was informed of intelligence affecting Hawaii and other places where he had forces. He was not informed regarding plans for places distant from Hawaii (page 282). The Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel said, gave him all the information which he had (page 283).

Captain Layton said that, as Fleet Intelligence Officer, his main sources of information were from CNO and DONI, who forwarded reports from naval diplomatic sources, reports from observers, from the State Department, from the local intelligence officers, and liaison with the British secret intelligence, and reports from ComTWELVE, ComSIXTEEN, and ComTHIRTEEN (page 904). He was kept informed of FBI and Army Intelligence at the time (page 909). He passed information to CincPac by hand in its original form. If the information was a long report, he made a brief of it (page 904). He thought that local Army Intelligence was not getting the "highly secret" information from the Army; he informed them in general (page 908).

Admiral Bloch said that the intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District was efficient, although not adequate in space and personnel, and kept him and CincPac informed (page 391). Intelligence was received from CincPac, the District Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. He did not receive the intelligence bulletins from the Navy Department, his ONI probably did (page 392).

Commander Rochefort testified that he was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District from June through December, 1941 (page 471). Combat intelligence consisted of an interceptor unit, a direction finder unit, and a cryptographic or research group. Collaboration with the FBI, Army, and Federal Communications Commission was on a personal basis. They received, normally, reports from ONI at Washington, and the letters and dispatches in their own system, which were of a more technical nature. They would get all information of a technical nature from Washington, but all information available at ONI in Washington was not sent them as a matter of course (page 471). Only one or two bits of political or diplomatic information were sent to him (page 472). Military information would be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Rochefort handled intelligence of Japanese ship movements. The information received was automatically passed to CNO, CincAsiatic, and to CincPac. Written summaries were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer (page 472).

The following information was contained in the ComFourteen Radio Intelligence Summaries and was made available to Admiral Kimmel (p. 193):

1. *The November 27th Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary, delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Samo and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third*

Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning airforces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

2. The Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered November 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

3. The communication intelligence summary of the 29th of November, delivered the 30th, stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders, both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, Radio Yokusuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AINew, and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, including CarDiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships, but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The CinC Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichijima the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet (Hew. Exhibit 22).

4. The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, and that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARU's. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief,

Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus the latter's known progress from the Empire to Chickijiam and Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; that various facts indicated a submarine concentration in the Marshalls. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only of the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer (Hew. Exhibit 22).

5. The communication intelligence summary for December 1st, delivered on December 2nd, stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December, indicated that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading, "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was understood in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated, as to the First Fleet, "Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China"; Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that the same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka—Chickijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated, "No change." As to carriers, it was said, "No change." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

6. The communication intelligence summary delivered on December 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that COMSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated

that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routine indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "No units have stood out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.

Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew Exhibit 22).

7. The communication intelligence summary of December 3rd, delivered on the 4th, under the heading "General," stated that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew Exhibit 22).

8. The communication intelligence summary of December 4th, delivered on the 5th, stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system, using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated, "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initiated by Admiral Kimmel (Hew Exhibit 22).

9. The radio intelligence summary for December 5th, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operations. There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old, which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition

of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you have said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force had been seen either."

There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet, addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo-China (Hew. Exhibit 22).

Any time important information was received, he said, CinePac and ComFOURTEEN would come and discuss it.

General Marshall said that prior to December 7th, he thought that all pertinent Army intelligence was given to the Navy, but the Army did not then receive, as regular routine, intelligence from the Navy as to Japanese ship movements (page 864).

(2) Interception of Japanese communications:

Captain Rochefort said that certain communications with which the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was concerned (Exhibit 13) were received by him from the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, about 2 or 3 December 1941. He identified one of these as Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245, and said that due to the difficulties inherent in the code it had not been deciphered until the night of 10 December. The message prescribed a set of signals indicating the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area and their activities, and included arrangements for lights in houses, on beaches, from boats, want ads over Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island (p. 57). Captain Rochefort said that aside from this communication he did not receive prior to December 7, 1941, any other Japanese reports regarding American ships in Pearl Harbor or preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack (p. 58).

Captain Rochefort also read into the record two communications (part of Exhibit 13) which he did not recollect having seen before (p. 57-59). One of these referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives, the other to the lack of reconnaissance by the "fleet air arm" at Hawaii.

Admiral Mayfield said that the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Naval District had sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on February 9, 1942, a report (part of Exhibit 40) regarding a message sent by the Japanese consulate to Tokyo on 3 December 1941. A copy of this message had been delivered by Admiral Mayfield to Commander Rochefort's radio intelligence unit for decryption on 4 or 5 December, but Admiral Mayfield did not learn its contents until 11 December. The message transmitted to Tokyo a proposed system of signalling by lights and other methods for the purpose of reporting departures of U. S. naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system had been conceived and submitted to the Japanese Consulate by one Otto Kuehn, a German resident on Oahu, who was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. Admiral Mayfield stated that neither his office nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation found definite information that any part of the proposed signals had ever been used (p. 564-565).

Mr. William F. Friedman, Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications, Signal Security Agency, War Department, identified two Japanese messages from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, (Exhibit 13) as having been intercepted by the Army. They had been decoded by the Army on 8 December 1941. One of these messages referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives and the other pointed out the lack of reconnaissance being conducted by "the fleet air arm" at Hawaii (p. 522-523).

Captain Safford stated that the two messages referred to in the preceding paragraph (Exhibit 13) were in the Japanese PA-K2 code and could have been

decrypted by the Navy in one and a half to two hours. However, the Navy gave precedence to the processing of all "purple" and J-19 messages and would not have touched the PA-K2 communications as long as there were any J-19's on hand (p. 530-531).

Lt. Donald Woodrum, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, produced transcripts of telephone conversations obtained by tapping the lines of the Japanese Consul and Vice-Consul for the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941, when the taps were removed by order of Capt. Mayfield. The transcripts (marked Exhibit 38) contain little, if any, information of military significance, being concerned largely with routine consular activities and those of the local Japanese population. (p. 379)

To Lt. Woodrum's knowledge, there were only 2 local telephone intercepts which may have had military significance. The first was in 1940 from Vice Consul Okuda to a Buddhist priest on the island of Maui advising the latter to keep the Consulate informed on any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In 1941, the exact date not stated, a woman very much agitated called the Consulate to say the the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor, to which the person at the Consulate made no reply. (p. 383)

Wire tapping was discontinued on 2 December because, in the opinion of Lt. Woodrum, the secrecy of the activity was jeopardized by the accidental discovery of similar activity on the part of the FBI by employees of the telephone company. (p. 379-81)

With regard to his instruction of 2 December 1941, that tapping of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul by officers of the District Intelligence Office cease, Admiral Mayfield gave as his reasons: (a) that the telephone company had discovered the FBI was also tapping these wires and he feared that the resulting disclosure of this tapping would jeopardize the security of the tapping by the District Intelligence Office, and (b) the interceptions up through 2 December had revealed nothing of intelligence value. (p. 571)

Lt. Woodrum stated that prior to 1 December 1941, efforts to obtain copies of coded messages sent from the Jap Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington via commercial cable companies were unsuccessful. As of 1 December, however, in accordance with an agreement between Mr. David Sarnoff, of RCA, and Admiral Bloch, copies of all messages sent via RCA were available to the naval service and the first of these were received at the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December. It is Lt. Woodrum's understanding that these were sent immediately to Commander Rochefort's unit and, further, that they were not decoded until after the attack, it being necessary even then to use a Japanese code book that was found during a search of the Consulate on the 7th. Summaries of decoded copies of messages sent from 1 December to 6 December has been marked "Exhibit 40." (p. 383-5)

Admiral Mayfield said that Exhibit 40 contained the translation and digest of several messages sent by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo via commercial cable companies on and after 3 December 1941. One of these messages, dated 3 December, reported the departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. A message, dated 4 December, reported the arrival of the HONOLULU. (p. 565) Copies of these two messages were received in the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December (p. 566) and forwarded to Commander Rochefort's unit. Another Japanese consulate message, dated 5 December, reported the arrival of 3 battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON, the departure of five heavy cruisers and other information. (p. 565) Admiral Mayfield did not know when this message had been received in his office. On 6 December, the Jap consulate filed two messages regarding U. S. ship movements and one regarding U. S. Army use of balloons. Admiral Mayfield believed that these probably did not reach his office until 7 December. (p. 566-567)

Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, testified that none of the intelligence material he received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor included any information received from intercepted telephone conversation of the Japanese or from intercepted cable messages. None of these cable messages was seen by Admiral Smith until two days after the attack. (p. 360)

Mr. George Street, Honolulu District Manager for RCA Communications, Incorporated, testified that during the first week in December 1941, copies of all cable messages sent to Japan by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu were turned over to the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer, (Admiral Mayfield) at his request. Mr. Street added that all the RCA copies of those messages had been

destroyed under authority of the Federal Communications Commission, because of lack of storage space. (p. 411-413)

Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer in the Hawaiian Department in November and December 1941, testified that the Army radio intercepted unit at Fort Shafter made no decryption whatever of intercepted Japanese messages. The intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decryption. (p. 387-388)

Commander Rochefort said that the United States was handicapped because it could not censor Japanese communications (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables, but efforts were made to get those messages. However, they had no information concerning the messages which the Japanese consul was sending out (pages 909-910).

Admiral Wilkinson said that the District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had endeavored to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents from the local cable companies but had been advised that the law did not permit interference of such messages. (p. 285) He said that despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence Officer had arranged to tap the long distance telephone and kept a record of the telephone conversations with Japan. This, he said, was done only in the last few days before December 7. The conversations in general appeared to be innocuous. There was one suspicious telephone conversation on the afternoon of December 6. Concerning this, Admiral Wilkinson said, "This conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed to intercept constituted, as I recall, the only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been correct." (p. 286)

Captain Mayfield said that messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio were not made available to him until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of RCA. He said that the Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company handled the traffic during the month of November. Traffic was switched to RCA as of December 1 and thereafter Captain Mayfield was able to obtain all of his traffic from RCA. Since it was in code and he had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit it to another organization to be read. He learned the content of a various number of these messages after the attack and there was considerable information about movements of the Fleet and other military forces which he said was not entirely accurate. (p. 311) Captain Mayfield said that so far as he was aware, the telephone conversations of the Japanese were not recorded or censored. (p. 313)

Admiral Bloch said that they were not able to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies did not and would not give them such dispatches. They all went by cable and so far as Admiral Bloch knew, none went by radio. (p. 15)

Admiral Smith said that they did not have access to the files in the Cable Office; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files; that it was taken to Mr. MacKey of Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph cable message; at that time there were certain Japanese codes which they could break and the Intelligence Officer thought if he could get those messages, he might learn what was going on; that they did not get them until three days after the attack and never received any information from this source before the war. (p. 46)

Commander Rochefort said that he received from the Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, directly or otherwise copies of such communications in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned—about December 1, 1941. These were about ten to fifteen messages and Commander Rochefort was asked to examine them, which he did. He succeeded in extracting some information from them within 12 hours, with the exception of two or three messages which he finished on the evening of December 10th. He said that the first messages did not contain any important information, but the latter two or three did contain important information. He said that

he had been unable to obtain that information at an earlier date because of the inherent difficulties in the task, and that the task had been made a matter of paramount importance and about 12 to 16 hours daily were devoted to that work alone. (p. 208-9)

Commander Rochefort said that the F. C. C. was monitoring radio traffic in the so-called "amateur" status, but that he never heard of their apprehending any communications from Japanese spies to Japan. (p. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at Hawaii communicated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and occasionally by radio. (P. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that he had not been informed of any telephone communication between the Consulate General at Hawaii and Japan. (p. 209)

Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese Consulate General, Captain Layton said:

"26.Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after?

"A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.

"27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack?

"A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source." (p. 218)

Captain Layton said that the District Intelligence Officer maintained certain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward appreciation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view, but that he did not recall the details of this. (p. 218)

Admiral Turner said that he did not know what type of decrypting Pearl Harbor was doing, but that Naval Communications had told him that CinePac was getting as much of the Japanese communications as they were, and sooner (page 1001). He said that the Director of Naval Communications had informed him that CinePac had the decrypted Japanese messages, and that was why no information of this nature was sent to CinePac. He was similarly assured by Admiral Noyes, he said.

Admiral Noyes denied telling Admiral Turner that Pearl Harbor was intercepting the same Japanese traffic as Washington (page 1036). He said that Pearl Harbor had an intercept station specializing in certain codes but was not intercepting Japanese cable messages, and the so-called "purple" messages were usually sent by cable (pages 1037-38).

Admiral Redman said that CinePac did not have facilities for decoding "purple" intercepts; the problem was not assigned to him and all translations were accomplished in Washington (page 1106).

(3) *Surveillance of consulate*

Admiral Bloch stated that after the receipt of certain dispatches relating to the destruction of codes, which are later discussed, he had Intelligence arrange for a close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate. What, if any, surveillance was in effect before this does not appear.

C. INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS

Captain McCollum, who was Officer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., during December, 1941, said that his duties consisted of evaluating and passing to the Director of Naval Intelligence all intelligence received concerning the Far East, including all information on the Jap Navy. (p. 10) Sources of intelligence available to his Section regarding the Jap Fleet were reports by our consular authorities and agents in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our merchant ships, reports on movements of Japanese merchant shipping, and radio intelligence supplied by Captain Safford's unit, Op-20-G. However, by the end of November, 1941, the Far Eastern Section had become almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Jap naval forces. This was due to the fact that U. S. embargoes against Japan had swept U. S. merchant shipping out of the north Pacific and also discouraged Japanese shipping to the Americas. In addition, increasingly strict Japanese security

measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get timely information out of the country. (p. 10, 12, 13) As a result of this situation, a dispatch was sent out by OpNav on 24 November (GCT) to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, pointing out that information on the Jap fleet was unsatisfactory and requesting that every effort be made by use of radio intelligence methods to locate the Japanese naval forces. (Exhibit 8) Following this dispatch, estimates were received from ComFourteen and ComSixteen, dated 26 November (GCT). (Exhibit 8) These evaluations were virtually the same and estimated that two Jap task forces were being organized, one fairly well located in the Formosa-southern Japan area, another possibly located in the Mandated Islands. However, ComFourteen estimated that there was a strong concentration of submarines and at least one carrier division with the force in the Mandates, while ComSixteen could not confirm this. Greater reliance was placed on ComSixteen's dispatch because his radio organization was in a better position to intercept Japanese radio traffic and was stronger in numbers and continuity of operation. (p. 13-14)

Captain McCollum said that radio intelligence consisted of three distinct procedures: translations of the enemy's code dispatches, inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic, and a study of the call signs of enemy ships. (p. 12) He said that on about 1 December 1941 intelligence obtained from a study of the call signs of Japanese ships became considerably less valuable because there was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the Jap fleet: "In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time elapsed before we could build up identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on . . . the actual radios were still going out, but we couldn't get anything out of them very much." (p. 15-16) Captain McCollum did not know of any general call sign change which had accompanied previous major movements of the Japanese. (p. 16) However, he said that taken in connection with the known regroupings of Jap naval forces and the fact that the Japanese fleet was believed ready for action the call sign change was interpreted as a "possible indication of action to come." He said that CincPac was as well informed as the Office of Naval Intelligence as to these changes in the call signs of the Jap fleet. (p. 17)

Other than the ONI bulletin of 1 December 1941, Captain McCollum was aware of no information sent out to the fleet from the Navy Department between 1 December and 7 December 1941 regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet. (p. 19)

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic, rather than from the decryption of Jap messages. (p. 73-74) Other sources of information during the period 26 November to 7 December 1941 were reports from the Naval Attache, Shanghai, and a number of sighting reports obtained by reconnaissance planes. On 2 December a despatch was sent from CinCAF to OpNav reporting the sighting of nine submarines. On the same date, another despatch to OpNav reported 3 submarines, 21 transports and enemy patrol planes in the Camranh Bay area. On 6 December, a despatch reported a convoy in Camranh Bay. Twenty-four to forty-eight hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a British report was received to the effect that heavy Japanese units were rounding Poulo Condore, French Indo China. During this period, it was believed that all known Jap carriers were in the Kure-Sasebo area. (p. 75-76)

Captain Rochefort stated that between 26 November and 7 December 1941 very little information was obtained regarding the location of the Jap fleet by radio intelligence means. The reason for this was that while the total volume of Jap radio traffic remained about the same or increased the traffic which contained as an addressee or originator one of the major vessels was almost non-existent. He said that the Japanese radio traffic which was received contained a certain amount of "padding or rejecting of messages," but that in his opinion there had been no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms. (p. 53)

Admiral Wilkinson stated that the ONI summary of 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) represented the best of the knowledge and belief of the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time, and was based on the digest of all available information, radio intelligence, and sightings. He believed, but could not be certain, that a copy of the summary had been sent air mail to Pearl Harbor on or about the date of issue, 1 December 1941. (p. 395)

Admiral Wilkinson recalled seeing a digest, prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI of daily Communication Intelligence summaries issued at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 22). He recalled noting in particular those for the period 1 December to 5 December, 1941, and being aware that a large part of the Japanese fleet appeared to have gone into radio silence. The Admiral believed that this fact appeared daily in reports issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and these reports drew the conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent, since the only movements picked up were in that direction (p. 396).

Admiral Smith said that based on the communication intelligence summaries during the period 27 November to 6 December 1941, he had estimated that the Japanese carriers during that period were "some in the Marshalls and the remainder in home areas." (p. 362) Referring further to the summaries, he said: (p. 363)

"Vice Admiral SMITH: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

"Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?"

"Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.

"Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?"

"Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up with, 'They are believed to be in home waters.'"

Admiral Smith said that he had not known about the change in call signs of the Jap Fleet which occurred on 1 December. (p. 364) He did not recall having discussed with Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers indicated by the communication intelligence summaries after 1 December. (p. 365)

A fortnightly summary, issued by ONI on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated concerning the Japanese military situation, that Japanese troops, supplies, and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continued. Japanese army strength in Indo-China was believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking Province and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China. Naval aircraft and craft also moved south. It was estimated that there were about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China, and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

Concerning the Japanese naval situation, the report stated that deployment of naval forces to the southward had indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters were pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Movements to the south appeared to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, then definitely indicated, would probably take sharper form in the following few days. To that date, this task force, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appeared to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constituted a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons; it asserted that although one division of battleships might be assigned, the major capital ship strength remained in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. It also stated that the equipment being carried south was a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consisted not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

The record does not contain other ONI summaries. Admiral Stark, however, testified that the estimates as to the positions of Japanese carriers and battleships were conflicting and that the easternmost position estimated was the Mandates (pages 72-3).

Admiral Turner said that there had been a great deal of naval radio traffic which suddenly ceased, which meant that the Japanese fleet had put to sea (page 994). Admiral Turner also said that they did not know where the Japanese fleet was. Deductions were that there was to be a covering force in the Marshalls' area and that some forces would carry on missions in the China Sea. Available information as to the location of the Japanese fleet, although considerable, was incomplete (page 1002).

Admiral Ingersoll stated that it was difficult to get information on Japanese ships. Units in Cavite and Pearl Harbor for radio intelligence were practically the only sources (page 818). When there was a significant move reported, he knew about it.

Captain Smith-Hutton said that in November, 1941, he could obtain no information of Japanese military movements except one to Southeast Asia. Japanese military movements did not appear in the press (page 1077). No information reached him indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the latter part of 1941, he felt sure that Japanese would make an aggressive move to relieve economic pressure exerted by the United States embargo, but he was not sure this would involve the United States in war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him (page 1079).

Ambassador Grew had no information as to movement of a Japanese carrier force towards Pearl Harbor (page 1064).

Admiral Redman did not think that the December 1st ONI Bulletin was sent to CincPac by dispatch (pages 1107-8).

Captain Layton

Captain Layton testified with respect to the photostatic copies of the various dispatches in exhibit 8 that he thought CinCPac received the dispatch of 24 November 1941, from OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac and others, that the dispatch from Com14 dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, had been sent by the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, and that Com16's dispatch of 26 November 1941, time date group 261331, was a reply to the Com14 dispatch 260110. (Page 190-191)

Captain Layton testified that the three dispatches referred to above (exhibit 8) summarized the intelligence available to Coms14, 16, CinCAF and CinCPac, concerning Japanese naval movements during the month preceding 26 November. (Page 191)

Captain Layton testified that he noted that the Com16 unit stated in the dispatch 261331, that it could not confirm the supposition: by Com14 that submarines and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and that Com16's best indications were that all First and Second Japanese Fleets were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. (Page 191)

Captain Layton considered that Com16's reference to First and Second Fleet carriers was made in relation to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated 29 July 1941; that the Japanese naval organization as stated by ONI at that time included information that there were attached to each of the First and Second Fleets, two carrier division, that is, CarDivs Three (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) and Five (RYUJO, HOSHO) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the First Fleet; and that CarDiv One (AKAGI, KAGA) and CarDiv Two (SORYU, HIRYU) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the Second Fleet; thus, Captain Layton explained, the ONI bulletin of July, 1941, stated that there were eight carriers assigned by the Japanese to the First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers listed as assigned to any other fleets.

Therefore, Captain Layton testified the Com16 dispatch 261331 stating that its best indications were that all known operating Japanese carriers were believed to be in the Kure-Sasebo area was understood by him to mean that all known operating Japanese carriers were in that area, and that Com14's estimate at that time differed from that of Com16, in that Com14 was of the opinion that there was at least one Japanese carrier in the Marshalls at that time. (Page 191-192) (also see Page 248-250)

said that in the latter part of November, he received information of two or more Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. He had reported to CincPac Japanese carriers at Truk and the Marshalls, in June, 1941 (page 912). On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire "4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home

area." This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913). He knows now that there were certain decrypted messages in the Navy Department which by themselves might not mean much, but taken together would have warned of an attack against Hawaii more than the messages they received. This refers to ship movement messages later discussed. Some other messages in Exhibit 63 indicated war, he said, but did not specifically refer to Pearl Harbor (page 916).

Commander Rochefort said that no Japanese ships were reported closer than the Marshalls during the latter part of November, up until December 7th (page 472). No information was received which indicated a Japanese attack other than at Guam or the Philippines, of the United States possessions. Nothing east of Guam was indicated.

Admiral DeLany stated that CinePac had no information contrary to the ONI Bulletin of December 1, 1941 (page 503). He recalled information that there was a small carrier force, prior to December 7th, to the southward of the Philippines, but that the main Japanese strength was at Japan (page 87).

Admiral McMorris stated that he had had no information that Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls (page 899).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was familiar with the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries, particularly those for the period 27 November–5 December 1941 (Exhibit 22); that he recalled being familiar with the information contained in them and though he frequently did not himself read them, he either heard them read or orally presented by Captain Layton; that he certainly had access to all the material contained in those summaries (pages 310–311).

He, in many cases, identified his own and the initials of Admiral Kimmel appearing either on the Communication Intelligence Summaries (Exhibit 22) or on the Intelligence reports prepared and submitted by Captain Layton (p. 310–311).

He further testified that he had no independent recollection of having seen the ComFOURTEEN dispatch of 26 November 1941, and other dispatches attached thereto in Exhibit 8, nor the memorandum dated 1 December 1941 prepared by Lt. Comdr. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. He considered it improbable, however, that he did not see the Layton memorandum of 1 December 1941 (p. 311–312).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that so far as he could recollect, he had believed the major elements of the Jap Fleet to be fairly well located on and after 1 December 1941. He remembered that on or about 1 December 1941 there was a change in the call signs of the Japanese fleet, and stated, with reference to the believed location of the Japanese carriers, that they were thought to be in home waters or towards Formosa (p. 312).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that offhand he could not recall the information on which his estimate as to the location of the Jap carriers was based, and that it would require a considerable number of quotations from Communication Intelligence Summaries (Ex. 22) to point out the source of such belief (p. 313).

Following this, Vice Admiral McMorris did refer to the Communication Intelligence Summaries, in an effort to show the basis for his belief that the carriers were in home waters or towards Formosa:

24 November: A statement that on the 23rd there were a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 3 with CinC Third Fleet.

25 November: A statement that one or more of the carrier divisions were present in the Mandates.

26 November: Reference was made to general traffic intelligence involving CinCs Second and Third Fleets, the China Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, and the Combined Air Force, indicating a heavy traffic condition, but no reference was made to any part of the Summary which said anything about carriers.

27 November: Reference was made to information in the Summary concerning various Japanese fleets but not to information specifically referring to carriers or to the carrier fleet.

28 November: Vice Admiral McMorris referred to information in the Communication Intelligence Summary of this date to the effect that there were many high precedence messages involving the Combined Fleet and to information concerning the Third Fleet, but he did not point out any information concerning carriers (p. 314).

29 November: Reference was made to various items of information in this Intelligence Summary, but not to any involving the carriers.

30 November: Reference was made to information to the effect that there was a strong impression that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was underway, and to the fact that one urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff of Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, and to the Combined Air Force.

1 December: No reference was made to any information concerning carriers (p. 315).

2 December: Reference was made to the paragraph in the Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on carriers and that carrier traffic was at a low ebb.

3 December: Reference was made to various items of information but none concerning carriers (p. 316).

4 December: Reference was made to the large number of urgent messages from Tokyo, to the lack of messages from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet, and to the fact that the former was believed to be in the vicinity of Takao (p. 316-317).

5 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders, and that there was no traffic from the Commander of the carriers or from the Commander of the Submarine Force (p. 317).

6 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders and to the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had originated several messages to the carriers (p. 317).

After reviewing the above Summaries, Vice Admiral McMorris admitted that between December 1st and the time of the Japanese attack there was no Intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a carrier fleet as such (p. 319). He stated, however, that it was his recollection that there had been one or two vague indications associating carriers with the Second and Third Fleets, and some possible associations with Palau and in at least one instance an association with the Marshalls (p. 320). Upon examination of the Fleet Intelligence Officer's memorandum of December 1st, Vice Admiral McMorris stated he could not find on it any reference to Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 (p. 320). He could not recall if there had been any conference between Admiral Kimmel and himself concerning the 1 December estimate of Captain Layton (p. 321).

He stated that he did not reach any conclusion that the carriers were operating independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet (p. 319).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that during the period in question, the information available as to the locations of the Japanese Fleet units was not as specific as was desirable; that he did not recall the lack of information as to the carriers, and "taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand . . . we were extremely disturbed" (p. 321).

General Short testified that he had received no information indicating Japanese movements east of Guam (p. 265).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the information from his own Fleet Intelligence was principally as to the movements of ships and, he said, it gave no indication of a Japanese attack (p. 327).

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of ONI and pointed out that there was no established or effective method for the dissemination of information of Combat Intelligence. (p. 280) Admiral Wilkinson said that for some time the Japanese section of the foreign branch of ONI had been preparing daily an analysis of the situation as to Japanese Fleet locations and as to Japanese-American relations. (p. 281) Admiral Wilkinson referred to the fortnight summary issued on December 1 and said that it had been discussed with Admirals Stark and Turner and had been sent out air mail on December 1.

According to Captain Safford, there were three main radio intelligence units—one in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations along the Atlantic seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean; the second at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Mid-

way, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor; the third at Corregidor. There were also intercept stations from the West Coast of the United States which fed their traffic directly to Washington. The main station in Washington was concerned particularly with that branch of intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments. It was also used for training personnel. The station at Pearl Harbor was confined to that branch of intelligence dealing with the dispositions and plans of naval forces in the Pacific and surveillance over Japanese naval communications. These duties did not include surveillance over any diplomatic communications. The Asiatic unit at Corregidor was at the disposal of CinCAF to use as he saw fit. Up to early 1941, it was mostly concerned with diplomatic communications, but in October or November shifted its main attention to Japanese naval communications. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that the unit at Pearl Harbor was kept fully informed only of results obtained by the Washington unit as to operations of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific with one important exception, namely that on December 1, 1941, CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN were sent a copy of a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that the Japanese were planning a landing in Malaya. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that on November 26, 1941, estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and distribution of the Japanese Fleet, and that the estimates differed. ComSIXTEEN'S report place one carrier division as operating in the South China Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters, and further added that the evaluation was considered reliable. He said that in Washington they believed that the report from ComSIXTEEN was correct, but did not so advise the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that on November 24 ONI had sent a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that Sixteenth District's intercepts were considered most reliable and requesting that other reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information. The basis for the belief that ComSIXTEEN's reports were better was the geographical location of ComSIXTEEN. (p. 357)

Captain Safford said, "Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December 1941, may be found in the monthly report of Station 'H'—in the 'Chronology' which was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks." (p. 360-2)

"Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by witness as being C. I. Station 'H' 'Chronology' for December 1—December 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communications Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination."

Admiral Brainard said that the "War Information Room" received information from sources such as O. N. I., Naval observers and what was made known to them through the communications system and plotted the movements of Naval units including Japanese. To the best of his knowledge, they were receiving all Japanese information available in the department. (p. 402).

Admiral Smith said that around the beginning of December 1941, the information he received from the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to the effect that one Japanese force was supposed to be at Truk and to the best of his recollection the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire waters; that they had no knowledge as to the Japanese carriers; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had said that he did not know where the carriers were; and that Admiral Smith recalled no difference of opinion between the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers. (p. 47)

Admiral Smith said that the Pacific Fleet staff believed that the Japanese Navy was very efficient although they had little knowledge or information concerning the Japanese Navy; all of the information on the Japanese Fleet was by Radio Intelligence only, that is, as to the location of the Fleet. (p. 59)

Admiral Pye said that a rather high evaluation was placed upon the report of the Intelligence Officer concerning the Japanese Fleet inasmuch as no contrary or other information had been received. At the time, Admiral Pye

knew the sources upon which the Intelligence Officer was relying for his information.

Concerning information from October, on as to the movements of units of the Japanese Fleet, Captain Layton said:

"Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attaches in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements of considerable number of Japanese transports and troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarkation. The Naval Attache at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for the joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Saeki area; that the invasion was to follow the line of the German blitzkreig of Holland and Belgium and that considerable air forces were being assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early part of November. Recurring reports of movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of some of these transports—that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats—led to a belief that amphibious operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface-force task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands—Southern Formosa region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations was noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the forerunner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied, 'Nothing yet.' He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com 14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet (which includes the First and Second Base Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally to our amphibious forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command, the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the French Indo-China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihoku and Takao, Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were somewhat connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this development, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of move-

ment, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-knit organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could not confirm the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of November, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated, in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com 14 unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch, but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G-3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condition of war was also received; and from the State Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again mentioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CincAF of Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is, active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Japanese Navy to be put into effect. On 6 December, a report from CincAF received stated CincChina had reported a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CincAF forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I prepared and submitted. It showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Divi-

sions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six—the latter was marked “May head for the Mandates?”—that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration of shore-based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area, and that the Cinc Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes, Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believed to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.

“34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?

“A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.

“35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?

“A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and NIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.

“36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?

“A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.

“37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the number of carriers in home waters?

“A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Fourteen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.

“38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at Hawaii?

“A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Commander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American Mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.

“39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up of forces as placed by your Intelligence toward the end of November, the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?

“A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however, was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and

cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts' Commission and not as an estimate of the situation that I had expressed formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.

"40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?

"A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that week-end, although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.

"41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to 7 December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?

"A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement discussed previously." (p. 219-223)

Captain Layton said:

"I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CincAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message, but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning." (p. 225)

In view of its importance, the following is quoted directly from the examination of Commander Rochefort:

"32.Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chronologically, as nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or about 1 October 1941.

"A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was to endeavor to obtain information from the specific types of traffic as assigned by Washington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of radio traffic originated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain information by radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first mission mentioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the part of the personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not in any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study an estimate was drawn up which was submitted to the Commandant, who

released a dispatch to Washington, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this dispatch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence, due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restrictions, was made available from the files of the communication companies in Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the personnel attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.

"33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate which you made about 26 November?

"A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main, of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the other force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.

"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?

"A. Two, sir.

"35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you getting along similar lines from the other two units?

"A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of my knowledge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.

"36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers—do I understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the Marshall Islands or proceeding in that direction?

"A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls area.

"37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the southward of, say, Formosa?

"A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.

"38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East in agreement with your estimate?

"A. No, sir.

"39. Q. In what respect?

"A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Washington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for the direction of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier division in the Marshalls.

"40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?

"A. I do not recall.

"41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch from Com 14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

"A. Yes, sir; the following morning the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.

"42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

"A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.

"43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplomatic negotiations were concerned?

"A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.

"44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a similar estimate from Washington, is that correct?

"A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating that several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was no direct answer.

"45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance of this subject, that you had a right to expect something from Washington?

"A. No, sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter within their purview.

"46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the most important units?

"A. Yes, sir.

"47. Q. Do you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not have a greater number of those ships located?

"A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack of traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of the larger ships.

"48. Q. What particular type of Japanese man-o-war did you feel you were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon their movements?

"A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.

"49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the large Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?

"A. No, sir.

"50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand you to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?

"A. Yes, sir.

"51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse as during that period?

"A. Yes, sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.

"52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might be presaging another offensive movement?

"A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another offensive movement.

"53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors to the importance of this lack of traffic?

"A. Yes, sir.

"54. Q. To whom did you represent that?

"A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. However, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned, did not include areas to the eastward of the Mandate islands." (p. 210-212)

Commander Wright discussed the equipment which was available at the Fourteenth Naval District unit for the detection and location of enemy ships. (p. 379-80)

XXV. INTERCEPTED JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS AFTER THE "WAR WARNING" AND UP TO DECEMBER 6, 1941

A. FAILURE TO TRANSMIT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL

After November 27, 1941, when the "war warning" was sent to Admiral Kimmel, and prior to the Japanese attack, there were a number of highly significant Japanese coded communications intercepted, decoded and translated by the Navy and the Army in Washington. Both the State Department and the Navy Department believed, according to Admiral Schuirmann, that from November 27th to December 6th relations with the Japanese were constantly deteriorating (page 204).

It will be recalled that on November 28th, there were available in Washington the intercepted Japanese communications showing the reaction of the Japanese to the State Department note of November 26th; that it was regarded as a "humiliating proposal;" that with a report of the views of the Imperial Government to be sent in two or three days the negotiations would be de facto ruptured; but, that the Japanese emissaries were not to give the impression that the negotiations were broken off (supra, pages 60-63).

Except to the extent set forth in the following chapter, Admiral Kimmel was not advised of any of this information. The reasons for this action have been previously mentioned (supra, page 44). As Admiral Stark explained it, in part,

CincPac was not sent all of the information that was available in Washington; it was the job of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate that information; they tried to give CincPac the most useful information; and, they left it to him as to what to do after they gave him the picture as they saw it (page 800).

Admiral Stark testified that the procedure by which he received classified information was through his Flag Secretary or delivery to him personally by ONI. Comdr. Kramer normally brought information from Intelligence. Sometimes the information was evaluated and sometimes dispatches were brought in direct before evaluation. Intelligence and War Plans did the evaluations which were usually gone over by Admiral Ingersoll. A watch officer and duty officer in Operations received information after office hours and decided whether it should be sent to him at once. During the critical period from November 27th to December 7th, he felt that he was receiving all of the important information regarding Japanese-United States relations (page 774).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he was not sure that he had seen every document received through interception (page 833).

B. CONCERNING THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND SITUATION

On November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated November 29, 1941 (Document 19, Exhibit 63), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had always taken a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of this message but did not deliver it to Admiral Stark.

Also on November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals"); that the President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was having strong repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different—some good word—but instead got this (the Premier's speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.

There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on December 1, 1941, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 21, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
 "To: Washington
 "1 December 1941
 "(Purple CA)
 "#865 Re my #857

"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall this, but it may have been discussed (page 778). He did not advise CincPac of this message since he did not consider that it added anything (page 779). Admiral Schuirmann said that he was aware of this message and the following one, but had not delivered them to Admiral Stark (pages 702-3). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 828).

2. Army translation—(Document 22, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo

"To: Berlin

"November 30, 1941

"Purple

"#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)

(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

[Part 2 of 2]

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

3. The Navy report states that "on 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured.

Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is."

Commander Kramer said that the President was so interested "in the dispatch" to Berlin that Kramer was directed to prepare a special paraphrase for the President's retention; otherwise neither the State Department or White House were permitted to retain copies of the "super secret" dispatches (page 983).

4. Army translation—(Document 23, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington (Nomura)

"To: Tokyo

"November 28, 1941

"Purple

"#1214 To be handled in Government Code.

"Re my #1190.

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principals, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

"This we must carefully note."

In connection with the diplomatic situation,

Admiral Schuirmann said that the Navy Department had been kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu. (p. 411) Reference was made to page 138 in "PEACE AND WAR" concerning which Admiral Schuirmann said that he did not recall the particular meetings mentioned on November 25 and November 28. Admiral Schuirmann did recall that on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull telephoned him and said that he wanted Admiral Schuirmann to know that he didn't seem to be able to do anything more with the Japanese and that they were liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone. Admiral Schuirmann assured Secretary Hull that a war warning had been sent out and reported the conversation to Admiral Stark. (p. 412) Admiral Schuirmann said that the general attitude of Admiral Stark and General Marshall was that any time that could be gained in the outbreak of hostilities was to the benefit of the United States. (p. 412)

it may be here noted that on December 2nd, Under Secretary of State Welles had a conversation with Nomura and Kurusu (page 311), which was summarized by Welles as follows:

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina. It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement—and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for the purpose of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government. Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and

independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.

"The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his Government."

Admiral Schuirmann could not recall that information as to this note was given to Admiral Stark.

On December 3, 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated December 2, 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit 63) which stated:

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary." I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233."

It may be noted that about December 3rd, according to Admiral Schuirmann, the State Department felt that although there might be some further discussions with the Japanese, it was inevitable that they would be unsuccessful. The Chief of Naval Operations, he said, was kept informed (page 203).

There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available on December 4, 1941, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 26, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
 "To: Hainking
 "1 December 1941
 "(Purple)
 "#893

"... In the event that Manchuria participates in the war . . . in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

"A summary follows:

"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

"2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia."

2. Navy translation—(Document 27, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington
 "To: Tokyo
 "1 December 1941
 "(Purple)
 "#1227

"(This raised the question of the possibility of a conference between persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have them make one final effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Honolulu . . . It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)"

3. Navy translation—(Document 29, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
 "To: Washington
 "3 December 1941
 "(Purple)
 "#875 Chief of Office routing.
 "Re your #1232

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement."

4. Navy translation—(Document 31, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington
 "To: Tokyo
 "3 December 1941
 "(Purple)
 "#1243

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."

On December 5, 1941, there were available translations of additional intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as follows:

1. Army translation—(Document 33, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington

"To: Tokyo

"3 December 1941

"(Purple)

"#1243

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

2. Navy translation—(Document 34, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington

"To: Tokyo

"1 December 1941

"(Purple)

"#1225

"(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secretary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech, the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)"

C. CONCERNING UNITED STATES SHIPS AND PLANES

On 4 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 20 November 1941, serial 7029, which stated: (Exhibit 13)

"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation."

Captain Safford said that to the best of his knowledge none of the Jap intercepts which were translated in the period immediately prior to 7 December 1941 and which showed interest in U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were sent to CinCPac. (p. 111) He added that so far as he knew the codes used by the Japanese for reports on U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were not being read by the radio intelligence unit there. (p. 116)

"In addition to the Japanese intercepts which were translated prior to 7 December 1941, a number of Jap messages regarding U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were intercepted before that date but not translated until after the attack. (Exhibit 13)

"From: Tokyo (Togo)

"To: Honolulu

"November 28, 1941

"J19-K9

"Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner.

"1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

"2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure." (Translated by the Army, 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu

"To: Tokyo

"December 6, 1941

"#253

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered for or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine tha

they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I image that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack, against these places.

"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation." (Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu

"To: Tokyo

"December 6, 1941

"PA-K2

"1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were—and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

"9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)

"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm." (Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)

"From Honolulu

"To: Tokyo

"November 28, 1941.

"J-19.

"Military report:

"(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

"(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are:—number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds: interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

"(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

"(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor." (Translated by the Army, 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu (Kita).

"To: Tokyo

"5 December 1941

"(PA-K2)

"(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here.

"(2) The LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

"(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

"8 battleships.

"3 light cruisers.

"16 destroyers.

"Four ships of the Honolulu class and . . . were in dock." (Translated by the Navy, 12-10-41.)

(6) "From: Honolulu (Kita).

"To: Tokyo.

"1 December 1941

"(J19) Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

"1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

* * * * *

"2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week." (Translated by the Navy 12/10/41.)

(7) "From: Honolulu (Kita).

"To: Tokyo.

"3 December 1941

"(PA-K2)

"From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

"1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

"I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

"Meaning		Signal
"Battleship, divisions including scouts and screen units.	Preparing to sortie.....	1
A number of carriers.....	Preparing to sortie.....	2
Battleship divisions.....	All departed between 1st and 3rd.....	3
Carriers.....	Several departed between 1st and 3rd.....	4
Carriers.....	All departed between 1st and 3rd.....	5
Battleship division.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	6
Carriers.....	Several departed between 4th and 6th.....	7
Carriers.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	8"

"2. Signals.

"I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	Signal
"One light between 8 and 9 p. m.....	1
" " " 9 and 10 p. m.....	2
" " " 10 and 11 p. m.....	3
" " " 11 and 12 p. m.....	4

"II.

"Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m.....	5
" " " 1 and 2 a. m.....	6
" " " 2 and 3 a. m.....	7
" " " 3 and 4 a. m.....	8

[Part 2]

"III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.

"If there is a 'star' on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals, 1, 2, 3, or 4.

"If there is a 'star' and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

"IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:

Times	Signal
"1900-2000.....	3
2000-2100.....	4
2100-2200.....	5
2200-2300.....	6
2300-2400.....	7.
0000-0100.....	8"

"V. K.G.M.B. *** Want ads.

"A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. Box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

"B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

"C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

"3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium **** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your signal is received:

Time	Signal
From 7-8.....	3 or 6
From 8-9.....	4 or 7
From 9-10.....	5 or 8

*Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

****At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W."

(Translated by the Navy 12/11/41)

"From: Honolulu (Kita)

"To: Tokyo

"November 24, 1941.

"J-19.

"1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

"2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaiana Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

"3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

"4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

"Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe." (Translated by the Army 12/16/41.)

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, did not recall seeing translations of intercepted Japanese messages prior to the attack, relating to the presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. (Exhibit 13) (p. 406-7)

Asked whether it was his belief, prior to the attack on 7 December, 1941, that Japanese agents at Pearl Harbor were reporting United States ships there, Admiral Wilkinson replied that he believed such reports were being made; however, it was his belief that the Japanese were concerned about the presence of the fleet "with a view to its availability for distant operations rather than its susceptibility as a target." (p. 407)

On November 29th, there was an Army translation of a message from Manila to Tokyo, dated November 22, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 68), which reported on British and American ships at Mamila.

On December 3rd, the Navy translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 15, 1941 (Doc. 24, Exhibit 63), which stated:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not specifically recall this message, but may have seen it, as the Japanese were reporting a great mass of ship movement information, and he assumed they knew every move we made (page 781). He stated that it was routine for the Japanese to report ship movements and the fact that they reported such movements from Honolulu was not unusual (page 790).

To have gone the limit, he said, in tightening up on espionage and on Japanese facilities for getting information out might have precipitated the war which they were trying to delay. He pointed out that they did stop Japanese ships from using the Panama Canal and did reroute safely United States ships (page 795).

On December 4th the following intercepts were available:

1. Navy translation—(Document 12, Exhibit 68)

"From: Manila (Nihro)

"To: Tokyo

"25 November 1941

"(Purple)

"#790

"1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port. (Probably the U. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons.)

"2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

"3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown."

2. Navy translation—(Document 14, Exhibit 68)

"From: Tokyo

"To: San Francisco

"29 November 1941

"(J19)

"Circular #2431

"Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

"Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed (or at which it arrived), and port of destination (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, on South China seas."

On December 5th the following translations of intercepted communications were available:

1. Army translation—(Document 37, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo (Togo)

"To: Honolulu

"November 18, 1941

"J-19

"#113

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, (Probably means Mamala Bay), and the areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy."

2. Navy translation—(Document 36, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo

"To: Honolulu

"29 November 1941

"(J19)

"#122

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements."

Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen these two messages, but that they did not change the situations as to which he had advised CincPac (page 781). Admiral Schuirmann did not remember seeing these (page 720).

3. Army translation—(Document 13, Exhibit 68)

"From Manila (Nihro)

"To: Tokyo

"November 28, 1941

"Purple

"#799

"Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day."

On December 6, 1941, there was available in Washington an Army translation of an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18, 1941 (Document 40, Exhibit 63), reading as follows:

"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219* (a—Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.) on that day.

"Area A^b—(b—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.) A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

"Area C^c—(c—East Loch) 3 warships of the heavy cruiser classes were at anchor.

"2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, ENTERPRISE, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS.' 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D^d—(d—Middle Loch).

"3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not see this message (pages 781-2). Admiral Schuirmann similarly testified (page 719).

"It is of interest to note that a Japanese message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated December 2, 1941, was intercepted, apparently on December 23rd, and translated by the Army on December 30th (Document 46, Exhibit 63), which read:

"(Secret outside the department)

"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets."

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.

Also of interest is a similar message, dated December 6, 1941, translated by the Army, December 12, 1941 (Document 45, Exhibit 63), which directed that Honolulu wire immediately the movements of the fleet subsequent to December 4th.

Admiral J. R. Redman during the latter part of 1941 was Assistant Director of Naval Communications (page 1091). He said that the general tenor of Japanese traffic was a searching expedition all over the world, as to ship movement. This had been going on for a long time, but was intensified during the several months preceding December, 1941. There were about 700 dispatches in November 1941. In the last month prior to December 7th, diplomatic intercepts averaged 25 a day. September and October were heavy but there was an increase in November (page 1101).

Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (the location of ships in areas in Pearl Harbor) was more specific than the other ship movement dispatches (page 1104).

Admiral Turner did not specifically remember seeing the ships movements dispatches; they had been going on for a long time (page 1004).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not remember Documents 24, 36, and 37 of Exhibit 63 (ship movements reports). He would not have attached any significance to them as he presumed such reports were being made as a matter of routine; same as to Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (page 836). No record was kept of persons to whom these documents were shown at the time.

Commander Kramer said that he was generally familiar with Documents 24 and 36 in Exhibit 63 and stated that these would have been in daily folders submitted to the regular recipients of this class of information. As to ships movements, the Japanese were always reporting them, so that those were not unusual messages, but somewhat more emphatic (page 961).

Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 36 of Exhibit 63 (concerning reports even when there are no ship movements) on December 5th; Document 37 (requesting reports on certain areas at Pearl Harbor) on December 5th; Document 40 (giving the locations of ships at Pearl Harbor (about December 6th)). Previously during the year similar intercepts were received, but Document 40 of Exhibit 63 was the first of the ship movement messages which had gone into detail as to the location of ships at Pearl Harbor at a specific time. It was received December 6, 1941 (page 974) (also page 976).

The inference he gathers from these is that the Japanese were concerned about the location of United States ships but they had also been concerned similarly about planes in the Philippines and all aspects of military establishments in the Netherlands East Indies (page 974). Moreover the inference was that since we were working with the British and Dutch, the Japanese were concerned about the action we were taking, and there was no indication from this material of overt intentions against the United States (page 975). This was, however, the first time the Japanese had asked for such detail (page 975).

XXVI. THE "WINDS" CODE AND MESSAGES

A. THE WINDS CODE

On November 28th, there was translated another intercepted Japanese communication establishing the "winds code," in addition to the previous message of November 26th, which in substance was as follows:

Navy translation—November 28, 1941 (Document 15, Exhibit 63):

"From: Tokyo

"To: Washington

"19 November 1941

"(J19)

"Circular #2353

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East wind rain).

"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudy).

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear).

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence."

On December 5th, Alusna at Batavia advised OPNAV of a message "from Thorpe for Miles War Department" of a code intercept to the effect that Japan would notify her consuls of "war decision," by using the "winds code" words in Japanese weather broadcasts (See Documents 2 and 3, Exhibit 64).

B. MONITORING FOR THE CODE WORDS

Captain L. F. Safford testified that in 1941 he was in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communications, which collected information through intercepts (page 744). Document 15 of Exhibit 63 is the so-called "Winds Code," which was available to the Navy on November 28th. This was repeated by Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64. There is no material difference in these messages (page 745). After receipt of these messages special effort was made to monitor for these messages. C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and Cairte were also monitoring (page 746).

Admiral Turner said that at the time when he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 he discussed it briefly with the Chief of Naval Operations and instructions were given to watch for the code words.

Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (Winds message) on November 28, 1941 (page 956). Arrangements were made to watch for any use of the Winds Code by the Japanese and to promptly notify senior officers who had cards showing the message.

C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF WINDS CODE

Admiral Kimmel was advised by a copy of a dispatch dated November 28th from CincAF to OPNAV (Exhibit 64), that according to an intercepted communication, if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed, certain words would be used in the Tokyo news broadcasts.

Captain Layton testified that he had not seen Document 15 of Exhibit 63, but had received the same information. Upon receipt of it special watches were set to intercept the execute of the winds code, but no execute was ever received (pages 905-6).

D. "WINDS" MESSAGES USING THE CODE WORDS FOR RUSSIA

On December 4, 1941, the Federal Communications Commission reported a Japanese radio broadcast apparently using the "winds code" words relating to Russia (Document 2, Exhibit 65), as follows:

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

"KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS"

"CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM"

Weather message from Tokyo station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941

On December 5, 1941, the FCC reported another Japanese broadcast again apparently employing the "winds code" relating to Russia. The report (Document 3, Exhibit 65) was, in substance:

"TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH

(repeated 3 times)

"Weather message from Tokyo station JYW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941"

Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood stated that he was watch officer in OP-20-G, Naval Communications (page 919A). He first saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (intercept establishing the Winds Code) about November 30, 1941 (page 920). On the evening of December 4, 1941, the FCC phoned an intercept to him. He did not remember the exact text, but it did not contain the words that he was looking for, which were the Japanese phrase: "Higashi No Kazame." These to him would have indicated the severance of relations with the United States, and war.

The watch officers in Op-20-G had been instructed to telephone Admiral Noyes when an execute message was received (page 920). He telephoned Admiral

Noyes and thought that he again called the FCC (page 921). Admiral Noyes said to him, on receipt of the message, that "he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction." He identified Document 2 of Exhibit 65 as apparently the message received from the FCC (page 921). This meant to him that there would be a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States, but with Russia (page 921). He thinks that's why Admiral Noyes said to him that "the wind was blowing from a funny direction."

A pencil memo was the only written record of the above-described intercept. He did not know the disposition of this memo. He turned it over to the succeeding watch officer (page 922). He had no recollection of any confirmation of this message from the FCC (page 921). He did not know of any other intercept of an execute message of the Winds Code (page 923). He can account for the inability of the Navy to produce the message as recorded by him, or a confirmation of it, only from his own viewpoint: He had instructions to transmit the message orally, in view of its urgency. He, therefore, had to call Admiral Noyes at once. He did not think that they had been ordered to make any record of the message (page 925).

E. WAS THERE A "WINDS CODE" MESSAGE RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES?

In a statement before Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Captain Safford testified concerning the "winds message" as follows:

He testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people. (pages 112-114)

Captain Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast (page 115).

Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received (pages 114-115).

Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrester, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in McCollum's draft dispatch. (pages 117-118)

Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "True 'Winds Message'." The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being inter-

cepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo-Pe'lin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of these stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept. (pages 119-122)

Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." (page 123)

Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor (page 124).

Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such message (page 540).

On being recalled for examination, Captain Safford testified that he never had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used (pages 538-539).

Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall (pages 131-132).

Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI" which was contained in the Japanese message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded (pages 133-135).

Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message," which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material (pages 133-136).

Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received or seen an intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation, but that as Captain Safford said he did make such a call, he (Brotherhood) believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time (pages 144-147).

Lieut. Comdr. Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United States were used (pages 140-142).

Lieut. Comdr. Pering's testimony was that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States or to any other nation (page 148).

Lieut. Comdr. Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a 24-hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941 (pages 433-441).

Lieut. Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew of or saw any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States (pages 149-150).

Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson (pages 28-32).

Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Possibly he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which Captain Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out (pages 398-401).

Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).

They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack. (pages 73, 78)

Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none later than six months prior to his testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler (pages 515-520).

Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a 24-hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941. (Pages 46-7.)

There was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether or not there had been any Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United States:

- (1) Witnesses who said that there was no such message or that they recalled no such message

Admiral Stark stated that he knew of no execute of the "winds message" (page 783).

Captain Wellborn said he knew of no "winds message" indicating that the Japanese were going to attack the United States. (p. 389)

General Marshall thought that he had been aware of the "Winds Code" (Document 15, Exhibit 63), but did not recall any execute message (page 872).

Admiral Noyes said no intercept of such an execute of the Winds Code was ever received in the Navy Department (page 1033. See pages 1047-8). The explanation of why such a "winds" message is missing from the Communications files is that no such message was ever received by naval means (page 1040).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he remembered the "winds" code (Document 15 of Exhibit 63), and probably saw it on November 29th. He recalled that there was some difference of opinion as to what it or the execution message meant. He did not know whether this was discussed with Admiral Stark, and did not remember what the doubt of the message was, but remembered that some message was received prior to December 7th (page 825). He did not know where the document, if any, showing a "winds" execute, was (page 826).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he knew of the "winds code" and that he recalled seeing on or about December 4th the Japanese broadcast directive indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States. He said that he did not know why this information had not been sent to Admiral Kimmel except that probably it had been supposed that the Hawaiian intercept station had also received that broadcast. He said it may have been because of this that a message in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes was sent. (p. 429)

Admiral Redman saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (winds code), but never saw any execute of it; he heard about it in discussions around December 6th or 7th, but doesn't remember where. He heard about it from Admiral Noyes and from Commander Kramer (page 1103).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he recalled that some broadcast had been intercepted, but that there was lack of agreement as to whether or not it constituted the "winds" message (page 723).

Lt. Comdr. Lynn and Lt. Comdr. Pering testified that they did not see any execute of the "winds" message (pages 740, 813).

Captain Layton said that the messages establishing the "winds code" signified that if the code word were sent it meant that diplomatic relations would be severed and anything could happen (page 907).

He did not know of the receipt by any unit of the Navy of any execute of the "winds" message (page 908). He asserted that if an execute of the "winds" message had been received, it would have been rapidly and aggressively acted upon (page 917); he believed that all personnel would have been recalled to their ships, an anti-submarine and distance patrol would have been started, and that a task force would have sortied (page 917). He did not think that the "war warning" message meant the same as the "winds code" for it concerned the cessation of negotiations but that did not necessarily mean the cessation of diplomatic relations or war (page 918).

(2) Witnesses who said that there was such a message, or some such message

Captain Safford stated that at 0800 on December 4, 1941, Lt. Murray, possibly Kramer, came in with a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is." He thought that the message translated read: "War with America; War with England; Peace with Russia." He has not seen a copy of this since December 15, 1941. It came in from an East Coast station (page 746), but he can't determine what station. There was no confirmation of this intercept from other sources. He had a vague recollection of a second "winds" message, but was unable to find any trace until he testified before Admiral Hart. Since then he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "winds" message at Portland. He saw that message for the first time at the hearing and did not recognize it (page 747). He did not recall any of the messages in Exhibit 65 (FCC intercepts). They do not indicate a break with the United States.

He asserted that the "winds" message he saw on December 4th is not on file and cannot be found despite repeated search since November, 1943; that Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them but did not care to tell him. The witness said he also knew what happened to the Army copies, through very "second-hand and devious sources" (pages 747-8).

He said that Document 15 of Exhibit 63 indicated that a "winds" message would be "a break of diplomatic relations;" the Dutch translation said it would mean "war." It was interpreted by DONI as meaning war and a signal for execution of Japanese war plans (page 748). Two sources said it meant a break in diplomatic relations; two said it meant war (page 748). The breaking of diplomatic relations and war were regarded by them, he said, as synonymous in Japanese-United States relations (page 754).

He was certain that an immediate distribution was made on December 4th of the "winds" message to CNO, DONI, Director of War Plans, Assistant CNO, State Department, White House, and War Department, and that Commander Kramer could tell about this (page 749). This information was not passed to CincPac, though McCullom wrote a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including this information, which dispatch was not sent. This draft dispatch had been given to Admiral Wilkinson, who wanted to sent it; Admiral Noyes said it was an "insult to intelligence of CincPac" (page 749). Admiral Wilkinson disagreed and went to the "front office" to try to get it released. He knew of no copy of this draft message now in existence (page 750).

In another lengthy statement at the close of the examination Captain Safford reviewed the McCollum dispatch and the "Winds" message as follows:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message' was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in

Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message,' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message', McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The following officers should have some recollection of the 'Winds Message': U. S. Navy—Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S. Army—Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft. The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time." (p. 360-361)

Because his section knew the Japanese, he said, they considered them tricky and underhanded, and Japanese history showed that they began war without a declaration or the breaking of diplomatic relations (page 755).

Comander Kramer said that on December 3rd or 4th, he was shown a "winds" message by *CY watch officer* and took it immediately to Captain Safford, and Captain Safford took it to Admiral Noyes. Kramer did not handle this as it was a plain language message (page 956). The message received and shown him was "Higashi No Kazeame," translated as "East Wind Rain." This meant strained relations or a break in relations and possibly war with the United States. That message was on teletype paper when he saw it, which indicated that it had come through a USN Intercept Station. He has not seen this message since (page 957).

The different meanings he gave of the "winds" message are inherent in the nature of the Japanese language. He could not definitely interpret a message executing the code as meaning war (page 969).

The "winds" message did not necessarily mean war (page 987).

He has seen the messages in Exhibit 65, but he did not handle these (page 957). There is no question that the "important" documents in Exhibit 63 were in the folder delivered regularly to CNO (page 980). He was sure that the "winds" message was sent to the office of CNO (page 981).

Admiral Turner said that to his knowledge none of the code words were received prior to December 7, 1941. He changed his testimony and said that Admiral Noyes had called him on the telephone—the date he could not recall; he thought it was December 6th—and had said "the winds message has come in" (page 1004). He understood that Admiral Noyes had told CNO. He assumed that CincPac had the "winds" message. The "winds" message meant at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war (page 1005).

(3) Testimony concerning the "McCollum Dispatch"

It will be recalled that Captain Safford testified that McCollum had drafted a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including information as to the "winds" message, which he and Admiral Wilkinson desired to send to Admiral Kimmel, and which Admiral Noyes opposed.

Admiral Noyes testified that he had discussed McCollum's dispatch with Admiral Wilkinson, and had thought that such estimates should come from CNO (page 1039).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall a draft dispatch prepared by Comdr. McCollum during this period which was not sent out (pages 154A, 780). Nor did he recall any conversations about this time concerning the sending of additional messages to Admiral Kimmel (page 165).

Admiral Turner said that he had known about the dispatch prepared by McCollum and had discussed it with McCollum. He did not know what happened to the dispatch, or whether it was transmitted. He thought he initialled it and gave it back to McCollum (page 998), but he "is not sure of it" (page 1004).

Commander Kramer heard, after December 7th, of a long draft dispatch which had been prepared by McCollum. He did not know how it had been handled (page 960).

Admirals Ingersoll and Redman did not recall the draft dispatch to CincPac which had been prepared by McCollum (pages 830, 1106).

XXVII. INFORMATION SENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL AFTER THE "WAR WARNING"

As of this time there was available to CincPac information of the organization of the Japanese fleets as follows:

(1) On 29 July 1941 the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report, which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of the Japanese Navy. This report stated that as a result of information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main commands—the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:

- (a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.*
- (b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.*
- (c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.*
- (d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.*
- (e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).*

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto, consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU); CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHIO); and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).

The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were: CarDiv 1 (AKAGI and KAGA); and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and HIRYU).

The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force, and sub-chaser squadrons.

The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine Fleet, and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also given (Hew. Exhibit 81; Hew. page 613).

(2) On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received) the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese Navy and with Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI Bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:

"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and sea-plane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below:

Major fleet commands

"I. Combined Fleet		
1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Battles, 1 Crusier, 2 Desrons
2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	4 Crusiers, 2 Desrons, etc.
3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	Small Craft.
4. Fourth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet		
6. Sixth Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet	(Aircraft Carriers)	6 Carriers
8. Combined Air Force	(Seaplane tenders, etc.)	4 Airrons, & shore based planes.
"II. Japanese Naval Forces in China.		
	(Staff Hdqtrs.)	1 PG and 3 DD's
1. First China Exped. Fleet	(Central China)	Gunboats
2. Second China Exped. Fleet	(South China)	1 CA, 1 CL and small craft
2. Third China Exped. Fleet	(North China)	Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet	(Saigon)	1 CL, transports and mine craft.

"The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full war-time footing."

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and HARUNA—as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941 and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.

The Second Fleet included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One of the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).

The composition of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated, "The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported at Maizuru." (Exhibit 21; p. 185.)

Admiral McMorris stated that he did not know whether Washington kept CincPac fully informed but, he said, the information which was received was taken at its face value (page 899).

The "war warning," it will be recalled, had been sent to Admiral Kimmel on November 27th. On November 28th, the Army dispatch had been repeated to Admiral Kimmel, advising, among other things, that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. Also on November 28th, there had been sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of CincAF's dispatch advising of the "winds code" to be used if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed. And, on the same day, he had been in communication with OPNAV concerning his plan for the reinforcement of Midway and Wake, and, in that connection there had been mention made of the shortage of anti-aircraft guns.

On November 30th, Admiral Kimmel sent a dispatch (Exhibit 77) urgently recommending the shipment of 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns and ammunition for familiarization and training.

On November 30, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to CincPac for information (Exhibit 76), which advised in part:

"Indications that Japan about to attack points on KRA by overseas expedition X. Disire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X. A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information were all negative.

Exhibit 10 is a dispatch of November 30 from CNO to CinCAF, information CincPac.

Also on November 30th Admiral McMorris prepared, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, a memorandum setting forth the steps which he recommended to be taken in the event of American-Japanese war within the ensuing twenty-four hours (Exhibit 69A). This was revised on December 5th and set forth the steps to be taken in the event of war within forty-eight hours (Exhibit 69B).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that during the first week of December, 1941, he, and he was sure Admiral Kimmel, had in mind constantly the "war warning," the fact that the Japaese forces were, according to Intelligence, on the move, the fact that the Japanese were destroying codes, and that the Japanese in the past had attacked without declaration of war (p. 328).

He stated further that during that time he was also considering the tasks set forth in Phase IA of the Pacific Fleet Plan, and that daily or on alternate days he furnished Admiral Kimmel with an informal memorandum as to the action that should be taken by important elements of the Fleet if war were initiated within twenty-four hours. He stated that typical of such memoranda were Naval Court of Inquiry Exhibits 69A and 69B, which were dated 30 November and 5 December 1941, respectively (p. 328-329).

With reference to the Phase IA task of maintaining air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and the fact that no provision was made for carrying out that task, Vice Admiral McMorris testified that submarines were considered to be the greatest element of danger. He said that anti-submarine patrols had been placed in effect (p. 329).

At about this time, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel also received information concerning the estimated position of the Japanese Fleet. As Captain Layton expressed it:

Captain Layton testified that in accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a memorandum for the Admiral, dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet. This was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of December 1st and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel and which reflected the later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December 1st-2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.

Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units of the Orange (Japanese) fleet were "thought" to be located as listed in the memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships, "(?)" and other units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.

In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai Base Force, and an air group.

In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force, with numerous air groups, and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted carrier with 36 planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Csrdiv 4—two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3—two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARUNA—3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.

In the Hainan-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the

French Indo-China Area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships, including 21 transports and some base forces, among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group and base force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier "KORYU? plus plane guards," and several submarine squadrons and base force (Hew. Es. 23).

Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on this point as follows:

"Mr. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"Captain LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of those units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect. . . . (P. 212-213)

"Mr. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious jocular one?

"Captain LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"Mr. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

"Captain LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location" (P. 255-256).

On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire—4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home area. This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships, and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913).

Captain Layton further testified that there were delivered to him, for presentation to Admiral Kimmel, daily communication intelligence summaries, during the period of time subsequent to the sending and receipt of the dispatches of 26 November. (Page 192). Captain Layton identified such summaries for the period 14 October to 14 December 1941, (Exhibit 22), and pointed out that the initials appearing in the lower right hand corner of these documents reading HEK, appeared on the original and were the initials of Admiral Kimmel (Page 193-194).

Captain Layton stated further that on certain of the originals of the communication intelligence summaries there appeared underscoring of certain portions, and that certain of the underscores were performed by Admiral Kimmel while certain other marks appearing on the summaries, including marks as to direction finder bearings and positions of ships were made by he, himself (Captain Layton). (Page 193).

Captain Layton summarized and made reference in his testimony to what he considered to be the significant parts of the Communications Intelligence Summaries dated from 27 November to 6 December 1941, and of the dispatches received and sent during the same period, (Pages 194, 237, 244, 245), including his 1 December 1941 estimate as to the location of the Japanese Fleet Units, (pages 244, 245, 252, 253), and to the comments made on 2 December 1941 by Admiral Kimmel when, in discussing the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate, Admiral Kimmel noted and commented on the absence of the information concerning the location of two Japanese carrier divisions. (Pages 212, 213, 255, 256). This intelligence, as summarized by him, particularly concerning the locations of Japanese carriers, but not entirely confined to them, was briefly, as follows:

A. 27 November 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary Information of 27 November, delivered 28 November, was: Some tactical traffic from carriers. Four enciphered addressees were noted, indicating a new command and a newly formed unit became active in an operational or maneuverable stage and not in an administrative or routine role. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates; it was stated that carriers were still located in home waters. The commander of the submarine forces was located in the Chichijima area and this was of significance. (Page 194-196).

(2) The term, "home waters", as used in the summary, with reference to the location of the carriers, meant Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay area, and, in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. The term, "home waters" did not include Etorofu, since places in northern Japan, including Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the high north area. The area east of Japan that would be included in the term, "home waters", would embrace perhaps 40 to 60 miles or more; it would be about the same distance that the United States Fleet operations would take us west of San Clemente, San Pedro or San Diego. The definition of the term, "home waters", as indicated above, was understood by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 198).

(b) (1) The Naval Attache at Shanghai in dispatch number 270855, reported sightings between Hong Kong and Shanghai, of many transports that were proceeding south, and that military wharves at Shanghai were abnormally empty. (Page 196).

(2) OpNav dispatch to CinCPac and CinCAF, information CinCLant, number 272337, was received. This was the war warning message. It directed an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. (Page 196-197).

B. 28 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 28 November, delivered 29 November, it was noted that Tokyo originators were sending a considerably high precedence traffic to the Commander-in-Chief, Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. It was further noted that no movements of Combined Fleet Units were detected. Communications noted between the Army Commander on Formosa and the Commander, Amphibious Force, were considered a sure sign of amphibious operations. No submarine traffic was observed. (Page 198-200).

(b) (1) The following dispatch traffic occurred:

a. Com14 to OpNav, information CinCAF, stating the British consul advised the Japanese would attack Krakow Isthmus on 1 December without an ultimatum. (Page 200-201).

b. CinCAF to OpNav, CinCPac, Com14, Com16, establishing the winds code in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net, the other from Japanese language foreign broadcasts. (Page 201).

c. Com16 to CinCAF, OpNav, CinCPac and Com14, advising that an unidentified ship had relieved the KASHII and was in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area. (Page 201).

d. OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Com16 and Com14, dispatch number 281633, advising of information received from the State Department of

various reports from sources in Asia concerning the movement of Japanese forces southward. (Page 201-202).

C. 29 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 29 November, delivered 30 November, it was noted that eleven messages from Tokyo intelligence, and four long messages from Tokyo radio intelligence were sent to major commanders. The Jaluit radio direction finder station included the Commander, Submarines as an information addressee, which indicated that he was in the approaches to, or about to enter the Mandated Islands, likely the Marshalls.

It was noted that there was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, who was in charge of the south invasion forces, Carrier Division 3, along with 2 cruiser divisions, 2 destroyer squadrons, 2 submarine squadrons, the Third Fleet or Amphibious Forces, and the French-Indo-China Forces. The Commander of the Submarine Forces had his traffic routed through Saipan, though on the previous day, it had been routed through Chichijima, indicating a southerly or southeastern movement. (Page 202-204).

(2) The only reference to carriers appearing in the Communications Intelligence Summary of this date was that CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet; and there was no other information on that date relating to Japanese carriers. (Page 205-206).

(3) It was believed that CarDiv 3 was composed of the RYUJO and Hosho. (Page 205).

(b) (1) The Communications Intelligence Unit at Cavite sent a dispatch noting general radio intelligence obtained by it on the previous two days. It referred, in dispatch number 261331, to new Japanese ship arrivals in the Takao area. (Page 204).

(2) There was received OpNav dispatch number 290110, addressed to Commander Northern Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Frontier, information CinCPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, advising that the Army had sent a war warning dispatch to the Western Defense Command, and quoting that dispatch, which advised of the termination of the negotiations with the Japanese, stated hostile action possible at any moment, directed the undertaking of reconnaissance and preparations to carry out WPL-46. (Page 204-205).

D. 30 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 30 November, delivered 1 December, it was noted that general radio traffic was less than usual, and that the only tactical circuit was between the AKAGI and several MARU's. The significance of the term, "tactical circuit" is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru. (Page 206).

(2) It was noted further that the battleships KONGO and HIYEI were placed as units in the CinC, Second's task force. Captain Layton explained that while it was a mistake to place the HIYEI as a member of the second fleet's task force, as it is now known that the HIYEI was one of the battleships that attacked Pearl Harbor, and that it was, on 30 November 1941, on the high seas enroute to Pearl Harbor. This mistake was an error in fact but not an error in substance and arose from a bad identification of a ship similar to the HIYEI, that is, the HARUNA, which, in fact, did take part in the second expedition under the CinC, Second Fleet. (Page 207-208).

(3) It was further noted that there was a strong impression that the CinC, Third Fleet was on its way, and that there was a continued association of the Commander, Submarine Forces with Jaluit, which, along with his known progress through the Chichijima area to the Sapien zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls. Consequently, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that this bore out Com14's previous contention that there was a submarine concentration in the Marshalls, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good portion of the submarines of the Submarine Force. (Page 208).

(4) It was also noted that there was in the Marshalls, a unit of plane guard destroyers, indicating the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although that fact was not confirmed. (Page 209).

(5) There were other indications of air-submarine operations from the Marshalls, following from the fact that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama Naval Air Corps were located there. (Page 208-209).

(6) The Communication Intelligence Summary of this date was initiated by Admiral (then Captain) McMorris, War Plans Officer. (Page 209).

(b) (1) CinCPac received from Com16 a dispatch addressed to OpNav, information CinCAF, CinCPac and Com14, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same garble pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' call signs had not been changed. (Page 210).

(2) OpNav dispatch number 301709, addressed to CinCAF, information CinCPac, was received. It requested CinCAF to report daily as to whether any contacts were made in the air search being conducted between Manila and Camranh Bay, and that such reports should be made even though the results were negative. This search was being made by CinCAF in pursuant of the directive by OpNav in its dispatch number 300419. (Page 210).

E. 1 December 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 1 December, delivered 2 December, it was confirmed that all service radio calls of the Japanese naval forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 1 December, minus nine time. (Page 213).

(2) This change in service calls was of particular significance since it was the Japanese custom ordinarily not to change their radio calls until after the same had been in use for a period of six months or more. The last change in calls had occurred on 1 November 1941, so that the discontinued service calls had been used for only one month. This indicated a progressive step toward preparing for active operations on a large scale. (P. 213).

(3) Captain Layton testified that the underlining in red on the original of the communication intelligence summary of the words that the change in calls indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale was, to the best of his recollection, made by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 213-214).

(4) It was further noted in the communication intelligence summary that the Japanese were adopting more and more security provisions in handling their radio traffic. (Page 213-214).

(5) No change was noted as to the location of the Submarine Force, which was believed to be eastward of the line between Yokosuka-Chichijima-Saipan, and under "carriers", it was stated that there was no change. This, Capt. Layton explained, meant that there was no change in the previous report as to the location of carriers. The last report as to carriers, he stated, was that they were in the Empire area with the exception of Car-Div 3, and with the further exception that there was possibly 1 carrier in the Mandates. (Page 215).

(6) The Communications Intelligence Summary noted further that there was nothing to report concerning the Fifth Fleet. (Page 215).

(7) Captain Layton explained that the Fifth Fleet was on organization of which little or nothing was known but there that were indications in the past that it was a force assembled for operations in the Northern waters. (Page 216).

(b) The following dispatches were handled:

(1) OpNav to CinCAF and Com16, information CinCPac and Com14, referring to an intrigue in Thailand, intended to draw the British and Japanese into war over that country. (Page 217).

(2) Com 16 to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Com14 and OpNav, advising that Japanese station JVJ in closing at 1700 hours, presumably minus nine time, stated that all listeners should be sure to tune in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be important news. Com16 suggested several radio frequencies that might be used. (Page 217).

(3) Com16 advised of the results of its radio intelligence activity which included the obtaining of information of Jap ship arrivals in the Takao area, which were under the command of the CinC, Third Fleet, and that the ATAGO had shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo communication zone and was apparently enroute to South China waters. (Page 217-218).

It also advised that there was an impression that the broadcast scheduled by the Japanese radio station JVJ, indicated above, would be an execute winds code message. Captain Layton testified that as a result of receiving this dispatch, the monitors were put on a double alert but nothing came of it. (Page 218).

F. 2 December 1941:

(a) (1) On this day there was presented by Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate

of the location of the Japanese Fleet Unit. Admiral Kimmel directed Layton to prepare the estimate late on the afternoon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, directing that it be prepared as of 1 December. (Page 210).

(2) The memorandum was prepared by Layton and dated 1 December, and, afterwards, Layton obtained certain substantiating and additional information from the officer who prepared the daily communication intelligence summaries. When the 1 December estimate was shown by Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noted that it contained a typographical error on page 4, which he corrected in his handwriting. (The error consisted of a reference to "20 CL", which should have read, and, was corrected by Admiral Kimmel to read "2 OCL". The 1 December Layton estimate is exhibit 23. (Page 211).

(3) Admiral Kimmel discussed this estimate with Layton and noted that it did not contain any information as to the locations of the Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers, though it did list Carrier Divisions 3 and 4, and the KASUGA MARU, 1 XCV, as being located in the Bako-Takao area, and the KORYU, 1 CV, in the Marshalls. It was in connection with the absence of reliable information on which to base an estimate as to the locations of CarDivs 1 and 2 that Admiral Kimmel addressed to Layton the question whether they might be rounding Diamond Head at that moment or words to that effect, to which Layton replied that he hoped that in such case they would be sighted before now. (Page 211-212-213).

(b) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary of 2 December, delivered 3 December, that the Japanese were having difficulty in routing their radio traffic, which arose from their change in call signs, which was probably due to the unfamiliarity of the operators with the new calls and with the location of the units affected. The summary noted that Com16 reported the Second and Third Fleets to be in the Takao area, but the Communication Intelligence Unit in Hawaii noted that there was one indication that the two fleets were not close to Takao and it expressed a belief that a large fleet, made up of First, Second Third Fleet Units, had left Empire waters and was proceeding on a course that was not close to Takao. (Page 218).

(2) The First Fleet appeared to remain relatively quiet. The association of the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet continued. Under "carriers" it was stated, "almost a complete blank on information of the carriers today." It was stated further that though over 200 service calls had been partially identified since the 1st of December, yet not one carrier call had been recovered since that date, causing it to be evident that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. (Page 219).

(3) Captain Layton stated that Admiral Kimmel read the statement in the Communication Intelligence Summary with reference to carriers, and the failure to identify carrier call signs, as well as the information that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. (Page 220).

(4) Captain Layton explained the difference between the reference in the Communication Intelligence Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, and the reference in this summary in connection with the Second Fleet that a lack of new identification contributed to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet was underway in company, as follows:

a. There was no radio silence insofar as the Second Fleet was concerned.

b. The Second Fleet was using its radio and was on the air on known frequencies;

c. That Fleet was handling a normal pattern of traffic; there was a normal number of calls in its circuits though a number of them were not identified.

The lack of identification was due to the change in call signs. However, the normal amount of the traffic, associated with the lack of identification, caused it to be believed that the Second Fleet was at sea. However, with reference to carriers, there was a complete blank of information, meaning that the carrier circuits were definitely not up to normal use. This would have meant either that the carriers were under radio silence wherever located or operating, or else that they were operating so close to home that they were using a broadcast frequency which could not be heard far away. (Page 220-225).

(5) Captain Layton in his testimony, however, insisted that the statement in the Communication Intelligence Summary that carrier traffic was at a low ebb did not signify anything unusual to him at that time, (page 225), since it was sometimes the custom of the Japanese to take their carriers into the Inland Sea area where they would not be heard from for a considerable period of time. (Page 225-226).

(6) He stated that he could not recall whether he had any discussions with Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of carrier traffic. (Page 226).

(c) (1) Com16 advised OpNav, CinCPac, CinCAF and Com14 that the CinC, Second and Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and stated further that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok has requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes. (Page 226).

(2) CinCAF dispatch number 020345 to OpNav, Information CinCPac advised that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a southerly course. (Page 226).

(3) CinCAF dispatch number 020730 to OpNav, information CinCPac, reported further sightings of Japanese submarines and some ships in Comranh Bay. (Page 226-227).

(4) Assistant Naval Attache in Shanghai to OpNav, information CinCPac, advised of Japanese troop movements in the vicinity of Shanghai. (Page 227).

G. 3 December 1941:

(a) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 3 December, delivered 4 December, that though the volume of traffic was normal, the state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. It was noted that there was an extensive use of alternate calls by major commands which slowed up identification. It was stated "no information on Japanese submarines or carriers." (Page 227-228).

(b) (1) On this day, OpNav addressed a dispatch to CinCAF and Com16, information CinCPac and Com14 that Tokyo had ordered its embassies to destroy its purple machine. (Page 228). Captain Layton obtained information as to what the purple machine was and at Admiral Kimmel's request, advised him of that information. (Page 228-229). Admiral Kimmel was also advised that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning papers. (Page 229).

(2) OpNav in dispatch number 031850 advised that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying their codes and important papers. (Page 230).

(3) The Naval Attache in Singapore in dispatch number 020335 stated that the Cinc, China Fleet had restricted the movement of Allied ships in China waters. (Page 230).

H. 4 December 1941:

(a) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 4 December, delivered 5 December, that an important move had been made by the Takao radio in inaugurating a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that was used by the Tokyo radio, showing that Takao had now assumed the position of handling major fleet traffic on high speed circuits. Many urgent messages were also noted, being addressed by Tokyo to major commanders and among these was a seven part Tokyo intelligence dispatch. The outstanding item of the day was the lack of messages originating from the CinC, Second and Third Fleets, who previously had been very talkative and now very quiet. (Page 230-231).

(2) There was no traffic which enabled any check to be made on the presence of the Fourth Fleet Units in the Marshalls. The impression obtained from the fact that the previously talkative commanders were silent, though still prominent as addressees, especially of intelligence dispatches, was that they were at sea and maintaining radio silence though still receiving. Captain Layton explained that as of that time the Japanese had not learned how to use the American trick of putting out messages without indicating who was the originator. (Page 232).

(b) (1) The dispatches handled on this day referred to Japanese troop and ship movements of China and Indo-China, and other general information, obtained from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch numbers 020704, and 020702, and Naval Attache, Tokyo, dispatch number 030630. (Page 232-233).

I. 5 December 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 5 December, delivered 6 December, noted that the traffic volume was extremely heavy and that all circuits were overloaded. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to cause a jammed condition on all circuits. Neither the CinC, Third or Second Fleets originated any traffic although they were still frequently addressed, and it is believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or further south. (Page 233-234).

(2) It was noted that a number of Marus had addressed the CinC, Third Fleet, and there was traffic strengthening the impression that the CinC, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. There was no traffic from the Commanders of the Carrier or Submarine Forces. (Page 233-235).

J. 6 December 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 6 December was not delivered until after the attack on 7 December. (Page 235).

(b) (1) *Certain dispatches were also received on the 7th, which Captain Layton thought were received after the attack. (Page 235-237).*

The information sent to Admiral Kimmel.

(ii) *Vice Admiral McMorris testified that in advising Admiral Kimmel during the critical period of 1941, he considered the negative as well as the positive information available concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers, and that such negative information included the Intelligence that there was no information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers (page 330).*

during this period, as previously noted, included the fortnightly summary of current national situations, prepared by ONI and issued on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57). In addition to the military and naval information furnished, this stated, concerning the Japanese diplomatic situation, that unless the Japanese requested a continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations would have virtually broken down; the Japanese government and press were proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the greater East Asia sphere; the press was also criticising Thailand severely; strong indications pointed to an early Japanese advance against Thailand; and, relations between Japan and Russia remained strained.

On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50) and advised that Admiral Halsey's advance in the ENTERPRISE to Wake had been covered by two patrol squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway, and Wake, and that upon completion of the movement, Admiral Kimmel planned to return one squadron to Pearl Harbor and leave the other at Midway and awaiting developments. The letter discussed the difficulty of supply and defense of the outlying islands. The letter also stated that consideration was being given to the dispatches concerning the use of Army personnel in outlying islands; and, that Admiral Kimmel had frequently called Admiral Stark's attention to the inadequacy of Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area, with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, he said, very little had been done to improve this situation. It was pointed out that because of the Army's lack of equipment, Admiral Kimmel was unable to understand the dispatches directing that the Army be utilized in the defense of the outlying islands.

A postscript to this letter stated, "You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area." It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he took no exception to this (page 153).

In connection with the Army's development of airfields in Fiji and New Caledonia, Admiral Kimmel stated in a further postscript to his letter that the Navy was bound to be involved in the protection of shipping and of the fields. He said, "I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles, that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive."

Also on December 2nd, Admiral Kimmel sent an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the defense of outlying islands and referring, among other things, to the November 28th dispatches in this connection. After some discussion, this letter concluded that Marine armament could be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent; that, if the Marines were replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, would be valueless as a defense battalion; that replacing the Marines would very materially weaken the defense because of less proficient personnel; and, that considering all aspects, Marine planes were more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

It was also stated that the presence of Army forces on outlying bases would inevitably bring up the question of command; that Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra were Navy bases; that unity of command would be necessary; and, that command would have to be vested in the Navy's commanding officer at each station.

This letter also said that Admiral Kimmel had conferred with General Short on the matter and that arrangements were in progress looking toward the organization of three Army defense battalions, the training of such units with available equipment, the obtaining by the Army of requisite equipment, the Army organization of three pursuit plane squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status, and bringing said units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available to support or replace Marines or for use on other islands not manned by Marines.

Admiral Kimmel stated also that the major point was that the Advanced Bases were "going concerns;" that "the international situation is such that active

defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice;" and, that any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there were compelling necessity therefor.

In his letter Admiral Kimmel also expressed "growing concern" over the increase in the Army and Navy stations that might require support from the Fleet; that such involvement "may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet;" that this should be curtailed; and, that the Fleet in a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific could not contribute very much toward victory over a power thousands of miles to the westward.

Admiral Kimmel's letter closed with various recommendations consistent with the views expressed in his letter.

Admiral Smith, during recross examination by Admiral Stark, said that Admiral Kimmel had regularly reported to Admiral Stark the action he took, but not after the "war warning" message (page 552). On recross by Admiral Kimmel, he stated that Exhibit 50, the December 2nd letter, did report what Admiral Kimmel was doing. Admiral Stark's lawyer contended this was not a reply to that message but to the earlier one about plane movements; the witness finally characterized the letter as a "routine weekly report" (pages 533-534). He remembered no dispatch which reported the action taken by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning" (page 554), but said "probably there was" (page 555).

In addition to the December 2nd letter, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel had sent a dispatch on November 28th, concerning the same subject.

On December 3, 1941, OPNAV sent two dispatches advising of Japanese instructions to destroy codes, as follows:

1. A dispatch from OPNAV to CinCAF, ComSIXTEEN for action, and to CinPac and ComFOURTEEN for information which advised that Tokyo ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy Purple machine and the Batavia machine already had been sent to Tokyo; Washington also had been directed to destroy the Purple and all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents; also, that the British Admiralty had reported that the Embassy at London had complied (Exhibit 66).

Captain Safford referred to OpNav secret dispatch 031855 which he said he prepared on December 3, and to a similar dispatch released by Admiral Wilkinson. He then said:

"Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him, 'Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing *anything* to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?' McCollum emphasized both 'we's' . . . McCollum replied, 'We are doing everything we can to get the news out to the Fleet.' In sending this information, I was overstepping the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. OpNav 031855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to CinCPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U. S. N., on CinCPac's Staff, could have explained its significance.'" (p. 359-360)

Captain Safford said that the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District did not have any material from which they could have gained this information through their own efforts. (p. 360)

2. A dispatch from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, for action:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important and confidential and secret documents" (Exhibit 20)

Admiral Pye said that he saw the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes and discussed it with the Commander in Chief, that it seemed perfectly evident that such action could precede war by many days and it did not indicate immediate action. They were unaware of the source of this information and as it had appeared in the newspapers it probably did not mean as much as it would have meant had they known the source. Admiral Pye felt that at Oahu they were pretty much operating in the dark so far as the international situation was concerned. (p. 157)

Exhibit 11 is the December 3 dispatch by CNO to CinCAF, CinCPac and others.

Concerning the code destruction messages, Admiral Turner said that it was impossible for him to understand how anyone could believe that because of the messages the war was coming in the Western Pacific and would not involve Oahu. He pointed out that both Washington and Manila had been included in the dispatch.

Admiral McMorris said that the December 3rd dispatch concerning codes was the best indication, in his opinion, that the United States would be involved in war with Japan. He did not recall Admiral Kimmel's view. (p. 247)

Admiral Anderson said that he had not precise knowledge but he thought that there had been a proper dissemination of information among the officers of the higher command. He saw the Commander in Chief at least weekly. Admiral Anderson did not think that he had seen nor had he been told about the October 16 dispatch. (p. 392). Admiral Anderson could not recall the November 24 dispatch or the November 30 dispatch to CinCAF with copy to CinCPac for information. He did remember having seen the war warning and believed that he had seen the December 3 dispatch.

As a matter of interest, it may be noted that a sentence appearing at the end of this copy of the dispatch, which was released by T. S. Wilkinson, was stricken out in pencil. That sentence read: "From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia."

On December 4, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CinCAF, CinCPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:

"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CinCAF, CinCPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and OpNav X. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X. Report crypto channels retained"

On December 6, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 22) bearing time-date stamp 061743 was sent by OPNAV to CinCPac for action, and to CinCAF for information. This stated:

"In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment"

Commander Kramer drafted Exhibit 66, the December 3rd dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of the "purple" machine. This was sent on the "Kopek" Channel, which was a channel for technical traffic between the Navy Department, Pearl Harbor and the Asiatic Station (page 971). It indicated, he said, a break in diplomatic relations. Exhibit 20, sent out by OPNAV on the same day as Exhibit 66, was the interpretive dispatch of Exhibit 66 (page 960).

Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 21 (dispatch to Guam of December 4th, directing the destruction of codes) was prepared by him and motivated by the growing feeling that war in the Pacific was imminent (page 1031). It was released by Admiral Ingersoll.

Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 22 (authorizing destruction of codes on outlying islands, dated December 6, 1941) was prepared by him and treated as priority dispatch, despite the lack of priority shown on its face (pages 1040, 1042).

Admiral Stark testified that the code destruction message was sent to Guam because he felt that Guam was in the most danger; he did not similarly advise ComFOURTEEN because he did not think Hawaii was in as much danger as was Guam (page 69). At this time, Admiral Stark testified, he believed that war was imminent. Of particular significance, he felt, was the information relating the destruction of codes (pages 165-6). He also knew that the Japanese consuls were advising the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines, Hawaii, the United States, etc. (page 157). Admiral Ingersoll stated that the dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of codes strengthened the "war warning" (page 835).

Admiral Turner said that on Friday, December 5, 1941, there was a discussion between Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll and himself concerning the general situation, and they all felt that all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary (page

1006). They did send some other messages about destruction of codes, both Japanese and our own (page 1007).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he regarded the dispatches concerning Japanese destruction of codes as indicating that the Japanese were going to take steps to prevent the seizure of their codes upon the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations, and regarded the dispatch directing Guam to destroy classified matter as a general precautionary measure (page 327). He "presumed" that he received the December 6th dispatch prior to the attack (page 327).

Admiral Smith testified that he saw the dispatches relating to the destruction of codes but that this meant little to him as CincPac was prepared to destroy codes (page 533). At this time, he said, war was inevitable (page 534).

About December 3rd, Admiral Smith said, after receipt of the dispatch of that date, and information from the Asiatic Fleet to the effect that heavy Japanese movements were on the way to the Southward, he believed that the Japanese were going to attack Malay Peninsula and possibly the Philippines; he thinks that the reaction of others at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters was the same.

Admiral Pye testified that he saw Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) on December 4th, but that this information was published in the newspapers (page 427). Admiral Pye testified that he had not seen Exhibits 21 and 22 (Page 428).

Commander Rochefort, who was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District, stated that during this period the Japanese Consulate was burning or destroying various papers (page 474).

Captain Layton said that the messages concerning Japanese code destruction meant to him only that the Japanese were destroying a cipher machine; he knew "purple" designated it as a diplomatic code (pages 904-5) and that the "purple" cipher was a high class cipher (page 908).

On December 5, 1941, he said, they received word from the Naval Observer at Wellington that the Japanese were destroying codes. This was given to CincPac and was considered along with other information received at that time (page 906). At that time, they received messages from the British and from Washington stating that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese attack on the Kra Peninsula; this seemed to dovetail with the other information which they had (page 906).

There was a discussion concerning the significance of the code destruction messages; they seemed to indicate to Layton that Japan was preparing for all eventualities. He presumed that when it was discussed by Admiral Kimmel with the War Plans Officer and others, it was a matter of discussion (page 906).

Admiral McMorris said that he felt that Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) indicated strongly that there would be war with Japan. He did not recall whether this opinion was prevalent on CincPac's staff, but believed it was thought by CincPac that war was then extremely possible (page 895).

It may be noted that although Admiral Kimmel stated that he had kept General Short informed, he did not personally direct that General Short be given the dispatches concerning codes destruction (Exhibits 20, 21, 22) and did not know whether they were given to him (page 327).

The only action that Admiral Bloch recalled as a result of the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes was the security measures already prescribed, the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, a warning that was given to the Destroyer captains, and his belief the Army was on a full alert. (p. 18)

Admiral Bloch did not believe that the Army had been informed of these warning (code) messages. The messages, he said, were secret and they had been admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, and one thing and another, Admiral Bloch's War Plans Officer would know about them. Admiral Bloch said that since General Short and he saw one another very frequently and Admiral Kimmel and he saw one another practically every day, it is hard to believe that anything of importance could take place or that anything could be received of even small importance that was not discussed because it is only fair to assume that they discussed everything. (p. 18)

General Short, he said, had an Army Colonel as a liaison officer in Admiral Bloch's office and Admiral Bloch had in the General's office a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve as a liaison officer and these men were supposed to be kept informed. Admiral Bloch's liaison officer did not know of the dis-

patches that had been received because Admiral Bloch did not consider that it was proper to tell him; he was quite inexperienced. Nor was Admiral Bloch sure that the Army's liaison officer knew of the messages, but he said they were in close touch through these liaison officers and felt that they knew what was going on. He said that it was indicated that there were some things which they were not correctly informed about. (p. 18)

Neither General Short nor his Chief of Staff recalled having seen these messages prior to the attack (pages 255, 486).

XXVIII. THE "MORI" CONVERSATION; JAPANESE BURNING PAPERS

General Short testified that about December 5th or 6th, he received intelligence reports to the effect that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers.

Admiral Bloch said that after the receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese were burning papers, he didn't know whether or not that was something that was really filled with meaning; he believed that so long as there were negotiations going on in Washington, there was a possibility of the period of waiting being extended; he had a very definite feeling that we were going to have war sometime in the future but just how far in the future he was unable to predict. (p. 17)

Lt. Stephenson discussed in some detail the Mori telephone conversation intercepted on December 6, 1941 and stated his conclusion that he believed it unlikely that this was a calculated transmission of information from Honolulu to Japan.

On December 6th, he received a report of a long telephone conversation between a person named "Mori" and someone in Japan, in which references were made to the weather, ships at Pearl Harbor, and the local attitude toward the Japanese (page 233).

The Mori conversation was as follows:

(Exhibit 39)

IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present.

Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

(H) I do not know why this is so, but appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) *Has there been any increase in . . ? . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.*

(H) *There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.*

(J) *What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?*

(H) *Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.*

(J) *Are there many big factories there?*

(H) *No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.*

(J) *Is that so?*

(H) *It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.*

(J) *How large is the population?*

(H) *The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.*

(J) *What is the population?*

(H) *About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.*

(J) *What about night time?*

(H) *There seem to be precautionary measures taken.*

(J) *What about searchlights?*

(H) *Well, not much to talk about.*

(J) *Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?*

(H) *No.*

(J) *What about the Honolulu newspapers?*

(H) *The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.*

(J) *What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?*

(H) *A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.*

(J) *Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?*

(H) *There are almost none wishing to do that.*

(J) *What is the climate there now?*

(H) *These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly a very unusual climate.*

(J) *Is that so?*

(H) *Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.*

(J) *Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?*

(H) *No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.*

(J) *Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.*

(H) *Yes.*

(J) *What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?*

(H) *A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.*

(J) *Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?*

(H) *Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.*

(J) *Do you know anything about the United States fleet?*

(H) *No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't know whether all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.*

(J) *Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?*

(H) *Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.*

**(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.*

(J) *Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?*

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

* (H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamuno"; that a person named Takogishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takogishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takogishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year's celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the Army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Thank you.

(J) Off phone.

XXIX. THE LIKELIHOOD OF A JAPANESE ATTACK AT HAWAII AS ESTIMATED WASHINGTON DECEMBER 6, 1941

A. NAVY ESTIMATES

Admiral Stark testified that as of December 6, 1941, he considered that a United States and Japanese war was imminent and that there was a strong probability that Japan would strike. He thought that the Philippines and Guam were the most likely targets, of United States territory. He considered that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but, he said, he thought that there was a good chance that any attack there would be detected in time to intercept it or to reduce its effectiveness (pages 73, 165). However, he had no information indicating that such an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable (pages 105, 792). Generally speaking, he said, he and his advisors did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).

Captain Wellborn said that there were various individuals in the Navy Department who felt that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable—such as Admiral Turner, and there were others who felt that it was less probable, although possible, such as Admirals Ingersoll and Stark.

Admiral Turner, on the other hand, testified that he had expected a landing in Southeast Asia, attacks on the Philippines and some form of attack on Hawaii

(page 1002). He had thought that an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor was not only possible (page 997) but that it was a probability, and he was not surprised when it was made (page 1021).

Captain Glover said that a daily short strategic summary of the international military and political situation had been prepared by Commander Ansel in collaboration with Captain Wright and submitted to Admiral Turner. These are contained in a notebook entitled "Daily Information Summary—Op12" filed with the Combat Intelligence Section. Captain Glover said that he did not believe that it had generally been felt by officers in the Plans Division that the Japanese would strike as they did. (p. 176)

Admiral Turner said that he had always been of the view that a torpedo plane attack on ships in Pearl Harbor was possible and pointed out that the Bureau of Ordnance had modified its earlier letters indicating that still 75' depth was necessary.

Admiral Turner said that the Chief of Naval Operations shared his view as to the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor and that they felt that Admiral Kimmel also had the same views. (p. 261)

Admiral Turner said that generally he thought our Intelligence regarding Japanese intentions and activities was quite good. He said that he had anticipated that the Japanese would attack the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies at the end of November 1941. The attack of December 7 came as no surprise to him whatsoever nor, he said, was it a surprise to the Chief of Naval Operations. He was not surprised by the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor and pointed out that he had originated the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 1941, pointing out that just such an attack was the most probable form that the initiation of war by Japan would take. (p. 259)

Admiral Wilkinson recalled no specific evaluation as to the capability of the Japanese to launch an attack such as the attack which was made. (p. 287) Admiral Wilkinson said that he was not surprised by the fact that the Japanese did venture a carrier raid, but was surprised by the force of the raid, and by the fact that the attack had come in without detection. (p. 287-8)

Admiral Ingersoll stated that he had considered that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility (page 821) but he had not thought that an air attack on Oahu was probable. He had thought that when war came there would be numerous Japanese submarines around Pearl Harbor and he expected raids against outlying islands in the Fourteenth Naval District and that any attack on Hawaii would be by submarines or surface forces (page 847). (3)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he thought the dispatches concerning the reinforcement of Midway and Wake should have accentuated the idea that there was a danger of raids in the area rather than allay suspicion as to the probability of attack in the Hawaiian area. (p. 427)

Admiral Ingersoll said that the December 3 dispatch indicated that war was imminent and a matter of a few days or hours and that it was believed in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations that such war would include the United States as indicated by the reference to Washington in that dispatch. (p. 428)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled no discussion in late November or early December regarding the probability of an air attack on Hawaii. They did anticipate possible attacks by submarines and possible raids either by light forces or by submarines at Wake, Midway and Johnston. (p. 426)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he expected that the Japanese attack against the United States would be on the Philippines and Guam with possible raiding attacks on our outlying islands to the westward of Hawaii and submarine attacks against shipping around Hawaii and generally between the west coast and the United States. He said that he did not recall anyone in operations reporting to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated by an air attack on Pearl Harbor. (p. 430)

Captain Heard testified that they had no information which indicated or would lead to an obvious conclusion that there was an impending attack on Hawaii. He was quite convinced that war would start in Southeast Asia (page 468).

Admiral Wilkinson said that for a month preceding 7 December 1941 there were no discussions in which he participated regarding the likelihood of a Japanese move on Pearl Harbor. He stated further that during the first week in

December, 1941, he remembered no discussions concerning the question of whether or not aerial reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu (p. 396).

According to Commander Kramer, from the information he saw there was not the slightest indication of Japanese overt intention to attack the United States. The information of this type was known to be incomplete and CNO knew this (page 985).

B. ARMY ESTIMATE

General Marshall said that he had felt that a Japanese attack would come in the Western Pacific, also possibly against the Panama Canal, which was then closed to the Japanese (page 861). The Japanese movements pointed to a move into Thailand, action to cut off the Burma Road, and a threat to the Malay-Kra Peninsula. They had no indications of Japanese plans for assault on Hawaii (page 860-1). He always was in fear of a surprise attack on United States territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and the Philippines before Hawaii; there were no specific indications in the possession of the Army and no reports from the Navy showing a threat against Hawaii (page 863). The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to General Marshall (page 882). It had appeared to him, as set forth in his letter in February 1941, that the possibility in Hawaii in the way of attack was combined air and sabotage. There was a strong probability—really a certainty—that there was an evil intent in the Far East. The question was when it would explode and to what extent it would be on an infiltration basis. As to probability, Siam, the Malaya Peninsula, and the Panama Canal took priority, in his opinion, to Hawaii.

C. STATE DEPARTMENT ESTIMATES

Ambassador Grew said that he had received no report from the Korean underground that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and Mr. Hamilton said that he had felt that the Japanese would move to the southward, but that he had not excluded from his estimates an attack on United States possessions (page 1075).

XXX. JAPANESE MESSAGE ADVISING OF FOURTEEN PART REPLY AND FIRST THIRTEEN PARTS

A. MESSAGE ADVISING OF FOURTEEN PART REPLY

On December 6, 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communication (document 38, Exhibit 63), as follows:

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"December 6, 1941
"Purple
"909 Re my #644 (*).

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

B. THE FIRST THIRTEEN PARTS OF THE REPLY

Also on December 6, 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63), which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy

(*) See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.)

translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part 13 disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.

C. DELIVERY OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE ABOVE MESSAGES

Captain Heard testified that he did not know what information was available on the evening of 6 December 1941, but that a 24-hour watch, headed by a senior officer, had been maintained in ONI since 27 May 1941 (page 467). Also a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section had been commenced on 4 December 1941 (page 467), and ONI had a direct wire to Secretary Hull (page 468).

Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn in December, 1941, was Senior Watch Officer in Op20-G, which handled the decoding of Japanese diplomatic cryptographs (page 734). He was familiar in general with Exhibit 63, the file of intercepts. The Army and Navy cooperated to get this material; each maintained interception stations (page 734). The Army intercepts were cleared through the Navy and vice versa. The division made on the basis of dates; the Army was responsible for even dates; the Navy odd (page 735). Documents were noted as to time of translation; the dates at the top were the dates of interception (page 735).

He said that Document 39 (14 part dispatch) was received in the Navy Department from station as follows: (all times Washington time)

Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 received 1149, 12-6-41:

Parts 9, 10 received between 1149 and 1451, 12-6-41

Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13 received at 1451, 12-6-41.

These first 13 parts were processed and given to Commander Kramer between 2100 and 2200, 12-6-41.

Commander Kramer said that the fourteen part message was received by him (Document 39, Exhibit 63) and he got the first 13 parts broken down and translated by 2105, December 6th. He called Admiral Wilkinson, who confirmed his plan of distribution. He went to the White House and gave a folder to one of Admiral Beardsall's assistants, which contained the 13 parts of the Japanese reply, with instructions to get it to the President right away. The President was entertaining. He then went to Secretary Knox's house and waited while the Secretary read the message, and had a brief discussion of it. When he delivered the messages to Secretary Knox, Secretary Knox did not comment as his wife and a business associate were present (page 972). Later Kramer and the Secretary privately discussed some of the points of the 13 parts of the reply. Secretary Knox called Secretaries Stimson and Hull, and these calls indicated a meeting of the three Secretaries at 1000, December 7th. Kramer was instructed to be there with this and any other material which came in. He then took the translations to Admiral Wilkinson, in his quarters. He thought that Admiral Wilkinson called Admirals Turner and Stark, but is not certain (page 982). He arrived back in the Navy Department at 0030. He then secured and went home, but could be reached by telephone at any time.

Document 38 of Exhibit 63, advising that the time of delivery of the 14 part reply would be directed by a separate dispatch, was received and delivered by Kramer on December 6th along with the 13 parts (page 971).

Captain Safford said that on the week-end of December 6, 1941, his unit handled three times the normal traffic for a busy day (page 756). Thirteen parts of the 14-part message came in and were distributed by Kramer between 2100 and 2400 on December 6th. The Army advised that it had informed Secretary Hull by 2230.

Apparently based on conversations with Kramer, Captain Safford stated that Kramer distributed the messages to the White House and to Admiral Wilkinson; that he believed that Admiral Wilkinson telephoned Admiral Stark; and that Kramer returned to Navy Department at 1 a. m., then went home, and left instructions for a call when part 14 came in, as he had instructions to deliver all of the message to Admiral Stark at 0900, December 7, 1941.

According to Admiral Ingersoll, he saw the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply on the night of December 6th-7th. This, he said, indicated that the situation was very tense (page 828). He did not remember the other message (Document 38).

Admiral Turner remembered Document 38, but he did not remember when he saw it (page 999).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall the above translations or any information delivered to him at his home by office messenger on the evening of

December 6th nor any conversation with Secretary Knox or Admiral Wilkinson (pages 780, 166).*

XXXI. DECEMBER 7, 1941, IN WASHINGTON

A. INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS OTHER THAN PART FOURTEEN AND THE
"1 P. M. MESSAGE"

Captain Safford said that an intercepted Japanese message in the shape of a circular telegram from Tokyo, using the "hidden word" code, dated 7 December 1941, (Exhibit 20), was received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, shortly before 11 o'clock in the morning of 7 December. Three of the words in this message had a secondary or hidden meaning, constituting the actual message. Captain Safford said that this message was translated in such a hurry on Sunday morning, 7 December, that only two of the three key words were given their hidden value. As a result, the message was translated (p. 125-126):

"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation."

Captain Safford said that if the third and omitted key word had been given its hidden meaning, the message would have read (p. 126, 609-610):

"Relations between Japan and England and United States are not in accordance with expectation."

Captain Kramer made the following statement with regard to his translation of the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941, referred to in the preceding paragraphs (p. 133-135):

"I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the fourteen-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message, which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the United States. . . .

" . . . My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30."

Captain Kramer further stated that when he returned to his office at around noon on 7 December and noted the omission in the "hidden word" message of reference to the United States, he attempted to telephone all persons who had received the translation. However, he was able to contact only two of them, he thought these two were Captain McCollum and Colonel Bratton. Captain Kramer believed that he had made the telephone calls at about 12:30 (p. 595-596).

* It will be recalled that on December 6th there was also available in Washington an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18th, describing ships, and the courses of ships in Pearl Harbor (Document 40, Exhibit 63).

On December 7, 1941, there were three Japanese communications intercepted and translated by the Army in addition to part fourteen of the Japanese reply and the "1 p. m. message." These were:

1.

"From: Washington (Nomura)

"To: Tokyo

"December 3, 1941

"Purple (Urgent)

"#1256. Re your #875^a.

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once."

2.

"From: Washington

"To: Tokyo

"December 6, 1941

"Purple (Urgent)

"#1272

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us . . . (Message incomplete).

3.

"From: Budapest

"To: Tokyo

"December 7, 1941

"LA

"#104 Re my #103.

"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

"Relayed to Berlin."

B. PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE"

Also on December 7, 1941, the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply, and the Japanese instruction to the emissaries in Washington to deliver the reply at one p. m. on the 7th of December were translated, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 39, Exhibit 63)

^a See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.)

"From: Tokyo
 "To: Washington
 "7 December 1941
 "(Purple-Eng)
 "#902 Part 14 of 14

(NOTE: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

2. Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
 "To: Washington
 "December 7, 1941
 "Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
 "#907 To be handled in government code.
 "Re my #902(*).

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."

C. DELIVERY OF PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE" AND ACTION TAKEN

Captain McCollum said that he arrived in the Navy Department at about 0730 on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, to assume a special watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI. Shortly after his arrival Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, sent for him and a discussion was had concerning the situation in the Far East. A little before 8:30 both Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum went down to talk to Admiral Stark. At about 9 o'clock Captain McCollum received word that one of his officers wished to see him urgently. He stepped outside and Lieutenant Commander Kramer delivered to him the last part of the Japanese "Fourteen Part Reply," together with the instructions directing its presentation to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, Washington time (p. 34-35). At that time Captain McCollum had a short talk with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance of the instructions and the latter pointed out that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about 7:30 in the morning, Honolulu time, and about 2 o'clock in the morning out in the Philippines; that the exact significance of this was not known, but that if an attack were coming it looked as if it were timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii (p. 33, 36). Captain McCollum said that he took the message and instructions in to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note (p. 36). Captain McCollum stated: "We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the ambassadors, we felt there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out . . . to Admiral Stark. . . ." (p. 33-34).

Referring to the Japanese instructions to deliver the "Fourteen Part Reply" to the U. S. Secretary of State at 1 p. m., Washington time, on 7 December, Captain Kramer said that he had been impressed by the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where he knew that the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Baru with the connivance of the Thai Chief of Staff. Consequently, when he delivered the "1 p. m. message" to Mr. Hull's private secretary, he pointed this fact out to the latter and to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office. He also mentioned the fact that 1 p. m. in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor (p. 137).

(*—S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.)

Captain Kramer said that in all he had pointed out the significance of the delivery time of the "Fourteen Part Reply" to perhaps eight or ten different people, including Commander McCollum, several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton, possibly Admiral Wilkinson, and probably Captain Safford. He did not remember whether he had mentioned the matter when delivering the "1 p. m. message" to CNO's office (p. 137-138).

Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood said that the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply was received while he was on watch between midnight and 7 a. m., December 7, 1941 (page 925). Also a further dispatch was received during the watch, concerning the time of delivery of the long diplomatic message. The first dispatch, the long diplomatic message, was in English (part 14 of Exhibit 63). He thinks he delivered this to the Army. The second was in Japanese (page 926), and required translation which he thinks was done by an Army translator (part 41 of Exhibit 63). He left the dispatches for Kramer and left around seven before Kramer came in. He can't remember whether the translated message was back before he left the office at 7 a. m. (page 926).

Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering testified that on 7 December 1941 he was on duty in Op20-G of Naval Communications, beginning at 0700 (page 812). He said that Part 14 of the Japanese reply was processed and ready for delivery at 0700 and was delivered to Kramer on his arrival between 0900 and 1000; the "1 p. m. message" was received from an Army translator at about 0715 and was held until Kramer arrived and then was delivered to him (p. 813).

Lieutenant Commander Lynn testified that Part 14 of the Japanese reply did not require translation into English; it was received between 0305 and 0700 on December 7th, and, he thought, it was handed to Kramer at about 0900-1000. He said that the "1 p. m. message" arrived between 0305 and 0700, 12-7-41 and was processed and in the Army's hands for translation at 0700, 12-7-41.

According to Captain Safford Part 14 came in and was decoded and ready at 0700, 12-7-41 (page 757). The "1 p. m. message" came in and was sent to the Army for translation from the Japanese, and came back about 1000, December 7 (page 758).

Kramer, he said, went to Admiral Stark's office, gave it to him personally or to an aide, then to Admiral Beardall at the White House, and then to the State Department with the 14th part at about 1000, where Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson were (page 758). (The Court here refused to sustain the Judge Advocate's objection to testimony by the witness as to what was told to him (page 748)).

Captain Safford continued, stating that Kramer came back and found the translation of the message instructing delivery at one p. m. There also was a message "in the hidden-word code" which had been translated hurriedly and said, "relations in England not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste they left out a word and the message should have read—(the witness was here interrupted). He then said that Kramer immediately redistributed the two messages; went to CNO and gave them to an aide, Admiral Stark being in conference; to the White House, there to an aide; to the State Department about 11 and gave copies to the Secretaries of War, State and Navy. He then said that to the copy which Kramer gave to the Secretary of the Navy was a note saying that this was sunrise at Honolulu and midnight at Manila and undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours. (On Admiral Stark's motion this was stricken out by the court since the witness had no personal knowledge.)

Captain Safford summarized the information which he said indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as follows:

"Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expell the United States and England from China, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government

had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead-line for negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable, and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) that date. 1:00 p. m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to Admiral Stark. At this same time, information was also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately." (p. 357-8)

Captain Safford then discussed the distribution of information within the Navy Department and to the President and State Department, etc. His statement of the distribution by Commander Kramer from December 1 on was based, he said, on what Commander Kramer told him verbally.

Commander Kramer said that he received no phone call on the night of December 6th-7th and came in at 0900 on December 7th, received the 14th part of the reply and took it and the first 13 parts to Admiral Stark's office about 0900 where there apparently was a meeting. He was not certain who was in Admiral Stark's office. He was in a hurry. Admiral Wilkinson was there (page 973). He then left the Navy Department at 0930 to make delivery to the White House, and was at the State Department at 0950 waiting for Secretary Knox in order to deliver this additional material.

This delivery did not include the message setting 1 p. m. as the time for delivery of the reply. He did not get that until he returned to the Navy Department at about 1020. He then found that a message had been received which directed delivery of the reply to the Secretary of State at 1300, and also other messages which directed destruction of Japanese codes still on hand, and one which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 1030. He handed the "1 p. m. message" to Admiral Stark's aide at 10:30 or 10:45 and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk. Document 41 of Exhibit 63 is the "1 p. m. message", which had been translated by Army. He then left to deliver this new material to the White House and the State Department. He handed the material to a State Department official, who customarily received such material for the Secretary of State, and who was to deliver it to Secretary Knox.

He invited attention, verbally, to the time involved (page 965); that is, that this was 7:30 in Honolulu and a few hours before sunrise at Koto Bharu. He did not tell the naval officers this as he figured they would know it. The remarks he made were not to Secretary Knox himself but to the State Department official who handled this material for Secretary Hull and who was to deliver it to Secretary

Knox. He did not advise the official in the State Department to tell the Secretary of the Navy that 1300 Washington time meant dawn in Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an attack on Pearl Harbor (page 985). And, he said, Captain Safford never stated to him or in his presence that the message concerning the delivery of the note indicated a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor (page 986).

Captain Heard, who was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI, stated that information about the Japanese reply was available in the Navy Department at 0900, 7 December 1941 (page 464). Sometime between 0900 and 1000 DONI took the Chief of the Far East Section, Commander McCollum, with him to CNO to present this information. This statement, he said, was based on official records, a report from McCollum, and an official statement of DONI made very shortly after the event (page 465). Lieutenant Commander Watts relieved McCollum at 0800, 7 December (page 466).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that on the morning of December 7, 1941, he knew that the Japanese Ambassadors would present a note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. He knew the general tenor of the note that would be presented (page 204). The note was in the nature of an ultimatum. He was in Admiral Stark's office in the morning of December 7th, and Admiral Stark had the information which he had. Admiral Stark talked to General Marshall on the telephone. The Japanese asking for an appointment at 1 p. m. on a Sunday was quite unusual and out of the known routine of the foreign service (page 205). Admiral Stark concurred in a dispatch to be sent by General Marshall. The State Department was not advised of this dispatch (page 205).

He also testified that information concerning delivery of the Japanese note at 1 p. m. was available to him between 0900 and 0930 on the morning of December 7th. He does not know when it got to the Navy Department (page 213).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of the contents of the Japanese message stating that a fourteen-part reply would be sent, of the fourteen-part reply, and of the "1 p. m. message." As to the "1 p. m. message," he repeated that he had this information at 0930 on December 7th, and believed that Admiral Stark received this information about that time (page 715). He talked to Admiral Stark about 1000 (page 214). General Marshall telephoned about 1030 (page 216).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that Commander Kramer delivered this type of material and that no record was kept of time of delivery. He discussed the situation with Admiral Stark but not specific messages. When he went to Admiral Stark's office on December 7th, he recalled, he waited a while for Stark to come in at about 0930 (page 729). He then knew of the prospective 1 o'clock delivery of the "sharply worded" Japanese note and that it was a reply to the United States note of November 26th, and so informed Admiral Stark. Admiral Stark knew of this when General Marshall telephoned. He believes that Stark had delivered to him that morning "the book" containing the messages received the previous night. He is positive that the Army had the same information the Navy had (page 730). He personally did not think Japan was going to attack us (page 732).

Admiral Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind concerning the evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th was the "one p. m. message", which he learned about on the morning of December 7th. He did not remember the "14 part message" in reply to the State Department note of November 26th. Admiral Schuirmann, he said, may have given him a full picture on the morning of December 7th, and it is reasonable to assume that he did so (pages 789-790).

He stated that he had no information about the "14 part" reply or the "1 p. m. message" until he arrived at his office on December 7th (pages 790-791). He said that on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, he received information that the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a message to Secretary Hull at exactly 1300. He was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when General Marshall called and asked if he had this information. He first told General Marshall he did not think this information should be sent out, but instantly changed his mind and called General Marshall back, asking him to have the Army authorities inform the Navy. He asked General Marshall if he could get the message out quickly and offered to send it via Navy communications. General Marshall said he could get it out quickly.

Admiral Stark recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann "the time element" in connection with the "one p. m. message" (page 170), but recalled no suggestion made to him that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor. He did not recall what information he had about the Japanese message to be delivered at 1300, December 7, 1941, except the hour of delivery (page 172).

Admiral Stark stated that he had not called Admiral Kimmel on the Trans-Pacific telephone before December 7th (page 190). He stated that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply and regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel on December 7th concerning this (pages 113, 793), and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (page 799).

General Marshall said that he first saw the "14 part message" and the "1 p. m. message" sometime Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 (page 873). He 'phoned Admiral Stark, and at first Admiral Stark did not think that any message to Hawaii was necessary because the recipients might be confused by too many messages. Admiral Stark 'phoned back in a few minutes, asking that the naval authorities be advised.

General Marshall was informed, after sending some of his men back two and three times to the message center, that his message would be received within 30 minutes after dispatch. It was in the message center at 1150 and sent by radio to all points except Hawaii; they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station and therefore sent it by wire. General Marshall did not know this until afterwards (pages 873-4).

General Marshall estimated that he arrived at 10:30 a. m., Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, and first saw the "14 part message" and "1 p. m. message" shortly thereafter (pages 878-9).

He said that Admiral Stark did not inquire as to the rapidity of War Department communications in connection with dispatching the Army message of December 7, 1941 (page 879).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he arrived at the office about 0900, December 7th. He did not recall any discussion with Admiral Stark about the fourteen part message or delivery thereof until Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with General Marshall (page 837). He stated that on the morning of December 7th, he knew that the Japanese Ambassador had requested an interview with Secretary Hull in the afternoon. At the same time, Admiral Stark told him that this had been discussed with General Marshall (page 831). Admiral Ingersoll said that there was no discussion on the morning of December 7th of the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was sunrise at Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila.

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or fourteen part Japanese reply. (p. 429)

Admiral Turner said that he came to the Navy Department about 1030 or 1100 on December 7th. Admiral Stark called him and showed him a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required the Japanese Ambassador to present the Japanese reply on the 7th. Admiral Stark said he had talked to General Marshall, who said he had sent a dispatch on the matter to Hawaii. Admiral Stark said that he thought Admiral Kimmel already had intercepted and decrypted the Japanese message; they thought that he had the 14 part reply and "1 p. m. message" (page 1000).

He first recalled the time of delivery as 10:30 and corrected this to 1 p. m. He said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that he could not give the Japanese an appointment until 2:30 p. m. Admiral Turner thought from this dispatch that an attack on the United States or Britain was coming that day or the next (page 1000). They had been warned, he said, that the scrambler telephone was not secure and so the Navy Department did not use it for secret matters (page 1001).

Admiral Noyes said he did not see the 14-part message or delivery instruction prior to 7 December 1941 (page 1035, 1036); that there was no direct or convenient telephone circuit between CincPac and CNO on 7 December 1941 (page 1038) and that a Navy message from CNO, which had been designated for the fastest possible transmission, would be in CincPac's hands in a maximum of an hour (page 1044).

According to Admiral Smith, CincPac was not kept well informed of developments by the Navy Department (page 565). He testified regarding Secretary Knox's visit to Pearl Harbor, after the attack, and statements made by him there (page 556-57). He said that at lunch he joined Secretary Knox, Kimmel, Pye, Bloch, Short, Beatty (Aide to Secretary), and that the Secretary said: "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" They said, "No," and the Secretary then continued: "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. on Sunday, the 7th. I know that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." They never got that information (page

566). The Secretary also said, "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor" (page 567). Admiral Smith said that it is easy to deduce from the 1 o'clock delivery dispatch, which they received after the attack, that Pearl Harbor was a logical place of attack as the time indicated was sunrise there.

XXXII. CONDITIONS AT PEARL HARBOR PRIOR TO ATTACK

A. THE SHIPS IN PORT

Admiral Hewitt's investigation developed that at the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows:

(1) In Pearl Harbor:

(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.

(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force—Task Force Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four mine layers.

(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which were under overhaul.

(d) Five submarines and the submarine tender *PELIAS* of Task Force Seven.

(e) The *TANGIER*, *HULBERT*, *CURTIS*, and *THORNTON*, and Patrol Squadrons (VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24—a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.

(f) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu.

(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the *ARGONNE*, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBV-1, 1 J2V.

(2) At sea:

(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier (*ENTERPRISE*), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.

(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.

(c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (*LEXINGTON*), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.

(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.

(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.

(3) At other places:

(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squadron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.

(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.

(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBV-1 planes.

(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.

(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.

To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines,

and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.

Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reinforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule (Ex. 73; Hew. page 605).

Admiral DeLany stated that the ships were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Fleet; the principal mission in late 1941 was training, and they had no orders from Washington to discontinue (page 507).

Admiral Smith said that after the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet to three task forces, one task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against one another; sometimes all three task forces would be at sea at the same time. (p. 35)

As Operations Officer, one of Admiral DeLany's duties was the preparation of "Schedules of Employment." These were originally prepared on a quarterly basis about six weeks before the end of the quarter, and a considerable number of these were printed and widely distributed. (p. 83) The schedules provided for patrol of the operating areas and for air patrol coverage, entrances and sorties, primarily because they felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating areas was something that they had to guard against and also to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor (p. 84).

On December 7, Commander Paul C. Crosley was Flag Secretary on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. He produced a copy of the Pacific Fleet employment schedule, dated August 13, 1941, which was incomplete since Enclosure A was missing. Enclosure A was a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter. (p. 179) Commander Crosley also produced a proposed employment schedule dated November 10, 1941. (p. 180). Commander Crosley produced copies of the employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3 for the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942, and discussed the method of printing and distributing same. (p. 181).

Admiral Brainard did not recall any changes which had been made in the employment schedules for the last quarter of 1941 which had been submitted by the Pacific Fleet. He said that a rather general freedom of action was given to the Fleet Commanders as to changes in the operating schedules. He recalled that about the middle of 1941, the schedules were changed from type schedules to task force schedules after the Commander-in-Chief had established a task force organization. (p. 401)

Admiral Pye stated that the task forces rotated days at sea and in port; the days and dates varied. A task force could be figured to stay in port for nine to fourteen days (page 430). His task force, Task Force One, was in Pearl Harbor from November 27th until December 7th (page 418).

Admiral Pye said that it did not occur to him at any time between November 27 and December 7 to take the ships to sea because of the Army's inadequacy since it was his confirmed opinion that the greatest danger was from submarines (p. 169)

On December 7, 1941, Task Force One was in port, except for the SARATOGA, which was on the West Coast. Task Force Two was at sea; the ENTERPRISE was delivering planes to Wake; Bat. Div. One of Admiral Halsey's Task Force Two was in port. Task Force Three was conducting operations at sea, and Task Force Three's carrier, the LEXINGTON, had gone to Midway to deliver planes (page 539). The COLORADO was on the West Coast, and the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock at Pearl Harbor (page 540).

Admiral McMorris said that one of the considerations that prompted leaving the battleships of Task Force Two when the ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake with Marine planes, was the possibility of a clash with some Japanese ships and they did not want to handicap the carrier and its light forces with the slower battleships (pages 891-2). The Fleet, he said, was operating under a schedule, but no directive had been received to keep the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at that particular time (page 893).

Admiral Kimmel testified that about two-thirds of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, because Task Force One and Task Force Two overlapped in schedule for a few days (page 369).

The location of the various ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th was set forth on a map, which is Exhibit 60. From the summary annexed to that map, it appears that there were in port 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 29 destroyers, 8 destroyer minelayers, 4 destroyer minesweepers, 5 submarines, 1 floating drydock, 1 hospital ship, and 21 auxiliaries. It also appears that the MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA were double berthed near Ford Island, as were the TENNESSEE and WEST VIRGINIA, and the ARIZONA and VESTAL.

Admiral Bloch said that the berthing of ships so as to develop maximum anti-aircraft fire was the responsibility of the senior officer embarked; the double battleships were unavoidable (page 400).

- (3) Admiral Bloch said that on December 7 all of the available battleships were in Pearl Harbor—8 battleships—and that those most severely damaged were the double-berthed battleships in the outer positions at the moorings; however, he did not think that the double berthing could have been avoided since there were no other berths available. (p. 28)

Admiral Anderson said that air torpedo attack was the most damaging to his battleships. The planes, he said, came from an easterly direction. As the ships were berthed, there was a considerable number of the ship's guns so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes. Admiral Anderson said that assuming that at least one-fourth of the anti-aircraft guns had been ready for opening fire and free to fire at will upon the approaching planes, his estimate would be that those guns could not have defeated nor seriously diminished the attack. (p. 397) Admiral Anderson said that there wasn't any choice as to what the Commander Battleships could do in assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just about as many berths designated available to him as there were ships. (p. 398)

Admiral Smith said that the ships were anchored in four sections because the Army did not have enough anti-aircraft guns and it was necessary to locate the ships so that the fire from the ships' guns would be effective. "We" knew that the only guns that could be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor probably were the Navy guns (page 552).

Admiral Smith said that they had thought at the time that the Army and Navy operating through the local defense forces were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack but that he now realized that they were not. (p. 42)

Admiral Brown said that knowing that the Army defenses were wholly inadequate, he thought that the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon their own anti-aircraft for their own defense both at Pearl Harbor and at sea. (p. 144)

B. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

Admiral Turner discussed the knowledge in the Navy Department of the Army's condition of readiness as to anti-aircraft equipment, radar and the like at page 260.

Admiral Kimmel testified that there were no naval guns ashore except a Marine battery (page 283). Admiral Kitts said that the statement in the Roberts' Report about Navy shore batteries, at page 20, is inaccurate although there may have been a Marine battery (pages 518, 521).

Admiral Bloch said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was one Marine battalion which had some anti-aircraft weapons. (p. 88)

Admiral Halsey said that during the months preceding December 7, he had been of the view that the Army did not have enough equipment or the proper equipment to defend Pearl Harbor, particularly as to anti-aircraft guns and fighting planes. (p. 303)

Admiral Kitts stated that the Army had charge of the shore-based anti-aircraft batteries. In the area immediately around Pearl Harbor, the only anti-aircraft fire on December 7th was from the ships and the fleet marine school at Palua. The greatest strength of Army anti-aircraft guns was in mobile batteries of 3" caliber, which had not been emplaced on December 7th and did not get in position until after noon on December 7th. He estimated that the Army had 32 to 48 3" guns and one battery of 90 mm. guns (page 516).

He said that the Army anti-aircraft guns at Kamehameha were in action in about 25 minutes after the attack. These were fixed position guns (page 522). The main Army anti-aircraft guns were mobile batteries which were not in place

except one battery. He was informed that the Army's mobile anti-aircraft was first in place at noon (page 522). The fixed guns may have been in operation earlier.

Admiral Kitts discussed the readiness of personnel and ammunition on shipboard and anti-aircraft batteries. (p. 191) Admiral Kitts said that the Fleet had its full allowance of ammunition and in general its mobilization allowance aboard at the time of the attack. (p. 192) Admiral Kitts discussed the gunnery training which had been given prior to Pearl Harbor. (p. 193) Admiral Kitts discussed the anti-aircraft guns at Pearl Harbor, (p. 189) and the anti-aircraft armament on ships in the Harbor. (p. 190)

The number and location of the Army's guns were, according to Admiral Bloch (page 413) as follows:

"To my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about 80 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, about 20 37-millimeter guns, and about 100 50-calibre machine guns—all of these for anti-aircraft use. Of the 3-inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed emplacements, always mounted, and about one-half or two-thirds of this 30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the other 3-inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3-inch guns; all of the 37-millimeter guns and 50-calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their orders from the Army."

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army planned the mounting of the anti-aircraft guns; he did not consider mounting anti-aircraft or machine guns on buildings in Pearl Harbor, nor did he ask the Army to install guns in such places (page 416). The Army, he said, had insufficient guns to carry out its assigned tasks under JCD-42 (page 387).

According to Admiral DeLany, Admiral Kimmel was familiar with the terribly weak defenses of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet. (p. 78)

Admiral McMorris said that although he personally felt the Army's preparations for the defense of Oahu were adequate that he thought Admiral Kimmel had been concerned over the anti-aircraft defenses and had talked with the Commanding General on the subject.

Colonel Phillips testified that he did not consider the material condition of readiness of the Army adequate to defend Pearl Harbor (page 494). There was, he said, a shortage of anti-aircraft guns (page 479).

General Marshall said that for Hawaii—110 30-mm., 144 37-mm., and 516 50-calibre AA guns had been ordered; on December 7, 1941, four-fifths of the 30-mm were complete, and one-fifth of the lesser calibres (page 855).

Admiral Pye testified that there was no system of coordinating the fire between ship and shore batteries; Sector Commanders took command of fire control and so notified ships in their sectors (page 418).

Colonel Phillips could not recall whether there had been any plan for coordinating the Army gunfire with the Navy gunfire (page 481). The Local Joint Army-Navy Committee made various plans, but he did not recall when they had met last prior to December 7th (page 481).

General Short testified that no plans had been made for coordinating the gunfire from the ships in the harbor with the Army's fire (page 228).

Admiral Kimmel testified that ComFOURTEEN had had many drills for coordinating the fire of the ships in harbor with the shore fire (page 365).

C. ARMY AND NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINESS

General Short testified that the Army had three alerts—the first against sabotage; the second the additional threat of submarine, surface or aircraft attack; and the third an "all-out" alert. The alert in effect on December 7, 1941 was Army Alert No. 1—the anti-sabotage alert (page 228).

Admiral Bloch said that with the exception of one or two isolated cases, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Those cases involved disgruntled sailors. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December. (p. 88)

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of an Army alert was in effect although he did know that they had some kind of an alert effective (page 326). He did not make specific inquiries of General Short as to the nature of the alert which the Army was maintaining (page 343).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy condition of readiness in effect was condition No. 3 as set forth in 2CL-41 and an order requiring two 5-inch guns and two 50-caliber guns on each battleship, which amounted to one-fourth of their anti-aircraft to be manned at all times (page 278). He said that he considered condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient under the circumstances (page 279).

Admiral Kimmel stated that on December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral Pye was the Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters were at the submarine base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship to which he could move on short notice (page 278). He testified that ComFOURTEEN was to advise the Senior Officer Present Afloat of the condition of readiness to maintain and that the Senior Officer Present Afloat was charged with the duty of setting the condition of readiness for ships (page 365). He did not know whether Admiral Bloch advised Admiral Pye of the condition of readiness to maintain (page 279).

The condition of readiness of the Fleet, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not changed after November 27th because full security measures for ships at sea were already in effect (page 303).

The court wanted to know whether if Admiral Kimmel had increased the alert would it have done any more than man a few anti-aircraft guns (page 1124). He said, at best, it might have done so and it might have enabled the intercepting fighters to come into action a little better.

Admiral Bloch stated that Condition 3 was, and for several months had been, in effect for the Fleet; the condition of readiness for Navy shore establishments and aircraft was determined by each commanding officer, but there was none in effect on December 7th, except normal day to day routine for training (page 390).

Admiral Pye stated that there was no condition of readiness set for ships in port. His testimony before Admiral Hart that condition 3 was in effect and that he so informed Admiral Kimmel was erroneous (page 419).

Admiral Pye said that the defenses of the Fleet were largely in the hands of the Army and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet itself, but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 158)

Admiral Pye said that Condition 3 was in effect for the ships in the Harbor on December 7, and had been prescribed previous to the last entry on the understanding that that condition would be in effect unless other notice was given. He did not receive any advice from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as to the necessity for a higher condition of readiness. (p. 164-5).

However, each battleship had two 5'' anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned in addition to the anti-aircraft control (page 419). This condition was in excess of that required by condition 3. Gun crews for manned guns were required to be on deck near their guns with communications, including anti-aircraft control, manned (page 422). The anti-aircraft control (director room) was the only battle lookout. The officers and men required to remain aboard were sufficient to man all anti-aircraft guns.

Admiral Anderson said that none of the three specific conditions of readiness set forth in sub-heading G of 2CL-41 were maintained by the Fleet while it was in Pearl Harbor during November and December. He said that he was very clear that none of these conditions was in effect at the time of the attack because he gave close personal attention to matters of gun and ammunition readiness and on his own initiative he had increased the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battleships. He had established 24-hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each battleship, and two of the 5'' anti-aircraft guns on each ship were to be told off each day as ready guns. (p. 396) Admiral Anderson said that the anti-aircraft batteries aboard the battleships were, generally speaking, eight 5'' anti-aircraft guns .25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns. Also most of the ships had either four guns of three inch .50 calibre or four quads of 1''1. (p. 397)

Admiral Bunkley said that in October, 1941, while his ship was in port, they were not under any condition of readiness, i. e., under conditions one, two or three. They had two machine guns manned at all times and am-

munition ready for two 5" guns with the crews of those guns standing by. They were operating under the Fleet security letter issued prior to October and a security order for the CALIFORNIA which was designated to prevent sabotage by requiring a security patrol. There were no changes ordered prior to December 7 that he could remember. (p. 413-4)

While at sea, Admiral Bunkley said the battleships did maintain conditions of readiness and it was his opinion that these precautions were carried out both for training and because of the danger of a submarine attack. (p. 415)

Admiral Pye said that: He was at sea on November 24th and received a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel and from then on until the task force entered Pearl Harbor, all possible measures against submarine and aircraft attack were taken (page 433). He said that Admiral Bloch only had the duty to inform him as Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor of the necessity for a condition of readiness (page 420). He did not do so (page 420).

Admiral Kitts testified that Condition 3 was in effect at sea and its equivalent in effect in port (page 513). He said that, the condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was equal to or better than that laid down in 2CL-41, dealing with Port Security (page 523).

Admiral Smith said that despite the Robert's Report, the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency (page 548).

Admiral Delaney said that the condition of readiness was as set forth in 2CL-41 (page 498). He felt that this was satisfactory.

D. NUMBER AND CONDITION OF THE MEN

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army had insufficient and "green" personnel (page 387). According to General Short, on December 7, 1941, he had 57,000 troops. He had asked for 71,500 (page 257).

As to Navy personnel, Admiral Smith said that in his opinion (which the Court did not seem to share), the withdrawal of men from the Fleet for the purpose of filling complements and new construction had not materially decreased the efficiency of the Fleet (page 560). The ship did have the crews that they had normally held, "say a year before Pearl Harbor" (page 560) on the 85 per cent basis. He commented that several days after Pearl Harbor they received a letter written shortly before Pearl Harbor from the Bureau of Personnel, refusing to give them further men, and stating that the war was in the Atlantic.

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel had constantly asked for additional equipment of men for the Pacific Fleet, but he adverted to a letter received shortly after Pearl Harbor from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated November 25, 1941, File No. FF12/MM-(55), (Secret-Confidential File Room Bureau of Personnel) advising that the war was in the Atlantic. (p. 38)

Admiral Smith said that the personnel and materiel shortages did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet; he had always felt that the complements were unnecessarily large; the Fleet was adequately manned; he considered the ships very efficient; the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed by the shortages; but the Commander-in-Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction. (p. 38)

Admiral Smith said that the materiel conditions of the Fleet was all right and was satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the program of alterations, as laid down by the Materiel Bureaus of the Navy Department, did not interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the morale and health of the Fleet was excellent. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that, in his opinion, the efficiency of the Fleet did not suffer from too frequent changes of personnel. (p. 63)

Admiral Halsey said that one of his most vivid recollections of the period prior to the attack was the constant effort on the part of Admiral Kimmel and his subordinate commanders to get additional personnel and materiel. (p. 307)

Admiral Kimmel testified that regular liberty was granted the night of December 6th-7th, i. e. three-fourths of the officers and one-half of the men had liberty. The ones who remained were required to be trained and capable of manning anti-aircraft guns. At the time of the attack there were 90 per cent of the men and 70 per cent of the officers aboard. There was no evidence of consequential indulgence in liquor (page 330).

General Short testified that he knew of no unusual intoxication on the night of December 6th, and that no effects of overindulgence were apparent on the morning of the 7th (page 269).

Admiral Delaney testified that morale in the fleet was high. The fleet had been intensively trained under warlike conditions. Joint training with Army had been conducted (page 496).

Admiral Kitts, who was in charge of training, stated that in his opinion the efficiency of the ships and gunnery on December 7, 1941, was in the highest state ever reached in time of peace (page 512). He stated that a shortage of 50-calibre ammunition had affected the target practice of the ships. (In this connection, the Court took judicial notice of the Robert's Report.) (page 518). He said, however, that the Fleet's training and efficiency were of the highest; subject to manpower and some ammunition shortages (page 525).

Admiral Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of December 6th-7th, and saw nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the ships were fit for duty on December 7, 1941. The high state of readiness of personnel for combat was the result of intensive training during 1941 (page 526).

Admiral Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of the men and officers on the 6th and 7th of December was satisfactory (page 443). Their behavior during the attack was superb (page 445). He considered that the state of training was the highest he ever saw in the Fleet, despite shortages of material (page 444).

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion on December 7, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it had ever attained. (p. 149)

Admiral Calhoun said that there was no unusual or excessive drinking on the night of December 6th, and no evidence of drunkenness on the morning of December 7th. (p. 226) Admiral Calhoun discussed the liberty provisions over the week-end. (p. 226)

No instances of men being unfit for duty came to the attention of Admiral Bloch (page 411). Admiral DeLany stated that in his opinion the men were fit for duty and they performed their duty well (page 508). According to Captain Ramsey, all men were fit for duty and were efficient (page 607). Commander Rochefort testified that the deportment of the officers and men was excellent (page 476). Colonel Phillips stated that the condition of officers and men as to sobriety was normal on December 6th-7th. All the men he came in contact with on December 7th were fit for duty and on the job (pages 494-5).

E. THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

General Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October, 1941. The system was not completely installed and the personnel were not expert. In October, 1941, he had sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for training and the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job (pages 223-225). In addition to the radar system, they maintained 100 coast artillery stations as lookout stations. These were not continuously manned, and were not manned on December 7th because of the alert then in effect (page 225). No civilian lookouts were maintained because the distances at Oahu were so small as to make them valueless (page 227).

General Short said that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at ranges of from 75 to 100 miles, and that they might have been more effective if higher station locations had been completed (page 227). On December 7th, the aircraft warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily (page 228). The system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel wished to do so (page 263). The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he estimated that that was the best time for the enemy to attack, if the enemy were going to attack (page 265). The Interceptor Command was functioning after November 27th on a 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m. basis daily, although the Interceptor Command was not established by written order until December 17th.

General Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer in the Information Center of the Aircraft warning system in August, and on November 24th the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He does not recall whether they were actually there on December 7th (page 226). He said that Admiral Kimmel assigned Commander Curtis as Liaison Officer the day after the request was made, but General Short felt that Admiral Kimmel did not understand that he wanted a liaison officer actually working in the Information Center and not a general liaison officer. Lt. Comdr. Taylor was sent to help with the aircraft warning system (pages 261-2).

Colonel Phillips said that the Interceptor Command was barely in the first stage of organization on December 7th; there were no permanent stations, but a mobile station was operating (page 487). Ultimately this command included an information center, but he isn't sure whether it was set up on December 7th. The Aircraft Warning System was operating for training from November 27th until December 7th. He did not remember the hours they were working (page 487), but it was in the morning.

General Marshall said that in connection with the installation of the aircraft warning service, the plans were for six fixed and six mobile stations (page 857).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army on the radar set-up. He sent officers to work with the Army. Army personnel had been taken to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system was in operation and that it was far from perfect (pages 289-290). He said that he did not know that the radar system was not to be operated after 0700 (page 290). He did not know the details of the progress of construction on the radar system but knew that the Navy had continued pressure on the Army to get something done on this line (page 294). The Army's radar crews, he said, were green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net needed polishing in order to make it effective (page 304).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel knew that the Army radar station had not been functioning; it had just been completed; it had been operating on the morning of December 7, but Admiral Kimmel hadn't known it. (p. 41)

Admiral Smith said that he knew the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning of a Japanese carrier raid. (p. 44)

Admiral Kimmel testified that he was quite certain that in many conversations which he had with General Short, he stressed the necessity for an aircraft warning system as well as for other elements of defense (page 1128); General Short never requested him to supply any naval operators to be used in the operation of Army radar on Oahu, and so far as Kimmel is concerned, he made no request of the Commandant (page 1129). General Short did ask for a liaison officer in July, who was furnished. Admiral Kimmel was informed that General Short did not in fact request the Commandant for "watch officers;" they would have been supplied, had he asked (page 1129). Admiral Kimmel did send Commander Taylor to assist the Army (page 1130). Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle radar matters with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that the Navy liaison officer who was supposed to be supplied to the Army Interceptor Command was only one of a number to be supplied as well by the Army (page 1146). A Navy liaison officer was not there on December 7th because the Army had not even sent watch officers, nor had they asked the Navy to send a watch officer. The Army Warning Service was not actually established until December 7th (page 1147). A Navy liaison officer for the Army Interceptor Command, for the evaluation and relay of information, was not sent until after December 7th, as the system was not set up before then, although the agreement had required this.

Admiral Bloch said that when General Short arrived in February, he and Admiral Bloch talked about the Army's radar system and as the net progressed to completion General Short, about September or October, told Admiral Bloch that he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train operators and he wanted to know if there was anything Admiral Bloch could do to help him. Admiral Bloch requested the Commander-in-Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea for training which was done. As of December, Admiral Bloch thought that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not yet all out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but Admiral Bloch had no knowledge as to whether they were standing any regular watches and early in December there was no means developed for controlling aircraft so as to differentiate by means of radar between friendly and other planes. (p. 11-12)

As to communications, Admiral Bloch said the communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. All ships and stations were required to listen at all times on that frequency. There were teletypes between the Army Headquarters and Admiral Bloch's Headquarters with a branch in Admiral Kimmel's office. There was telephonic communication

between Admiral Bloch's Headquarters and General Short's "Message Center". Admiral Bloch also had such communication from the Harbor Control and Command Posts, both at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor to the gates. There was also telephonic communication between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters. There were, Admiral Bloch said, means for rapid communication including communication from the "Interceptor Command" to Admiral Bloch's Headquarters. (p. 19)

Admiral Bloch said that there was no naval officer specifically detailed at the Army Interceptor Command. After December 7, that Command was staffed by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them at that time, the Army asked for watch officers to communicate with the Navy, although Admiral Bloch said it had been his plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy people were sent there on December 7. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net had ever been used in any tactical operation. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army was having a great deal of trouble getting the radar system to work; there was trouble with the electronics and the Army came to Admiral Bloch for assistance; the Army was referred to the Commander in Chief and an officer by the name of Taylor was sent to help the Army in an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison and Admiral Bloch thought that he was there only in the capacity as an expert to assist the Army with their electrical and mechanical difficulties. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch had no confidence in the Army radar system because he knew that it was not completely set up; the operators were not completely trained; and there was no way so that friendly or hostile planes could be identified there being no IFF equipment. Admiral Bloch said that there was a standard procedure for aircraft approach to and departure from Oahu for Army and Navy planes and that in addition to Army and Navy planes, there were various commercial companies operating aircraft there. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army had a number of observation posts on Oahu and adjacent islands, but that these were not manned unless there was a full alert and that not all of such posts had means of rapid communications with headquarters. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had for obtaining information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by visual observation was the signal tower. (p. 21)

Captain Ramsey stated that about a week or ten days before December 7th, General Davidson asked Admiral Bellinger whether the Navy could furnish officer personnel to help man the radar system for 24-hour operation and said that if the Navy did not supply the men, he could operate only in the critical hours of the morning and evening. The final decision was that the Navy could not supply the officers required at that time on a permanent basis. He did not know the reason (page 601).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he was only slightly informed as to the Army radar system (page 686).

Admiral Bellinger said that the Army Interceptor Command was not ready to perform its part in the protection of Pearl Harbor from the viewpoint of the radar installations and of their ability to control their fighter groups, the number of planes they had, and the general quality of their pilots. (p. 131)

Commander W. G. Taylor testified that between October 1st and December 7th, he was assigned to temporary duty, Commander Airforce, Pacific Fleet (page 609). He was loaned to the Army Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity to aid in setting up the air warning system. (3)

Admiral Halsey said that he had sent his communication officer to work with the Army on the Army's radar system and that that officer had reported to him that the radar system was very backward as to its state of readiness. (p. 302)

He had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar development at the time. In working with the Army, he worked mainly on liaison between the air warning systems and the commands; he worked in an advisory capacity (page 611). He had been detailed to the job at the direction of Admiral Kimmel around the middle of November, at the request of the Army (page 622).

He first reported to the Army as an advisor about the second week in November and called a conference at which he submitted a memorandum which was prepared because of the difficulty in getting the Information Center set up. (4)

Commander William E. G. Taylor completed a naval flight course and was commissioned an Ensign in 1926; after a year's service, he resigned his commission and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. He served as an instructor specializing in fighter aircraft, and was placed on inactive duty as a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1934. He then had various jobs as a pilot, and was commissioned a Sub-Lieutenant in the British Naval Reserve Force in September, 1939, and thereafter engaged in various combat operations with the British. (p. 338-340) He said that the British fighter operations were very effectively directed while the planes were in the air. The general assumption was that the direction was employing a system of advanced electronics for interception of enemy aircraft. (p. 341)

Commander Taylor, while serving with the British, made reports to United States Naval representatives and endeavored to get as much information as he could on the methods of fire control used by the British. (p. 342) Commander Taylor returned to the United States in an effort to get from the British faster fighter craft which could be used by the Fleet and the Fleet air arm. (p. 342) Commander Taylor was next transferred to the British Royal Air Force on October 2, 1940, and was assigned to an R. A. F. squadron known as 242 in order to get operational experience before taking over his own squadron. He said that it was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of the R. A. F. fighter during the so-called Battle of Britain was the magnificent fighter direction control which the British had. (p. 343)

During this period of service with the Royal Air Force, Commander Taylor became more interested in the patrol system used by the British and continued to make reports to the American Naval Attache. Commander Taylor said that both the American Army and the American Navy had a large number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system, and that his impression that all of the information was made available to them, but that it did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of the method used by the British. (p. 343-4) Commander Taylor said that he had made a full report to various officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics and particularly sought out the officer who was at that time in charge of radar development. Commander Taylor could arouse no interest in the use of this radar for fighter direction. (p. 344)

In July, 1941, after having had his own squadron for six months, Commander Taylor was advised by the British that because of his age they were going to make him a Wing Commander in charge of a fighter operational unit. He asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to be returned to the American Navy. He was commissioned in the American Navy in July, 1941, given a special assignment to visit several radar stations, and reported to the Bureau of Aeronautics in August of 1941. (p. 345)

Commander Taylor was given various lecturing assignments to ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and he arrived at Pearl Harbor in October, 1941, where he spoke to Admirals Halsey and Kimmel, among others. He lectured to the Army fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field and lectured to the pilots of the SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. He found that the ENTERPRISE' fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods but had progressed much further than any other ship. He found that the ENTERPRISE had had their radar equipment for some time, the SARATOGA had no radar, and the LEXINGTON had recently acquired radar. In all ships equipped with radar, all hands were going through a training period. Commander Taylor was recalled by a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel which stated that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, desired Commander Taylor's assistance for technical purposes. (p. 347)

The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1, 1941, as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and the Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows:

"During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true; (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command

appeared to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. At no time before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. 2 The actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under the Interceptor Command. The Interceptor Command fully realized the importance of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and lend all assistance in their power to help complete its installations. They seemed relatively impatient, however, in getting assistance needed from the Commanding General's Staff. 3 One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. 4 The air warning equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground-to-air and air-to-ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve its purpose as was later proved. 5 There were only five Army mobile radar equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the reported azimuth readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen miles radius from the equipment. It was, therefore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction at each station. All stations were under-manned for twenty-four operation. At the time of my inspection, either commercial or Signal Corps field telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the Information Center. 6 The Information Center itself had been planned on an Area Command scale similar to the Boston or New York Information Centers and was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu. The building was a temporary, wooden building and had been just completed at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had been provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the activities at which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this time and no provisions had been made to provide them. 7 The anti-aircraft batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established between the anti-aircraft command and the Information Center. 8 No attempt had been made to secure control of the anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor. 9 No liaison had been established between the searchlights and the Information Center. 10 No attempt had been made to disperse the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. 11 No automatic aircraft recognition system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. 12 No aircraft approach lane system had been planned. 13 No system for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu by reports from parent aviation activities had been organized. 14 No visual observers reporting system had been organized. . . ."

"By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and

the command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal points at Wheeler Field. Direct command lines were installed from Liaison positions in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and one at Haliena Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been established between the Army anti-aircraft batteries (three and five inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff to request control of anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that 'No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot it down.' However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down USS ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 29, at which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems would not be put into effect until war was declared, because it was felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corp's (Hawaiian Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G-2 liaison officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400-0700 by the order. The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it existed on about 1 December and was told that in view of the failure of the responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to activate the Information Center on a twenty-four basis, he would initiate a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. However, no action was taken up to December 7." (P. 350-351)

Commander Taylor said that there was a 15-mile dead area around Oahu in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December 7 there was no visual system to supplement that weakness. (p. 351)

Commander Taylor said that the Army's radar operators and maintenance men at radar stations were insufficient in number and were not fully trained even up to December 7. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said that he had asked the Navy for six liaison officers for the Information Center, and on December 8 he received ten who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA. He had also asked ComFOURTEEN to whom he was directed by the Commander in Chief's Staff, that control of the anti-aircraft guns on naval vessels in the harbor should be held by the Information Center; also that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu; and that a letter be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a 24-hour basis. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said he made full reports to the Staff of the Commander in Chief as to the inadequacy of the Army Air warning system. (p. 352) He was quite sure that the Commander in Chief's Staff fully realized the situation.

His recommendation in regard to the Army air warning system was made on November 24, 1941. The memorandum containing his recommendation was introduced in evidence, marked Exhibit 62, and read to the Court. This covered a meeting held for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a wartime basis; attended by Army and Navy officers who agreed as to the importance of the Center and as to the necessity for liaison watch officers from each activity to transmit information; information was to be drawn from various sources including naval aircraft; the system was being operated 0700 to 1130 but should be on a full-time basis; ComFOURTEEN should be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison officers; confusion during exercises due to the number of planes could be controlled (1) by having all flights reported by parent units; (2) by enforcing aircraft approach procedure; (3) by requiring approaching planes to report at least 60 miles before coming in (CincUS had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises, this was to be discussed for a decision as to its value); IFF was not available; the question of gun control of ships in port was to be discussed with CincUS; also it was decided to investigate the possibility of using naval radar to supplement land radar in an emergency.

Very little was done as a result of this memorandum, he said, because they were unable to get more personnel. It was the Army's duty to supply personnel, with the exception of the Navy liaison officers (page 619). He personally requested CincPac's, ComFOURTEEN's Chief of Staff and Admiral Bellinger to supply liaison officers and was told that they were not available, but would be ordered to report to the Information Center as soon as possible. Liaison officers were essential to the proper dissemination of information (page 620). Their absence here, however, actually made little difference so far as the Navy liaison was concerned.

Commander Taylor said that the air warning system could have been made operative sooner if there had been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things needed (page 621). This impetus should have come from the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army. He remained with the Army for one month after December 7th, and at the end of seven days the Information Center was running smoothly. The war made it easier to get liaison officers (page 621).

Even if information from the radar were properly plotted, it would have been impossible to tell if planes were Japanese or whether they were United States planes; without some method of identification, radar cannot tell friend from foe. The Information Center is for the purpose of determining what friendly planes are in the air so that if a radar track is picked up that does not correspond to the course of the friendly planes it is presumed that it is the track of enemy planes.

The radar equipment of the Army, he said, was adequate to do a fair job in the morning. Communication between the air warning system and the other organizations was in, except for some of fighter dispersal areas and the lines to the civilian air warning. Communications between fighter director officers and fighter aircraft were inadequate to control fighters more than five miles off shore. The Army radar operators were well trained. For some time prior to December 7th, the radar had been operated from 0800 to 1630 in the afternoon, but shortly before December 7th, General Short gave orders to close down the radar stations

except between the hours of 4:00 a. m. and 7:00 a. m. (page 611). He understood the change was made to save the equipment.

On December 7th, there were no permanent radar installations on Oahu; there were five mobile sets (page 624). The permanent equipment was there, but it would take some time to put it in (page 624).

He stated that the Information Center of the air warning system was not adequately set up prior to December 7th, and they were in the process of teaching controllers (page 612).

At no time were there sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the radar station even partially (page 625). The Robert's Report is incorrect in stating that there were sufficient partially trained personnel on November 27th to operate the system twenty-four hours a day (page 626). There were insufficient well-trained personnel to operate even partially at any time. They could get fairly good 360° coverage, and he believed that in no case could a large raid come in undetected (page 626).

The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, was in charge of the radar, and the Navy assisted in setting up an air warning system, except that they had not furnished liaison officers (page 615). The radar was entirely under the control of the Army; his duties were advisory (page 616). At the time he came in contact with the Army, the Information Center was being organized by two junior Army officers who worked hard to get the system into operation but did not have enough force to get what they needed from various commands to get the station operating (page 627).

There was not sufficient personnel to operate the radars twenty-four hours a day, although he felt that the station should be operated twenty-four hours a day, fully manned. There were just enough sets to cover the area of Oahu. If any one set had gone out, it would have meant the loss of that coverage. (page 617)

Concerning the Army radar system, Admiral DeLany said that they did not rely upon it for any information because the radar itself had just been installed and was being used for training operators. (p. 80)

Captain Curtis discussed his connection with the development of radar from 1936 to 1938 and the disclosure of the Navy's developments to the Army in about 1937. (p. 110) Captain Curtis discussed the status of the Army radar in November 1941 at Pearl Harbor. He did not know what delayed the Army generally in securing radar. The Army's problem in connection with radar was much simpler than the Navy's; he informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar was not in an operational but was merely in an instruction status prior to December 7. (p. 111)

Admiral Anderson said that it was the Army's mission primarily to defend Pearl Harbor and that he had no exact knowledge as to the readiness to repel air attack; he was not familiar with the state of readiness of the air warning net.

F. SHIPS' RADAR

Admiral Kimmel testified that some of the ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th were equipped with radar, but it was not manned because it was ineffective due to the surrounding hills (page 331).

Admiral Pye said that the PENNSYLVANIA and CALIFORNIA were equipped with radar (page 422). The efficiency of this radar was good. The ships' radar could not be used in port because of the surrounding hills and buildings.

Admiral Pye said that after the beginning of the war, the PENNSYLVANIA while at sea had picked up planes with radar and tracked them for a distance of 85 miles. (p. 168)

Admiral Smith said that the ships' radar was of no use in port (page 559). He stated that two carriers which were outside had radar, but picked up nothing, and that Admiral Halsey on his trip to Midway and return had an air search to a radius of 300 miles and picked up nothing (page 559). To have stationed a ship clear of Pearl Harbor with radar would have been ineffective due to the 65-mile range of the radar, and to station a cordon for that purpose would have been ineffective and very dangerous because of the risk of attack on the ships (page 559). However, he did not recall consideration of this at the time.

Captain Ramsey stated that the CURTIS, from her berth in Pearl Harbor, could cover the 150°-160° arc to southward with her radar for a distance depending on the altitude of the target (page 603).

Commander Taylor said that the radar equipment in the Navy was excellent prior to December 7, 1941, but the operators of radar were, in general, inex-

perienced (page 610). In a land-locked harbor with mountains around it, performance of radar equipment aboard ship was not good (page 614). In Pearl Harbor, the ships' radar might work, and again—it might not. It would be affected by mountains to the north as to performance to the south (page 614).

G. STEPS TAKEN BY COMMANDER LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE

Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch's performance of duty as Naval Base Defense Officer was satisfactory (page 285). He was to advise of the condition of readiness, but this did not relieve the Senior Officer Present Afloat from fixing the condition of readiness (page 286).

Admiral Bloch, he said, was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer and was to command the Naval forces in the event of an attack, and also for necessary drills (page 289). Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch had nothing suitable for reconnaissance (page 356), and that planes were available to Admiral Bloch only for drill or in an emergency (page 354), but that he should have asked for planes if he considered them necessary for long range reconnaissance, and could have asked for submarines or surface ships for such use (pages 354-5). He said that Admiral Bloch had available four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three coast guard cutters, and the SACRAMENTO (page 361).

Admiral Bloch testified that the forces assigned to him as a local defense force were four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three Coast Guard cutters, the SACRAMENTO, one net vessel, one gate vessel, two self-propelled oil lighters, and a few small tugs and small craft. This force was not adequate to perform the Navy's task under JCD-42 (page 386). He had no surface or aircraft for offshore patrol and had no attack force.

Admiral Bloch said that CincPac was his immediate superior in command (page 388). He stated his responsibility under 2CL-41 and what steps had been taken so as to discharge this responsibility. These were an agreement which had been made with the Army regarding the use of planes, and drills held pursuant thereto, marine anti-aircraft had been made available to the Army, arrangements had been made at Navy installations to emplace Army guns (which were not emplaced prior to the attack) and to take care of those gun crews; about twenty-six 3" anti-aircraft guns had been emplaced by the Army near Pearl Harbor; air control had been arranged for through Commander Patrol Wing Two; in drills the Senior Officer Present Afloat had been advised of what condition of readiness to maintain and this was Admiral Bloch's responsibility; bi-weekly drills had been held with the Army during the Autumn and up to December 7th; a Communications plan, including air raid alarm signal, had been planned and executed in drills (page 390).

On the 7th of December, 1941, certain features of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Department plan were in effect, Admiral Bloch said:

"Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy in paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie. (c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e), which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f), which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono-buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets, torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation. (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant reconnaissance: the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and

taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective. (l): with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack. (o): supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that."

Captain Curts said in substance that the communications between Headquarters and the ships were the same as they would have been if Headquarters had been maintained aboard the PENNSYLVANIA. Captain Curts discussed communications arrangements with the Army and with aircraft and with the air station at Kaneohe Bay. (pp. 105-107)

General Short testified that he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol during the period from October 16th to December 7th, and that harbor patrol posts were established and the channel was being swept (page 234). (2)

Admiral Bloch said that he gave General Short no reason for believing that the Navy forces at sea would give adequate warning against a hostile attack. (p. 21)

Admiral Bloch stated that there was no inner air patrol on the morning of December 7, 1941. He had asked the Navy Department for four observation sea planes for this purpose (page 407). He had no planes under his direct command.

H. ARMY AIRCRAFT

General Short testified that his aircraft defenses were very inadequate and that he had on December 7th, twelve B-17's, only six of which were in commission. In addition to the six available B-17's, he had ten A-20's, and 50 B-18's, which he characterized as death traps against a modern plane, only twenty-four of which were in commission. He had asked the War Department for more planes (pages 223, 224, 231).

On December 7th, General Short testified, the Army pursuit planes were in a state of routine training except for the alert against sabotage (page 228). Not being alerted for combat, it required 55 minutes for the Army aircraft to get into action on December 7th (page 229). General Short testified that on December 7th, the Army maintained no inshore patrol except as incidental to training. One squadron of planes, he said, did have ammunition right next to the planes (page 229). The long range bombers which he had were available for cooperation with the Navy. The B-17's were good for a 1200 mile radius if they carried bomb loads.

Colonel Phillips testified that on December 7th, the Army had about twelve planes sendable for distant reconnaissance (page 484), and a squadron of small reconnaissance planes (page 485). He said that there was a shortage of Army planes (page 479).

General Marshall said that for the Hawaiian project 148 pursuit planes were scheduled: there were 99 P-40's and 46 P-36's there on December 7th. The commander had asked for 180 long range bombers but shortages prevented reaching this figure. There were 12 B-17's there on December 7th (page 855).

Admiral Kimmel testified that during his tour of duty, the effective Army pursuit planes had been increased from none to 100 and that only six Army B-17's were available on December 7th (page 289). He said that in November, 1941, the War Department had ordered the transfer of certain B-17's from Oahu to the Philippines, which left only twelve at Oahu, six of which were available for use (page 290).

Admiral Kimmel stated that the best defense the Army had against an attack such as the attack which in fact was made, was pursuit planes, and that the Army did not have sufficient planes or crews (page 331). He estimated that on December 7th the Army needed three times the number of pursuit planes they had at Oahu (page 371).

Admiral Bloch said that in his opinion the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on; their main fighter field was Wheeler Field; they had another at Bellows Field and an improvised field in the neighborhood of Haleiwa; and Admiral Bloch had recommended that the Navy release a field at Kahuku Point. (p. 21)

Admiral Bloch believed that on December 7 the LEXINGTON, the ENTERPRISE, the SARATOGA and the YORKTOWN were away from Pearl

Harbor and had their planes with them so that there were only about 70 Marine fighting planes at Pearl Harbor at the time. How many were available that morning, he did not know. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch said that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin, had told him that he only had three planes available for inshore air patrol; he could not use the Army bombers because they could not see, and he could not use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs and could not see very well either; Admiral Bloch believed that one of the three planes cracked up before December 7. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch's recollection of the number of Army bombers available on December is set forth on page 25.

Admiral Smith said that they did not have a very high regard for the ability of the Army fighter and bomber pilots; that they considered, apart from anti-aircraft gunfire, that the most efficacious defense against air attack would be from the Navy's own carrier planes; since the carriers were away with their planes, he said, he would have sensed, if he had realized the danger of an air raid, that there was no security for Pearl Harbor aside from the anti-aircraft gunfire. (p. 44)

The Army aircraft, Admiral McCormick said, were insufficient in number and limited in usefulness because they lacked some navigational equipment and had some weakness in radio. The comparative efficiency of personnel, was not in his mind at the time. (p. 72)

During his discussion of the Army aircraft, Admiral Davis said that provisions for command in the air were still only of a general nature and there had been no real development along that line by drills, although drills had been held. There were two reasons for this: first, that the air warning net and radar system had not been actually placed in operation and secondly, that the Hawaiian area had not been placed on the basis of unity of command so that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual drills was slower than it might have been. (p. 100)

Admiral Pye said that it was definitely known that the air forces available to the Army and the aircraft installations were below those which were considered necessary for proper defense. (p. 163)

Commander Taylor said that, in his opinion, there were sufficient numbers of fighter aircraft at Oahu to repel a number of aircraft that actually attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, and that the quality of the fighter aircraft was such as not to outperform the Japanese fighters, but the performance was sufficient, he believed, to have been able to break up, to a large extent, a raid of the sort which came in. Commander Taylor said that about 50 percent of the fighter pilots of the Interceptor Command were well trained: the other percent were green. (p. 353)

I. THE SUBMARINES

Rear Admiral Withers, Commander Submarines, stated that the submarines were engaged in training for war. They were assigned to task forces for training and trained with other ships.

He considered his force mobilized on December 7th, and the condition of the personnel was excellent (page 1087). The submarines were ready for war but there was no particular condition of readiness in effect.

He generally kept about one-third of the submarines at Pearl Harbor (page 1085). The total number of submarines which he had was 32, 18 of which were based at Hawaii. Some of these were on the West Coast for overhaul (page 108). Twelve submarines had gone to Manila early in November, 1941 for observation, and to be in position should war come (page 1084). On December 7th two submarines were off Midway and two off Wake. There was no line of submarines out to cover the area surrounding Hawaii (page 1084). Only five submarines were at Pearl Harbor (pages 1088-9). Five submarines were inadequate to throw a scouting force around Hawaii (page 1089).

J. RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE

The responsibility for long range reconnaissance, the readiness of aircraft and drills, the extent of the actual reconnaissance and the extent of reconnaissance which could have been undertaken during the period November 27th to December 7th have been discussed at pages 77-85, *supra*.

The court inquired whether Admiral Kimmel's reason for not using planes for distant reconnaissance was not that the presence of foreign carriers was neither

known nor suspected. He agreed (page 380). There were no inner air patrol flown on December 7, 1941, stated Admiral Kimmel (page 375). As to distant reconnaissance, he said that the planes available to the Army and Navy had been lumped for defense but there were not enough to perform distant reconnaissance effectively. A total of 81 patrol planes and twelve B-17's were in the area. Of this number, 61 patrol planes and six B-17's were available on Oahu immediately prior to the attack. There were twelve patrol planes operating from Midway. The number was not sufficient "on a requirement of 84 planes" for 360° patrol based on 15 mile visibility. The inadequacy had been reported and more planes asked for; they did the best they could. He thought that there were a number of planes searching on December 7th in the operating areas and some engaged in maneuvers with our own submarines—he was told that there were about a dozen in the air (page 374). Midway was running a reconnaissance, as much as they could with 12 planes. He estimated that not more than 50 patrol planes on Oahu were in flying condition on December 7th.

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 1941, the actual situation of the planes was as follows: There were 7 planes in the air conducting search between 120°-170° to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; there were four planes on the surface of Midway armed with two 500-pound bombs, and on ten-minute notice; at Oahu, there were 12 planes of Vp-11 ready for flight on four hours notice; VP-12 had six planes ready for flight in 30 minutes notice, and 5 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP-14 had 3 in the air on security patrol, 3 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and 4 ready on 4 hours notice; VP-22 had 12 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP-23 had 11 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP-24 had 4 planes in the air conducting tactics with submarines, and 1 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice (page 684).

Admiral Bellinger described his duties on December 7. Planes normally under his command consisted of a total of 81 planes on December 7. (p. 115). On December 7, he said, there were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33 planes at Pearl and 12 at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned on December 5 from an extensive tour of duty at Midway and Wake. They had been sent there about October 17. He did not believe that any of the patrol planes were dispatched to the outlying islands after November 27 except in connection with sending Marine planes by carrier to Wake where one squadron was sent. (p. 116).

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 58 of the 81 planes were in commission, nine were under repair and fourteen were in the air. (p. 117).

Admiral Bellinger discussed the conditions of readiness of the airplanes and the report of availability of Army and Navy planes on December 5 and 6. (pp. 125 and 126).

Admiral Bellinger said that after the attack, the Army communicated with the Army planes and the Navy communicated with the Navy planes. He also discussed the communication difficulties between Pearl Harbor and the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe. (p. 123).

There was no inner patrol around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th (page 685), and there were no planes available to him, either Army or Navy for that purpose (page 685).

Captain Ramsey said that units of the Army bombardment division and of Marine bombardment aviation reported daily planes available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, when functioning. The Base Defense Air Force only came into existence in an emergency or for drill purposes. ComFOURTEEN or CinPac could vitalize this Base Defense Air Force (pages 574-6). Some order by officer senior to Admiral Bellinger was necessary (page 576). PatWings One and Two were under Admiral Bellinger's command, of course.

Exhibit 53 was the basic operations plan of Naval Base Defense Force and was in effect on December 7th (page 576). Annex B to Operations Plan No. 1-41 was issued pursuant to this plan, and Addendum 1 to Operating Plan No. 1A-41 was an estimate of the situation prepared by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, covering the situation at the end of March, 1941 (page 577). (Paragraph 3(b) of this addendum stated that an air attack was the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu, etc.). He considered this estimate sound, and that if any attack came on Oahu, it would come by air, which would be the only effective way to attack (pages 578-9).

The general condition of readiness of aircraft was "Baker 5," 50% available on four hours notice, between November 27th and December 7th, but many units were in a higher condition and some airplanes were actually in the air (page 579).

He had no records from which he could refresh his memory as to the condition of readiness but gave isolated examples (page 580); PatWing Fourteen was in the air, conducting search of the operating area on December 7th, he did not remember whether there were three or four; there were about six planes of PatWing Two in the air, conducting tactics with the submarines in the "sanctuary over that island." (page 585). There was a ready squadron, planes lined up and presumably ready to take the air in 30 minutes, which was to be relieved at 8 o'clock by another from Kaneohe (page 580).

The readiness question was one in fact decided by higher authority (page 581). He could not say whether directly by CincPac or Commander Naval Base Defense Force. In ordinary drill practice the drill message placing the organization on an activated status came from the latter; then they would send a dispatch to all units making aircraft available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, and start issuing drill orders. Planes in the air were to be sent immediately to search sectors. At the end they would send a message, "Resume normal condition of readiness." At least once in a while he was on that job (it appears he was there at least as early as November 1, 1941, but may have been there earlier, see page 575) the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree. He could not recall who sent the message, but it was some higher authority and the change was from "Cast" to "Baker" (page 581).

Under normal operating conditions the planes available for the Naval Base Defense Air Forces were under different commanders.

The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force never had planes assembled under his command except for drill or emergency and, therefore, except in these cases, he had no opportunity to set the condition of readiness (page 582).

He also said that aside from the ready squadron at Ford Island, the other patrol craft there were in various position: some were ready for launching, some being repaired, some in hangers for long repair or modification (page 585).

On the morning of December 7th, six planes at Midway were scouting to cover task forces there and six on the water fully manned and loaded with live bombs (page 585).

He said that dispersal of patrol planes was impracticable on land or in harbor (page 585).

According to Captain Hamsey, on the morning of the 7th, patrol planes covering operating areas were under orders to depth bomb submerged submarines outside the sanctuary without a close escort. He said that for several months prior to December 7th, the planes of PatWing Two flew armed. All planes on search of operating areas, by order of CincPac, carried live depth charges (page 604). The Army planes were usually armed (page 604).

He said that before December 7th, he had only one officer assistant; after, he had 42 officer assistants (page 608). They were available later because their ships had been sunk.

General Short testified that one of the most important things the Navy was supposed to do was long range reconnaissance (page 228). He said that from October 16th to December 7th, he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol, harbor patrol, posts were established and channels were being swept. There was a plan for Navy long distance reconnaissance and drills were held once a week (page 234). He said the joint air plan was effective March 1941 (page 234).

General Short testified that he did not know what Admiral Bloch did with respect to distant reconnaissance. Under the agreement, if the Navy planes were insufficient for such reconnaissance, the Navy could have asked the Army for planes (page 237). The Navy made no request of General Short for planes for distant reconnaissance, although General Short conferred with the Navy on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251).

General Marshall said that heavy Army bombers had been delayed because of delay at the manufacturing plants and, after delivery, unexpectedly strong winds, adverse to Hawaii, kept the planes at the West Coast for three weeks. The initial squadron arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (pages 681-2).

XXXIII. THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

This investigation developed the following evidence regarding the sighting of Jap submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (Exhibits 18, 75, 76):

At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive

sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.

The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:

"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course speed 9 knots"

After receiving this visual, signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR, asking:

"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you sighted?"

At 0520 the CONDOR replied:

"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance"

In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine it was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.

The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that he had seen a submarine (p. 87-92, 428-429).

The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18.) Since the conversation was solely between the ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate vessel charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer, who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of December 6-7. At 0458 on the 7th the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR, now Lieutenant Commander M. H. Hubbell, testified that at 0532, when the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching daylight conditions" (Exhibits 44, 45).

The log of the signal tower for December 6-7, 1941, records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Ex. 46).

The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appeared to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke pots near the object (Exhibit 73).

The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES into Pearl Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened

fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine. The submarine keeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water (Exhibit 74).

At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):

"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."

The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supplementary message:

"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area (Exhibit 18)."

This message was received by the Bishop's Point Radio Station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired (pages 414-416, 452-469).

A. JAPANESE SUBMARINES

Captain Smedberg said that the sum of the information on the midget subs used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was that they were carried and launched from mother submarines, were about 41 feet in length, and had a maximum cruising range of 175-180 miles at the most economical cruising speed of 4-6 knots. They were probably not equipped with radio (p. 8-9). Complete information on Jap midget subs is available in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 20 October 1944, Volume 1, number 15 (Exhibit 5), and Office of Naval Intelligence Publication "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines" (Exhibit 6).

NOTE: The latest Office of Naval Intelligence publication referring to Jap midget submarines ("ONI 222-J, The Japanese Navy") establishes that the Japanese midget submarines used at Pearl Harbor were actually about 80 feet long, rather than 41 feet long as stated by Captain Smedberg. They carried two 18-inch torpedoes, had a top speed of 12 knots, and could dive to a depth of 100 feet.

Captain Ramsey said that at 0730 on December 7, 1941, he received a call from the Staff Duty Officer to the effect that they had sunk a submarine one mile off the Pearl Harbor entrance (page 586).

Captain Earle said that at about 0710 on December 7, he learned of the submarine attack off Pearl Harbor; that this did not indicate to him that an air attack might be imminent; that his reaction was that the enemy had decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign of war; that the WARD was making another mistake. He pointed out that they had had on the average of ten or fifteen reports of submarine sighted in that area in the several months preceding the attack. When he received word of this attack, he told the Watch Officer to be sure and get the dispatch verified, to notify the Commander in Chief's Watch Officer immediately, to advise ComFOURTEEN's Operations Officer, and then he called Admiral Bloch and discussed the matter with him. As the matter had been referred to the Commander in Chief, they decided that they would wait for further develop-

ments. They did not discuss the fact that the presence of the submarine might indicate an air attack. (p. 376)

Admiral Bellinger read an excerpt from a report prepared by him as follows: "0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief. 0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone and received by some of the planes in the air at 0805." (p. 129)

Admiral Bellinger knew of no attempt at his command headquarters to relay the information of the attack on the submarine to Army headquarters.

He requested authentication; reported it to the Staff Duty Officer of CincPac, and drew up a search dispatch (page 586).

Concerning the submarine attack on the morning of December 7th, Admiral Smith said that he had received no report of that attack, the report was received by the Staff Duty Officer, who was Commander V. R. Murphy, who delivered the message to Admiral Bellinger, and he believed to Admiral Kimmel. He said:

"My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of the Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at 7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor, and as she turned, the conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the WARD informed the signal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that he had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody that it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You see, we had received so many false submarine reports before that time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal sent through the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told us later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. I'm quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secretary of the Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message before that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made for months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult to communicate with the Army. It had to go through several stations."

Captain Murphy said that no specific information was furnished to him concerning the international situation when he went on watch as Staff Duty Officer; he had a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving him the dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet and instructions as to action to be taken in the event of war. (p. 196)

Captain Murphy said that he was not familiar with the Army's condition of readiness on December 7th. (p. 198) He did not know whether or not the Army radar system was operating that day.

Captain Murphy said that as Staff Duty Officer if anything unusual occurred during his tour of duty, he would have advised ComFOURTEEN, who in turn would have advised the Army since ComFOURTEEN was charged with dealings with the Army. (p. 201)

Captain Murphy said that about 7:20 or 7:25 in the morning of December 7th, he received a report to the effect that a submarine had been sunk by the WARD. He described his actions as follows:

"At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant Duty Officer. And I said, 'Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?' And he said, 'No.' I said, 'While I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it and whether or not he's called Admiral Bloch.' I finished dressing, Black

came back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. I then dialed the operator—it was a local dial system—and told him to tell the Duty Officer to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he might be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the phone and it was Ramsey—now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from PatWingTwo. He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, 'I have just had a report that I have not been able to get any more details on,' and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang from the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready-duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and to investigate, and had ordered the stand-by destroyer to get up steam. I said, 'Had you any previous details or any more details of this attack?' He said, 'The message came out of a clear sky. There was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind.' I then called Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and of the ready-destroyer being ordered out and of the stand-by destroyer getting up steam. He said, 'I will be right down.' About that time, and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he had nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, 'No,' but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone rang again; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that he had another message from the WARD saying that she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and requesting a Coast Guard tug be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him that message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman came in, said, 'There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor and this is no drill.' I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel, either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea: 'JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' I then called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available'—no, I'll correct that: I told the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available?' He said, 'I don't think I have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for search.' I then called all the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief; some I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith myself. By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information. From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immediate direction of events."

Captain Murphy said that that contact was about the third or fourth of a series of such contacts; that all previous ones had, insofar as actual proof was concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, he thought, might be the real thing but he wanted some further information as to why the WARD thought that it sunk a submarine so that he could formulate an opinion whether or not there was a submarine sunk. In the previous contacts, they had never been able to establish definitely that there had been a submarine involved. He had less doubt about the authenticity of this than he had had about some of the others. He did not interpret this submarine as possibly being accompanied by an air attack (p. 202) .

Admiral Bloch stated that at 0715 on December 7, 1941, he received a telephone message from the Chief of Staff that the WARD had attacked a submarine off Pearl Harbor and was escorting a sampan in,

Commander Granville C. Briant was Aviation Aide to ComFourteen in 1941. (p. 229). During November and December, 1941, Commander Briant was one of the District Watch Officers. There were about eight to ten of such officers. Commander Briant discussed the instructions given to

Watch Officers and qualifications of those on the Watch Officers list. (p. 230). He also discussed the functions of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 232). Commander Briant said that to his mind the Watch Officers had not been advised of the seriousness of the situation and specifically they were not advised of the war warning. (p. 233)

Admiral Bloch said that, "on the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine was sighted by USS WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the USS ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did receive at 7:12 a. m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counter-attacking a submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed—at least his operations Watch Officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time we were." (pp. 21 and 22)

Admiral Bloch did not think that the Army had been advised on the morning of December 7 of the dispatch from the WARD concerning the submarine attack. (p. 22)

The Staff Duty Officer at CincPac was given the same information. They were not sure whether this was a true report. The ready duty destroyer was ordered out. Before the report was clarified, the air attack had started. The first submarine contacted was one mile outside the entrance buoy (page 401). He learned after December 7th that a patrol plane had also seen this submarine or another, attacked it with depth bombs and sunk it. This was a midget (page 403).

A midget submarine was later sunk inside the harbor. When it was later recovered, it was found that both its torpedoes were missing (page 403). It had fired at the CURTISS and missed.

No anti-submarine nets had been installed, but anti-torpedo nets had been installed to keep a submarine outside from firing torpedoes into the harbor. If the anti-torpedo net had been closed, a midget submarine would probably have become fouled in the net. Practice required the net gates to be open all day and closed all night except when ships were passing them. At 0445, December 7, 1941, some minesweepers came in and the gate was not closed until after 0800 when it was ordered closed by Headquarters (page 404). The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet; the depth of the net was 45 feet (page 405). From keel to conning tower the submarine was about 20 feet.

Also, a midget submarine ran aground on a reef off Bellows Field and was recovered by the Army (page 406).

Admiral Kimmel testified that on December 7th his headquarters were at the submarine base at Pearl Harbor, his Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was nearby and he could move to it on short notice. By moving his headquarters to shore, he did not intend to supplant Admiral Bloch (page 278). There was nothing irregular in his establishing his headquarters ashore since this in no way changed his responsibilities (pages 363-4).

Between 0730 and 0740, Admiral Kimmel had a report of a submarine attack off Pearl Harbor and he was waiting for an amplification of this report. Between November 27th and that time, he had had about a half-dozen such reports. While waiting for amplification, the air attack started (page 332). He said that the officer reporting the sinking of the submarine should, under 2CL-41, have broadcast in plain language, but sent it in code which resulted in delay.

Admiral Kimmel said that the one submarine which did attempt to attack in Pearl Harbor was stopped before accomplishing anything (page 373).

He also said that he had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack (page 1124).

Admiral Calhoun said that on December 7, 1941 he had no warning that a submarine was in Pearl Harbor until the MEDUSA and CURTISS informed

him that they had sunk a midget submarine on the other side of Ford Island (page 945).

Captain Layton testified that a submarine entered Pearl Harbor and fired both of its torpedoes, one passing between the *RALEIGH* and *CURTISS*, the other burying itself in the mud near the berth of the *UTAH*. This submarine was sunk and was so thoroughly destroyed that no intelligence material was obtained from it. (Page 285-286)

Another Japanese midget submarine which was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu, was captured on December 8th along with its commanding officer. This submarine contained various documents which were captured, including a chart of Pearl Harbor on which was laid a course into the harbor, around Ford Island, and out of the harbor, as well as indications of positions of various ships in the harbor. (Exhibit 32A, 33A)

Captain Layton also testified that the midget submarine beached off Bellows Field bore the designation I-18 which was the apparent designation of its "mother submarine." He pointed out that the chart of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from the "I-18" contained notations in pencil along both sides of the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor, reading "I-16", "I-20", "I-22", "I-18", and "I-24". He testified that from intelligence subsequently received it was known that such were the designations of the Japanese mother submarines that carried the five midget submarines believed to have been present outside Pearl Harbor on 7 December. (Page 284).

Captain Layton further testified that the times shown on the track map of Pearl Harbor that was recovered from the Japanese submarine off Bellows Field was, in accordance with Japanese naval custom, Tokyo time, minus nine, and that all dates indicated were east longitude or Tokyo dates, regardless of the fact that the 180th meridian may have been crossed. Therefore, he said, that the "times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor." (Page 279).

Captain Layton examined the original Japanese map which contained the track around Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 32A), and stated it to be his professional opinion as a seaman that the track shown on the map was a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings and distances indicated thereon. He stated that "it is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the CO₂ absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary gang." (Page 281-282).

Captain Layton also testified that the notations on the chart under the time 0450 did not indicate that the captain of the midget submarine recorded that he, himself, had sunk an enemy ship. Captain Layton pointed out that the submarine still had both of its torpedoes aboard, which was its full complement. He pointed out also that the track in question was carefully laid out both by course and distance, with the course in degrees and distance in meters, and the time in minutes and seconds; and that the latter indicated that the speed of the submarine was to be varied from point to point so as to make its arrival at the several points at a predetermined time. He pointed out that the time indicated, 0450, which was Tokyo time, would be 0920 Pearl Harbor time, and that at 0920 Honolulu time, the attack was still taking place and there was a tremendous amount of activity in the area indicated on the map. Accordingly, Captain Layton gave it as his opinion that he doubted if the captain of the midget submarine would have been able to so meticulously follow his course all around the harbor and at the same time make notations from point to point. (Page 283).

The notations on the Japanese chart indicated also that the submarine commander had received intelligence reports as late as December 5th. (Exhibit 32-32A).

The Japanese submarine commander who was captured, upon being interrogated, admitted that he had failed in his mission. (Page 16).

With reference to the language appearing on the Japanese map, which is variously interpreted as "sink enemy ship," and "enemy ship sunk," Captain McCollum testified that it was not possible to infer whether the past tense or the future tense was in the mind of the person who made the notations, because there were no kana symbols attached showing the tense of the verb. (Page 25-26)

NOTE: It is to be noted that the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board that Japanese midget submarines must have been in the harbor

a few days before the attack and evidently moved in and out of the harbor at will ('RAPHB', Page 155) is based wholly on the captured Japanese maps and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge at Honolulu, 7 December 1941, which in turn is based solely on those maps. In this connection, it is pointed out that Admiral Hewitt made a thorough study of the question (Hewitt Report, Page 146-148) which caused him to conclude that there was no evidence warranting the belief that any Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. (Hewitt Report, Page 157).

B. DETECTION OF PLANES BY THE ARMY RADAR SYSTEM

J. L. Locard, First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, and Sergeant George E. Elliott, U. S. Army, who were privates on December 7, 1941, testified that they were on duty that morning from 0400 to 0700 on a mobile radar unit on the northern part of Oahu at a site called Opana (page 628).

There were supposed to be three men on the shift, but the men arranged, and Sergeant Murphy approved, only two, it being a Sunday morning (pages 637-8). The station had been set up in November, about Thanksgiving (page 639).

Locard stated (page 641) that his station worked 0400 to 0700 on Sundays and holidays and 0700 to 1700 on weekdays. The Robert's Report states that on November 27, 1941, the Army ordered the radar system operated each day from 0400 to 0700, but Locard had no knowledge of such order (page 643), and his station operated those hours on Sunday.

Elliott understood that the station had been operated from 0400 to 0700 before December 7th according to schedules (page 652).

The radar set which they were operating could cover 180° from northeast to west. They were instructed to track for flights, intercept them and report them to the Information Center (page 629). Locard was in charge of the station. They had telephonic communication with the Information Center.

Locard had been operating these radar sets since August, when they were put in operation (page 630). The set was of rather crude construction at that time. It would pick up one plane at 100 miles and sometimes not pick up three or four (page 631).

They had no information prior to 0800 of the movement of friendly aircraft. Radar could not distinguish friend from foe.

On the morning of December 7th, they continued to operate after 0700 as the truck had not come for them, in order to give Elliott training in radar operation (page 631). He was not regarded by Locard as a qualified operator (page 633).

At about 0702 they discovered an unusually large response in a northerly direction at 136 miles. Locard checked the equipment to make sure, and when the planes came in to 132 miles they decided to call the Information Center (page 633). Elliott first talked to the switchboard operator at the Information Center (page 633).

Elliott testified that he had wanted to send the information in right away, but that Locard had laughed at him and finally told him to send it in if he liked. After a short time, they did (page 648).

Locard then got the switchboard operator to call the Army officer on duty and then he reported the information to him. The officer thanked him. They continued to track the planes in to 20 miles, when they lost them because of distortion.

They left the unit and became aware of the attack at 0830 and went back on duty at their unit at 0910. Their equipment meanwhile was being operated by others who had relieved them (page 636).

Elliott had no information concerning an expected flight of B-17's (page 646).

This, incidentally, was the first time Elliott had this 0400 to 0700 duty; previously he had worked in the late mornings or afternoons (page 646). He thought that other units had also picked up the flight and reported it, but had no knowledge to that effect (page 657).

Lt. Col. K. A. Tyler, U. S. Army, who was then a first lieutenant, was at the Army Information Center on the morning of December 7, 1941. He was there for training as an assistant controller. He was the only officer present and had been on duty there only once before (pages 446-7). Five or six plotters were on duty, who plotted radar reports (page 448). In all, five radar stations were in operation.

He received no information or instructions before going on watch, nor did he relieve any one. Watch was 0400 to 0800 (page 449). He understood the mechanics of radar, but he had never seen one in operation.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, at 0715, he received a call from the radar station at Opana, stating that the operator had a report of a large number of

planes at 130 miles. Private Lockard was the operator he talked to (page 457). He thought about the report for a minute, thanked the operator, and did nothing about it.

He was looking for a flight of B-17's, but had no official notice that they were coming in. A bomber pilot friend had told him that when there was a flight of B-17's en route, the radio stations played Hawaiian music all night. That night and morning they did. He thought B-17's were coming in because Hawaiian music was playing on the radio, which was an arrangement made for homing planes (page 458). He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to contact his superiors (page 459).

There was no means of distinguishing friend from foe. He thought the planes were either B-17's, due from San Francisco on a northeast course, or some Navy carrier planes. He thinks now that the large plot report at 0715 were the Japanese planes (page 460).

The only information he had of Japanese-United States relations was what he had read in newspapers.

He learned of the attack by phone call at 0800. He called all forces back. Major Berquist and Major Tindall came and took over (page 452). A naval officer reported to the Information Center shortly after the attack began (page 453).

Commander Taylor said that on the morning of December 7th, he got to the Information Center between 0830 and 0900 (page 612). Upon his arrival, the Information Center was in great confusion. Plots were made of everything reported, but there was no way of determining what planes were Japanese or American (page 613).

Captain Ramsay said that during the day, they called Army radar and requested that they track the Japanese planes in retiring and advise, but got no information (page 601).

It is not clear whether the Navy had been advised of the expected arrival of the Army planes on December 7th. Admiral McMorris stated that several senior members of CincPac's staff certainly were aware that some large bombers were flying from California to Oahu at that time, December 6th (page 900). Admiral Smith thought that they did not know of the prospective arrival of Army planes on December 7th (page 563). He said, incidentally, that the Army B-17's arrived that morning without ammunition (pages 569-72). Captain Ramsey stated that prior to 0755 on December 7th, he had no information as to the scheduled arrival of Army planes (page 587).

C. THE AIR ATTACK

Captain Smedberg said that a Chief Yeoman in the Japanese Navy who had formerly been attached to the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Jap Combined Fleet, and who had been captured during the Marianas campaign, had furnished what is believed to be an accurate account of the composition and movements of the enemy forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This information is presented in summarized form in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 8 December 1944, vol. 2, number 22 (Exhibit 3; p. 4-5).

The high points of the prisoner's account were as follows: The secret operation order upon which the Pearl Harbor attack was based was dated 1 November 1941 and specified that: (1) "War will be declared on X-Day," and (2) "This order will become effective on Y-Day." A second operation order, dated 5 November, fixed Y-Day as 23 November 1941 (22 November, Pearl Harbor time), and a third operation order, dated 10 November, set X-Day as 8 December 1941 (7 December, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 5-6).

The Japanese plan called for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by a carrier "Striking Force," with a "Surprise Attack Force" of submarines delivering a coordinated blow. The submarine force was to carry out reconnaissance in advance of the attack by the Jap carrier planes and was to attack U. S. warships which escaped from Pearl Harbor. If the opportunity became available, it was also to launch attacks with midget subs after the plane attacks (p. 6-7).

The striking force, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo, consisted of three of Japan's five carrier divisions: The KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA, and destroyers, including elements of DesRon 1 (Exhibit 3; p. 6).

The "Surprise Attack Force" included about twenty fleet-type submarines, some of which carried midget subs. This constituted a large part of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.

The Japanese operation order specified that the carrier force was to leave Japan about X minus 16 Day (21 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) and proceed by way of Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, for Pearl Harbor. Most of the submarines of the "Surprise Attack Force" were to leave the Inland Sea on X minus 20 Day (17 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 6-7).

The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo Channel some time between November 19 and November 21, 1941, Pearl Harbor Time, and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, where it assembled and fueled. Departure was taken on or about 27 November 1941, under cover of a heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction, heading on course about 085° to a point in longitude about 170° W; then turned southeast on course about 135° and proceeded to a point due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor Time. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to the northwest on a heading of about 300° to a point about longitude 170° E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a point near 140° E, and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).

General Short testified that he heard the first bomb of the attack; the Chief of Staff told him it was the "real thing." He immediately ordered an all-out alert (No. 3). His narrative of the attack appears at pages 254-255 of the Record. He had no notice of a submarine having been sunk near Pearl Harbor prior to the attack.

Admiral Kimmel testified that he became aware of the attack by a telephone message from the Staff Duty Officer (pages 332-333). He reached his headquarters at 0805.

Admiral Bloch said that he knew of the attack at 0755; he heard bombs and saw a Japanese plane; he went to headquarters, sent dispatches to Washington, Philippines, Guam and to ships at sea advising that Oahu had been attacked; called all Navy Yard workers and Naval personnel to duty, flooded dry docks and took other local measures (page 400). He said that ample personnel reported (page 401). When the Japanese attacked, a visual signal was given and the air raid alarm was given. Insofar as other measures planned, including air search for the enemy, were possible after the attack, they were carried out.

Admiral Pye testified that on the morning of December 7th, he was in the Halikulani Hotel (page 418). He learned of the attack at 0755 and proceeded to Pearl Harbor in an automobile with Admiral Leary (page 423). His Chief of Staff took action to carry out 2CL-41 as he was not aboard at the time of the attack (page 421).

Concerning the sortie of ships on December 7, Admiral Pye said:

"I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul." (p. 166)

Admiral Bellinger said that, on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Force immediately assumed a functioning status without orders from higher authority (page 664).

Captain Ramsey saw the bombing on Ford Island; had a radio message broadcast of the raid; ordered planes in the air to search 315° to 360° from Pearl Harbor to the maximum distance, and assigned searches of other sectors (page 587).

After the attack he ordered the planes in the air to search 315° to 360° because they always thought that the likely direction of approach (page 597). To the best of his belief, the Japanese attack came from the northwest and subsequent information indicated that the planes had been launched from carriers about 325 miles from Oahu bearing 325° (page 598).

Shortly after December 7, Admiral Davis saw a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which indicated that the planes had been launched from a point about 250 miles north of Oahu. (p. 103-104)

Captain Ramsey reviewed what he did on the morning of December 7th (page 605). After he issued search orders and Admiral Bellinger approve, there were a stream of requests for information; the first order he received was from CincPac to "locate and destroy enemy," but all possible action was already taken; communications were disrupted by the raid and smoke; all planes available were told to take off immediately; various orders were received during the day, including some from CincPac to search specific sectors (page 606).

Captain Ramsey said that they received some information during the morning concerning a chart from a shot-down plane in which the purported rendezvous was to the southwest of Hawaii (page 602).

Various Army planes did go northward that day—they went out to 150 miles but had to return because B-17's could go no further without protection of A-20's, which had no longer range (page 602).

Admiral Smith stated that he did not get information as to the probable location from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack—for some two days. There was a great deal of confusion; false reports from civilians of troop and parachute landings; a false report from one of our planes of an enemy carrier to the south; a squadron of our seaplanes returning from Midway to Pearl Harbor on that afternoon dropped two bombs on what the pilot said was a camouflaged Japanese carrier south of Pearl Harbor, but seems to have been the PORTLAND. A chart showing the position of Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7th, but was not shown to the Navy until the afternoon (page 564). Planes left to the north, but this was not known by the Navy until two days after the attack. Visibility was good at Oahu on December 7th, but fog could usually be found to the north.

Admiral Kitts said that about 175 to 250 Japanese planes came in from carriers to attack from west-northwest, a distance of some 200 miles (page 524).

Admiral Kitts said that no orders in regard to fire control were issued on December 7 other than by the ships' commanding officers and one by the Commander in Chief were issued to stop firing on friendly planes. (p. 191)
Admiral Kitts said that, as he recalled it, 28 planes were shot down by the Fleet. (p. 193)

He testified that on December 8th, after the attack, he was in conference with General Davidson and was shown a radar plot showing planes coming in from about 150 miles and going out again. The plot coming in might have been interpreted as friendly planes, but after a two-hour attack on Pearl Harbor, the outgoing plot must have been the enemy. This plot was not reported to the Navy until he saw it on December 8th (page 520).

Colonel Phillips said that on December 7, 1941 he received a telephone message of the attack and ordered the all-out alert. Some Army pursuit planes took off but he did not know when or how many (page 389). He did not know whether any bombers took off. He said that there was on December 7th, a radar track of planes which turned out to be Japanese, but he cannot remember whether it was incoming or outgoing or either (page 488). He saw this track after December 7, 1941, but did not remember where or what it showed (page 489).

Admiral Smith was not familiar with the Army radar system (page 558). He stated that after the attack, Colonel Davidson told him the radar track had been reconstructed from the bearings, but on Sunday that they were not convinced that that was the direction from which the attack came (page 558). This is "obviously correct, because we searched to the south rather than to the north" (page 588).

Commander Taylor described the confusion which existed on December 7 at the Information Center. He said, among other things, that there were a number of plots prepared of the course of aircraft that morning which were studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from and what direction they had returned; that about 48 hours after the raids they completed the construction of an estimated plot, and that it was his understanding that during the subsequent visit of the Secretary of the Navy, this plot was shown to him as evidence that all information received by the Information Center had been received in an orderly manner. (p. 351)

At the time of the attack, Commander Wright was having breakfast with Commander Williams, who, he said, had been handling the traffic analyses end of the job. He directed Williams to go over to the Communication Intelligence Unit, find out as much as he could about the composition and location of the attacking forces and telephone the information. He said that, in general, the information coming over indicated that there were at least four carriers, including the two by identified radio calls. The bearings obtained on this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South at an estimated distance of 250 to 300 miles. Conflicting reports were coming in from other sources. One bearing which was obtained from Lualualei, was in direct conflict with the other bearings, and indicated that the attacking force was almost exactly due North. (p. 380-1). Commander Wright said that he believed that an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the Southward affected all of the subsequent reports. He said that the report from Lualualei was transmitted by him to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Lt. Comdr. Layton, and he assumed that he passed it on to higher authority. (p. 381)

Captain Rochefort said that when the attack commenced, the communications unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the direction finder stations, one of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea and that consequently no bearings on the attacking Jap force were received by his unit. He added that the failure of communications was not due to sabotage but was an accident caused by Army personnel setting up certain new circuits. He said that the Lualualei direction finder, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally broadcast by radio a bearing obtained on one of the attacking units. He had heard that this bearing was received by CinCPac as an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true, but was subsequently informed by the direction finder station that it had actually transmitted the bearing as 357. He said that the Lualualei direction finder was capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing. (p. 63-64)

D. THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARMY'S MESSAGE

It will be recalled that on the morning of December 7th, General Marshall sent a message which indicated that the Japanese were presenting a note at 1 p. m., Washington time, which corresponds to dawn at Hawaii.

General Short testified that the December 7th dispatch from the Chief of Staff (Exhibit 48) was received by the Signal Officer at 1145, and decoded by 1428, well after the Japanese attack (page 251).

That dispatch, as set forth in Exhibit 48, was as follows:

"Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)

"Subject: Far East Situation.

"The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

Admiral Kimmel testified that a copy of the December 7th dispatch of the Chief of Staff to Short was received by him on the afternoon of December 7th, too late. He considered this information as news of a Japanese ultimatum and, as it stated that a note was to be delivered at 1 p. m. Washington time which was sunrise in Hawaii and midnight in Manila, he felt that it would have indicated a Japanese attack at Oahu (page 328).

E. THE FAILURE TO TELEPHONE ON DECEMBER 7TH

Colonel Phillips said that at about 0822 Hawaiian time on December 7th, he telephoned General Marshall, that it took about five minutes to get the call through, and the connection was excellent. General Marshall asked if he had got the message. He replied, "What message?" General Marshall said, "The message I sent yesterday" or "last night." He replied, "No." (page 490). He got the dispatch from General Marshall at 1530, December 7, 1941. He did not know the time at which it had been sent or when it got to RCA in Honolulu.

Admiral Smith said that communications on December 7, 1941 could be established with Washington in thirty minutes by radio; they had no telephone (page 549).

Admiral Bloch stated that the only telephone connection he had with Washington was the regular commercial, not scrambler, phone (page 410).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Navy Department had no scrambler telephone connection to Pearl Harbor; the Army had one; that the scrambler telephone is not secure against an expert and that the Navy Department did not use the scrambler phone until 1942 (page 843).

It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply; that he regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel about this, and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (pages 113, 793, 797).

F. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IF THERE HAD BEEN ADVANCE NOTICE

General Short testified that if he had had two hours notice on December 7th, he could have been completely ready for an air attack. He thought that he would have alerted against an air attack if he had the information contained in the Chief of Staff's December 7th dispatch two hours before the attack (page 256). He stated, however, that he could not have prevented a torpedo attack on the battleships even with two hours warning since any aircraft attack once launched can be driven in (pages 265-6).

Admiral Kimmel testified that if he had received Exhibit 48 prior to the attack he would have assumed the highest condition of readiness (page 329). He also testified that in the event of an attack together with submarines, and he had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack, it is well within the realm of possibility that had he taken the Fleet to sea, the losses would have been greater (page 1124). However, that presupposes that they would have found the Fleet and would have been able to deliver an attack. Had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese might not have attacked at that time at all. However, he thought that he would have taken the Fleet to sea.

In his closing testimony, Admiral Brown made a statement to the effect that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on December 7 might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu were almost free to pick the date and hour of attack. On December 7, the Japanese risked an attack only because they had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state of our defenses and their so-called diplomatic agents were able to direct the moment of attack. Admiral Brown then said: "I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never again allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air forces can be observed."

Admiral Bloch said that had the Fleet left Pearl Harbor on December 7, there was a serious question in his mind as to whether or not the entire Fleet would have been destroyed in view of the powerful forces that the Japanese had in the area. Also, he said, had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the Fleet, the United States would have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that the oil storage was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air. (p. 94)

Admiral Kimmel said that if he had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and had it met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an attack except by means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126). Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably could have delivered a very effective attack.

Admiral Halsey said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, they were 150 to 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor. He had flown off some of his planes and some of them on arrival at Pearl Harbor shot down Japanese planes and some were shot down. A number of his planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. (p. 305)

On the morning of December 7, Admiral Newton was about 300 odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. He thought that he would receive orders to intercept the enemy which he felt must be to the Northward of Oahu and signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was cancelled because presumably Midway had also been attacked. He reported his position to the Commander in Chief and told him that he had cancelled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, he received a dispatch from the Commander in Chief to report to Admiral Halsey but he did not know where Admiral Halsey's task force was or where it had been. He sent a dispatch advising Admiral Halsey of his position and Admiral Halsey directed him to join him in the vicinity of Oahu. He set a course for Oahu and about ten or eleven that morning received a message from Admiral Halsey that he was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles south of Oahu and was to intercept and destroy those carriers. He changed course and sent search planes. The search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had received information indicating that the attack had been from carriers located to the north, not to the south. They returned to Pearl Harbor around the 13th or 14th, meanwhile continuing air patrol. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes. (p. 319)

Admiral Newton said that he had assumed that the Japanese carriers attacked from the north because they had a better chance for coming in from that direction without being observed and because of the fact all shipping had been diverted to the southward and the training grounds of the Fleet were also to the southward. He felt sure that the Japanese were cognizant of this and consequently was greatly surprised when he was told that the Japanese carriers were to be assumed to be south of Oahu.

The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector. If he had detected an attack by the Japanese naval force 700 miles from Oahu, he would have violated his orders just as he did when he gave the orders to bomb the submarines; he does not know what he would have done, but thinks he would have found some way to handle the situation (page 1127).

Admiral McMorris said that if he had known a few days before that an attacking force was coming, he would have had the Fleet out, regardless of defense, so they could attack the enemy forces (page 897). His action (getting the Fleet out if he knew that a hostile force was approaching) would have been the same if a state of war had or had not existed (page 898). He would have informed the Navy Department if we had not been at war. To have deferred action would certainly have been unwise, even under our Constitution (page 898). Even if long range reconnaissance to 700 miles had been in effect, the attack could not have been prevented. He might have sent ships out to intercept the enemy and diverted carriers for this purpose. However, he thought the losses might have been greater if this had been done (page 898). However, the Army planes would have been alerted too and undoubtedly would have done some damage, principally to enemy planes. He doubted that the enemy carriers would have suffered very seriously (page 899).

Admiral McMorris said that had they foreseen the Japanese carrier raid, they would not have had the American battleships in port. He said, however, that actually the most profitable target for the Japanese would have been the oil tankers at Pearl Harbor. If they had destroyed them and the shops and dry docks, our capabilities would have been nullified for a very long time. (p. 248)

Admiral Bellinger agreed with the Court's view that it is a historical fact that carrier borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to successfully repel a carrier attack. He stated that he doubted very seriously that even with advance warning of this attack, he could have taken steps to save a great many planes which might have been destroyed otherwise, because of the difficulty of dispersion of patrol planes (page 686).

Admiral Turner thought that the Fleet could have been kept at sea after the orders for defensive deployment (page 1021). Admiral Stark knew that CincPac had his fleet divided in three parts and that an operating schedule provided for the time each part was to be in Pearl Harbor (page 1022). This seemed satisfactory.

He did not think that the Japanese attack could have been averted. Its destructive effect could have been lessened and more Japanese planes destroyed. If some ships had been deployed to northward, there would have been a better chance of detecting the enemy and bringing out shore based planes and carriers to attack them (page 1024). It was well recognized by people who concerned themselves with the defense of Oahu that the northern flank is a very weak place (page 1024).

Admiral Smith said that if Exhibit 48 (the Army dispatch of 1 p. m. meeting, had reached them between 0500 and 0600 Hawaiian time, effective measures could have been taken against the Japanese (pages 549-50), and perhaps we would not have been damaged so much and the Japanese more. The destroyers could have gotten out and probably the cruisers; Army and Navy aircraft alerted, and oil tankers sent out to the carriers; but, the battleships probably could not have gotten out, and, if they did, would have been sunk outside (page 550). The Robert's Report, he said, is incorrect in saying that prompt receipt of that message would still have been too late to be of any substantial use (pages 549-50).

Admiral Smith later said that if they had known, they would have given Condition I, sent the Fleet to sea, alerted all aircraft and sent carriers to the north to try to locate the enemy (page 569). It was true, he said, that if the Fleet had sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before the attack and were within enemy range, they would have been sunk, but had they been two or three hundred miles to the west, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would have been attacked. The battleships, therefore, could have been used as a support force since their speed was about 15 knots (page 568). Getting the Army planes aloft before sunrise would not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, have diverted the attack but would have decreased our damage and increased the damage to the Japanese. "There is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been damaged even if we had been alert" (page 568). He agreed with the court that the only method by which the attack could have been completely diverted would have been to locate the carriers before they got within launching range.

G. THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE

The personnel casualties were summarized by Lt. Comdr. Robert D. Powers, Jr., USNR, as follows:

"These reports, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give in detail the names of ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From this examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded. This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded, 896."

The damage to ships, as described by CinPac on February 16, 1942 (Exhibit 61), was as follows:

"(a) Battleships:

"ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck except for material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable amount of ordnance material has already been removed, and work is underway in removing the 12-inch guns from turrets three and four.

"CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire. It sank gradually for about three or four days and is now resting rather solidly on a mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and the port side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.

"NEVADA struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast caused explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage to the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5-inch gun crews.

"OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to being up-side down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.

"PENNSYLVANIA one bomb hit in way of after 5-inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the second deck.

"MARYLAND two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through the forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the maindeck causing only a small amount of damage. The second bomb (probably 500 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about twelve feet under water and exploded in the C&R storeroom. This explosion wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks through the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without going into drydock.

"TENNESSEE two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell type). One of the bombs struck the center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which necessitated replacement of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage. Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret and penetrated same in way of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no serious damage except for putting one rammer out of commission. The TENNESSEE suffered serious damage aft in officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by the oil fire starting from the ARIZONA. The shell plates around the stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken.

"WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the damage from torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below water and above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat deck and apparently exploded near the port side of the main or second deck. This explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire, which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to and including the bridge. A second bomb hit hit the top of turret III and passed through the 6-inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated defective material. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of the left gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have been located aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be wrecked and the rudder is lying on the bottom.

"(b) Cruisers:

"HELENA hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo causing the flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engineroom. The starboard engine was found to be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await permanent repairs.

"HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through dock and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out the electric power cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H.

"RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the forward half of the machinery plant. The ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused serious

flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The vessel will return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent repairs to machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by replacement of one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.

“(c) Destroyers:

“SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire following bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. The SHAW was re-docked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942, for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.

“CASSIN and DOWNES: CASSIN was struck by one bomb and DOWNES by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the PENNSYLVANIA. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the CASSIN partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the DOWNES when the dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the DOWNES were set-off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the CASSIN and probably well over 400 in the hull of the DOWNES.

“Most of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and re-conditioning, and it now appears that the machinery of the CASSIN is 98% good and the DOWNES about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs have been made on the hull of the CASSIN to permit her re-floating about February 5, and similar work is proceeding on the DOWNES.

“At present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two vessels as first-line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be effected within two to four months which will make the vessels entirely suitable for escort vessels, thus releasing two first-line destroyers for this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans covering suitable arrangements for deck houses, bridge, armament, etc., adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally believed that although the hull of the vessels have been considerably weakened, they will be entirely adequate to carry the considerable reduced load in armament and other topside weights required for an escort vessel.

“(d) Auxiliary vessels:

“OGLALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the HELENA. Vessel sank slowly at ten-ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1½ hours after being struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to remove her from the berth that she now occupies.

“CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commission. One bomb (probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Temporary repairs have been completed and permanent repairs await availability of the ship at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

“VESTAL struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit forward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main deck. The vessel was alongside the ARIZONA when the raid commenced and was beached at Acia to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been completed during a short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed when a dock is available.

“UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth. Ship is within a few degrees of being exactly upside down.”

The damage to airplanes, as reported on February 15, 1942 (Exhibit 61) was:

“Extracts from Columns.....	2	5	6
Type	Number present Dec. 7	Number on hand after raid	Number usable after raid
Patrol planes.....	69	45	11
Inshore patrol planes.....	0	0	0
Fighters.....	24	15	0
Scout bombers.....	60	29	14
Torpedo bombers.....	2	2	0
Battleship and cruiser planes.....	92	82	11
Utility and transport planes (non-combatant).....	54	48	16
Total.....	301	221	52”

LIST OF WITNESSES

<i>Witness</i>	<i>Title</i>
Admiral H. R. Stark.....	Chief of Naval Operations.
Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann.....	Director Central Division; Liaison with State Dept. for CNO.
Major General W. C. Short.....	Commanding General Hawaiian Dept.
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel.....	CincPac and CincUS.
Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch.....	Com14; Comdr. Local Defense Forces; Comdr. Hawaiian Sea Frontier; Comdt. Navy Yard Pearl Harbor; Naval Base Defense Officer under 2CL-41 Comdr. Task Force Four.
Vice Admiral W. S. Pye.....	Comdr. Battle Force; Comdr. Task Force One; Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor.
Lt. Colonel K. A. Tyler.....	Army radar.
Captain W. A. Heard.....	In charge of Foreign Branch, ONI.
Commander J. J. Rochefort.....	In charge of combat intelligence 14th Naval District.
Colonel W. C. Phillips.....	Chief of Staff (for General Short).
Rear Admiral W. S. Delaney.....	Chief of Staff for Operations (for Admiral Kimmel).
Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III.....	Fleet Gunnery Officer (on Admiral Kimmel's staff).
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith.....	Chief of Staff to CincPac.
Captain L. C. Ramsey.....	Operations officer to Adm. Bellinger (Adm. Bellinger in command of Pat Wing 2 and PatWing's Hawaiian Area); Comdr. Task Force Nine; aviation liaison officer to cooperate with Com14; Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force.
Commander W. G. Taylor.....	Advisor to Army on radar.
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger.....	Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Comdr. Patrol Wing Two; Comdr. Task Force Nine; Comdr. Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor; Liaison with Com14; Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force.
1st Lieut. J. L. Locard, USA.....	Army radar.
Sergeant G. E. Elliott, USA.....	Army radar.
Lt. Commander G. W. Lynn.....	Senior Watch Officer, Op20-G decoding Japanese diplomatic cryptographs.
Captain L. F. Safford.....	Charge of Security Section of Naval Communications, intercepts.
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.....	Special Assistant to Secretary of State.
Lt. Commander A. V. Pering.....	On duty in Op20-G of Naval Communications.
Admiral R. E. Ingersoll.....	Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
General George C. Marshall.....	Chief of Staff, Army.
Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris.....	War Plans Officer for CincPac.

LIST OF WITNESSES—Continued

<i>Witness</i>	<i>Title</i>
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood-----	Watch Officer in Op20-G, Naval Communications.
Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun-----	Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.
Admiral C. W. Nimitz-----	Chief of Bureau of Navigation.
Commander A. D. Kramer-----	Head of translation section of communication security in Op20-G Naval Communications.
Vice Admiral R. K. Turner-----	Director of War Plans in office of CNO.
Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes-----	Director of Naval Communications.
Admiral J. O. Richardson-----	CincUS prior to Admiral Kimmel.
Joseph C. Grew-----	Ambassador to Japan.
Maxwell M. Hamilton-----	Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs in State Department.
Captain H. H. Smith-Hutton-----	Naval Attache in Tokyo.
Rear Admiral Thomas Withers-----	Commander Submarines, Pacific.
Admiral J. R. Redman-----	Assistant Director of Naval Communications.

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HART

<i>Witness</i>	<i>Title</i>
1. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, USN, (Retired).	Commandant 14th Naval District; Commandant Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor; Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
2. Commander Benjamin Katz, USN.	Charge of Code Room, Navy Department.
3. Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, USN.	Chief of Staff of Pacific Fleet.
4. Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick.	Assistant War Plans Officer to CincPac.
5. Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany, USN.	Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer for CincPac.
6. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, USN.	Fleet Aviation Officer for Pacific Fleet.
7. Captain M. E. Curts, USN.	Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.
8. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN.	Commander PatWing Two; also controlled PatWing One; Commander, Fleet Air Detachment on Ford Island; Commander, Task Force Nine; Liaison with Commandant 14th Naval District in connection with aviation facilities at outlying islands; Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.
9. Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, USN.	In command of Task Force Three.
10. Rear Admiral W. S. Pye, USN.	Commander, Task Force One.
11. Captain R. O. Glover, USN.	Assigned to Plans Division of Office of Chief of Naval Operations.
12. Commander P. C. Crosley, USN.	Flag Secretary on Staff of CincPac.
13. Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III, USN.	Fleet Gunnery Officer.
14. Captain V. R. Murphy, USN.	Assistant to War Plans Officer.
15. Commander J. J. Rochefort, USN.	Assistant Operations Officer; Force Intelligence Officer for Scouting Force Commander; Officer in Charge of Combat Intelligence attached to ComFOURTEEN.
16. Captain E. T. Layton, USN.	Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
17. Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, USN.	Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.
18. Commander G. C. Briant, A-(V)G, USNR.	Aviation Aide to ComFOURTEEN.
19. Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris, USN.	Operations Officer on staff of Commander Scouting Force; War Plans Officer for Adm. Kimmel.
20. Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, USN.	War Plans Officer for Chief of Naval Operations.
21. Captain J. L. McCrea, USN.	Aide to Admiral Stark.
22. Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN.	Command of the MISSISSIPPI; Director of Naval Intelligence.

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HART—Continued

<i>Witness</i>	<i>Title</i>
23. Vice Admiral A. W. Fitch, USN---	Preceded Adm. Bellinger as Commander, PatWing Two.
24. Captain George Vandeurs, USN---	Assistant to Adm. Bellinger in connection with joint Army-Navy air command.
25. Admiral Wm. F. Halsey, USN-----	Commander Aircraft Patrol Force; Commander, Task Force Two.
26. Captain I. H. Mayfield, USN-----	District Intelligence Officer of 14th Naval District.
27. Vice Admiral J. H. Newton, USN--	Command of Cruisers Scouting Force.
28. Lieut. W. B. Stephenson, USNR----	Head of Counter-espionage Desk of District Intelligence Office of 14th Naval District.
29. Rear Admiral H. F. Kingman, USN-	Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI; Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence.
30. Commander W. E. G. Taylor, A-V(T), USNR.	Special assignments on radar.
31. Captain L. F. Safford, USN-----	Charge of Communications Security Section of Naval Communications.
32. Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, USN---	Commander, Cruisers Battle Force.
33. Captain J. B. Earle, USN-----	Commander, Destroyer Squadron Five; Chief of Staff 14th Naval District.
34. Commander W. A. Wright, USN---	Assistant Communications Officer on Adm. Kimmel's staff.
35. Captain C. Wellborn, Jr., USN----	Administrative Aide to Chief of Naval Operations.
36. Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson, USN.	Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.
37. Vice Admiral R. M. Brainard, USN-	Director of Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.
38. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, USN.	Director of Central Division of Chief of Naval Operations Office.
39. Rear Admiral J. W. Bunkley, USN (Retired).	Commanding Officer of U. S. S. CALIFORNIA (Admiral Pye's Flagship).
40. Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, USN-----	Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HEWITT

A. AT PEARL HARBOR IN 1941

<i>Witness</i>	<i>Title</i>
1. Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN-----	Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182).
2. Captain Joesph J. Rochefort, USN-----	In charge of Communications Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541).
3. Vice Admiral William W. Smith, USN--	Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335).
4. Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN.	War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R. 293).
5. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN--	Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, CincPac. (R. 163).
6. Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN.	Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings; Commander, Patrol Wing Two; Commander, Task Force Nine; Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471).
7. Captain John B. Earle, USN-----	Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451).
8. Mr. George Street-----	Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411).
9. Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN-	District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D. (R. 554).
10. Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN-----	Cryptanalytical and Decrypting Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418).

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HEWITT—Continued

A. AT PEARL HARBOR IN 1941—continued

<i>Witness</i>	<i>Title</i>
11. Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN-----	Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 424).
12. Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN---	Assistant Communications Officer, CincPac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Communications Intelligence Unit. (R. 442).
13. Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN.	Cryptanalyst, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541).
14. Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC-----	Translator, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541).
15. Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN-	Commanding Officer, USS WARD. (R. 87).
16. Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR.	Commanding Officer, USS CON-DOR. (R. 428).
17. Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR--	Bishop's Point Radio Station.
18. Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkoffler, USNR.	Communications Office, 14th N. D. (R. 465).
19. Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR--	District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D. (R. 376).
20. Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR----	Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's Headquarters. (R. 376).
21. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA.	Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department. (R. 387).

B. AT THE PHILIPPINES IN 1941

22. Captain Redfield Mason, USN-----	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68).
23. Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN---	Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68).

C. AT WASHINGTON, D. C. IN 1941

24. Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN.	Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. (R. 389).
25. Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN----	In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign Branch, ONI. (R. 10).
26. Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN-----	Communications Security Section. (R. 97; R. 529).
27. Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN-----	ONI and Communications Security Section. (R. 128).
28. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers-----	Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511).
29. Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 143).
30. Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN-	Communications Security Section. (R. 149).
31. Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 433).
32. Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 140).
33. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Per- ing, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 148).

C. OTHER WITNESSES

34. Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN.	Now Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4).
35. Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, USNR.	Now in charge of a translating unit in Op-16-FE. (R. 158).
36. Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR.	Translation sub-section head in Op-16-FE. (R. 158).
37. Commander Walter Karig, USNR-----	Authors of "Battle Report." (R. 80).
38. Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR----	
39. Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR.	Head of Op-20-GL. (R. 554; R. 607).

ADDENDUM ONE—FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.

4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the success of their attack.

5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.

6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.

8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p. m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.

10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.

12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.

14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.

15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.

16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications.

17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the following reasons:

(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.

(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.

(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would have been small.

18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the following reasons:

(a) Ships' anti-aircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready. It is to be noted that the anti-aircraft fire was more effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.

(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.

(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.

(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.

(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.

19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for a 360 degree daily search, they would have increased the area which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments, it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operation to weigh the prospective needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines were already in progress.

21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have been designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of success.

22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.

23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.

(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.

(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.

24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in the Hawaiian area was justified.

25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken, it should be noted that:

(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.

(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and relaxation desirable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.

(c) Failure to install anti-torpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.

(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.

(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of anti-aircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.

26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.

27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.

28. War experience has shown that:

(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.

(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.

29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity of Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.

FINDINGS

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.

9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of *threatening* naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and *other outlying* United States *positions*"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces *widely distributed in the Pacific*, and that *submarines* in the *Hawaiian area* * * * ." (Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a *possibility*. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious *probability*.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Marine planes.

26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.

31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CinCPac of the important facts learned,

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

36. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and

other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Office feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be studied further by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the

presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.

62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.

65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received

the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, states that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." * * *

"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location." * * *

"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have

obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.

74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and matériel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.

80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.

84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected

within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forth-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 3

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

U. S. S. NEVADA AFIRE ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

(See story of *PEARL HARBOR* on page 1)

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Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINC-PAC-CINCPAC "Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday. Therefore, Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on 18 December.

CONTENTS

	Page
PEARL HARBOR: The Planning Stage-----	1-22
Sub Situation-----	23
Jap Ships Sunk in MANILA Harbor-----	24-25
MANILA Strike Results-----	26-27
Probable Conversion of Jap Hospital Ship-----	28
Increased AA Armament on Jap Freighter-Transport-----	29
MANILA PHILIPPINE Islands-----	30-31
KUMA-NATORI Class CL-----	32-33
Long Delay Bomb Fuse-----	32
Floating Mines in JAPAN Sea-----	34-35
New Jap Rifle Grenade-----	34
GENYO Class Tanker Victim of PB4Y-----	36
Jap Aerial Anti-Sub Doctrine-----	37-43
Long-Shafted Engine Used on JACK-----	44-45
New Army Air Division-----	45
Jap Airfield Camouflage-----	46-47
Thumbnail Biography of HELEN-----	48
Provisional Sketch of George-----	49
Sidelight on Suicides-----	50
Japs Develop INDO-CHINA-----	51-54
Jap Ordnance vs. Allied Aircraft-----	55-56
Jap Anti-Sub Bomb-----	56
Weekly Photo Coverage-----	57-58
LUZON Airfields-----	59-62
Enclosures:	
"Japanese Infantry Weapons"	
Revised Drawing of YAMATO Class BB	

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[1] PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE

When Jap planes struck clustered U. S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pin-pointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the

interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable.

Most remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The POW claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

On 2 September the final all-important "games" got under way, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were made up [2] as follows:

	Rank	Official duties
UMPIRES:		
NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:		
NAGANO, Osami.....	Admiral.....	Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations).
FUKUTOME, Shigeru.....	Rear Admiral.....	
UOZUMI, Jisaku.....	Captain.....	Member First Section.
YAMAMOTO, Chikao.....	Captain.....	Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.
MAYUZUMI, Harue.....	Commander.....	Member " " " "
TAMURA, Saburo.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
UOZUMI, Yoriichi.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
NAVY MINISTRY:		
TAKATA, Toshitane.....	Captain.....	Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
SHIKI, Tsuneo.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
TOIBATA, Kurie.....	Commander.....	" " " " " "
FUJII, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).
N-TEAM.		
COMBINED FLEET:		
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku.....	Admiral.....	CinC Combined Fleet.
ITO, Seiichi.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
KUROJIMA, Kameto.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
GOTO, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Staff Adjutant.
ISOBE, Taro.....	Commander.....	Staff Engineering Officer.
SUGI, Toma.....	Commander.....	Staff Gunnery Officer.
SASAKI, Akira.....	Commander.....	Staff Air Officer.
WADA, Yushiro.....	Commander.....	Staff Communication Officer.
NAGATA, Shigeru.....	Commander.....	Staff Navigation Officer.
WATANABE, Yasuji.....	Commander.....	Staff Operations and Plans Officer
ARIMA, Takayasu.....	Commander.....	Staff Torpedo Officer.
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi.....	Commander.....	Staff Supply Officer.
OTA, Kanai.....	Commander.....	Meteorologist attached to Staff.

	Rank	Official duties
<i>N-TEAM</i> —Continued		
1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE):		
KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro.....	Rear Admiral.....	Commander.
ARISAWA, Naosada.....	Commander.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
<i>E-TEAM</i> :		
SECOND FLEET:		
KONDO, Nobutake.....	Admiral.....	Commander.
[3] YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
OISHI, Tamotsu.....	Commander.....	Staff Navigation Officer.
FOURTH FLEET:		
INOUE, Semi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
FIFTH FLEET:		
HOSOGAYA, Boshiro.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:		
TSUKAHARA, Nishizo.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
KUSAKA, Jinichi.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
<i>A-TEAM</i> :		
THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions):		
TAKAHASHI, Ibo.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
ISHIHARA, Hajime.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
SIXTH FLEET:		
SHIMIZU, Mitsumi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
KANOAKA, Tomojiro.....	Captain.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.
FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet):		
NAGUMO, Chuichi.....	Vice Admiral.....	Commander.
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke.....	Rear Admiral.....	Chief of Staff.
GENDA, Minoru.....	Commander.....	Deputy Chief of Staff.

On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW was assigned to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). The afternoon, Commander WATANABE—Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer—handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the POW realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoked-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as [1/4] sunk.

On 6 or 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus—calculating board—was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by Fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that—when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded—the basic plan continued as originally intended.

These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, D. E. I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands—including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMAN will begin".

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the Staff were already on board.

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including POW) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO—then still War Minister—was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Op Orders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder—i. e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct E.L.T.)

[5] The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN
1 November 1941

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1

The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

War will be declared on X-Day.

This order will become effective on Y-Day.

General Situation

(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservation of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, [6] supported by BRITAIN and the United States, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to Japan in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan border is formidable.

The USSR is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

Our situation

The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

Strategic objectives

To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof—HAKKO ICHIU), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

Strategy

The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy [7] of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

Precaution: Disposal of this order.

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1

ANNEXED VOLUME

1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HITO-KAPPU BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

3. Targets for attack are airfields, aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be

via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR.	"The fate of the Empire".
"No warships in PEARL HARBOR-----	"The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".
"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack".	"Climb MT FUJI".
"The time to commence the attack is 0520.	"The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520'.
"All forces attack"-----	"Climb MT NITAKA!".
etc.	

[8] 5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force commander.

The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION).

(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupa- [9] tion Forces will probably be PALAU.

9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet.

10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another POW confirms this).

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11 Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U. S., Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph—a few of which follow:)

(1) GUAM

(2) WAKE

about X plus 2.

about X plus 7.

[10] (3) (The dates for the invasions of RABUL and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMO, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 1942.

Herewith are two of the above referenced documents

THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows:)

1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILLIPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.

2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for landings.

3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."

4. Supply Plans.

Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

5. Communications Plans.

6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October—and stated in effect:)

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku,
Commanding, Combined Fleet.

[11]

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI WAN
10 November 1941

STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETO-ROFU Is. KURILES).
3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
4. Break-down of attack plane units.
The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit
Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX
1st Carrier Attack Unit
Etc. (details not recalled by POW).
5. Fleet cruising formation
(Including retiring formations)
6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.
Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO Chuichi,
Commanding Striking Force.

Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.

(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)

1. The the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

[12] 3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)

4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never

being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.

6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months [13] for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.

Communications Plans. (POW does not know about these; no details.)

Supply Plans. (outline)

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

5 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #2
Y-Day will be 23 November.

10 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3
X-Day will be 8 December.

During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Detailed of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.

The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHOU); two BBs: HIYEI, KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus AKUKUMA; elements of DesRon 1; and about twenty subs.

[14] (Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA; the majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged, although definite identification is not yet possible.)

One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sorties was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel.

These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.

Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U. S. Navy H. O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear eleven items, as follow:

1. Photograph of a Midget Submarine beached on Oahu.
2. Track Chart of Midget Submarine for Transit of Pearl Harbor.
3. Captured Track Chart of Japanese Carriers, covering the period from Pearl Harbor to Midway.
4. Chart reflecting translation of code tables carried by Japanese planes.
5. Photostatic copy of a document from a crashed Japanese plane obtained after the Pearl Harbor raid.
6. Captured chart [fragmentary] employed by Japanese Pearl Harbor raiders giving name, frequency, time of transmission and signal strength of two Honolulu radio stations.
7. Chart of torpedo runs, received from crashed Japanese plane.
8. Captured Japanese photograph of Ford Island under attack on 7 December 1941.
9. Photograph of vessels in the harbor bearing caption in Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".
10. Photograph showing Wheeler Field during the raid.
11. Chart captioned "Submarine Situation, Nov. 28-Dec. 4".

The foregoing materials will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 1 through 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[24] JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a sketch showing the approximate location of Japanese ships sunk in Manila Harbor through 14 November 1944. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant shipping have been sunk in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the Third Fleet. This estimated tonnage refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and does not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transporters ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross tons. *Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the above estimate.*

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANILA Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA class and a destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.

The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to mark the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the ship was first observed to have been sunk.

Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Maru Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear three items, as follow :

1. Photograph of Manila Harbor.
2. Photographs showing [a] results of Third Fleet Aircraft strike on Manila Harbor 11-14 November and [b] two freighters on the bottom near the breakwater, Manila Harbor.
3. Photographs showing [a] burning ships and shore installations at Manila Harbor and [b] Pier Seven and other installations, Manila Harbor, showing damage from Third Fleet Bombs, 11-14 November 1944.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 13, 14, and 15, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[28]

PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP

Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward and one aft.

Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his AHs for more practical if less humane purposes. More than 20 sizeable Japanese vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships—a disproportionate allotment in view of his general shipping situation.

(The photograph mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, being of ships at Manila with arrow pointing to a ship apparently identical with *Baikal Maru*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 16, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[29]

INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON JAP FREIGHTER-TRANSPORT

(The photograph mentioned in the following paragraph, being of a Japanese freighter-transport in ORMOC Bay, will be found reproduced as Item No. 17, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomber Command on 11 November in ORMOC Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA—probably single-mount 25-mm mounted three on each end of the bridge. This armament is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on such vessels.

The enemy may be expected to holster his AA defense aboard all types of merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a photograph of Manila Harbor and environs taken from the *USS Hancock*. This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 18, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[32]

KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL

(The sketch showing the drawings mentioned in the following paragraphs and bearing caption "KUMA-NATORI CL; Estimate of Revised Armament" will be found reproduced as Item No. 19, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warships has prompted a continuous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class light cruisers offer added documentation of this trend.

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted cruisers are now believed armed as follows:

Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch guns of the original armament).

Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armaments.

Four 25-mm single mount guns.

Ten 25-mm in dual mounts

Three 25-mm in a triple mount.

Two 13-mm in a dual mount.

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge, and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible, this change is believed unlikely.

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-mount AA gun.

The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each side of its former location.

A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.

LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE

A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPA Item No. 8309) disclosed that the Japanese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as Experimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark 23 bomb, Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against airfields.

Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 36 or 72 hours. In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.

ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U. S. light cruisers sank this Jap warship.

[34]

FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered enemy document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,410). Although dated well over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU were very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U. S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.

(The chart mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, being of floating mines in Japan Sea Area, March 1943 to May 1943, will be found reproduced as Item No. 20, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE

(A photograph of the new Japanese rifle grenade, mentioned in the following paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 21, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

A new type of Japanese High explosive rifle grenade, embodying several features not previously encountered, was captured during a recent operation. This grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade was produced for universal use.

Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. The cap ignites a black powder relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.

The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents accidental detonation.

A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear photographs of a *Genyo* Class Tanker, the victim of a PB4Y. These photographs will be found reproduced as Item No. 22, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[37]

JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.

This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issuing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and the general tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

Of special interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evidence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKEs early last summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not reproduced in this article.

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to make some sacrifice in quality.

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.

"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale because of the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness is nothing but throwing away fuel."

Aggressiveness is stressed. *

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradually counters with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."

Patience and imagination are essential.

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained, [38] we must not become impatient and do anything rash.

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules. This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be determined."

In regard to night operations.

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its special need in reference to the use of radar."

Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUYO, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the TATEYAMA Air Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."

Planes must be ready for instant operations.

"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving warning reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the scene of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter so as to remedy the deficiency."

Bad weather must be turned to account.

"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even if it means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return to base without loss of time."

U. S. submarine tactics.

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing his [39] present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."

"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However, a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future. Counter-measures must be studied.

"Surface submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other types.

Tactics for anti-sub patrol.

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable combat results.

"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.

"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the surface."

Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions (distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels).

Patrol altitudes and security.

"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondarily the ease of carrying out bomb and/the possibility of/complications.

"(1) When primarily for visual contact.

"a. Usually 400-800 meters will be suitable.

"b. In darkness it is best/to fly at/about 200 meters.

"c. For confirming/sightings, etc./it is best to fly at about 300 meters.

"(2) When using magnetic detector.

"Daytime—under 80 meters is best.

[40] "Night time—80-100 meters is best.

"When an important escort convoy is passing it is necessary to report its

movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that there are no gaps in the escort protection.

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of the movements of the convoy.

The lookout.

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy subs is the lookout.

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.

"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plane overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious result will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth serious efforts.

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar, magnetic detectors and the like.

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential submarine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and the radar is employed especially at night in search of surface enemy submarines.

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct escort without loss of time.

Principles of the attack.

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inaccurately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try. When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs as signals.

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain [41] due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its periscope and making another attack.

Guiding other planes to the attack.

"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker bombs so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the position of the enemy sub. Moreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.

"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. When the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.

"When two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off and make a second run.

Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.

"To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vectoring bombless plane—but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close visual lookout. (Comment: sic!)

(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being a "Method of dropping target bombs," will be found reproduced as Item No. 23, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[42] "When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used when guiding surface craft.

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of the enemy, and attack.

Cooperation with surface craft.

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since they are a most important means of establishing understanding.

"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio communications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired understanding can be realized.

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from the aircraft section.

"In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat them as if blind.

Ordnance and equipment.

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received, as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, 'Without a rifle, no infantry', so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.

"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (550 lb.) bomb as much as possible.

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine bombs is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow, and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."

(Comment: The Japanese use time rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub bombs.)

"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to be [43] outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.

Maintenance.

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of matériel, depends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required.

Confirmation evidence.

"The confirmation of combat results is extremely important for the planning of future attacks.

"Furthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of submarine and additionally because enemy subs are pulling various sorts of deceptive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or

dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is easy to let the enemy slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.

"When the following phenomena have been noted, consider the sinking confirmed.

"1. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.

"2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.

"3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which has been destroyed, come to the surface."

[44]

LONG-SHAFTED ENGINE USED ON JACK

The smoothly streamlined cowlings of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is made possible by the installation of an unusually constructed engine, the long-shafted Kasei 23.

Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a recently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,608). Data on its performance has appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a highly streamlined cowlings and results in a relatively small frontal area. The cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.18 to 1.

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fan. The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling fan is similar to that employed on the FW190; in place of a carburetor, it has a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of the Japanese Kasei 23 engine, will be found reproduced as Item No. 24, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

its [45] 14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German BMW801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DINAH 3.

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.

Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the same direction as the propeller.

The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.

NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION

The existence of an 11th Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might indicate that the 11th Air Division has been established to control the air defense of the industrial KOBE-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last March.

An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and administrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically commands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.

[46]

JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE

Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated by photographs of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes. Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice, netting is not used.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Item No. 25, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

LIPA WEST FIELD's paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully toned down and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being also of Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Item No. 26, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[47] Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and fuselage. In most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.

There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and without foliage covering.

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).

[48]

THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

HELEN

(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft)

HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in combat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new developments may make it much more formidable.

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its performance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.

The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h. p. engines. It was replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engines of 1450 h. p. Both models are

similar in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and nacelles similar to that of the British Mosquito.

There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 h. p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version has not been definitely identified.

(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of a heavily camouflaged "Helen," the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, will be found reproduced as Item No. 27, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[49]

PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE

Reproduced below are provisionals sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor.

This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured mimeographed manual.

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be superseded when better information is at hand.

Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at five o'clock and large spinner.

Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.

(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of George", a new type Japanese Navy interceptor plane, will be found reproduced as Item No. 28, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[50]

SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.

Quoting the interrogation report:

"POW stated that his unit had become a 'suicide' squadron on the 27th of October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd (Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were 'weak points'. At the time he left MABALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).

"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U. S. carrier had any special significance.

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut

down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAMIKAZE" units are made up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAMIKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.

[51]

JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA

The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the position of JAPAN in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANH BAY are used for the protection of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN's sources of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of INDO CHINA will be increasingly developed.

It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing Force troops.

There are 64 airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG-HON BAY area, at TOURANE, CAM RANH BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following items appear:

1. Outline map of Thailand and French Indo-China.
2. Aerial photograph of Cat Bai Airfield.
3. Aerial photograph of Hon Gay, the chief coaling port of French Indo-China.
4. Aerial photograph of Cam Ranh Bay.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 29, 30, 31, and 32, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[55]

JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. The latest development—the use of implanted bombs—is described in a report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded by BuOrd.

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the main parking areas on the field.

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.

- a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Composition C or dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.
- b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps inserted into the explosive.
- c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the mined area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate

dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size bomb for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40, Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight cars.

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, was a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been substituted for the BETTY as bait.

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.

[56] Other areas have reported the use of a type of 70-mm mortar. The projectile is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are difficult to see. If contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm shell.

JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB

The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modification 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.

(A photograph referred to in the foregoing paragraph, being of an altered Japanese bomb captured on Guam, will be found reproduced as Item No. 33, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[5] WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944

*Prints only received; **Sorties distributed]

JAPAN

Kyushu: Good vertical partial coverage of Sasebo and Nagasaki

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V-----	154.9 mm.	32,500'	M10/258-21P-----	9225-41-----	10/31**

CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical coverage of areas indicated

V-----	152.6 mm.	32,000'	MR7-14PL-----	9240-153-----	9/29
V-----	6"	32,600'	M13/5C-21PS (Amoy A/D)-----	9230-222-----	1/23
V-----	24"	25,600'	M13/5C-21PS (Amoy A/D)-----	9231-223-----	1/23
V-----	6"	50,450'	M11/6C-21PS (Amoy Is.)-----	9232-224-----	11/7
Split Vert.	24"	22,450'	M11/6C-21PS (Amoy Is.)-----	9233-225-----	11/7
V-----	6"	29,300'	M7/2-9PS-A1 (Shanghai)-----	9237-226-----	7/12
Split Vert.	24"	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Amoy Vic. to (W. of Chelin).-----	9241-227-----	8/8**
				9242-227-----	

Photos received at CinCPac.CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical converge of areas indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jiepoa #	Date taken
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Linyeung to Shalung).	9249-228	8/8**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Chinkanchi to San-lui Vic.).	9250-228 9251-229 9252-229 9253-229 9254-229	8/8**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Chungtung to S. of Paotal).	9255-230 9256-230 9257-230 9258-230	8/8**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	4MA3-24CM (Swatow to Amoy Vic.).	9259-231 9260-231 9261-231 9262-231	8/8**
V.....	24''	7,300'	21PR-4MB201 (Sanchiosze-Hweilung Kiao Area).	9265-232	9/21**
V.....	24''	9,000'	21PR-4MB201 (Tanganhsien).	9266-233	9/21**
V.....	24''	14,000'	21PR-4MB201 (Chiting).	9267-234	9/21**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Nanya to Saikiao).	9314-235 9315-235	7/27**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Yentien to Kwanyinting).	9316-236 9317-236	7/27**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (NW Naushan N Pingtan).	9318-237 9319-237	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (N Pingtan to SE Santu to Liutu).	9320-238 9321-238	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Lintu to S of Foochow).	9422-239 9323-239	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (S Foochow to N Hingwa).	9324-240 9325-240	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (N Hingwa to Melchowcheng).	9326-241 9327-241	7/28**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CM-4MA1 (Linchow to Kweilin).	9328-242 9329-242	7/25**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Kitung to 8 Mi W Sungki).	9347-243 9348-243	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi W Sungki to Kuaotow).	9349-244 9350-244 9351-244 9352-244	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Linyang to Paishih).	9353-245 9354-245 9355-245 9356-245	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (6 Mi S Siaoma to 10 Mi SE Kuaotow—10 Mi W Kuaotow to Haoscasha).	9357-246 9358-246	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi NW Juian to Changyang).	9359-247 9360-247	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Fengwei to Amoy).	9361-248 9362-248	8/7**
V.....	24''	18,500'	24CM-4MA2 (Amoy to Paishuiying).	9363-249	8/7**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CMS-4M9-62A (26° 50' N, 117° 57' E to 26° 50' N, 119° 24' E).	9395-250 9396-250	9/16**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CMS-4M9-21A (24° 50' N, 118° 10' E to 25° 42' N, 118° 53' E).	9397-251 9398-251	9/17**
Split Vert...	24''	20,000'	24CMS-4M9-21B (25° 48' N, 118° 59' E to 26° 20' N, 119° 29' E).	9399-252 9400-252	9/17**
V.....	24''	30,000'	21PR-4MB21 (Canton, White Cloud & Tienho A/Ds).	9493-277	3/13**
V.....	24''	30,000'	21PR-4MB21 (Whampoa Docks).	9494-278	3/13**
V.....	24''	30,000'	21PR-4MB21 (Kowloon and Hongkong).	9495-279	3/13**

BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto

Chichi Jima: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage

V.....	24''	17,000'	C-840-26BS-4-11-65	9401-184	11/23**
V.....	24''	17,000'	B-933-26BS-4-11-65	9402-185	11/23**
V.....	12''	17,000'	A-002-26BS-4-11-65	9403-186	11/23**
V.....	24''	18,500'	A-974-38BS-4M30-71	9404-187	11/24**
V.....	24''	18,500'	B-973-38BS-4M30-71	9405-188	11/24**
V.....	20''	19,450'	C-617-38BS-4M30-71	9406-189	11/24**
O.....	6 3/8''	200'	A-682-42BS	9407-190	11/17**
O.....	6 3/8''	200'	B-662-42BS	9408-191	11/17**
O.....	6 3/8''	200'	C-327-42BS	9409-192	11/17

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V	24''	18,900'	A-526-819BS-4M30-71	9454-193	11/24**
V	24''	17,500'	C-674-819BS-4M30-71	9455-194	11/24
V	12''	17,500'	D-527-819BS-4M30-71	9456-195	11/24**
V	24''	16,000'	A-873-98BS-11-65-7BC	9457-196	11/23**
V	12''	17,000'	B-876-98BS-11-65-7BC	9458-197	11/23**
V	24''	17,000'	C-951-98BS-11-65-7BC	9459-198	11/23**
O	12''	200'	A-016-431BS-4-11-64	9474-199	11/23**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-1A	9475-200	11/25**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-1C	9476-201	11/25**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-1D	9477-202	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-1E	9478-203	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-1G	9479-204	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-1H	9480-205	11/25**

Haha Jima: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage

V	12''	11,720'	A-948-38BS-4M30-55	9193-71	11/8**
O	12''	12,725'	A-491-98BS-7BC	9194-72	11/9**
O	24''	12,750'	B-951-98BS-7BC	9195-73	11/9**
V	12''	13,000'	A-153-431BS-47	9196-74	11/9**
V	24''	16,500'	A-661-819BS-4M30-53	9197-75	11/6
O	6 3/8''		No data	9198-76	
O	12''	200'	A-016-431BS-4-11-64	9471-77	11/23**
V	24''	14,500'	B-223-431BS-4-11-61	9472-78	11/21**
V	12''	11,400'	B-683-819BS-4M30-71	9473-79	11/24**
V	12''	14,000'	A-016-431BS-4-11-64	9470-80	11/23**
V	40''	20,000'	VD5-2A	9481-81	11/25**
V	24''	20,000'	VD5-2H	9482-82	11/25**

Nishino Shima: Distant oblique partial coverage

O	6 3/8''	Var	VB102-18	9216-6	11/7**
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KAZAN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto

Iwo Jima: Good vertical partial coverage of island in color

V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9219-261	11/19
V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9220-262	11/19
V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9221-263	11/19
V	24''	20,000'	VD4-97	9222-264	11/19

MARCUS: Nanpo Shoto—Good complete vertical coverage

V	24''	17,000'	A-880-26BS	9199-36	11/7**
V	12''	13,300'	A-998-392BS-4M30-55	9200-37	11/9**
V	21''	18,000'	A-846-98BS-7BC	9201-38	11/7

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Cebu: Good trimetrogon partial coverage

Tri	6''	13,500'	Essex-131 (V)	9213-83	9/13**
Met			Essex-131 (P)	9214-83	
			Essex-131 (S)	9215-83	

Negros: Good trimetrogon partial coverage

Tri	6''	13,500'	Essex-131 (V)	9210-65	9/13**
Met			Essex-131 (P)	9211-65	
			Essex-131 (S)	9212-65	

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

PHILIPPIOE ISLANDS

Luzon: Good split-vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
Split Vert...	24''	Var	CV16-2652 (Manila)	9263-132	11/5**
			CV16-2653	9264-132	
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-5 (Manila)	9268-133	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-6 (Manila)	9269-134	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-7 (Manila)	9270-135	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-8 (Manila)	9271-136	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-9 (Manila)	9272-137	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-10 (Manila)	9273-138	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-11 (Manila)	9274-139	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-12 (Manila)	9275-140	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-14 (Manila)	9276-141	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-15 (Manila)	9277-142	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Tico-16 (Manila)	9278-143	11/5**
O	8 1/2''	Var	Tico-17 (Manila)	9279-144	11/6**
[58] O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-125 (North Tip)	9280-145	10/18**
	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-111 (North Tip)	9281-146	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-1 (North Tip)	9282-147	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-114 (North Tip)	9283-148	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-126 (North Tip)	9284-149	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-113 (North Tip)	9285-150	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-107 (North Tip)	9286-151	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV11-112 (North Tip)	9287-152	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	Frank-149 (Manila Bay)	9288-153	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-201 (Manila Bay)	9289-154	11/6**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-196 (Manila Bay)	9290-155	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-198 (Manila Bay)	9291-156	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-202 (Manila Bay)	9292-157	11/6**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-197 (Manila Bay)	9293-158	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV127-199 (Manila Bay)	9294-159	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV16-2649 (Manila Bay)	9295-160	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	CV16-2651 (Manila Bay)	9296-161	11/5**
O	6 3/8''	Var	BKHL-366	9297-162	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	BKHL-367	9298-163	10/18**
O	6 3/8''	Var	BKHL-368	9299-164	10/18**

FORMOSA: Good split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

Split Vert...	24''	30,000'	21PH-4MB163 (Takao A/D & Docks)	9243-339	9/12**
				9244-339	
Split Vert...	24''	29,800'	21PR-4MB163 (Sikano A/F)	9245-340	9/12**
				9246-340	
Split Vert...	24''	29,500'	21PR-4MB163 (Taito A/D)	9247-341	9/12**
				9248-341	

MALAY STATES: Good vertical coverage of Singapore

V	24''	22,070'	(444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC352)	9340-2	11/5**
V	6''	21,500'	(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC475)	9341-3	11/5**
V	12''	22,900'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC492)	9342-4	11/5**
V	12''	21,000'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC411)	9343-5	11/5**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC584)	9344-6	11/5**
V	24''	22,300'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC485)	9345-7	11/5**
V	24''	22,300'	(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC419)	9346-8	11/5**
V	24''	21,300'	(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC382)	9364-9	11/5**
V	24''	21,300'	(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC581)	9365-10	11/5**

BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

			(Rangoon)		
V	24''	24,000'	(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC-581)	9366-3	11/3**
V			(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC329)	9367-4	11/3**
V			(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC479)	9368-5	11/3**
V	12''	21,400'	(462BC) (4MB15) (462-AC479)	9369-6	11/5**
V	40''	23,500'	(462BC) (4MB13) (462-AC444)	9370-7	11/3**
V			(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC475)	9364-8	11/3**
V	24''	23,500'	(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC463)	9371-9	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC461)	9372-10	11/3**
V	24''		(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC506)	9373-11	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC485)	9374-12	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC419)	9375-13	11/3**

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944--Continued

BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated--Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC580)	9376-14	11/3**
V	40''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC524)	9377-15	11/3**
V	24''	22,000'	(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC411)	9378-16	11/3**
V	24''	21,000'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC525)	9379-17	11/3**
V	24''	21,400'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC494)	9380-18	11/3**
V	12''	21,500'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC546)	9381-19	11/3**
V	40''	21,200'	(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC469)	9382-20	11/3**
V	24''	21,000'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC508)	9383-21	11/3**
V	12''	20,500'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC452)	9384-22	11/3**
V	12''	21,000'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC574)	9385-23	11/3**
V	12''	20,800'	(11PL) (4MB14) (40-AC541)	9386-24	11/3**
V	12''	16,500'	(Taungup) (444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC202)	9387-25	11/3**

SUMATRA: Good vertical coverage of area indicated

V	24''	21,300'	(444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC580) (Pangalan Brandan)	9388-4	11/5**
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CAROLINE ISLANDS

Palau: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated

V	24''	14,800'	28PR4MB77-1 (Babelthuap A/F)	9421-475	11/1
V	40''	14,000'	28PR4MB90-1 (Babelthuap A/F)	9422-476	11/5
V	40''	13,000'	28PR4MB94-1 (Babelthuap A/F)	9423-477	11/9
V	24''	12,000'	28PR4MB82-1 (Central Harbor Area)	9424-478	11/3
V	6''	2,500'	28PR4MCB97-1 (Ngeregon Is)	9425-479	11/10
V	40''	15,000'	28PR4MB95-1 (Urukthapel Is)	9426-480	11/9
V	40''	14,000'	28PR4MB88-1	9427-481	11/5
V	40''	10,000'	28PR4MB118-1 (Urukthapel Is)	9428-482	11/15
V	12''	500'	28PR4MCB97-2 (Ngeregon Is)	9429-483	11/10
V	40''	14,000'	28PR4MB99-1 (Koror Is)	9430-484	11/9
V	40''	16,000'	28PR4MB83-1 (Koror Is)	9431-485	11/3
V	40''	15,000'	28PR4MCB104-1 (Eylmalk Is)	9432-486	11/10
O	12''	50'	28PR4MB81-1 (Ngargol Is)	9433-487	11/2
O	6 3/8''		VPB117	9434-488	11/17

Ponape: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

O	6 3/8''	1,200'	MAC22-VMF-422-8	9311-596	11/22
O	6 3/8''	1,000'	MAC22-H4-68	9312-597	11/22
O	6 3/8''	15,000'	MAC22-VMF-113-8	9313-598	11/22
V	20''	10,000'	MAC22-7	9444-599	11/12

Pulo Anna: Good vertical partial coverage

V	40''	5,000'	28PR4MB70-1	9235-6	10/30
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Sonsorol: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

V	40''	5,000'	28PR4MB70-1	9228-3	10/30**
O	21''	50'	28PR4MB70-3	9229-4	10/30**

Truk: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage in airfield areas

V	12''	19,300'	A-236-27BS-4M30-70	9445-596	11/22
V	12''	19,400'	B-151-27BS-4M30-70	9446-597	11/22
V	12''	18,200'	C-935-27BS-4M30-70	9447-598	11/22
O	6 3/8''	18,800'	D-633-27BS-4M30-70	9448-599	11/22
O	6 3/8''	17,000'	E-810-27BS-4M30-70	9449-600	11/22
V	24''	18,000'	A-425-392BS-4M30-70	9450-601	11/22
V	24''	18,200'	B-838-392BS-4M30-70	9451-602	11/22
V	12''	17,600'	C-358-392BS-4M30-70	9452-603	11/22
O	6 3/8''	17,600'	D-358-392BS-4M30-70	9453-604	11/22

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944—Continued

MARIANAS

Aguigan: Good oblique partial coverage

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ ".....	Var.....	VB117-23.....	9218-30.....	11/15**

Farallon De Medinilla: Good complete vertical coverage

V.....	24".....	13,000'.....	B-832-26BS.....	9469-6.....	11/23**
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Guguan: Good complete vertical coverage

V.....	24".....	10,000'.....	23PR4MC163-1.....	9223-6.....	11/14**
--------	----------	--------------	-------------------	-------------	---------

Pagan: Good oblique partial coverage

O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ ".....	Var.....	VB117-22A.....	9227-134.....	11/14
--------	------------------------	----------	----------------	---------------	-------

Rota: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

V.....	12".....	3,000'.....	28PR4M1C167-1.....	9236-185.....	11/14**
O.....	12".....	50'.....	28PR4MC169-1.....	9238-186.....	11/16**
O.....	12".....	75'.....	28PR4MC170-1.....	9496-187.....	11/16**

Sarigan: Good oblique partial coverage

O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ ".....	Var.....	VB117-22.....	9224-8.....	11/14
--------	------------------------	----------	---------------	-------------	-------

Zealandria Park: Good oblique shot

O.....	6 $\frac{3}{8}$ ".....	Var.....	VB117-22B.....	9226-1.....	11/14
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(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following appear:

1. Aerial photograph of Luzon airfields, being an example of the concentration of Japanese airfields in the vicinity of Manila.
2. Aerial photograph of Grace Park Airfield, located in the northern part of Manila.
3. Aerial photograph of Legaspi Airfield.
4. Aerial photograph of Fort Stotsenburg, thought to be a Japanese Garrison Headquarters.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 34, 35, 36, and 36-A, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 4

(Exhibit No. 4 is a captured Japanese submarine chart, translated, showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 37, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Vol. 1 No. 15

20 Oct. 1944

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

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CONTENTS

	Pages
Damaged Jap Auxiliary in MANILA Drydock-----	1
Jap Midget Subs-----	2-4
Fighter Planes Strafe Enemy Ships-----	5
YAMATO Class BB-----	6-7
JAP Influence Ground Mines-----	8-9
JAP PC-----	9-10
Submarine Situation-----	11
Thumbnail Biography of OSCAR-----	12-13
Crashed FRANK Believed Found-----	13
Japs Work on New Four-Engine Bomber-----	14-15
GEORGE—Fire Pattern and Specifications-----	16-18
Captured Photo of DAVE-----	18
IRVING Versions Clarified-----	19-20
New Jap Air-To-Air Bombing Devices-----	21-25
Weekly Photo Coverage-----	26-28
Recent Publications-----	28
Jap Army Headquarters-----	29-33
Jap 5 CM Gun-----	33
Japanese Type 3 Land Mine-----	34-36
ANGAUR-----	37-42
YAP-----	43-45
U. S. Tanks at PELELIU-----	46
ADDENDUM: "Japanese Aerial Tactics Against Ship Targets"	

[1]

DAMAGED JAP AUXILIARY IN MANILA DRYDOCK

When carrier planes from the USS ESSEX (CV-9) joined Third Fleet strikes on MANILA Bay on 22 September, they photographed a damaged Jap ship with stern awash in a floating drydock just outside the breakwater. This vessel was possibly the ship first believed to be a cruiser or even a battleship, although subsequent photo interpretation indicates that it is an engine-aft Naval auxiliary, probably a repair ship or tender. Based on measurements of the Dewey Dock, the only floating drydock known to be in MANILA, the damaged ship has an overall length of 350 feet and a beam of 48 feet. In lines but not in size it resembles the former AS TSURABASAKI (before conversion to the CV SHOHO) and the AR AKASHI, which was sunk at PALAU.

The deck is flush and rounded, with a cruiser stern. The bridge is forward, similar to that of the AKASHI. A single shielded gun, probably 5-inch, is forward of the bridge. Two AA mounts are on each side of the bridge, and two more are on the after superstructure. The amidships section is free of superstructure. The large single stack is aft. A four-sided pylon-type foremast is immediately aft the bridge superstructure, with two of the mast booms built into the bridge itself. Two heavy kingposts are aft of the stack. Aft of the kingposts appears a long rectangular open hatch; a gun may have been removed from this location. There is a probable crane amidships immediately aft of the foremast.

The Dewey floating drydock (YFD-1) was built in the U. S. in 1905 and towed to MANILA, and can handle ships up to cruiser size. The inside (floor) measurements of this dock are 500 feet by 99 feet, with a 30 foot clearance above the keel blocks. In the photograph, the dock appears to have been submerged for protection. Reports have not yet been received indicating damage to the drydock, although aviators from the HORNET claim at least three effective hits in the area.

(The photograph referred to in the foregoing paragraph, being of a Dewey floating drydock which was built in the U. S. in 1905 and

towed to Manila, will be found reproduced as Item No. 38, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[2]

JAP MIDGET SUBS

Japanese midget subs may be expected in number as Allied forces push westward into the restricted waters adjacent to the PHILIPPINES, NANSEI SHOTO, and FORMOSA. Evidence that the enemy continues to operate these widely-publicized units was obtained when a hastily-scuttled boat was discovered and salvaged at SAIPAN. Another harbinger of midget subs to be encountered was early dispatch information from Third Fleet carrier planes, which claim to have sunk four such subs during the recent OKINAWA strike.

The tactical situation has restricted JAPAN's use of the midget sub during the past two years. (The use of the midget sub in the European theater is well known.) There is no concrete evidence that JAPAN has had units in combat zones since 7 December 1942, when a large U. S. cargo vessel was damaged and beached by a midget sub near GUADALCANAL. Aviators have reported possible midget subs in the South Pacific, but there sightings have never been confirmed.

In the early months of the war, midget boats were reported in almost every theater—KISKA, HAWAII, GUADALCANAL, AUSTRALIA, and MADAGASCAR. While the boxscore of ships damaged or sunk by these subs is not impressive, it includes a battleship damaged and a tanker sunk (in addition to the AK in the SOLOMONS); and one very narrow escape of a cruiser in SYDNEY Harbor in May 1942. Six of the two-man subs are known to have been sunk.

The PHILIPPINES area offers the midget sub far more favorable operating conditions than has hitherto been the case. The restricted waters will reduce the maneuverability of his targets, and hamper the effectiveness of our ASW vessels. The indentations of the coast offer adequate concealment. At the same time, the distance from base is greatly reduced.

One type of midget sub is designed to be launched from a "mother ship", another is carried as special equipment aboard a mother sub.

The sub-borne midgets are carried on the deck of the parent sub, secured by four heavy clamps and one supplementary clamp. An access hatch in the midget is designed to make a watertight fit into the deck hatch of the mother. The two are linked by telephone wires and battery-charging leads. In casting off, the mother sub releases the four main clamps while the supplementary clamp is released by the midget.

Ship-borne midget subs have been carried in the holds of certain seaplane carriers specially equipped for this purpose. This equipment includes a large hold, equipped with four sets of 6-ft. 8-in. tracks running lengthwise through the hold, and two cranes capable of lifting the 44-ton midget.

Midget subs vary in size from the 41-foot Pearl Harbor type to the 82-foot KO HYOTEKI type. This sub has a theoretical maximum surface speed of 24 knots for a brief time, and has a reported cruising range of 175-180 miles at 4 to 6 knots. Two 18-inch torpedoes are carried. For full details see ONI 220-J "Japanese Submarines".

[3] In at least one case a Jap cargo tube was mistaken for a midget sub. This tube, which was probably used to deliver supplies to beleaguered garrisons ("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 7) was similar in size and shape to the submarine, but had less taper forward and had a raised hatch forward and one amidships, rather than the single streamlined conning tower of the sub.

The doctrine for use of Jap midget subs is indicated in a translation of the orders found in the midget salvaged at GUADALCANAL on 7 May 1943 (SOPAC Item No. 607). Excerpts from this document follow:

Plan of attack against anchored Enemy Warships for the KO HYOTEKI (2 man sub) TAI based at GUADALCANAL.

The Time for Resolute Attack!

If a powerful ship or transport should enter and anchor, the resolute attack will be executed immediately. In view of the present enemy situation, there will be more daytime attacks. However, even at night, aggressive attacks will be executed against the powerful enemy if the condition of the moon and the weather permits.

Select a time for attack on an enemy ship when its defense is most awkward, such as while it is in the midst of unloading cargo.

Upon receiving a report that the enemy has been discovered, the attack will be carried out with the least possible delay. Do not lose your opportunity (to

attack) because you vainly delayed and thereby allowed the enemy to escape into a strongly defended harbor.

Two HYOTEKI's (midget subs) will customarily be used against a powerful enemy ship. Four or more will not ordinarily be used simultaneously at one spot. When completely submerged, it is essential that a maximum depth be maintained.

Take the shortest course (to the point of attack). After completion of attack, HYOTEKI's must take a suitable circuitous route, while avoiding the enemy, and executing deceptive maneuvers.

It is essential that the attack be carried out from a firing position which is sufficiently close to ensure a direct hit. The basic firing position is from 70°-110° at 500 meters.

It is essential to pick out the most powerful ship or transport. However, if in order to do this you vainly delay your fire, you may lose the (chance to) attack due to enemy counter-measures, or impede the attack of the other HYOTEKI's.

When you receive interference from any enemy anchorage patrol boat, it is permissible to use some torpedoes, depending upon the situation. After having fired, submerge quickly to a deep depth and follow the action outlined in (3) of Article III.

[4] When it becomes impossible to return to the Base, return to, and land at territory occupied by friendly troops. Then tow the HYOTEKI quickly to the Base when possible. Otherwise, take quick and proper measures so that the HYOTEKI will not fall into the hands of the enemy.

After the HYOTEKI's depart, the Base will always stand by to receive (messages). It is essential that HYOTEKI's select the proper opportunity to send messages depending upon the situation of the enemy.

Evasive Action by Midget Sub while on Attack Mission.

(Comment: The translation of the next few paragraphs is not clear, but apparently refers to evasive action to be taken by the midget sub *after it has been launched from the base on an attack mission*. The document goes on to state that the sub will flood all tanks at once under this circumstance, and submerge to 50 meters or deeper, "utilizing the manual steering gear". It will then allegedly evade by turning to right angles from its original course. The midget sub is then to return to its base, taking precautions to avoid discovery.)

Measures for the Prevention of Damage while Waiting at the Base

When it is probable that there will be an enemy attack while moored at the Base, HYOTEKI's will submerge to the bottom immediately. They will surface when there is no further danger of attack, if it is easy to form an estimate of the outside situation from the inside of the submarine; if not, they will receive instructions for surfacing one hour after submerging.

Depending upon the enemy situation, it may have to remain submerged at the bottom daily from 30 minutes before sunrise until dusk.

Whatever enemy interference you encounter after leaving the Base, carry out your attack. After it is finished, do not uselessly throw away your lives but do your utmost to seek a means of escape and endeavor to return. Such as these are truly brave men and are faithful to the cause of their country.

Radio Equipment on the HYOTEKI's.

(The HYOTEKI's) are equipped with one type 97 Experimental Short Wave Radio Set (range approximately 50 nautical miles). Frequency Band, 8,000 kc. to 10,000 kc.

Crystal Sizes—8590 ck., 8905 kc., 9365 kc. (there is a separate set (of crystals) for sending and receiving on each of the above (frequencies).).

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear two photographs showing strafing by planes of the *USS Independence* of an enemy AK and an Enemy Patrol Craft. These photographs will be found reproduced as Item No. 39, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[6]

YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP

The YAMATO and MUSASHI, newest battlewagons in the Jap Navy, have long been mystery ships, even to Jap Naval personnel. For security reasons, even official Jap NAIREI appear to have been published with incorrect figures on characteristics and capabilities of these ships. Rumors have been rife on

tonnage, armament, and equipment aboard both BBs. The sketch on the facing page represents the impressions of an intelligent prisoner who is believed to be fairly reliable. It was drawn after close collaboration between the POW and draftsman. Pending further photographic or documentary evidence, the sketch must be evaluated as unverified information from an enemy source.

(The sketch of a *Yamato* class battleship, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 40, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The prisoner, who served aboard the *YAMATO* and *MUSASHI* for a total period of 13 months, claims that the ships are almost identical. The flag of CinC Combined was reportedly on board first the former and then the latter, prior to the recent move to the new *CL OYODO*.

On the controversial subject of main batteries, the POW confirmed the reported triple mounts, but insisted that the guns were 45 cm (17.7") rather than 40 cm (15.7"). The size and calibre of these guns has long been subject to speculation. The POW claimed that projectiles for these guns stand six feet high, as compared with the *NAGATO*'s projectiles, which stand 5'6". Ammunition ordered for the *YAMATO* and *MUSASHI* is assertedly "40 cm, Type 2" rather than "40 cm, Type 1". According to the POW, this indicates 45 cm ammunition. The prisoner added that a standing joke among CPOs aboard the *YAMATO* concerned the remark to boots that these guns "are the largest 40 cm guns in the Jap Navy".

The secondary battery consists of twelve 15.5 cm (6") in triple mounts, as shown in the sketch. Heavy AA armament is made up of six dual-mounted 12.7 (5") DP guns, three on each side. There are "many" 25 and 40 mm mounts. Some of the 40 mm guns are in triple mounts. The prisoner insisted that the 40 mm AA on the main deck were (as shown) without added protection.

Another controversial subject discussed by the prisoner was the reported pair of tunnel-shaped compartments on either side of the stern, which have variously been reported as housing subs and PT boats. The POW stated that each tunnel was designed for two midget subs. He said that he had never heard of these subs actually being carried, and that he had no idea how they would be launched. (It will be seen that the funnels are well above water-line). While the prisoner was aboard both new BBs, the compartments were used for storage space—including CinC Combined beer.

Two elevators are allegedly installed on each side of the foremast tower, capable of carrying three or four men. All ships' boats are carried aft in the passageway space directly under the catapults. The space in the hangar is large enough (the POW said) for eight planes with wings folded, but he had seen no more than three carried. At full speed, the POW stated, the *YAMATO* was capable of 26.5 knots. He added the following details:

Length—886 ft; Beam—114.8 ft; Tonnage—55,000; Speed—26.5 kts; Draft—30.2 ft; Main battery—9 x 45 cm (17.7"); Secondary battery—12 x 15.5 cm (6"); AA Battery—12 x 12.7 cm (5"); Horsepower—90,000.

JAP INFLUENCE GROUND MINES

A new type of mine threat to U. S. ships is indicated in the photograph of a Jap minelayer seen on the opposite page. Three influence ground mines are identifiable on the starboard track and three others inboard. Although no such mines have as yet been encountered by our forces, the photograph—coupled with documentary evidence—proves that the standard type of Japanese influence ground mine (known as Type 3) is in the forward areas.

(A photograph of a *Toshima* class Japanese Minelayer with Influence Ground Mines, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 41, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The photograph and a preliminary report of this mine were included in Intelligence Bulletin 14-44, distributed on 6 October by the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center. The minelayer was identified by SEFIC as of the *TOSHIMA* Class. The photograph was taken on 22 August off NGARUANL Reef (PALAU) by a PB4Y of TF 73.

Characteristics of a Type 3 ground mine were contained in a captured Japanese

notebook which is believed fairly reliable: Overall length—11 ft., 2 inches; Diameter—21 inches; Total weight—2398 pounds; Weight of charge—1950 pounds; Maximum depth of water for laying—100 feet; Minimum counter-mining distance—560 feet.

The notebook has been translated as CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 10368-B. This document has not yet been published, but data on the mine was disseminated by the Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4 as Intelligence Report No. 10.

Although smaller, dimensions of the mine photographed here appear roughly similar to those of the mine described in the document. The mines photographed may be a smaller model of the prototype, or the disparity in length may be caused by the fact that the mines are being shipped without the parachute housing attached.

By virtue of its large charge, a ground mine need not fire on contact with the skin of a ship, but—being fired on the bottom by the magnetic or acoustic field of a target—will tend to break the ship's back or at least shatter all castings and pipes. Mines of this type are usually laid with parachute by aircraft at minimum altitude, but may be laid equally well by submarines or surface craft.

Development of a sure sweeping technique for such mines requires laboratory analysis of the firing mechanism to determine its selection of targets and possibilities of laying dormant over an extended period. Mine Disposal Units in forward areas are equipped to recover and disassemble new mines for return to technicians.

JAP PC On the following page is a profile and plan view of a 170-foot Jap PC photographed at CHICHI JIMA by ENTERPRISE planes on 1 September. This vessel very closely resembles the 200-foot PC-13 Class as described in ONI 222-J, although there is a length differential of 30 feet and the PC shown in the sketch has added AA and depth-charge equipment. Reports from the South Pacific of patrol craft, described as of the PC-13 Class, cite lengths varying from 160 to more than 200 feet.

(The profile and plan view of a 170-foot Jap PC, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 42, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5, there appears a sketch map captioned "Submarine Situation, Oct. 9-Oct. 15" and bearing notation "Sightings in the Western NEW GUINEA-MOLUCCAS areas indicate the submarine concentration in the PALAU-MINDANAO region has moved southward". This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 43, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[12]

THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

OSCAR

(Seventh in a series reviewing the background of important Japanese aircraft)

The stubborn persistence of a poorly conceived airplane design is well illustrated by OSCAR, the Japanese Army's Type 1 fighter.

(A photograph referring to the foregoing paragraph, being of an "OSCAR" Model 1, the Japanese Army Type 1 fighter, will be found reproduced as Item No. 44 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This plane, development of which has closely paralleled that of the Navy ZEKE, is a product of the Japanese pre-war idea that planes and pilots were completely expendable. Carrying only two machine guns, OSCAR is the most lightly armed of any active fighter in use by a major power. It is highly vulnerable, despite the addition of some armor plate and gas tank leak-proofing.

But for all of that, it is still the most numerous of Army fighters and is standard equipment for combatant units in every theater. Because of its relative ease of manufacture, the Japanese have been forced to continue making it while striving for quantity production of more effective types. They are aware of the

plane's armament deficiency, but, up to now, have been unable to remedy it because of design limitations.

TONY and TOJO have not yet succeeded in replacing OSCAR. There are indications [13] that FRANK (see page —) was intended as a successor, but it is only beginning to come into the combat picture and may not live up to expectations.

OSCAR was active in some quantity at the time of PEARL HARBOR, in a Model 1 version powered by a Type 99 950 h. p. engine and carrying two 7.7 mm synchronized machine guns. A Model 2 made its combat appearance early in 1943. It had a Type 2 1150 h. p. engine and standard armament of two 12.7 mm machine guns. Early planes of the Model 2 series closely resembled the Model 1, but later versions appeared with blunt wing tips. There have been reports of a Model 3, of which no details are known.

OSCAR's strongest point in combat is its extreme maneuverability at medium speeds and altitudes. This factor has made it troublesome to our fliers, but has failed to compensate for its weaknesses.

CRASHED FRANK BELIEVED FOUND

Fragmentary information from CHINA reports recovery of the wreckage of a new type fighter, believed to be the Japanese Army's "Ki 84", or FRANK.

This plane was powered by an 18-cylinder engine and armed with two synchronized 12.7 mm machine-guns and two 20 mm wing cannon.

The plane was equipped with a four-blade paddle-type electric propeller. Gas tanks were self-sealing and two pieces of half-inch armor plate, 18" x 29" and 10" x 8" were installed behind the pilot's back and head. The empennage was reported as similar to that of TOJO, and hydraulically actuated landing gear retracted rearward. It had split flaps.

[14]

JAPS WORK ON NEW 4-ENGINE BOMBER

Japanese development of a new heavy bomber, strongly armed and powered by four Homare engines, is disclosed in a document (CINCPAC-CINCPHA Item No. 11,939) captured on PELELIU.

This plane, a Navy design still in the experimental stage, bears the Japanese designations of "Renzan" (Distant Mountain) or 18 Experimental Land Attack. It is the Japanese Navy's second attempt to produce a four-engine land plane, LIZ having proved to be a combat failure. There is little possibility that "Renzan" will be ready for service use until late 1945 at the earliest.

The document containing data on "Renzan" is another in the series of tables which have been recovered after recent invasions. It must be viewed as tentative, because it is mimeographed and bears no date or issuing authority, but it does appear to be of semi-official nature and recent origin.

"RENZAN"

The given data for this plane is as follows:

Crew: 7.

Engines: 4 x Homare (Modified).

H. P.: 1850 at 26,240 ft.

Maximum speed: 315 Kts. at 26,240 ft.

Rate of climb: 12 mins., 45 secs. to 26,240 ft.

Cruising speed: 200 kts. at 26,240 ft.

Hypothetical ranges: Normal—2080 naut. mi.; attack overload 3520 naut. mi.;

Recce overload—4070 naut. mi.

Armament: 2 x 20 mm each in dorsal, ventral and tail turrets; 2 x 13 mm in nose turret, and 1 x 13 mm each in right and left waist hatches. (Total 6 x 20 mm and 4 x 13 mm).

Bomb Load: 3 x 1760 lb. bombs or torpedoes, or 2 x 4400 lb. bombs, or 2 x 3300 lb. bombs, or 8 x 550 lb. bombs, or 18 x 132 lb. bombs.

Because of the recent development of this plane—it was ordered in 1943—it is probable that the performance figures given above are specified rather than actual. However, they are, at least theoretically, possible of attainment by a

plane with engines of the horsepower given. The high output listed for 26,240 feet—a rated altitude higher than that of currently operational Japanese aircraft—indicates a possibility that the Homare engines specified may be Model 51 or 52, both listed by official sources as designed for high altitude performance. The twin-gun turrets also are new in Japanese design.

TAIZAN

The same document supplies a new set of specifications for the two-engine bomber "Taizan", first information on which was outlined in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 11. The new material significantly differs from previous data, [15] possibly indicating error in one or both of the sources. However, it is not necessarily contradictory or inconsistent inasmuch as the plane is still in an experimented status and variations in design, equipment, and performance are to be expected.

The new information follows:

Crew: 5.

Engines: 2 x MK10A.

H. P.: 1950 at 26,240 ft.

Maximum speed: 303 kts. at 26,240 ft.

Rate of climb: 10 mins. to 13,124 ft.

Hypothetical range: Normal—1200 naut. mi.; attack overload—2000 naut. mi.; Recce overload—2400 naut. mi.

Armament: 2 x 20 mm in dorsal turret; 2 x 13 mm in tail turret; 2 x 13 mm in nose turret, and 1 x 13 mm each in right and left waist hatches.

Bomb load: 2 x 1760 lb. bombs, or 2 x 1100 lb., or 6 x 550 lb., or 12 x 132 lb.

The foregoing differs from prior information in listing a crew of five, rather than four; considerably increased armament, and a maximum bomb load of two, rather than one, 1760 lb. bombs.

The greatest difference, however, lies in the listed engine installation and consequent performance variations. Previous data indicated "Taizan" to be powered by two souped-up engines of the MK6 series, each delivering a takeoff maximum of 2700 h.p., and 2000 h.p. at 26,240 feet. Little is known of the MK10A engine, a new development, except that it is shown in official documents to be an 18-cylinder twin-row radial having a "Vulcan type" (presumably turbo) supercharger. This would account for the high rated output listed for 26,240 feet.

Another unresolved question is how five gun stations could be manned by a total crew of five, unless one man were responsible for both waist positions or a remote control apparatus were used. Previous information indicated total armament of only 2 x 20 mm and 2 x 7.7 mm, positions not given.

[16]

GEORGE—FIRE PATTERN AND SPECIFICATIONS

New translations add to the growing body of information on GEORGE (SHIDEN), Kawanishi's interceptor-fighter powered by a Homare 21 engine developing 2,000 h. p. at takeoff.

Although GEORGE has been in service for nearly a year, there have been no definite identifications of it in combat and no crash examinations in the field. It is believed that most of these planes have been assigned to Empire defense.

Reproduced as Figure 1 is a diagram showing the harmonization plan for GEORGE's four 20 mm fixed cannon and two 7.7 mm synchronized machine-guns. It was taken from a mimeographed Japanese copy of an armament manual published by YOKOSUKA Air Group in February, 1944 (CINCPAC-CINCPAC Item No. 9720). The same document furnished rough line drawings of GEORGE which were published in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 5.

(Figure 1, referred to in the preceding paragraph, is a diagram showing the Harmonization Pattern for "GEORGE", Kawanishi's interceptor-fighter powered by a Homare 21 engine developing 2,000 h.p. at takeoff. This diagram will be found reproduced as Item No. 45, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[17] Two of GEORGE'S four 20 mm cannons are mounted conventionally, one in each wing. The other two are installed in faired housings on the under-

side of the wings. Of the conventionally mounted 20's these weapons may be either the Type 99 Mk. I (low velocity) or Mk. II (high velocity). They are hydraulically charged and electrically fired.

The harmonization pattern illustrated is an experimental one and may have been revised, but it is of interest in showing the Japanese approach to the problem.

Another document (CINCPAC-CINPOA Item No. 11,805) supplies new information on the specifications of GEORGE. This document is a pilot's notebook and should be evaluated with reserve but probably is reliable in the main. The given span of 39.37 feet agrees with previous information, but the length, 29.35 feet, is greater than the 26.25 feet given in an earlier notebook. It is believed that 29.35 feet is the more nearly correct figure. Weights given in the current notebook also exceed those noted in prior documents and quite possibly indicate the installation of additional equipment.

Item No. 9720 shows provisions for mounting a small (66 or 132 lb.) bomb under each wing. This loading had been presumed, but not established, previously. Available data on performance of GEORGE appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 9 and 12.

Specifications extracted from the notebook (Item No. 11,805) follow :

Principal Measurements:

Overall Span.....	12.000 meters (39.37')
Overall Length.....	8.9445 meters (29.35')
Overall Height.....	4.038 meters (13.25')
Landing Angle.....	13.0°
Wheel Base Length.....	4.450 meters (14.6')

Main Wing:

Area.....	23.5-m ² (252.8 sq. ft.)
Chord Length:	
At wing root.....	2.700 meters (8.86')
At wing tip.....	1.250 meters (4.10')
Mean Chord Length.....	2.070 meters (6.79')
Angle of Setting.....	4.0°
Aspect Ratio.....	6.13
Taper Ratio.....	1/2.16
Aileron Area.....	1.23-m ² x 2 (13.23 sq. ft. x 2)

Tail Assembly:

Horizontal Tail Assembly Area.....	4.4-m ² (47.34 sq. ft.)
Elevator Area.....	0.55-m ² (5.92 sq. ft.)
Vertical Tail Assembly Area.....	2.00-m ² (21.52 sq. ft.)

[18] Rudder Area..... 0.66-m² (7.10 sq. ft.)

Weight:

Net Weight.....	2.710-kg (5.962 lbs.)
Normal Load.....	3.750-kg (8,250 lbs.)
1st Overload.....	3.891-kg (8,560 lbs.)
2nd Overload.....	4.246-kg (9,341 lbs.)

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a captured photograph showing cruiser or battleship recovery of an old Jap float recce plane, "DAVE". This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 46, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[19]

IRVING VERSIONS CLARIFIED

A recently captured document, combined with field observations, sheds considerable light on the several versions of IRVING and their nomenclature.

This document, a mimeographed reference pamphlet (CINCPAC-CINPOA Item No. 11,907), lists five separate variations of IRVING—all of them bearing the common Model-Type symbol "JINI". They are: Type 2 Land Reece Plane; Type 2 Land Reece Plane, converted as bomber; Type 2 Land Reece Plane converted as Type 2 night fighter; GEKKO, Model 11, and GEKKO, Model 11, Modified.

The following table condenses salient points of difference among the five versions:

Designation	Crew	Normal weight	Fuel carried in normal cond. (in U. S. gallons)	Armament
Type 2 Land Recce.....	3	15,950 lbs....	475 gals.....	1 x 20 mm and 1 x 7.7 mm fixed, and 4 x 7.7 mm in remotely controlled dorsal turrets.
Type 2 Land Recce (converted as bomber).	3	15,940 lbs....	264 gals.....	Same as above, plus 2 x 550 lb. or 4 x 132 lb. bombs.
Type 2 Land Recce (converted as night fighter).	2	15,063 lbs....	475 gals.....	1 x 20 mm and 1 x 7.7 mm fixed and 1 x 20 mm in power turret.
GEKKO, Model 11.....	2	15,246 lbs....	475 gals.....	2 x 20 mm dorsal inclined and 2 x 20 mm ventral inclined.
GEKKO, Model 11 (Modified).	2	15,048 lbs....	475 gals.....	Same as above, except 1 x 20 mm ventral.

[20] The foregoing information makes it possible to trace the history of IRVING, which has gone through more mutations than any other Japanese combat plane. The original version apparently saw little service, although one of them was recovered on TINIAN. The second variation required only the installation of external bomb racks, but also apparently was used very little.

Collateral information indicates that the third version made its appearance late in the summer of 1943, but it seems to have met with little success and was succeeded in the autumn of that year by the one mounting inclined, fixed 20mm cannon. This latter was dignified by an official Japanese Navy acceptance order, which changed the plane's designation from Type 2 to GEKKO. It is believed that all IRVINGs made since late 1943 have been the GEKKO variety.

The third variation, with a 20mm cannon in power turret, was illustrated in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 11. According to the document, the second member of the two-man crew normally occupies the rear cockpit section, but operates the turret during combat. Varying armament of GEKKO has been discussed in several past issues. The modified GEKKO, noted in CINCAP-CINCP0 Item No. 11,907, may be the one for which a triple fixed 20mm dorsal mount ("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 13) was designed. Although the document does not specifically say so, it would be logical to add a dorsal gun when one of the ventral guns was removed.

However useful the document may be in clarifying nomenclature and development, still other minor variations of IRVING have been found in the field. Some specimens have mounted *both* nose cannon and inclined cannon, and most of them, whatever their armament, have been equipped with bomb racks.

There is also good evidence that a re-engined Model 12, or J1N2 IRVING is in existence, and IRVINGs equipped with radar have been examined in the field.

(A photograph of the GEKKO, Model 11, version of "IRVING", referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 47, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[21]

NEW JAP AIR-TO-AIR BOMBING DEVICES

The Japanese, vigorously experimenting with methods to halt our bombing strikes, have developed a variety of new weapons based on the principle of air-to-air bombing. Most of these still fall into the category of interesting gadgets, but all present a threat which may become serious if techniques are improved.

The standard air-to-air weapon appears to be the 75 lb. aerial burst phosphorus bomb with a 3 or 3.5 second delay, which was discussed in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. I, Nos. 4 and 13. Continuing use of this bomb is indicated.

More recent evidence shows experiments with at least three types of cable bomb and indicates the possibility of cable-training balloons, released from aircraft. Action reports have noted several new types of areal explosive bursts, under circumstances indicating that they were caused by air-to-air bombardment, but the nature of these has not been fully determined. The Japs also have used several types of aerial grenade discharger for some time, with little reported success.

An intriguing device of the cable variety is illustrated and described in a handwritten document (CINCPAC-CINCPA Item No. 11,006), captured on PELELIU. This document is rough, incomplete and partly self-contradictory. In view of its nature and lack of date or source, it must be accepted with considerable reserve, but it is presented as an interesting and possibly significant bit of evidence.

The document, entitled "Notes on the 10 Kg. (22 lb.) Towed Bomb", remarks that the weapon is for use against "enemy large model planes". Exact tracings from the attached sketches, together with translations of the original notations, are reproduced as Figures 1 and 2.

(Figures 1 and 2, *supra*, are sketches showing:

1. Tracing of Japanese sketch purporting to show method of releasing towed cable bomb against Allied bomber.
2. Detail of towed cable bomb, from captured sketch.

These sketches will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 48 and 49, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[23] "The towed bomb", says the document, "is fired from a point 200 meters (656 ft.) above the enemy plane by driving directly from above, in accordance with the method for attacking enemy planes. A tow cable is attached to the towed bomb. The initial speed of the bomb is about 200 meters per second, and since its head resistance is strong, it should be made to travel not more than 500 meters before striking the enemy plane. At the time of firing, the position of the bomb will form an angle of about 30° to the plane from which it is fired, and an angle of 45° to the enemy plane".

(Comment: The last sentence appears anomalous under conditions of a vertical dive. To achieve such a combination of angles, assuming level flight by the plane under attack, the attacking plane would have to be gliding at an angle of 15° from the horizontal, or diving 15° past the vertical.)

The document continues: "The bomb will pass, in falling, close to the enemy plane. Since the bomb is pulled by a fighter plane by means of a fixed length of tow cable and assumes a position similar to that of a sleeve target, the tow cable is pulled taut upon coming in contact with the enemy plane. The bomb, which is at the very end of the cable, is equipped with horns (to detonate it). Since there is an instantaneous detonation when the horns touch the enemy plane, it is fully possible to bring down a plane with one bomb.

"Nomenclature of the parts:

- "a. Bomb body.
- "b. Firing cylinder.
- "c. Firing mechanism.
- "d. Firing safety cylinder.
- "e. Tow cable housing tube.
- "f. Tow cable disengaging mechanism.

"Operation:

"When, in diving, the handle of the opening mechanism of the firing cylinder is pulled, the firing cylinder forms an angle of 30 to 45 degrees, depending on the air pressure, with the under surface of the wing. The bomb is fired by an electrical firing mechanism".

Piecing together the text and the illustrations, it appears that the bomb container tube is carried flush against the under surface of the fuselage, or within it, during flight, with the tow cable extending back along the fuselage to a reel near the tail. On entering the dive, the pilot operates a lever which permits the container tube to swing outward on its hinge, at an angle apparently controlled by inter-action of air pressure and a resistance spring. At the proper instant, the expulsion charge is detonated, throwing the bomb out, while the cable unreels and the protective cover falls away.

There have been no reports of such a device being used in combat, and it has not been examined in the field.

It has been established that the Japanese have developed another type of cable [24] air-to-air bomb, consisting of an explosive unit attached to a cable which, in turn, is suspended by a parachute. There is, also, a fragmentary documentary indication of a device made up of two small bombs at either end of a cable.

An air crew of Seventh Bomber Command has reported being attacked by Jap planes which released an aerial burst bomb estimated at six feet in length and a foot and a half in diameter, thought possibly to be a 550 lb. version. From the

Asiatic theater come reports of balloons, possibly trailing cables and released by aircraft, and of mysterious aerial explosions far out over the ocean.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a photograph of a B-29 over Yawata, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 50, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The supposed aerial-release balloons were noted over YAWATA by B-29s at an altitude of about 24,000 feet under circumstances which made it unlikely they [25] could have been either fugitive or captive. Such a device, equipped with trailing cables and explosive charges might be developed into an effective anti-bomber weapon if released in quantity.

Information on Japanese aerial-burst bomb tactics as carried out in actual combat is contained in Intelligence Memorandum No. 19 of Commander Shore-based Air, Forward Area, quoting the report of a veteran B-24 navigator. It follows:

"After being subjected to repeated attacks by Jap fighters over TRUK and IWO JIMA, dropping phosphorus bombs, it can be stated that certain definitely recurrent maneuvers are used. The attacking ZEKES will fly parallel to our formation, usually at 3 or 9 o'clock for one to five minutes, possibly gauging our altitude. They then accelerate, pass the head of the formation and go into a steep chandelle, cutting in towards the center of the formation. They then roll over on their backs, begin to descend and flip out the phosphorus bombs. Were our squadrons to lose altitude at the beginning of the enemy chandelle, this might be good evasive action.

"These passes were used almost exclusively at IWO JIMA when the sun was to the back of our formation. When the sun was high and from 10 to 2 o'clock, the Japs at both TRUK and IWO JIMA would drop their bombs on their first surprise run, directly out of the sun. The only evasive action we can take to avoid this is to plan our missions at times when the sun will be at our back".

The tactics described appear to follow written Jap doctrine ("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. I, No. 13) to the extent that, in each case, the bombs are released ahead of the bomber formation and while the attacking fighter is flying towards it. The report that the bombs sometimes are "flipped out" while the fighter is on its back does not fit the normal wing-rack loading of aerial burst bombs, and may indicate some type of ejection device which has not yet been examined in the field.

On the parallel approach from the rear a chandelle or Immelman, following acceleration, would permit the attacking plane to gain proper distance and altitude increment with a minimum of exposure to opposing fire and in a minimum of time.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear photographs showing Liberators under attack over Iwo Jima, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 51, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[26]

WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944

[*Negs. received; **Prints only received]

JAPAN

Kyushu: Good trimetrogon split and oblique coverage of areas indicated

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
Split Vert.	24"	30,000'	Omura M7-40-25-AC288	7213-16	8/21*
V	24"	25,000'	Yawata-M7-468-265	7214-17	8/20*
		26,000'	Yawata-M7-40-44-AC503	7215-18	8/20*
			Yawata-M7-40-45-452	7216-19	8/20*
Split Vert.	24"	30,000'	Taka Shima M7-40-25-AC288	7220-20	8/20*
V	24"	26,000'	Yawata-M6-462-769	7222-12	8/20*
Split Vert.	24"	30,000'	Nagasaki M7-40-25-AC288 (Taka Shima)	7223-13	9/21*
Split Vert.	24"	30,000'	M7-40-25-AC-288	7225-14	8/21*
Tri Met	6"	30,000'	M7-40-25-AC-288	7226-15	8/21*

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

JAPAN—Continued

Kyushu: Good trimetrogon split and oblique coverage of area indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V.....	12½"	26,000'	Yawata (Bomb Run) Wing M6-462-769-13PL.	7262-25.....	8/20*
V.....	12"	25,000'	Yawata A/F M7-468-442-14PL.	7261-24.....	8/20*
V.....	6"	26,300'	Yawata-M19-444-262.	7260-23.....	8/20*
Tri Met.....	6"	30,000'	Nagasaki-M7-40-25-AC288.	7258-21.....	8/21*
Tri Met.....	6"	30,000'	Omura M7-40-25-AC288.	7250-22.....	8/21*
O.....	6¾"		Yawata Area-468-217-20AAF.	7263-26.....	8/20*
			Yawata-468-353-20AAF.	7264-27.....	8/20*
			Yawata-468-370-20AAF.	7265-28.....	8/20*

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

CEBU-LEYTE-BOHOL: Trimetrogon and vertical coverage of portions of islands indicated

Tri Met.....	152.2 mm.	Var.....	CVL23-33 (p) CEBU, LEYTE.	7098-42.....	9/13*
	6"	Var.....	CVL23-33 (v) CEBU, VIC MAC-TAN IS, LEYTE.	7099-42.....	9/13*
	6"	Var.....	CVL23-33 (s) CEBU, BOHOL, LEYTE.	7100-42.....	9/13*
V.....	8¼"	Var.....	ESSEX-124 (CEBU).	7124-43.....	9/12*

Bohol: Good Partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

V.....	24"	Var.....	CV16-2478.....	7009-4.....	9/14*
V.....	12"	Var.....	CV16-2479.....	7016-6.....	9/14*
V.....	8¼"	8,000'	CV16-2457.....	7005-1.....	9/12*
V.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV16-2480.....	7005-2.....	9/14*
V.....	6"	9,500'	CV16-2455(V).....	7007-3.....	9/12*
V/O.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV12-353.....	7011-5.....	9/13*
O.....	6"	9,500'	CV16-2456(P).....	7008-3.....	9/12*

Cebu: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated

Tri Met.....	6"	6,000'	CV16-2448(V).....	7079-19.....	9/12*
		6,000'	CV16-2449(P).....	7080-19.....	9/12*
		6,000'	CV16-2450(S).....	7081-19.....	9/12*
V.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV16-2451.....	7082-5.....	9/12*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CV16-2452.....	7083-6.....	9/12*
V/O.....	24"	Var.....	CV16-2453.....	7084-7.....	9/12*
V.....	12"	Var.....	CV16-2454.....	7085-8.....	9/12*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CV16-2458.....	7086-9.....	9/12*
			CV16-2459.....	7087-10.....	9/12*
			CV16-2460.....	7088-11.....	9/12*
			CV16-2461.....	7089-12.....	9/13*
Tri Met.....	6"	10,000'	CV16-2462(V) (MACTAN) (CEBU).....	7090-13.....	9/13*
		10,000'	CV16-2463(P) (MACTAN) (CEBU).....	7091-13.....	9/13*
		10,000'	CV16-2464 (S) (MACTAN).....	7092-13.....	9/13*
V.....	6"	1,000'	CV16-2467 (N. E. COAST) (CEBU).....	7093-14.....	9/13*
O.....	6"	1,000'	CV16-2468 (N. E. COAST) (CEBU).....	7094-15.....	9/13*
V.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV16-2469.....	7095-16.....	9/13*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CV16-2472.....	7096-17.....	9/13*
			CV16-2473.....	7097-18.....	9/13*
			CV12-240.....	7101-20.....	9/12*
		2,000'	CV12-341.....	7102-21.....	9/12*
		2,500'	CV12-342.....	7103-22.....	9/12*
			CV12-343.....	7104-23.....	9/13*
O.....	24"	Var.....	CV12-346 (N. CEBU).....	7105-24.....	9/12*
O.....	6¾"	1,000'	CV12-347 (SHIPPING).....	7106-25.....	9/12*
		Var.....	CV12-348 (CEBU HARBOR).....	7107-26.....	9/12*
O.....	24"	Var.....	CV12-349 (CEBU TOWN).....	7108-27.....	9/13*
V/O.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV12-353.....	7109-28.....	9/13*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CV12-354 (CEBU TOWN).....	7110-29.....	9/13*
			CVL27-159.....	7111-30.....	9/12*
			CVL27-160.....	7112-31.....	9/12*
			CVL27-161.....	7113-32.....	9/12*
			CVL27-163.....	7114-33.....	9/12*
V.....	12"	5,000'	WASP-167 (SHIPPING CEBU HARBOR).....	7115-34.....	9/12*
		8,000'	WASP-168 (SARAVIA & MANAPLA).....	7116-35.....	9/12*
V.....	12"	3,500'	WASP-170 (EAST COAST).....	7117-36.....	9/12*

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—Continued

Cebu: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
O.....	8¼"	Var.....	BKHL-302.....	7077-4.....	9/13*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	BKHL-298.....	7118-37.....	9/13*
		Var.....	BKHL-303.....	7119-38.....	9/13*
V.....	6"	800'	ESSEX-123 (V).....	7120-39.....	9/12*
O.....	6"	800'	ESSEX-123 (P).....	7121-39.....	9/12*
O.....	8¼"	Var.....	ESSEX-139 (SHIPPING).....	7122-40.....	9/12*
		Var.....	ESSEX-147.....	7123-41.....	9/14*

Dinagat: Good complete vertical and oblique coverage of northern portion of island

Tri Met.....	6"	Var.....	CV16-2476 (S).....	7073-3.....	9/14*
		Var.....	CV-16-2471 (V).....	7074-3.....	9/14*
		Var.....	CV-16-2475 (P).....	7075-3.....	9/14*
V.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV12-353.....	7076-4.....	9/13*

Leyte: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated

Tri Met.....	6"	Var.....	CV16-2476 (S).....	6996-19.....	9/14*
		Var.....	CV16-2474 (V).....	7010-19.....	9/14*
		Var.....	CV16-2475 (P).....	6997-19.....	9/14*
V.....	20"	7,000'	CV16-2477 (BURAUEN & N. W. LEYTE).....	6998-21.....	9/14*
O.....	24"	Var.....	ESSEX-148 (LEYTE-SAMAR).....	6999-22.....	9/14*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	BKHL-289 (LEYTE-SAMAR).....	7003-24.....	9/12*
V.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV12-351.....	7047-20.....	9/13*
V.....	20"	Var.....	BKHL-284.....	7126-26.....	9/12*
O.....	12"	Var.....	CVL 27-165 (TACLOBAN).....	7024-23.....	9/14*
O.....	24"	Var.....	CV12-346 (DULAG A/F).....	7125-25.....	9/12*

Mindanao: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated

O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CV125-80 (CAGAYAN AREA).....	7048-32.....	9/8*
		Var.....	CV125-80A (CAGAYAN AREA).....	7049-33.....	9/9*
		Var.....	CV125-80B (CAGAYAN AREA).....	7050-34.....	9/9*
V.....	8¼"	1,100'	CVL25-83 (SAN AGUSTIN).....	7051-35.....	9/14*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CVL25-84 (C. SAN AGUSTIN).....	7052-36.....	9/14*
V.....	20"	8,200'	CVL27-150 (VALENCIA).....	7053-37.....	9/9*
V.....	6¾"	Var.....	CVL27-151 (VALENCIA).....	7054-38.....	9/9*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CVL27-152 (VALENCIA).....	7055-39.....	9/9*
		Var.....	CVL27-153 (VALENCIA).....	7056-40.....	9/9*
V.....	12"	8,500'	CVL27-154 (MACAJALAR BAY).....	7057-41.....	9/9*
O.....	12"	Var.....	CVL27-155 (MACAJALAR BAY).....	7058-42.....	9/9*
V.....	12"	Var.....	CVL27-156.....	7059-43.....	9/9*
O.....	12"	Var.....	CVL27-157 (SURIGAO).....	7060-44.....	9/9*
V.....	8¼"	Var.....	CV12-351.....	7061-45.....	9/13*
O.....	6¾"	Var.....	CV12-355 (JAP DD DAVAO).....	7062-46.....	9/14*
O.....	24"	Var.....	CV12-356 (DAVAO).....	7063-47.....	9/14*
O.....	6¾"	3,000'	CV12-357 (DAVAO).....	7064-48.....	9/14*
		2,500'	CV12-358 (SASSA A/D).....	7065-49.....	9/14*
Split vert.....	24"	8,000'	CV23-32 P (MALABANG).....	7066-50.....	9/10*
		8,000'	CVL23-32 S (MALABANG).....	7067-50.....	9/10*
V.....	24"	15,000'	WASP-195 (AIRSTRIPS N. OF DIGOS).....	7068-51.....	9/14*
V.....	12"	10,000'	WASP-196 (DAVAO TOWN AND AIRSTRIP).....	7069-52.....	9/14*
V.....	24"	8,500'	WASP-197 (AIRFIELD S. OF DAVAO).....	7070-53.....	9/14*
V.....	12"	Var.....	WASP-198 (AIRFIELD S. OF DAVAO).....	7071-54.....	9/14*
			(DIGOS PT. AREA & PADADA A/D).....		
Tri Met.....	6"	6,500'	WASP-138(P).....	7247-68.....	9/9***
		6,500'	WASP-139(V).....	7248-68.....	9/9***
		6,500'	WASP-140(S).....	7249-68.....	9/9***
			(SARAGANI BAY AREA).....		
V.....	12"	Var.....	WASP-142.....	7250-69.....	9/9***
			(BUAYAN TO MT. TANGLI).....		
			(BUAYAN TO BEE HIVE).....		
			(SUMBANG PT. TO TINAGA PT.).....		
			(CAPE AGUSTIN).....		

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—Continued

Mindanao: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated—Con.

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
Tri Met	6''	10,000'	WASP-144(V)	7251-70	9/9***.
		10,000'	WASP-145 (P)	7252-70	9/9***.
		10,000'	WASP-146 (S)	7253-70	9/9***.
			(SARANGANI BAY AREA)		
V	12''	15,000'	WASP-147	7254-71	9/9***.
		10,000'	CVL24-86 (COTABATO)	7255-72	9/10***.
O	152.8mm	1,600'	CVL24-88 (COTABATO)	7257-74	9/10***.
O	154.0mm	3,000'	CVL24-87 (COTABATO)	7256-73	9/10***.
Split Vert	24''	Var.	ESSEX-120 (P)	7207-55	9/12*.
		Var.	ESSEX-120 (S)	7208-55	9/12*.

Negros: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas and airfields indicated

O	20''	Var.	BHKL-307 (BACOLOD & TALISAY A/F).	7004-4	9/14*.
V	24''	8,000'	CV16-2465 (MANALPA, ALICANTE SARAVIA AND TALISAY A/F's).	7012-5	9/13*.
V	152.3mm	Var.	CV12-344(V)	7013-6	9/12*.
O	152.3mm	Var.	CV12-344 (S)	7014-6	9/12*.
O	24''	8,000'	CV12-352	7015-7	9/13*.
		Var.	CV12-349	7017-8	9/13*.
O	12''	Var.	CVL27-162 (DUMAGUETTE)	7018-9	9/12*.
[27] V	12''	5,000'	CVL27-171	7019-10	9/14*.
O	12''	Var.	CVL27-172	7028-11	9/14*.
V	12''	Var.	CV16-2466 (FABRICA)	7029-12	9/13*.
V	24''	7,000'	ESSEX-140 (AIRFIELDS)	7030-13	9/14*.
		8,000'	WASP-169 (SARAVIA TN & MANAPLA TN).	7031-14	9/12*.
V	6''	Var.	WASP-179 (V) (BACOLOD A/F, ALICANTE A/F).	7032-15	9/13*.
O	6''	Var.	WASP-180 (P) (BACOLOD & ALICANTE A/F).	7033-15	9/13*.
O	6½''	4,000'	CV12-359	7034-16	9/13*.
O		Var.	CV12-351 (DUMAGUETTE & SOQUIJOR).	7035-17	9/13*.
O	6½''	Var.	BKHL-297	7037-19	9/13*.
O	8¼''	Var.	ESSEX-133 (SARAVIA) (P)	7036-18	9/13*.
O	6½''	Var.	BKHL-300	7038-20	9/13*.
		Var.	BKHL-304	7039-21	9/14*.
		Var.	BKHL-305	7040-22	9/14*.
		Var.	BKHL-309	7041-23	9/14*.
		Var.	BKHL-310	7042-24	9/14*.
		Var.	CVL27-173	7043-25	9/14*.
		Var.	CV16-2470	7044-26	9/13*.
		Var.	CV16-2471	7045-27	9/13*.
		Var.	CV16-2481	7046-28	9/13*.
		Var.	CV16-2482	7072-29	9/14*.
		4,000'	CV12-343	7141-30	9/13*.
		1,000'	CV12-345	7142-31	9/12*.
O	8¼''	Var.	ESSEX-129	7209-33	9/12*.
O	12''	Var.	ESSEX-130	7210-34	9/12*.

Palmas: Good Partial oblique coverage of island

O	24''	Var.	CV12-356	7077-1	9/14*.
O	6½''	2,500'	CV12-358	7078-2	9/14*.

Panay: Good vertical and oblique coverage of ILOILO

V	24''	8,700'	ESSEX-141 (ILOILO)	7020-3	9/14*.
V	12''	3,000'	ESSEX-142 (ILOILO)	7021-4	9/14*.
O	8¼''	Var.	ESSEX-144 (ILOILO)	7022-5	9/14*.
O	12''	Var.	CVL27-164 (ILOILO)	7023-6	9/14*.
O	6½''	Var.	CVL27-168 (ILOILO)	7025-8	9/14*.
V	6½''	Var.	CVL27-169 (ILOILO)	7026-9	9/14*.
O	6½''	Var.	CVL27-170 (ILOILO)	7027-10	9/14*.

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—Continued

Samar: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
O-----	20''-----	5,000'-----	CV11-34 (TUGNUG PT. TO CABLAGNA PT.).	7001-4-----	9/13*
V-----	152. 0mm.	Var-----	CV11-36 (TIP SAMAR IS.)	7002-5-----	9/13*
O-----	8¼''-----	Var-----	BKHL-302-----	7000-6-----	9/13*

FORMOSA: Good vertical coverage of areas and airfields indicated

V-----	24''-----	30,300'-----	4MB137-21PR TAKAO HARBOR	7127-98-----	8/25*--*
		30,400'-----	4MB137-21PR TAKAO A/D-----	7128-99-----	8/25*--*
		30,500'-----	4MB137-21PR HEITO A/D-----	7129-100-----	8/25*--*
		30,200'-----	4MB137-21PR OKAYAMA A/D-----	7130-101-----	8/25*--*
		29,800'-----	4MB137-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR.	7131-102-----	8/25*--*
		30,500'-----	4MB137-21PR TAINAN A/D AND SAT. L/S.	7132-103-----	8/25*--*
		29,900'-----	4MB139-21PR KATO SEA PLANE BASE.	7133-104-----	8/26*--*
		29,900'-----	4MB139-21PR TAKAO A/D-----	7134-105-----	8/26*--*
		29,300'-----	4MB139-21PR TAKAO HARBOR	7135-106-----	8/26*--*
		29,700'-----	4MB139-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR.	7136-107-----	8/26*--*
Split vert.	24''-----	31,500'-----	4MB143-21PR TAKAO HARBOR.	7137-108-----	8/29*--*
		30,000'-----	4MB151-21PR TAKAO.	7138-109-----	9/7*--*
		30,000'-----	4MB151-21PR TAKAO.	7138-109-----	9/7*--*
		30,300'-----	4MB151-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR.	7139-110-----	9/7*--*
		30,300'-----	4MB151-21PR TOSHIEH HARBOR.	7139-110-----	9/7*--*
		30,000'-----	4MB151-21PR RUN FROM TANSUI RIVER TOKO TO N. OF HEITO.	7140-111-----	9/7*--*
		30,000'-----	4MB151-21PR RUN FROM TANSUI RIVER TOKO TO N. OF HEITO.	7140-111-----	9/7*--*
V-----	24''-----	30,100'-----	4MC7-21PR TAKAO HARBOR.	7192-112-----	1/24*--*
		30,100'-----	4MC7-21PR HOZAN RADIO STATION & A/D.	7193-113-----	1/24*--*
V-----	6''-----	30,100'-----	4MC7-21PR HEITO A/D-----	6888-91-----	1/24*--*
V-----	24''-----	30,100'-----	4MC7-21PR HEITO A/D-----	6888-91-----	1/24*--*
V-----	6''-----	30,300'-----	4MC7-21PR OKAYAMA A/D-----	6889-92-----	1/24*--*
V-----	24''-----	30,300'-----	4MC7-21PR OKAYAMA A/D-----	6889-92-----	1/24*--*
V-----	6''-----	30,200'-----	4MC7-21PR TAINAN & A/D-----	6890-93-----	1/24*--*
V-----	24''-----	30,200'-----	4MC7-21PR TAINAN & A/D-----	6890-93-----	1/24*--*
V-----	6''-----	29,400'-----	4MC7-21PR KAGI A/D-----	6891-94-----	1/24*--*
V-----	24''-----	29,400'-----	4MC7-21PR KAGI A/D-----	6891-94-----	1/24*--*
V-----	24''-----	30,400'-----	4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN LAKE.	6892-95-----	1/24*--*
V-----	24''-----	30,500'-----	4MC7-21PR TAICHU AND TOYOHARA A/D.	6893-96-----	1/24*--*
V-----	6''-----	30,500'-----	4MC7-21PR TAICHU AND TOYOHARA A/D.	6893-96-----	1/24*--*
V-----	6''-----	29,800'-----	4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN LAKE.	6894-97-----	1/24*--*
V-----	24''-----	29,800'-----	4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN LAKE.	6894-97-----	1/24*--*

PESCADORES

Mako Island: Good complete vertical coverage of Mako Island

V-----	24''-----	24,300'-----	M4/5-9PS-----	7176-8-----	4/24*--*/43
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Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

KURILES

Onkotan: Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V-----	24''-----	14,500'-----	11AAF4M1143-1-----	7199-10-----	8/26**
V-----	12''-----	14,000'-----	11AAF4M1143-2-----	7200-11-----	8/26**
		13,800'-----	11AAF4M1143-5-----	7203-14-----	8/26**
		13,800'-----	11AAF4M1143-6-----	7204-15-----	8/26**
		14,000'-----	11AAF4M1143-7-----	7205-16-----	8/26**
		14,000'-----	11AAF4M1143-8-----	7206-17-----	8/26**
V-----	6''-----	14,000'-----	11AAF4M1143-3-----	7201-12-----	8/26**
		14,000'-----	11AAF4M1143-4-----	7202-13-----	8/26**
O-----	24''-----	14,500'-----	11AAF4M1143-1-----	7199-10-----	8/26**

Paramushiru: Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

V-----	12''-----	-----	FAW4-S425-----	7198-45-----	9/2**
O-----	20''-----	-----	FAW4-S425-----	7197-44-----	9/2**
O-----	63½''-----	-----	FAW4-S425-----	7196-43-----	9/2**

BONINS

Chichi Jima: Good partial vertical coverage showing bomb damage to Omura seaplane base

V-----	24''-----	19,400'-----	A-973-38BS-H337-7BC-----	6991-118-----	9/22*
		17,000'-----	D-708-819BS-H337-7BC-----	6992-119-----	9/22*
V-----	20''-----	11,500'-----	B-556-H346-38BS-7BC-----	6989-116-----	9/24*
V-----	12''-----	11,500'-----	B-809-819BS-H346-7BC-----	6990-117-----	9/24*
		11,700'-----	A-282-H346-38BS-7BC-----	6993-120-----	9/24*
		18,100'-----	C-674-819BS-H337-7BC-----	6994-121-----	9/22*

Haha Jima: Partial vertical coverage of island

V-----	12''-----	15,000'-----	C-674-819BS-H337-7BC-----	6995-44-----	9/22*
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KAZAN GROUP

Iwo Jima Rhetto: Good selected oblique shots of Kita Iwo Jima and enemy ship

O-----	63½''-----	Var-----	VB116-31-----	6966-158-----	9/23*
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Iwo Jima: Good partial vertical coverage showing bomb damage to airfields

V-----	40''-----	19,000'-----	B-838-392BS-H343-7BC-----	6987-162-----	9/25*
V-----	24''-----	17,800'-----	B-236-27BS-H343-7BC-----	6984-159-----	9/25*
		17,800'-----	A-473-27BS-H343-7BC-----	6985-160-----	9/25*
		17,800'-----	493-27BS-H343-7BC-----	6986-161-----	9/25*
		19,000'-----	A-870-392BS-H343-7BC-----	6988-163-----	9/25*

MARIANAS

Maug: Selected distant obliques of island

O-----	63½''-----	Var-----	VB116-30-----	6968-14-----	9/23*
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Pagan: Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island

V-----	24''-----	11,000'-----	28PR4MC133-----	6970-105-----	9/29*
		11,500'-----	A-994-27BS-7BC-----	6971-106-----	9/21*
O-----	20''-----	10,000'-----	A-556-38BS-7BC-----	6972-107-----	9/23*
O-----	12''-----	2,000'-----	28PR4MC131-1-----	6969-104-----	9/29*

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

CAROLINES

Ponape: Three selected oblique shots showing bomb damage to old and new airfields

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
O-----	6½''	9,000'	A-296-MAG22(48BS-M356-7BC)-----	7173-581-----	9/24*
		1,000'	B-503-MAG22(48BS-M356-7BC)-----	7174-582-----	9/24*
		5,500'	C-614-MAG22(48BS-M356-7BC)-----	7175-583-----	9/24*

Truk: Selected oblique and vertical shots showing damage to airfield on Eton and seaplane base on Dublo

V-----	24''	19,500'	B-840(26BS-H339-7BC)-----	7150-523-----	9/19*
		19,500'	C-833(26BS-H339-7BC)-----	7151-524-----	9/19*
		20,000'	D-832(26BS-H339-7BC)-----	7152-525-----	9/19*
		20,000'	E-993(26BS-H339-7BC)-----	7153-526-----	9/19*
		20,500'	A-873(98BS-H339-7BC)-----	7154-527-----	9/19*
		19,400'	B-876(98BS-H339-7BC)-----	7155-528-----	9/19*
V-----	12''	19,500'	A-025(26BS-H339-7BC)-----	7149-522-----	9/19*
O-----	12''	19,700'	C-362(98BS-H339-7BC)-----	7156-529-----	9/19*

MARCUS: Good complete vertical coverage of island

V-----	24''	18,500'	A-708-819BS-7BC-----	7158-21-----	9/24*
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NAURU: Selected distant oblique shots showing bomb damage to phosphate plant and airfields

O-----	7''	9,500'	B-295-396BS-M355-7BC-----	7178-272-----	9/22*
		8,500'	D-294-396BS-M355-7BC-----	7179-273-----	9/22*
		6,300'	A-607-820BS-M353-7BC-----	7181-275-----	9/20*
		7,500'	B-825-820BS-M353-7BC-----	7182-276-----	9/20*
O-----	6½''	9,500'	A-615-396BS-M355-7BC-----	7177-271-----	9/22*
		6,500'	051-820BS-M353-7BC-----	7180-274-----	9/20*

[28] MARSHALLS

Jaluit: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to government station on Emiddj

V-----	24''	19,000'	A-002(26BS-TM-SPEC-7BC)-----	7143-454-----	9/20*
		19,000'	B-947(26BS-TM-SPEC-7BC)-----	7144-455-----	9/20*
		19,000'	A-168(98BS-SP. MIS-7BC)-----	7145-456-----	9/20*
		19,000'	B951(98BS-SP. MIS-7BC)-----	7146-457-----	9/20*
		20,000'	A-673(431BS-SPEC-7BC)-----	7147-458-----	9/21*
V-----	20''	5,000'	MAG31 (VB-133)58-----	7188-464-----	10/4*
		5,000'	MAG31 (VB-133)59A-----	7189-465-----	10/5*
V-----	8¼''	3,000'	VM0155-76-----	7185-461-----	9/30*
O-----	8¼''	2,500'	VM0155-78-----	7186-462-----	10/4*
O-----	6½''	1,000'	MAG-57-----	7148-459-----	10/3*
		2,000'	VM0155-76-----	7184-460-----	9/30*
		1,500'	VM0155-78-----	7187-463-----	10/4*
		1,000'	MAG31-60-----	7190-466-----	10/5*
		1,000'	MAG31-59-----	7191-467-----	10/5*
		Var-----	MAG31-56-----	7194-468-----	9/30*
		1,000'	MAG31-61-----	7195-469-----	10/6*

Malaelap: Selected distant oblique shots showing bomb damage to airfield on Taroo.

O-----	6½''	1,500'	VMSB331-72-----	6981-415-----	9/27*
		1,400'	VM0155-75-----	6982-416-----	9/27*
		2,000'	VM0155-70-----	6983-417-----	9/27*
		1,500'	VM0155-77-----	7183-418-----	10/3*

Mille: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to airfield on Mille.

V-----	8¼''	2,000'	VM0155-69-----	6976-277-----	9/26*
O-----	6½''	2,000'	VM0155-73-----	6973-274-----	9/29*
		1,500'	VM0155-74-----	6974-275-----	9/29*
		1,500'	VM0155-68-----	6975-276-----	9/26*
		1,500'	VM0155-69-----	6977-278-----	9/26*

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and including 13 October 1944—Continued

MARSHALLS—Continued

Wotje: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to A/F on Wotje.

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
V-----	12'-----	16,800'-----	A-287(431BS-S. B.-7BC)-----	6980-483-----	9/24*
O-----	6½"-----	1,000'-----	MAG31-54-----	6978-481-----	9/27*
		1,000'-----	MAG31-55-----	6979-482-----	9/28*

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

(Important CINCPAC-CINCPAC translations of captured documents and POW interrogation reports issued during the past week).

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 75 (6 October 1944). Interrogation of an infantry private captured on GUAM. Principally concerned with POW's opinions about morale in JAPAN and methods of inducing surrender of Japanese troops. Sketch-map of barracks area in HAICHENG, near ANSHAN, MANCHURIA. 8 pp.

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 76 (7 October 1944). Interrogation of member of a Navy Construction Battalion, captured on SAIPAN. Brief information on training and functions of such units. Sketch-maps of FUJISAMA Naval Airfield near YOKOHAMA. 4 pp.

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 77 (7 October 1944). Interrogation of an infantry 1st lieutenant captured on SAIPAN. Detailed history of 9th Expeditionary Unit; brief order-of-battle information on other infantry units. Detailed opinions of POW on Japanese military morale. 8 pp.

Item #9589 (7 October 1944). Plan for Naval Air Arsenal Organization in the PHILIPPINES; including excerpt from Naval Air Hq Secret #17497, dated 20 December 1943. 8 pp.

Item #11,072 (7 October 1944). Air Strength of the 1st Air Fleet and status of supply of ordnance, fuel and vehicles, at such bases as YAP, AMBON, DAVAO, PALAU, MARIANAS, HAIMAHERRA, etc., as of May 1944. 11 pp.

Item #9384 (7 October 1944). Northern MARIANAS Group OpOrd A #10 & #14 (CHARAN KAMOA, 26 29 May 1944): giving T/O of Group Fortification Dept. 3 pp.

Item #9783 (7 October 1944). Extract resume of a Naval Air Technical Arsenal Secret Report on the Results of Research and Testing of the 1K1B Engine; dated August 1942. 10 pp.

Item #10,801 B (7 October 1944). Two tables giving data on Japanese aircraft and specifications and performance of experimental planes; undated. 3 pp.

Item #11,114 (7 October 1944). A list of Naval Air Groups and their locations; undated (presumably 1943). 3 pp.

Item #11,403 (7 October 1944). 1st Air Fleet (61st Air Flot): proposed schedule of transfer of Air Groups to the PHILIPPINES; undated. 5 pp.

Item #10,804 (7 October 1944). Japanese Navy Administrative Orders (for 1942, 1943, 1944) dealing with Naval Guard Units and Specially Established Guard Units. This publication is a compilation of all available Navy AdOrders regarding these two classes of KEIBITAI, extracted from NAIREI TEIYO, Vol. I, with corrections and deletions. 60 pp.

Item #10,390 (9 October 1944). A Sketch of harbor installations at HAKATA KOWAN; undated. 1 p.

Item #10,415 (9 October 1944). A Sketch of MOJI Port Facilities; undated. 3 pp.

Item #10,959 (9 October 1944). A brief description of the sinking of the HIYORI MARU on 17 May 1944; and a T/O of the 3rd Co, 28th Ind Car Inf Bn. 4 pp.

Item #11,112 (9 October 1944). Notes on Japanese shipping (minerals production in Japanese colonies, fuel, etc.) taken from a notebook; undated; fragmentary. 2 pp.

Item #11,405 (9 October 1944). Excerpts taken from the diary of a member of the Medical Admin Unit, Mt Arty Bn, 50th Inf Regt; TINIAN; entries: 23 February through 29 July 1944. 8 pp.

Item #9882 (10 October 1944). A very full name list of officers assigned to units under the command of the 31st Army; dated May 1944. 105 pp.

Item #9883 (10 October 1944). A file of shipping Hq Orders; dated March through May 1944; showing troop movements for that period. 27 pp.

Item #10,103 (10 October 1944). Sketches of airfields in JAPAN, taken from a notebook; dated variously 1934 to 1943. 12 pp.

Item #10,130 and #10,130 A (10 October 1944). North Pacific Weather Summary Maps and text—translation of a Japanese Hydrographic Office publication. 24 charts.

Item #10,188 (10 October 1944). Communications Net for ROTA; undated. 1 p.

Item #10,015 (11 October 1944). Hq, 14th Div: Reported on Conditions; dated 5 April 1944. 13 pp.

Item #10,090 A&B (11 October 1944). Two standing orders of the 523rd Naval Air Group (February & April 1944) giving the organization of the air group. 11 pp.

Item #9961 A (11 October 1944). A table of specifications for important Japanese planes; undated. 8 pp.

Item #9660 (11 October 1944). Reports on supplies, ordnance and personnel for Central Pacific forces; dated February through April 1944. 23 pp.

Item #10,452 A (11 October 1944). 13th Div OpOrd A #4, giving T/O's and ordnance issues for subordinate units. Dated 22 October 1943. 13 pp.

Item #11,823 (12 October 1944). Sketch map of KOROR, MALAKAL, and ARAKABESAN Islands, PALAU, showing location of supply depots. 1 p.

Item #9945 (12 October 1944). Naval Technical Research Laboratories report on tests with an underground sound detector, dated 10 June 1943. 15 pp.

Item #10,127 (12 October 1944). Naval Air Technical Arsenal report on the Model 10 Rocket Launcher for the Type 97#6 Land Bomb; dated February 1944. 15 pp.

Item #8635 (13 October 1944). Tables of symbols used by Japanese ordnance plants and ordnance depots. 4 pp.

Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 78 (13 October 1944). Interrogation of an artillery private captured on SAIPAN. Description of POW's reaction to surrender inducements. Information on food supply and rationing in JAPAN. Considerable new information on airfields and factories in vicinity of NAGOYA; sketch-maps. 16 pp.

ERRATA

In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. I, No. 14, article entitled "The Jap Naval Air Force, a Synopsis", second paragraph on page 21 should be corrected to read "It moved to the MARIANAS following our February, 1944 (not September) successes, and until May, etc."

CINCPAC-CINCPHA Item No. 10,987, pages 1 and 2, for "CV RYŪJŌ" read "CVL RYŪHŌ" (entry for 27 March 1944).

[29]

JAP ARMY HQ

(Note: The following article was prepared by the War Department. Much of the information is included in the new edition of TM 30-48.)

The Emperor.—The Japanese Constitution provides that the Emperor is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, that he determines their organization, and that he declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties. He is advised by two military councils, namely, the Board of Marshals and Admirals and the Supreme Military Council.

Imperial General Headquarters.—In wartime or in case of grave emergency an Imperial Headquarters is established under the supervision of the Emperor to assist in the exercise of supreme command. It consists of the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, the Ministers of War and of Navy and a staff of specially selected officers.

Army Heads (Corresponds to U. S. War Dept.).—Subordinate to the Emperor and Imperial Headquarters the direction of the Army is in the hands of four principal agencies. These are:

The General Staff (SAMBO HOMBU)

The Ministry of War

The Inspectorate General of Military Training

The Inspectorate General of Aviation

The General Staff.—The General Staff comprises five bureaus: General Affairs, Operations, Intelligence, Transport and Historical. It is charged with the preparation of war plans, the training and employment of combined arms, the direction of large maneuvers, the movement of troops, the compilation of field service regulations, maps and military histories, and with supervision of the General Staff College, Land Survey Department and probably the Fortress Headquarters. The Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the Emperor. The General Staff is organized as shown in Figure 2. Sources available to the War Department prior to 1941 indicated that the five Bureaus of the General Staff were further subdivided into numbered Sections. However, recent sources, such as the 1942 Army List and recent Transfer Lists do not confirm the numbering of the Sections. The Sections apparently are still in existence, but it is not known how many there are, nor are their functions known.

The Ministry of War.—The Ministry of War is the administrative, supply, and mobilization agency of the Army. Its chief, the Minister of War, is a member of the Cabinet and provides liaison between the Army and the Diet. He must be a general or lieutenant general on the active list and he is directly responsible to the Emperor. The Ministry of War is subdivided into the Secretariat and eight bureaus.

[30] *The Inspectorate General of Military Training.*—The Inspectorate General of Military Training consists of a general affairs bureau, a so-called 2nd Bureau (DAI NI BU), and several inspectorates, and is responsible for technical and tactical training of the separate arms, except the Air Corps, and of services not under the War Ministry.

The Inspectorate General of Aviation.—This agency was created by an ordinance issued 7 December 1938 to supervise Air Corps training. It comprises a General Affairs Department and a Training Department and is headed by a general or lieutenant general. In aviation training matters only is it directly responsible to the Emperor; in other respects, the Inspector General of Aviation is subordinate to the "Big Three" (Chief of General Staff, War Minister, and Inspector General of Military Training.) The Inspector General of Aviation may be said to rank with but after the "Big Three".

(Figures 1 and 2, appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 5, are tables of organization of the Japanese High Command and the Japanese Army General Staff Headquarters, respectively. These tables will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 52 and 53, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The Air Headquarters and the Army General Staff.

The relationship of the Army General Staff and the Air Headquarters has come to be very close. Nominally the Army Air Force Headquarters (RIKUGUN KOKU HOMBU), as the highest tactical command, comes far down the chain of subordination from the Army High Command and under the Inspector-General of Aviation rather than under the Chief of the Army General Staff. But during the TOJO regime one and the same general, Jun USHIROKU, occupied the posts of Vice-Chief of Staff, Inspector-General of Aviation, and Chief of the Air Headquarters. It is not clear, however, that so close a relationship, bringing tactical command of air operations directly into the office of the Vice-Chief of Staff, is to continue. In the shuffle of commands after TOJO's fall, General USHIROKI was relieved of his aviation posts. For the first time an Air Officer, Lt. Gen. Michio SUGAWARA, was placed in command of the Inspectorate-General of Aviation. He was made commander of Air Headquarters simultaneously, thus continuing the now customary combination of the posts. But he had not at any time been a General Staff Officer, and his appointment may mean the reversal of the trend away from Air Force autonomy which USHIROKU's position had climaxed.

Nominally, of course, the Inspectorate-General of Aviation is one of the [32] four agencies of the Army High Command, along with the War Ministry, the General Staff, and the Inspectorate-General of Military Education. Like the other three, it is responsible only to the Emperor.

The Supreme War Council and the Army General Staff.

The new Koiso cabinet has introduced a new element into the picture of the Japanese High Command in the formation of a Supreme Council for the Direction

of the War. Domei transmitted a rush bulletin 5 August announcing the Supreme Council (SAIKO SENSO SHIDO KAIGI) as follows:

"Having received Imperial Sanction, and in order to formulate a fundamental policy for directing war and in order to adjust the harmonization of the combined strategy of politics and war, a Supreme Council for the Direction of War has been hereby established."

More recently a 14 September broadcast ascribed more specific functions to the Council. It was created, according to the announcement, to "harmonize and adjust state affairs and the High Command." Its function is "to unify the administration and the strategy of carrying out the task of modern warfare, but also extends to deciding the basic policies of administration, foreign affairs, and economy." Broad as such powers seem, the procedure outlines for the Council seems to place it high enough to carry them out. "The procedure of the Council," the announcement went on, "is to hand down to the Cabinet supreme policies decided by the Council which * * * the Cabinet and the various Ministries will * * * put into force."

The new Council, then, becomes the supreme power in the Empire, relegating the Cabinet to the position of an administrative body. The announcement of 14 September in fact called it "a powerful combined strength of the Army and Navy * * * the fountainhead from which the measures to be enacted by the KOISO-YONAI joint cabinet will originate."

As the only source of information on the new Council is the official announcements of the Japanese, one must turn to inference for further explanation of its creation and function. Much light can be drawn from the composition of the Council. While no persons were named, the Japanese did announce its membership to include the War and Navy Ministers, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief of the Navy General Staff, and the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals.

The Council's membership, thus, represents a broadening of the basis from which Army and Navy influence upon JAPAN's war decisions can be drawn. It is to be observed that the Council's members are the members of the Imperial General Headquarters, plus senior officers of Army and Navy. The Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals already exists as a body, made up of elder statesmen in the two military branches, advisory to the Emperor on matters of military policy. To include them in the new Council is an obvious means of calling upon a wider circle of Army and Navy opinion and healing the rift so evident between Army and Navy [33] in the last months of TOJO's regime. Significantly, too, the Japanese have reverted to the practice of setting up a headless group in supreme place, combining in the new Supreme Council nearly all the reins of command over Cabinet and Armed Forces alike which TOJO had gathered into his own hands. Significantly, too, the same officers who ran JAPAN's war effort as the Imperial General Headquarters, still do so, as the nucleus of the Council.

The evidence is thus that the General Staff of the Army still functions behind the scenes as one of the chief ruling bodies of JAPAN. The new KOISO cabinet has brought it still closer, perhaps, to the Navy, but it has not changed its role and its influence.

5 CM GROUND-MOUNTED NAVAL GUN

Information concerning this weapon is incomplete in view of the fact that plans were missing when the weapon was captured. However, examination has revealed several points not covered in a preliminary report published in "Weekly Intelligence," Vol. I, No. 5.

This weapon is a naval gun adapted to a ground mount, apparently designed from a British piece. Principle data on the gun includes:

Overall weight: 500 lbs. (approx.)	Elevation: -11° to -21°
Length of tube: 4'8"	Traverse: None.
Recoil: 6'	

It is equipped with a box-type single trail with a lunette through which a stake is driven to prevent the gun from moving to the rear when fired. There are no spades. The trunnions are attached to the one-piece, cold-worked steel tube at the center of gravity and mounted on the extension of the trail directly above the axle.

The breech cannot be opened when the maximum elevation is approached because of interference of the trail.

The photo below shows the captured gun.

(The photograph referred to *supra*, being of a Japanese 5 CM Ground-Mounted Naval Gun, will be found reproduced as Item No. 54, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

JAPANESE TYPE 3 LAND MINE

A Japanese document captured in the MARIANAS presents an explanation of a new type land mine. This is the first data available to Allied forces. It is important to note that data on this mine is derived from an enemy document and is not yet verified by contact in combat. The mine, known as the Type 3 Land Mine, has no exposed parts made of metal, and its presence would be extremely difficult to detect by use of standard mine detecting equipment. The case is made of terra-cotta, is circular in shape and has an earthen collar. The outer surface is unglazed. The fuze body, cover, plunger and striker support are made of bakelite. The fuze seat is of hard rubber. The springs, pins and striker, all contained inside the fuze, are the only metal parts in the mine.

The mine is manufactured in two sizes. The larger mine is 27 cm (10½ in.) in diameter and 9 cm (3½ in.) thick. It contains approximately 3 kg. (6½ lbs.) of explosive and is assertedly effective against personnel at a radius of 10 meters (33 feet). The smaller mine is 22 cm (8½ inches) in diameter and 9 cm thick, contains 2 kg. (4½ lbs.) of high explosive and has an effective anti-personnel radius reported to be about 8 meters (26 feet). Both mines are considered to be effective against the tracks of a heavy tank. The bursting charges may be of any of the following composition: Ammonium nitrate (50%) TNT (50%); Ammonium nitrate (90%) Dinitro naphthalene (10%); Ammonium perchlorate (75%) Ferro-silicon (16%) Sawdust (6%) crude oil (3%).

The most interesting development in the new mine is the fuze. It may be detonated by pressure of pull after the safety pin has been removed, and, according to the document, will function satisfactorily even after being buried in the ground for long periods of time. A percussion hammer located within the fuze is held in position by a release fork to which a trip wire may be attached. When the wire is pulled, the fork releases the hammer which is forced downward by the percussion hammer spring. The hammer comes in contact with the striker forcing it against the percussion cap. When pressure is applied directly on the head of the fuze, the plunger spring is compressed, and the entire plunger group, moving as a unit, is forced downward. The hammer comes in contact with the head of the striker and again forces it against the percussion cap. A pressure of approximately 2 kg. (4½ lbs.) or a pull of about 10 kg. (22 lbs.) is stated to be required to cause detonation.

(The sketch referred to, *infra*, being of a section of a Type 3 Land Mine Fuze, will be found reproduced as Item No. 55, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The fuze is threaded so as to be interchangeable with the standard type 88 instantaneous impact and type 100 dual action artillery fuzes. By substituting it for one of the standard fuzes, any common mortar or howitzer shell may be converted into a very effective land mine or booby trap. It may also be inserted into a block of picric acid, TNT or other explosive and used similarly.

The mine's sensitivity to detonation by a normal fall is stated to be negligible. Dropped from a height of 0.5 meter (1½ feet) onto a concrete floor, the mine will assertedly not explode, and it can safely be dropped on ordinary ground from a height of 4 meters (13 feet).

Because of its color and unfinished surface, the mine may be easily camouflaged in almost any terrain. It is considered to be greatly superior to previously reported mines designed for the same purposes.

The preceding sketch and following photos are captured photographs showing details of this Type 3 Land Mine. Most of the information presented herein was derived from CINCPAC-CINCPHA Item No. 11,431 which will not be published in any other form.

(The photographs referred to *supra*, being two in number and having several items on each photograph, are as follows:

1. [a] Sketch of a Type 3 Land Mine; [b] photograph of Type 3 Land Mine and Fuze; [c] photograph showing packing of Type 3 Land Mine; and [d] photograph of fragments from Type 3 Land Mine.
2. [a] Photograph of Type 3 Land Mine with trip wires tied to sticks of wood; [b] photograph showing explosion of Type 3 Mine; and [c] photograph showing component parts of Type 3 Land Mine Fuze.

These photographs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 56 and 57, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear six separate items with several photographs on each item as follows:

1. Three views of a wrecked phosphate plant at Angaur.
2. [a] Photograph of small boat basin north of Angaur; [b] photograph of phosphate loading pier, Angaur; and [c] photograph of destroyed warehouses in Angaur.
3. [a] Photograph of a Jap 37 mm anti-tank gun in covered emplacement on Saipan; [b] photograph of Jap pillbox defending western side of Angaur; and [c] photograph of a personnel shelter.
4. [a] Photograph of a Jap 75 mm gun emplacement near Middle Village, Angaur; and [b] two views of a Jap 75 mm anti-aircraft gun at Angaur.
5. [a] Photograph showing manner in which Japanese at Angaur strung heavy rope between trees on the beach; and [b] two photographs showing two types of anti-boat obstacles encountered at Angaur.
6. [a] Photograph of remains of Jap lighthouse demolished by naval gunfire prior to U. S. landings at Angaur; and [b] photograph of an anti-tank trench along beach near a Saipan town.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

YAP

[43] Outflanked YAP, Jap island outpost between new U. S. bases at PELELIU and GUAM, was an important secondary target during landings in southern PALAU. YAP's military installations were extensively worked over by Allied surface units and aircraft, with results indicated in the photographs reproduced here.

In pre-war days, YAP—a compact group of four large and ten small islands, with a land area of only 83 square miles—was known chiefly as an important cable station and as the home of curiously primitive natives. YAP was linked by cable with PALAU, MENADO, the PHILIPPINES, and the Empire, as well as GUAM and the UNITED STATES. Anthropologists and ethnologists were intrigued by the natives, whose superstitions have persisted despite the efforts of missionaries.

Sensing impending U. S. moves in the CAROLINES, the Japs in early 1944, began an airfield on RULL Island. A prisoner claims the field was completed in April. According to this POW, elements of the 343rd, 523rd and 261st Air Groups were based here. Maximum A/C strength prior to our strikes was estimated by the prisoner as 40 bombers and 60 fighters, although photo reconnaissance never showed more than 45 planes.

Military installations on YAP include one airfield, three radio stations, radar and RDF installations, and a small seaplane base. These are protected by strong coast defense and AA gun positions as well as anti-invasion defenses. Beach defenses were strengthened recently and many new boat barriers constructed. It is difficult to assess the admitted heavy damage suffered by YAP; the airfield has however, definitely been neutralized.

The Jap garrison strength of YAP is estimated as about 8,000. Of this figure, 5000 are reported attached to the 49th Independent Mixed Brigade, 800 to the 46th Guard Force, plus 1200 air base personnel and about 1000 construction personnel. Women and children, said a POW, were evacuated to PALAU sometime ago.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear four photographs as follows:

1. Photograph of Yap town under attack by carrier planes.
2. Photograph showing burning aircraft at Yap's soggy airfield.
3. Photograph showing the bomb-scarred and shell-pocked retreatment area of Yap's airfield.
4. Photograph showing a marine rifleman leading the way for a General Sherman tank at Horseshoe Valley, Peleliu.

The foregoing paragraphs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 64, 65, 66, and 67, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Confidential
20 Oct. 1944

JAPANESE AERIAL TACTICS AGAINST SHIP TARGETS

"KNOW YOUR ENEMY!"

(Addendum to CinCPac-CinCPOA—"Weekly Intelligence" Vol 1, No. 15)

CONTENTS

	Page
Search and Reconnaissance-----	1
Tracking-----	8
Homing the Attack Unit-----	14
Illumination-----	17
The Attack-----	19

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a sketch caricaturing a Japanese aviator throwing a bomb by hand. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 68, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[1]

INTRODUCTORY

This study brings together an assortment of documentary evidence bearing on Japanese tactical doctrine for aerial operations against ship targets. No attempt has been made here to collate available information on other phases of Jap aerial warfare.

Although most of the material contained in this study is drawn from official Japanese documents, this has been supplemented by such unofficial documentary and POW information as appears to be logical and consistent.

It is important to note that the tactics outlined represent Japanese *theoretical* doctrine, and may not be followed in combat.

Exact evaluation of such tactical information is difficult, because: (1) battle experience postdating available evidence may have changed enemy concepts; (2) operating units in any given case may not rigidly adhere to official doctrine; (3) it is not clear whether some documents reflect the tactical thinking of a particular Air Group or that of the Naval Air Force.

One final word of caution must be added. Study of this article will quickly reveal that the enemy has given much thought to the problem of tracking fleet units and guiding the attack group into the position for a run. Fairly elaborate

tracking and liaison methods have been developed. These may well become outmoded and of scant importance as Jap airborne radar improves.

Despite the limitations indicated above, however, the material presented here is believed significant. It forms a fairly comprehensive background for the study of Jap tactics as well as a basis on which future tactics may be assessed.

SEARCH AND RECONNAISSANCE

The doctrine for the Southeast Area Fleet succinctly points out that the function of a *recce* unit is reconnaissance, and warns the unit to avoid combat if this would interfere with the primary mission.

The normal search radius for a medium bomber (BETTY) is 600-660 nautical miles, or, in the event of anticipated action, 700 miles. *Recce* seaplanes (JAKE) may be expected to search a radius of 250 to 300 nautical miles, and carrier attack planes (JILL) 350 nautical miles. Flying boats (EMILY) may fly a radius of 1000 to 1200 nautical miles.

A captured chart, reproduced as Figure 12, in the center spread of this addendum, sets forth a comprehensive search plan for TRUK, PALAU, WOLEAI, and SAIPAN. The date of the document is not given, but appears to refer to projected enemy searches in April (1944). All the sectors shown were not to be covered each day. Sectors to be flown were to be selected either by the day or according to a general plan. In some cases, it is known that the odd-numbered sectors were covered on even-numbered days, and vice-versa. Of course, if there was any indication of an Allied amphibious operation from a given direction, or if Allied ships or subs were sighted, searches were to be concentrated in this area.

[2] The following search plans, designed to meet particular tactical situations, have been taken from captured documents:

(A sketch relating to the "Patrol Search Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 1, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is designated as the "*patrol search method*", and is recommended for night searches.

Each plane flies in an angular figure eight, dropping a flare each time it crosses its base point. After a given patrol line has been covered the planes advance to a new patrol line in the direction of the enemy force.

(A sketch relating to the "Search Sector Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 2, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is designated the "*search sector method*". It is specified for use when the course of the enemy is not known and when it is necessary to carry out an abbreviated search with a small number of planes.

In this method target lights are dropped at the four corners of a square and the aircraft flies back and forth in parallel lines within the marked area.

(A sketch relating to the "Sweep Search Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 3, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is designated as the "*sweep search method*". This method is used on moonlit nights when the visibility is particularly good, or when the object of the search is a large force.

In this method a number of planes fly out from a common base and advance in parallel lines.

(A sketch referring to a "Night Search Method" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 4, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[3] This is a "*night search method*" for use by a radar-equipped plane.

The "a" on the diagram varies with the altitude. If radar conditions are favorable, it will be determined according to Table 1, (which follows the next

search plan). If radar conditions are unfavorable, the value for "a" will be decreased to correspond with the decreased efficiency of the radar.

(A sketch relating to a method used for "Night Search" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 5, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used for "*night search*" employing two planes equipped with radar. Distance "d" is set by the commander of the unit and is based on the degree of certainty of the general position of the enemy and the lapse of time between the time of the discovery of the enemy and the beginning of the search. The value for "a" is determined by the following table. The search is planned so that a rectangle with sides of 2 "d", which has as its center the presumed location of the enemy, will be thoroughly searched.

Altitude, meters..... feet.....		Over 1500 5000	750-1000 2500-3300	500-750 1650-2500	200-500 600-1650
A	Flying Boat.....	60 nautical miles..	45 nautical miles..	40 nautical miles..	30 nautical miles..
	Recece Seaplane..	40 nautical miles..	35 nautical miles..	30 nautical miles..	20 nautical miles..

Table No. 1

(Comment: This chart probably reflects a fairly realistic Japanese conception of the ranges of their own radar installed in EMILYs and JAKEs at the altitudes shown.)

(A sketch relating to "Search Plan for Use When the Distance Involved Is More Than 500 Miles" mentioned in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 6a, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[4] This is a "*search plan for use when the distance involved is more than 500 miles*". The various factors, such as distance of the sally "R", the deployment angle (c) (45 degrees in the absence of special orders), the intervals between search lines (b), the lateral distance to be covered (e) and the number of planes to be used, are determined in advance. The interval "b" is less than twice the range of visibility.

This method is used when the course of the enemy is not known or it is thought that it may intersect the search base line at a large angle.

(A sketch referring to the next succeeding paragraph, being a plan used when it is thought the angle of intersection of the course of the enemy and the search base line will be small, will be found reproduced as Figure No. 6b, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This plan is used when it is thought that the angle of intersection of the course of the enemy and the search base line will be small.

(A sketch showing a search plan "for daily patrol on long distances of over 500 miles" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 7a, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used principally "*for daily patrol on long distances of over 500 miles*". The interval "b" is less than twice the range of visibility. The lateral distance (1) will be $\frac{3}{10}$ of the total width of the search out made by planes turning in the same direction. The return angle (E) will be from 0 to 15 degrees depending on the anticipated angle of intersection between the course of the enemy and the base line of the search.

This plan is used when the number of planes available is large.

(A sketch showing a search plan for daily patrol on long distances of over 500 miles where the number of planes available is small will be found reproduced as Figure No. 7b, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[5] This method is used under the same circumstances as 7a where the number of planes available is small. The symbols have the same meaning here as in 7a.

(A sketch relating to a search method "when it is possible to predict the enemy's approximate course", mentioned in the next succeeding paragraph, will be found reproduced as Figure No. 8, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used "*when it is possible to predict the enemy's approximate course*" and when there is a small number of planes available.

(b) interval between the search lines will be less than four times the range of visibility.

(1) lateral distance will be one half of (b).

The search base line must be parallel to the expected course of the enemy.

(A sketch relating to a search method "when an attempt is made to search an area of broad frontage with a few planes" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 10a, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[6] This method is used "*when an attempt is made to search an area of broad frontage with a few planes*" or, when a rough estimate can be made of the general position, course, and speed of the enemy as in the case of enemy supply routes.

This plan is used when search is to be made in a direction opposite to that of the enemy's course.

Distances 1 and 1' are figured as follows:

$$1 = \frac{2dV_f}{V_f + V_e} \quad \begin{array}{l} V_f \text{ equals plane speed} \\ V_e \text{ equals speed of enemy} \\ d \text{ equals visibility} \end{array}$$

$$1' = 2d - \frac{(2L+1) V_e}{V_f}$$

No method for determining L is given.

(A sketch relating to a search plan "when a search is to be made in close pursuit of an enemy" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 10b, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This plan is used *when a search is to be made in close pursuit of an enemy*. The distances 1 and 1' are determined as follows:

$$1 = \frac{2dV_f}{V_f - V_e}$$

$$1' = 2d - \frac{(2L+L) V_e}{V_f}$$

Symbols have the same meaning as in 10a.

(A sketch relating to a search plan "for use of the night, or when visibility is poor" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11a, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[7] A plan *for use of night, or when visibility is poor*. Starting points are selected to the rear of the enemy. The base lines of the search should coincide with the expected course of the enemy.

L—length of search—no method for determining is given.

1—lateral distance—twice the range of visibility plus the length of the enemy force.

A—angle of change of course. Will the 20 degrees except where change indicated.

(A sketch showing an alternate plan of search for use at night or when visibility is poor will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11b, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

An alternate to 11a using three planes.

(A sketch showing still another alternate plan of search at night or when visibility is poor, using four planes, will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11c, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

An alternate to 11a using four planes.

Distance between starting points will be more than twice the lateral distance (1).

(A sketch showing a plan of search to be used on moonlight nights when the visibility is good will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11d, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[8] This plan is *to be used on moonlight nights when the visibility is good*. The symbols have the same meaning as in 11a. In this plan the base line may be at right angles to the enemy's course. This illustration shows the plan as it operates with three planes.

TRACKING

After a target has been located, it is followed by one or more planes until such time as the Japanese attack unit is in a position to attack.

Flying boats (EMILYs) and recce seaplanes (JAKES) are used in night tracking, (i. e., from about two hours after sunset until about an hour and a half before dawn). During the daytime less vulnerable planes are used.

According to one source, night tracking operations should be carried out at altitudes of 2500 to 5000 feet, while in the daytime, dependent largely on the visibility, higher altitudes are flown.

The following series of rather rough tracking plans are taken from a captured notebook, with the comments. These plans are designed for use at night.

(A sketch showing an elliptical maneuver in tracking the enemy will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Elliptical maneuver. To be used during good visibility when the pilot can track the enemy while keeping him in sight by contact flying.

In this maneuver the pilot flies "d" distance away from the target, which is said to be about 8200 feet.

(A sketch showing a maneuver used to track more than one ship will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[9] This is a maneuver *used to track more than one ship*, and "d" again represents the limit of visibility (about 8200 feet), while the distance fore and aft from the target is 3300 feet. This short distance is flown in order to make a close reconnaissance of the target.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver used for the purpose of making a close reconnaissance on one ship will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is used for the purpose of *making a close reconnaissance on one ship*. Three sides of the box are flown at the limit of visibility, while the fourth side is flown at 3300 feet.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the wind is of high velocity will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is flown at approximately right angles to the course of the ship at times *when the wind is of high velocity*. The probable purpose is to keep the plane in sight of the target without running quickly down wind and then being forced to buck back against it.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the wind velocity is

small will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is likewise flown at right angles to the course of the enemy. It is stated to be effective for use *when the wind velocity is small.*

(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a chart of Japanese air searches out of Truk, Woleai, Palau and Saipan. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 71, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(A sketch referring to a tracking maneuver when the enemy force is great and there is no danger of losing it will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[12] This figure eight should be flown only *when the enemy force is great and there is no danger of losing it* if the plane temporarily loses contact.

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the target can be kept against the moon will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This maneuver is to be flown *when the target can be kept against the moon.*

The following tracking plans, all but one of which contemplate the use of radar, were taken from an operation order of the 11th Recce Unit.

(A sketch showing a flying boat tracking method designed for night work will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This is a *flying boat method designed for night work.* As indicated in the diagram, the plane flies out of radar range on each leg. The altitude should be as high as possible. The plane employs a lateral beam. (This probably refers to the beam created by the radar antenna mounted on the side of the fuselage, which has been found in some Jap planes.)

(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver designed for seaplanes will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[13] This is the same basic method as the one previously shown but is designed for *recce seaplanes.* Forty-five rather than seventy degree turns are employed.

(A sketch showing a tracking method designed for use where there is interference by enemy fighter planes will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is designed for use where there is interference by enemy fighter planes. It may take any pattern and simply consists of getting a radar contact, flying out of radar range and returning from a different direction until another radar contact is obtained.

(A sketch showing a tracking method to be used after the target is located by radar will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 6, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This method is used after the target is located by radar. It is used by flying boats and recce planes. It is designed for two planes. (Apparently one plane describes a rectangle ahead of the target and another in back of the target.)

(A sketch showing a tracing method without the use of radar will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 7, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[14] This is a method for tracking without the use of radar. It employs target markers.

HOMING THE ATTACK UNIT

Action reports from the early days of the war report the activities of Japanese snoopers planes. Their function is not only to locate and track the target, but to get the attack unit over the target in a position for an attack. In some cases the guide plane may be simply a bellwether, equipped with superior communications and navigational equipment and manned by competent personnel. More frequently, however, the guide plane is the snooper, i. e.; a plane in actual contact with the target.

It is clear from documents that the attack unit, or a relief tracking plane, may be brought in on the radar of the snooper or by the use of RDF equipment. The tracking plane is advised to keep the radar and communication transmission at a minimum during the tracking operation. However, when the time coming in for the attack. A sudden increase in communications, or the commencement of the transmission of RDF, is a reasonable indication that an attack group or a relief plane is being homed in to the target. The following table, which was an annex to an official order (source and date unknown), gives the communication between the attack unit and the tracking plane. The general authenticity of the pattern set forth is corroborated by fragmentary references found in other documents.

(Note: Those marked * to be used only when necessary)

Attack Unit	Tracking Unit	Notes
Expected time of arrival over battle area.	Discovery of enemy: Strength, positions, base course, speed.	For dive bombing report accurately the wind direction and velocity at 1600 feet. For low altitude bombing (TN: below 3300 feet) report the wind direction and velocity at 650 feet.
Direction of approach.	[15] Weather in enemy area. Standard altitude for tracking position.	Direction of approach. Direction of approach is that of course at time of approach. Unless under special order, direction of approach is from direction of moon or of twilight.
*Method of Attack Method No.		Method of Attack. (1) Unilluminated torpedo attack. (2) Illuminated torpedo attack. (3) Unilluminated dive bombing. (4) Illuminated dive bombing. (5) Unilluminated low altitude bombing. (6) Illuminated low altitude bombing.
Commerce transmitting RDF guide Beam! (MUSEN YUDO).	We are transmitting RDF guide beam.	Unless under special order, commence transmitting RDF guide beam 45 minutes before attack unit reaches battle area.
*Drop parachute flares!	We are dropping parachute flares.	'The RDF guide beam plane, ten minutes before attack unit reaches battle area, will put out Aldis signalling light in direction of attack unit and will attempt to guide it. "Drop parachute flares!" Each time one white flare is dropped over the enemy. Continue to "drop parachute flares!" Flares are dropped at about two minute intervals.
(Continue to drop parachute flares!)		About three course target lights, (KHOHMOKU HYOTEI) or flare landing lights (SHOMEI TODAN CHAKUSUI SHOMEITEI) are dropped near the enemy. They are dropped ahead with regard to the speed of the enemy. On this occasion, if the situation warrants it, low altitude bombing (TN: below 3300 feet) may be carried out.
*We recognize the tracking unit's parachute flares.	Enemy speed.	Reported without fail if it is to be a torpedo attack.
[16] *Indicate enemy position!	Report of enemy course.	If the situation warrants it, pyrotechnics may be used as well as radio.
		Parachute flares GREEN: Enemy changing course to starboard.
		GREEN-GREEN: Enemy changing course sharply to starboard.
		RED: Enemy changing course to port.
		RED-RED: Enemy changing course sharply to port.
*Commence illumination!		Parachute flares, Model 2, dropped so as to form a continuous illuminated background.
Peel off!		In the event that the attack unit is to illuminate by itself, if necessary, it will maintain constant illumination (HOSOKU SHOMEI WO NASU).

A captured notebook states that the RDF should be transmitted thirty minutes before the estimated time of arrival of the attack unit.

When the RDF system of homing is used, it is apparently intended that the tracking plane shall guide the attack unit over the target and not to the guide plane. In two separate sources, diagrams illustrating the method of guiding the attack unit in seem to emphasize this point. One of the diagrams is as follows:

(The diagram referred to in the foregoing paragraph illustrating a method of guiding an attack unit in will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[17] (Comment: If this scheme is followed, the target, by intercepting the RDF signal, should be able to determine the line upon which the attack unit is approaching.)

The tracking plane is instructed to fly at a low altitude while transmitting RDF and it is stated that where the distances are short and the altitudes high there is likely to be great inaccuracy in the directions indicated. It is further stated that the method is practically useless at altitudes of greater than 6500 feet.

ILLUMINATION

Japanese doctrine states that targets should be illuminated only when there is not sufficient natural light. The following table gives the periods when it is considered that illumination should be used.

Moon Age	Visibility	Illumination
10-20 days.....	Visibility good but with some mist and cirrus clouds.....	No.
5-10.....	} Visibility good but with light mist.....	No.
20-25.....		
1-5.....	} Regardless.....	Yes.
26-28.....		

(Comment: Despite the above, it is noted that throughout discussions of illuminated attack, continual reference is made to the method of approach in which there is an assumption of some moonlight.)

Approaches should always be made so that the target is between the attack unit and the moon. (This piece of advice constantly recurs in documents.) The attack should be timed to take advantage of the greater visibility of the target when the moon is above 10 degrees and below 50 degrees above the horizon. It is more difficult to see the target when the moon is high.

[18] The actual illumination of the target may be accomplished by the tracking plane or by a couple of planes from the attack unit especially designated for the job. In either event, the technique is the same. When the attack unit is 20 nautical miles from the target, the tracking plane drops course lights in the rear of the target. As soon as the attack unit is able to see the course lights, it maneuvers to approach from the proper position with respect to the moon. When in proper position, the attack unit gives the signal for the illumination at which time para-flares are dropped on the side of the target away from the attack unit. One prisoner of war has stated that the flares are dropped to form a Vee, with the point indicating the direction from which the attack should be made, and it is noted that the following illustration seems to confirm that statement.

(A sketch referring to the foregoing paragraph and showing a method of dropping flares to form a Vee, will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 8, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

One source claims that planes of the attack unit are supposed to drop flares at intervals of five to seven minutes when they are within 50 nautical miles of the target. This is so basically unsound from a tactical stand-point that the Japanese would probably do so only if the other methods of homing were proving completely inadequate.

Some sources indicate, as does the communication table in Section III, that flares should be dropped directly over the target. This, it is thought, would be

done when it was otherwise difficult to inform the attack unit of the position of the target prior to the actual illumination.

After each plane has made its run or dive it is directed to drop a flare in order to illuminate the target for the succeeding planes of the attack unit.

[19]

THE ATTACK

The Japanese have long recognized the value of a coordinated attack by dive bombers, torpedo bombers and horizontal bombers. In the early days of the war there are examples of such attacks. More recent action reports are more difficult to analyze because they do not show any very clear pattern; this may be due to the relative efficiency of the pilots and to the fact that, in the face of the modern task force, what started out to be well-planned attacks simply break up in the face of the opposition encountered.

In any event, the coordinated attack is planned for the particular occasion and may employ the various aircraft in an almost infinite variety of patterns. Other than statements generally recognizing the value of such an attack, no statements of doctrine relative to the coordinated attack have been found. Hence these notes are concerned largely with dive, glide and torpedo tactics which have been given some attention in documents recovered.

A. DIVE BOMBING

Dive bombers should approach to within 50 nautical miles of the target in normal flight formation. Aircraft should be in close formation in order to maintain their defensive firepower and at the same time simplify communications and receive more effective support from the fighter escort.

Two examples of a normal flight formation are as follows:

(Two examples of a normal dive bomber flight formation, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[20] At about fifty nautical miles from the target, a screening formation is taken. (Some documents omit this intermediate step.) A diagram of the screening formation is as follows:

(The diagram referred to in the foregoing paragraph showing a screening formation at about 50 nautical miles from the target will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

A high altitude approach is favored if visibility and cloud conditions permit. Approach altitudes of from 13,000 to 33,000 feet are given in various documents, with approaches at 16,000 to 20,000 feet being favored. Observation from the field tends to confirm the later altitudes as reasonably standard.

For night approaches, the following altitudes are given. Full moon (10 to 20 days old) fine weather and good visibility: 10,000 to 13,000 feet. With full moon, light clouds and good visibility, or with full moon, fine weather and a certain amount of mist in the air: 6,500 to 10,000 feet. With new moon (5-10 or 20-25 days) fine weather, and good visibility: 8,000 to 11,500 feet. With new moon, fine weather and misty air: 5,000 to 8,000 feet. It is said that while the above is standard, the succeeding planes may come in at higher altitudes by being stepped up.

At a distance of from 33,000 to 65,000 feet from the target, the attack formation is taken. It consists generally of a column, or, where the attack is to be made from two or more directions, two or more columns. An altitude of 13,000 feet is preferred at this time and is maintained until the order for attack is given, at which time the formation flies to an altitude of about 6,500 feet at an air speed of more than 140 knots.

The planes push over and dive at 60° to an altitude of 1600 to 1800 feet, at which altitude bombs are released. The No. 1 plane peels off first, followed at short intervals by the succeeding planes. It is stated that a smoothly coordinated attack by 36 planes can be accomplished in three minutes, and some reports of attacks in the early days of the war indicate that this is a reasonable estimate.

[21] Normally, the approach is made directly to the target, but it is recommended that:

- a. When the sun is high, fly out of it;
- b. At dawn and dusk, fly out of the dark;
- c. Fly against the blue of the sky rather than the white of the clouds;
- d. Make use of scattered clouds.

When the wind is negligible (below 50 feet per second), it is recommended that the dive be from the bow or stern. If the wind is greater than 50 feet per second, the dive should be made with the wind at the tail of the plane.

There seems to be no particular preference with respect to dives from the bow or stern, although a majority of the diagrams show the dives as being made bow to stern.

The "multiple formation" attack in which different elements come in from different directions is stressed in documents. A typical sketch is as follows:

(The sketch referred to in the foregoing paragraph showing "multiple formation" attack in which different elements come in from different directions, will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Other similar diagrams show the second and third sections attacking at angles of 20° on the bow. Where there are only two sections, the bow to stern dive from dead ahead is omitted.

The preferred evasive tactic is a high speed, low altitude retirement along a predetermined course.

The No. 1 plane performs an important function in that it indicates the target, its course and speed; the wind direction and speed; the point of aim; bomb release altitude; direction of retirement; and rendezvous point. The planes following No. 1 observe its bomb drops and correct on them.

It is estimated that to make five or six direct hits 18 planes are required, of which eight will be shot down.

[22]

B. GLIDE BOMBING

The general doctrine applicable to dive bombing is applicable to glide bombing. Glide bombing is prescribed when, because of visibility, sufficient altitude cannot be gained for dive bombing. It seems to be standard for night attacks.

The push-over into the glide is at 3300 feet. The angle of the glide is 40° to 45°. The bombs are released at 1000 feet during the day and at 1300 feet at night.

C. TORPEDO ATTACKS

There is relatively little documentary evidence on Jap torpedo doctrine. Information available indicates that the approach formations are very similar to those employed in dive bombing.

Standard approach altitude is stated to be 6500 to 10,000 feet. Observations in recent encounters indicate that when within radar range an altitude of 160 feet or less is used. One prisoner of war stated that the approach until near the formation was at 3300 to 5000 feet after which the planes dropped to about 160 feet.

When the attack has started, the aircraft fly in a loose string, although in the face of heavy AA they may come in line abreast on a broad front. Diagrams of torpedo attacks follow:

(The diagrams of torpedo attacks mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No. 73. and Sketch No. 9, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[23] There are documentary references to an individual method of approach, in which the torpedo plane approaches on a course parallel to that of the target and then turns in toward the target for the drop.

One source states that the torpedo should be dropped from altitudes of 160 feet at an air speed of 160 knots; according to other sources, from 330 feet at an air speed of 140 to 160 knots. Reports indicate that torpedoes have been released at altitudes varying from 50 to 500 feet.

The release point is uniformly stated to be 2600 to 4000 feet depending on the course of the target. (Horizontal distance.)

(A sketch showing three release points with respect to the target will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 6, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 6

(Exhibit No. 6 consists of ONI Document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines", being a compilation of photographs and descriptive data relating to Japanese submarines. This document will be found reproduced, in its entirety, as Items Nos. 74 through 104, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 7

Exhibit No. 7 is a Berthing Plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 105, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 8

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Drafter.....	Extension Number.....	Addressees	Precedence
From: COM 14. Released by..... Date: 26 November 1941. TOR Coderoom.....		Asterisk (*) mailgram addressed: For action: OPNAV.	Priority P Routine Deferred
Decoded by A. V. PERING. Paraphrased by..... Routed by.....		Information: CINCPAC. CINCAF. COM 16.	Priority Routine Deferred

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

If Operational
Check below
☐

260116

Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT

On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text.

COPEK

For past month Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units:

Second Fleet, Third Fleet including First and Second Base Forces and First Defense Division, combined Air Force, Desron three, Airron seven, Subron Five and possible units of Batdiv Three from First Fleet.

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indo China force have appeared as well as the Naval Station at Sama, Bako and Takao.

Third Base Force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with Second Fleet Commander.

Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.

Second Base Force appears transporting equipment of Air Forces to Taiwan. Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and submarine division or squadron.

Crudid Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be en route South China.

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airron Twenty-four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet.

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Drafter -----	Extension Number 2027	Addressees	Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by ----- Date: 26 November 1941. TOR Coderoom -----		Asterisk (*) mailgram address: For action: CINCPAC. OPNAV. COMFOURTEEN. CINCAF	Priority Routine Deferred.
Decoded: P. R. WHITE. Paraphrased by ----- Routed by -----		Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

If operational
check below
☐

261331
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT
On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text

Morning comment ComFourteen Two One Ten of Twentysixth X Traffic analysis past few days indicate Cinc Second directing units of First Second Third Fleets and Subforce in a Loose knit Task Force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X For purposes of clarity units expected to operate in South China area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as Second Section X Estimated units in First Section are Crudiv Seven X Airron Six Defense Division One X Desron Three and Subron Six XX Second Section Crudiv Five X Cardiv Three Ryujo and One Maru X Desrons Two and Four X Subron Five X Desdiv Twentythree X First Base Force of Third Fleet X Third Base Force at Palao X Fifth Base Force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv Six and Batdiv Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance Third Fleet units In doubt but may be Assumed that these vessels including Desron Five will take station in Formosa Straits or further South X There are slight indications today that Desron Three Crudiv Seven and Subron Six are in Takao area X Combined Air Force units from Empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China Coast X Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X Our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sase-Bo-Kure area X Our lists indicate Cinv combined in Nagato X Cinc First in Hyuga and Cinc Second in Atago in Kure area X Cinc Third in Ashigara in Sase-Bo area X Cinc Fifth in Chichijima area X Comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China Fleet appears to have been Strengthened by units from Central or North China probably torpedo boats XX Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being reinforced by one Base Force Unit XX Directives to the above Task Forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations X Cinc Second X Third and Cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X Traffic from Nav minister and Cnrgs to Cincs of Fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered Reliable.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Drafter Extension Number Br. 3598	Addressees	Message precedence
From: OPNAV. Released by T. S. Wilkinson. Date: November 24, 1941.	For Action. CINCAF.	Priority Routine X Deferred
TOR Coderoom ----- Decoded by ----- Paraphrased by -----	Information. COM16. ALUSNA, CHUNKING. ASTALUSNA, SHANG- HAI. ALUSNA, TOKYO. CINCPAC.	Priority Routine X Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

2402239CR0465

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addressees are often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature X since com 16 intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to com 16 for action OpNav for information X after combined all incoming reports com 16 direct dispatches to OpNav info CincPac based on all information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity X request CincPac issue directive as necessary to fulfill original objective.

Make original only deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76(4) av. Regs.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 9

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, December 1, 1941.

Confidential

Copy No. 33
Serial No. 25

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publication due to its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which some of the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

/s/ T. S. WILKINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

[1] *Confidential*

Serial No. 25
December 1, 1941

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATION

A. *The Diplomatic Situation*1. *Japan.*

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the

work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticizing Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese attack against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.

2. Germany.

Members of the German Armament Commission in Casablanca are now authorized to wear uniforms and make arrests. General Schultheiss of the Air Force, Head of the Commission, is reported to favor a German military occupation of Morocco.

There is evidence that Germany, now virtually in control of the governments of Spain and Portugal, has impressed upon these governments the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with the United States and with Britain. It is Germany's expectation that such a policy will increase the resources of these two countries with materials which evidently can be turned against those who have supplied them.

Turkey still is being subjected to diplomatic pressure to join the Axis or "take the consequence." Germany's representations have had no apparent effect.

According to a press report from Berlin, seven more nations have signed the anti-comintern pact. The new signatories are Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government in China. This pact should not be confused with the Tri-Power Accord of which Germany, Japan and Italy were the original signatories and to which Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia subsequently adhered.

[2] 3. Italy.

The repurchase of war materiel sold to Italy by the French is now the subject of conversations being held by a French delegation which arrived recently in Rome. These conversations were initiated by Italy and were based on Italy's urgent need for foreign exchange. These negotiations are not expected to meet with particular success.

The visit of the German Minister of Economics (Dr. Funk) to Rome on October apparently was motivated by the serious concern felt by Germany over the steady climb in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Dr. Funk threatened to raise the price of coal shipments to Italy, but it was agreed finally that Italy would not raise prices, and that Germany would increase the yearly exports of coal to Italy from the twelve million tons previously agreed upon to eighteen million tons. Previous shipments of coal from Germany barely reached two-thirds of the Italian national requirements. This was demonstrated by the recent laws restricting heating this winter.

4. France.

France moved a step closer to the "new order" in Europe on November 18 when Marshal Petain, under continued pressure from Berlin and the pro-collaborationist elements within the Vichy government, announced the "retirement" of General Maxime Weygand as delegate-general and military commander of French North Africa. That strategic area henceforth is to be administered from Vichy under the direct control of Vice Premier Darlan. Lieutenant General Alfonse Juin, until June of this year a prisoner of war of Germany and later commander of French troops in Morocco, succeeds Weygand as military commander in North Africa. The military command of French West Africa goes to General Jean Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Vice Admiral Fenard was named permanent Secretary General of French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the new Governor General of Algeria. Additional concessions to the Germans may be announced following the meeting of Petain and Darlan with Reichmarshal Goering which is scheduled for the near future. There are indications that this meeting may be followed by a conference with Adolph Hitler, with the possible attendance of Premier Mussolini.

[3] The Reich is said to be attempting to persuade Vichy to provide naval convoys for Italian supply vessels and to have requested that French Army divisions replace Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany, meanwhile, is reported to have cut the occupation cost levied against France from \$8,000,000 to \$6,000,000 a day, retroactive to May 10, 1941.

France's concern over the situation in Africa is manifested by the sudden departure from Vichy of Admiral Platon (Minister of Colonies), General Bergeret (Air Secretary) and Admiral Auphan (Chief of the Naval General Staff) to inspect the defenses of North and West Africa. During the absence of Platon and Bergeret, Admiral Darlan will act as interim Secretary of Colonies and Air

Additional powers have been granted Darlan by placing under his National Defense Ministry all services under the Franco-German armistice formerly administered by the War and Foreign Ministries.

Following the dismissal of General Weygand, the United States Department of State announced that trade with North Africa would be suspended and that Franco-American relations were to be studied in the light of the new developments. At the same time American lend-lease aid was extended to the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle.

On November 26, General Catroux (Free French Commander in Syria) proclaimed the independence of Lebanon and the termination of the mandate in the name of France. The new government will be headed by President Alfred Macache.

France is understood to have protested to the Japanese government over the size of the mission, numbering 350 political and economic experts, accompanying Kenkichi Yoshizawa, new Japanese Ambassador to French Indo-China.

Despite rumors of capitulation, the situation in French Somaliland remains unchanged. The Paris radio announced on November 21 that the colony could not hold out longer than four to six weeks under the continued British blockade.

[4] 5. *Latin America.*

Mexico.

President Roosevelt has nominated the present Ambassador to Cuba, George S. Messersmith, to succeed Josephus Daniels as Ambassador to Mexico. The new British Ambassador to Mexico, Charles Bateman, is expected to arrive in mid-December, which is about the same time that Messersmith probably will take up his new duties.

The State Department announced an agreement has been reached with Mexico providing: (1) The settling of a final fair price for American properties taken over in 1933, through experts or through further diplomatic negotiations. Mexico tendered \$9,000,000 in advance as a token payment. (2) General and agrarian claims comprised, Mexico to pay \$40,000,000 in full settlement. Mexico has already paid \$3,000,000 on these claims and will pay \$3,000,000 upon exchange of ratifications of the conventions covering them. The remaining \$34,000,000 is payable at the rate of \$2,500,000 annually. (3) A reciprocal trade agreement to be negotiated at once. (4) The United States will provide a \$40,000,000 stabilization fund to maintain the peso at its present rate. (5) The United States will purchase up to 6,000,000 ounces of newly-mined Mexican silver monthly.

The Export-Import Bank has established a \$30,000,000 credit for the development of roads and highways. The credit will be available in yearly increments up to \$10,000,000 over a three-year period. The Mexican Government guarantees payment unconditionally; and additional security is provided, in the form of highway bonds, payable from the Federal gasoline tax.

Costa Rica.

President Calderon has repeated his offer of landing fields, air and naval bases to the United States, as free measures of hemispheric defense.

El Salvador.

Pro-Axis Chief of Police Colonel Merino has been replaced by pro-Ally Colonel Monterrosa.

[5] *Panama.*

Little progress is noted in the new government of Panama towards consolidation of its gains. The second designate to the presidency is named Minister to Washington; the third designate, Anibal Rios, is in Colombia, and will be arrested if he returns to Panama, where a number of his supporters have been jailed. Key positions still are occupied by Ariaristas, although there is a cordial disposition to cooperate with the United States. The extreme nationalistic laws passed by Arias are not repealed, but already their application is lapsing. The government is unlikely to do anything that will frighten off U. S. tourist or business dollars.

Argentina.

There are many indications that a secret understanding as to the joint defense of the Straits of Magellan has been established between Argentina and Chile. The recent death of the President of Chile probably will reopen discussions on defense in that area. There have been expressions of annoyance on the part of high Argentine officials over staff discussions between the United States and countries adjacent to the Argentine, and over the U. S. lend-lease aid promised to Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. The view is held that the Argentine is an interested party to all such discussions and dispositions.

A new political party, of Fascist character, called *Patria* has been launched in Buenos Aires by the pro-Axis Manuel Frisco. Observers note a new student's party, or "Young Argentine" party, in process of formation. It is a coalition of radical nationalist groups.

German influence in the Argentine is very low, the Russian war having alienated many former supporters. There is demand for a more vigorous attitude toward the Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo, and an intensification of the Baborda Committee activities may be expected.

While there are no immediate signs of trouble in the Argentine, the next few weeks will be critical. The conscripts are finishing their military service and returning home. Justo, always a dubious factor in [6] politics, seems firmly in control of the Army. In the Senate, the nationalists and the Democratic factions have reached an impasse. A coalition of nationalist—or totalitarian—factions, under a strong leader probably would mean the overthrow of the present government.

Brazil.

During the period under review there have been some alarming reports from various sources in Brazil, forecasting trouble between Vargas and the explosive elements in his government. To date, however, nothing serious has occurred. Brazil is meeting, with some hesitation, her commitments in hemisphere defense, and cooperating in the movement of U. S. troops to *Surinam* by sending a military mission to Paramaribo, and strengthening her border forces in that area. Currently, General Goes is denouncing U. S. aims as imperialistic in South America, and his good faith in staff discussions should be accepted with grave reservations.

Chile.

The sudden death of President Aguirre Gorda, from a bronchial affection, has caused considerable unrest in Chile, and responsive uneasiness in that country's neighbors. Don Tinto, as he was affectionately called, because of the red wine for which his vineyards were famous, headed the only popular front government, but was generally regarded as a friend to Democracy. He has preserved for some years an uneasy equilibrium between highly antagonistic and immoderate factions. His successor pro tempore is a noted conciliator. Most observers believe that the government will remain stable during the sixty-day period before the election of a new President.

Colombia.

The Colombian Senate has rejected the U. S. Black List of Axis firms in the Western Hemisphere, on the grounds that, in a matter of such mutual interest to the American Republics, all their governments should have been consulted.

The Colombian press condemns articles on the country by Benjamin Welles and John Gunther, terming them "Ambassadors of Ill-Will." It is not realized [7] in the United States to what a high degree the Latin-American press is sensitive to criticism of national custom and usage. The sum total of U. S. literary comment on the Latin Americas is undoubtedly harmful to Pan American accord.

Bolivia.

A U. S. Army Air Mission has been established in *La Paz*.

Ecuador.

The notorious and able Dr. Kuhne, suspected Nazi-agent in Quito, has been banished to a small town on the Ecuador-Colombian border, because of attention focused on him by the writer John G. Gunther.

Peru.

Early in the period observers in Peru reported widespread popular resentment over Peru's failure to receive certain airplanes and material, embargoed by the U. S. Department of State pending settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Concessions have been made in the procurement of non-combatant types, and the excitement is subsiding. Affairs on the border are quiescent.

In Lima, the Aprista Party announce the possibility of the resignation of President Prado, because of popular dissatisfaction with the border situation. General Ureta, the hero of the Ecuadorean war, is a strong Presidential possibility, but he is said to have no desire to gain the office by unconstitutional means. Ureta is pro-U. S. and anti-Axis.

General.

The ABC countries at large are showing signs of disillusionment and exhausted patience in the matter of lend-lease material. Much has been promised; almost literally nothing has been sent. Some deliveries, even token deliveries, would have a happy effect at this time.

[8] *Trends.**Military and Naval.*

Mexico.—The naval budget for 1942 has been set at 35,000,000 pesos, or about \$8,000,000. This is twice the 1941 budget.

South America.—Nothing to add to summary of November 15.

Economic.

The period under review has been characterized by numerous complaints in the press of the American Republics, and in reports from various local sources, over the growing dearth of materials essential to the support of industries. Deprived of European export markets, the American Republics look to the United States for a variety of heavy materials, neither produced nor manufactured south of the Rio Grande. Immediate obstacles are: The matter of priorities, and the availability of shipping. Here, as in the lend-lease military and naval material, the patience of the Latin-Americans is about exhausted, and their confidence in U. S. good faith is deteriorating. Few Latin Americans appreciate the magnitude now of the demands upon U. S. industry. Aids to Britain, to Russia, and to China, and confusion in U. S. production, are widely advertised. Opponents to U. S. and to Pan American policies are alert to take advantage of current circumstances. As a measure for the future, no less than for immediate benefit, the allotment to Latin American trade of certain priorities, however limited, and of shipping, appears urgently desirable.

[9] *B. The Japanese Military Situation*

Japanese troops, supplies and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continues. Japanese army strength now in Indo-China is believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking province, and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China.

Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. It is estimated that there are about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

D. The Chinese Military Situation

The Chinese are concentrating troops to defend the Burma Road. In position, or moving up for this duty, are about 185,000 men, including China's only mechanized units. Skirmishing was reported during the period in north Honan, south Hopei, Shantung, south Anhwei, near Shanghai and near Canton.

[10] *E. The German Military, Naval and Air Situations.**1. Military**Strength.*

It has been estimated that Germany now may have 300 divisions. Of these, 28 divisions are unidentified. Of the identified divisions 72 are probably unfitted and not yet ready for field duty. This would leave 200 divisions ready for active service at the present time.

Distribution

The 272 identified divisions are distributed as follows:

<i>Location</i>	<i>Number of Divisions</i>	
Russian Front	Total 168	(including 20
Northern Group	31	motorized, 19
Central Group	86	armored, 2
Southern Group	51	cavalry, and 2
		mountain divs.)
Italy and Libya	3	(including 2 armored)
Balkans and Hungary	14	(including 1 mountain)
Poland and East Prussia	10	
Finland	7	(including 1 motorized
		and 3 mountain)
Germany and Austria	33	
Holland, Belgium and France	27	
Norway	8	
Denmark	2	

Operations

(NOTE: Eastern Front only; see ITALY for Libyan Campaign.)

[11] Following the freezing of the ground, German offensive operations have been resumed.

Finnish sector.—There is evidence of renewed pressure towards Murmansk, Kandalaksha and the White Sea. None of these objectives has been reached to date. The situation along the Svir River and in the southern Karelian front remains unchanged. There has been a resumption of artillery action at Hangoe.

North-Central Sector.—The siege of Leningrad continues with no apparent change in the situation. The Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active against the Finnish right flank on the Isthmus and against the German left flank engaged in the siege of Leningrad.

Russian counter-attacks have prevented German forces at Tichvin, just east of the Volkhov River, from effecting a junction with Finnish-German units in the Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to Leningrad via Lake Ladoga still open.

The Russians claim to have carried out counter-attacks in the vicinity of Novgorod. These attacks have had no visible results to date.

Central Sector.—German assault against Moscow has been resumed during the past 6-10 days. Despite bitter Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks, the Germans have made some headway north and south of the city. At Kalinin no appreciable shift in the lines has been apparent. Southeast of Kalinin the Russians have admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have officially claimed the capture of Solnechnogorsk, indicating considerable German penetration northwest of Moscow. The Russians admit being forced back in the Moshaisk sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where the Russians report great German pressure.

South-Central Sector.—Gradual German advances along the Orel-Kursk front, which have been hinted at for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in the reports that Yefremov (on the Moscow-Yelets railroad) has been captured and that advance units, progressing toward the important center of Voronezh, have reached Tim, 40 miles east of Kursk.

[12] *Donetz Basin Sector.*—The Russians claim deep advances in a counter-attack on the "Donetz Plateau", but fail to mention the recapture of any important industrial centers. Axis reports have emphasized gradual progress along a broad front, but have been vague as to details.

Rostov apparently has been captured, although the Soviets insist street fighting is still in progress. A crossing of the lower Don River and the pursuit of retreating Red forces towards the Caucasus is reported from Berlin.

Crimean Sector.—According to reports, all of the Crimea except Sevastopol is now in German hands. The defeat of Russian forces in the central Crimea, the breaking of strong defense positions across the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of Kerch and of the western shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened up another avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.

Sevastopol is isolated and under siege, and apparently has lost its value as a base for the Red Black Sea Fleet.

Personalities.

General Kurt von Briesen was killed in action on the eastern front on November 20, 1941.

*2. Naval.**Distribution.*

Ship		Date	Location
Name	Type		
TIRPITZ.....	BB	November 9.....	Kiel
SCHARNHORST.....	BB	November 21.....	Brest
GNEISENAU.....	BB	November 21.....	Brest
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.....	OB	November 9.....	Hamburg
SCHLESSEN.....	OB	October 7.....	Central Baltic
[13] GRAF ZEPPELIN.....	CV	Prior Nov. 16.....	Departed Stettin
ADMIRAL SCHEER.....	CA	November 19.....	Swinemuende
LUETZOW.....	CA	November 9.....	Kiel
SEYDLITZ.....	CA	October 12.....	Bremen
PRINZ EUGEN.....	CA	November 21.....	Brest
ADMIRAL HIPPER.....	CA	November 5.....	Off Sassnitz
NUERNBERG.....	CL	November 5.....	One of these two ships off Sassnitz
LEIPZIG.....	CL		
KOELN.....	CL	September 29.....	Gdynia
EMDEN.....	CL	November 9.....	Kiel
4 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	Northern Norway
5-7 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	In the Baltic
1 Unit.....	DD	September 24.....	Bergen
3 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	North Sea ports
2 Units.....	DD	October 24.....	Cherbourg
Remaining Units.....	DD		Unknown
150 Units (estimated).....	SS		Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports

Operations

A smaller number than usual of German submarines were encountered during the period November 6 to November 13. Two forces were operating: one off the Portuguese coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.

British October shipping tonnage Losses were less than 75% of the September, 1941, losses.

[14] HMS ARK ROYAL was attacked and sunk by two or more German submarines just east of Gibraltar on November 13, 1941. It is not certain whether these submarines were operating out of the usual French West Coast bases, or from newly established bases in the Mediterranean.

In the light of available information, it appears practically certain that all Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports are being prepared by the Germans for use as bases for offensive operations. The naval forces at Axis disposal in this sea are still very inferior to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Axis Black Sea naval operations on any extensive scale are not to be expected until such time as the Red Black Sea Fleet either will have been destroyed or otherwise neutralized.

It is reported that Axis Black Sea forces have been reenforced by five small submarines brought down the Danube. A sixth small U-boat is to follow.

A shortage in available Axis Black Sea shipping may be indicated by the recent sinking of a 1200-ton Hungarian river motor vessel. This ship was reported to have been carrying munitions for Axis land forces and was sunk by a mine in the Black Sea.

H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE (CA) encountered and sank a converted German commerce raider on November 22 in the South Atlantic. The Axis raider, believed to have been the TAMESIS, was blown up by a magazine explosion thirteen minutes following the commencement of the engagement.

According to belated evidence, it is not fairly certain that the German 6,000-ton light cruiser KOELN was engaged in operations leading to the capture of the Baltic (Oesel) Islands six weeks or so ago.

Personalities

Lt. Reschke and Lt. Guggenberger were in command of the two German submarines credited with the sinking of the ARK ROYAL. Reschke entered the Navy in 1929 and Guggenberger in 1934. Neither officer had been previously mentioned in connection with submarine operations.

[15] Captain Bernhard Rogge was in command of the raider reported sunk by H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE. Captain Rogge entered the Navy in 1915

and was advanced to his present rank in 1940. He has been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

3. Air

Strength and Disposition

According to a recent reliable report, the disposition of the German Air Force in Russia is as follows:

	Leningrad	Moscow	South of Kharkov- Kiev	Finland & North Norway
Long range bombers.....	90	200	240	40
Bomber reconnaissance.....	30	30	45	10
Dive bombers.....	0	90	60-75	30
Single-engine fighters.....	30	180	130	30
Two-engine fighters.....	30	35	0	10
Totals.....	180	535	475-490	120
Grand Total, 1310-1325.				

A previous report from the same source estimated that, as of October 1, 1941, the Germans had almost exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian front. This reduction in air strength may be due to some, or all, of the following factors: (a) reported withdrawal of some 560 bombers and 150 single-engine fighters from the Russian front to Central Germany for refitting; (b) losses; (c) shift of air strength to the Mediterranean, which has recently been reported from several sources.

In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of the recent British offensive in Cyrenaica, German Air Force distribution was reliably reported as follows:

[16]

	Bombers	Dive Bombers	Fighters	Reconnais- sance	Coastal
Cyrenaica.....	30	70	75	5	-----
Sicily.....	10	-----	-----	-----	-----
Crete.....	-----	20	10	-----	-----
South Greece.....	60	-----	-----	20	25
Total—325.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

This represented a slight decrease in German air strength in the Mediterranean from the last previously reported figures.

Operations

West.—Reconnaissance continues to be the chief German aerial activity in this theater, operations being carried out over the British Isles and over the sea approaches. A small number of bombers were regularly in action, and activity of mine-laying planes was reported occasionally.

Russian Front.—According to German claims, the German Air Force has been very active on the Eastern Front. Leningrad and Moscow were bombed regularly during the past two weeks. The northern part of the city of Leningrad is now in ruins, the Germans report. German bombers also are said to have paid particular attention to railroad communications; namely, the yards near Moscow and the Murmansk railroad at and north of Vologda.

The Luftwaffe also claims many successes in pounding the Russians in the Crimea at Sevastopol and at Kerch.

Up to November 1, German sources claim that 83,000,000 pounds of supplies in 30,000 flights had been carried to the front by German air transport.

On November 21, the Germans claimed further that, to that date, 15,877 Russian planes had been destroyed.

[17] *Mediterranean.*—German activity in this theater has been limited largely to defensive operations. It has been reported that German air units in Libya have recently vainly requested reinforcements of troop-carrying planes.

Personalities

During the last fortnight, the German Air Force has lost its greatest technical expert and its leading ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed while testing a new secret

weapon. Lt. Col. Moelders was killed when a transport plane in which he was a passenger crashed near Breslau on November 22. Moelders was returning to the front after attending Udet's funeral.

[18] *F. The Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations*

1. *Military*

Libya

At dawn, Tuesday, November 18, the British launched their long-awaited offensive against the Italian and German forces in the Libyan Desert. The British have been preparing for this drive for many months, and a steady stream of material has been flowing to the Middle East. For the first time British forces are meeting the Germans with ample equipment and air superiority.

The main spearhead of the attack began south of Sidi Omar, fifteen miles from the coast at Sollum, and branched northward to Bir el Gobi and Sidi el Rezegh. At Bir el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Armored Division apparently was badly mauled by the British. At El Rezegh, Imperial forces captured the airfield, including planes and personnel. Further south an Imperial Motorized Force, starting from Giarabub, raced across the desert to Gialo Oasis and captured the Italian outpost of El Augila.

Since the initial thrust a tank battle, between German and British armored forces, ensued at El Rezegh where both sides lost heavily in mechanized equipment. To date the fighting is still fluid, and no decision has been reached. However, the British are now in possession of Rezegh; Gambut and Sidi Omar Nuovo (the main supply bases of the German armored forces) have been captured, and the Tobruk garrison has made a juncture with the main Imperial forces at Ed Duda.

East Africa

Gondar, the last stronghold of the Italians in Ethiopia, is expected to capitulate within the next few weeks. The beleaguered Italian forces are entrenched on a mountain top north of Lake Tana where they have been cut off from supplies for the past seven months. British forces are closing in now and are only seven miles from Gondar.

(Note: Since the preparation of this report, the fall of Gondar has been announced.

[19] *Russian Front.*

Italian ground lines of communication are being obstructed on the Russian Front and air transport is being used to supply the troops. Italian difficulties are due to mined and mired roads, lack of transportation facilities and the refusal of the Germans to repair the railroads in that sector. As a result, Italian forces in the Stalino area have been directed to exploit whatever local resources are available.

2. *Naval.*

The Italian Navy is demonstrating its inability to protect convoys to Africa. In the attack on an Italian convoy November 8 by the British, the two Italian 8-inch gun cruisers stayed beyond the range of the British 6-inch gun cruisers during the entire action. Seven of the ten ships sunk in this convoy contained German troops. Again on November 21/22 a British submarine attacked another Italian convoy escorted by three cruisers and three destroyers in the Straits of Messina. One cruiser and a destroyer were hit. On the night of November 22 the convoy was again attacked by British aircraft off Cape Spartivento in which hits were claimed on another cruiser and several merchant ships.

German submarines are basing now in the Mediterranean. Reports indicate that the principal German submarine base in the Mediterranean is located at Capri. Permits to visit Capri are almost unobtainable, even for persons of Italian nationality. A German submarine base also is being established on the West Coast of Sardinia which will accommodate seven submarines.

3. *Air.*

On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the Italian Air Force when General Rino Corso Fougier succeeded General Francisco Pricolo as Under-Secretary for Air. First reports of the ousting of General Pricolo indicated that he had failed to protect Italian cities from British air attacks because his interest lay in bomber and torpedo planes. It was believed that General Fougier, who is a specialist in pursuit aviation, would relegate bombers to second place

in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command of the Italian Air Force because of [20] the sinking of the big convoy on November 8 when many German soldiers were drowned. Mussolini was said to have acquiesced to the German demand and, rather than submit, General Pricolo resigned.

General Fougier is only a figure-head, and it is reported that he is not respected by the Air Force. He was a protege and satellite of the late General Balbo and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT NO. 10

In reply refer to No. Op-16-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington December 1, 1941.

Memorandum for the Director

1. Attached hereto is a resume of the outstanding military, naval and political moves made by Japan during the past two months. No effort is made to draw conclusions in each instance but a view of the general situation would indicate that the principal preparatory effort has been directed by the Japanese looking towards, first: an eventual control or occupation of Thailand followed almost immediately by an attack against British possessions, possibly Burma and Singapore.

A. H. McCOLLUM.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

DECEMBER 1, 1941.

Army preparations

Starting about 1 October and continuing until about the middle of November the Japanese shipped out of the port of Shanghai alone a large quantity of military supplies. Vessels carrying this equipment were seen headed South or Southwest. The equipment consisted of all sorts of military stores and equipment, a large number of landing boats being particularly noted. Other especially noteworthy items consisted of a considerable number of tanks and trucks, quite a few of which were camouflaged green; considerable railroad equipment, particularly locomotives and rolling stock. While a few troops were taken out at this time these ships principally carried equipment. Starting about 15 November the character of the shipments underwent a marked change. From 15 to 21 November large transports took out of Shanghai alone some 24,000 fully equipped veteran troops, while an additional 30,000 were reported as being withdrawn from North China reputedly destined for Formosa. From 21 to 26 November 20,000 troops were landed at Saigon and 4,000 at Haiphong which with 6,000 troops already there were sent South to Saigon and Cambodia by rail. All wharves and docks at Haiphong and Saigon are reported crowded with Japanese transports unloading supplies and men. It is estimated that the following Japanese troops are now in French Indo-China ready and equipped for action.

(a) South and Central Indo-China-----	70,000
(b) Northern Indo-China-----	25,000

The landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops and supplies are undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan Island and more distant Formosa.

Naval preparations

Starting about 1 October and continuing through November extensive naval

preparations have been made. The following are the high points of this preparation:

(a) All possible ships have been recalled to Japan for a quick docking and repair check up that has now been completed.

(b) Some additional naval aircraft strength has been sent to the Japanese Mandate Island area.

(c) An air and surface patrol was established on a line between the Marshall Islands and the Gilberts. Guam was placed under air and submarine observation.

(d) The CinC 2nd Fleet organized two task groups, both rather loosely knit organizations; group No. 1 to operate in the South China Area and group No. 2 to operate in the Mandate Islands area. This organization is about finished and the CinC of the 2nd Fleet expects to be in Southern Formosa by 3 or 4 December.

(e) The CinC of the Combined Air Force has just completed an inspection of all outlying naval air groups, particularly those in the Mandates, South China and Formosa.

(f) Many merchant vessels have recently been taken over by the Navy and at least three of these have been equipped as antiaircraft ships.

Political preparations—1 October–30 Nov.

Japanese residents particularly women and children have been evacuated from

(a) British India and Singapore

(b) Netherlands East Indies

(c) Philippines Islands

(d) Hongkong

(e) Australia

(f) Many Japanese residents have recently withdrawn from the United States, Canada and South America.

Preparations have been made to shift the center of the War Intelligence and Espionage net covering the Americas from Washington to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Japanese Embassy at Rio de Janeiro has been equipped with short wave radio transmitter.

Great stress has been laid on establishment of espionage net in Thailand and Singapore as follows:

(a) Japanese consulate at Singora is manned by 4 Army Intelligence Officers.

(b) A consulate has been established at the northern railhead of Chiangmai.

(c) Army communication personnel and equipment is present at Singora, Bangkok and Chiangmai.

(d) Four Army and Navy officers under assumed names have been sent to the Embassy at Bangkok. The Ambassador has received instructions not to interfere in the work of these men.

(e) A chain of drug stores manned by intelligence agents is in process of establishment.

(f) Japanese Army doctors under assumed names are in the hospital at Bangkok.

(g) At the end of November 60,000 Bahts were sent in gold to the Ambassador at Bangkok with instructions to hold it for emergency intelligence use.

(h) At least two sabotage agents have been sent into Singapore.


In French Indo-China the Japanese military has taken over many police functions. Many Chinese and Annamese are being summarily arrested. At the end of November Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa queried his government as to whether he and his staff should take over the governmental functions of French Indo-China or continue to function through the front of the French Government General.

The Consul General at Shanghai has informed his government that all preparations are complete for taking over all physical property in China belonging to Britain, Americans and other enemy nationals.

The Army General Staff sent urgent requests for information for U. S. and Dutch troop and plane strengths and dispositions in the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies.

Special Ambassador Kurusu sent to the United States to conduct negotiations with the United States.

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